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Abstract 
The organisation of drug development has radically changed in the last 40 years due to 
changes in the scientific knowledge base and the availability of new forms of finance. 
Stimulated by breakthroughs in biotechnology, new investment has facilitated changes 
to the strategies and structure of the industry. Furthermore, scientific advances have 
provided greater understanding of disease, drug targets and disease-drug interactions, 
particularly in oncology. Yet new ways of organising innovation bring new challenges. 
This thesis provides evidence to inform new policies and business models by assessing 
the non-technical conditions associated with the success and failure of drug development 
projects. The thesis presents an integrative theoretical framework that supports a multi-
dimensional analysis of the network, organisation and individuals involved drug projects. 
This approach is applied to case studies of 11 development projects for rare cancer 
drugs involving UK organisations. These cases are then compared and contrasted 
through a descriptive multi-case analysis and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
The findings contribute towards an understanding of the environmental conditions for the 
successful development of drugs. Firstly, the concept of project drag is introduced, to 
draw attention to the accumulation of issues during development that can cause projects 
lose momentum and lead to termination. The organisational environment around firms is 
found to be key; common disruptions are identified, particularly within small firms which 
are more vulnerable to industrial dynamics than larger organisations. This thesis also 
highlights mechanisms that can mediate adverse conditions; key individuals, their 
networks, power and consistent enthusiasm for projects can mediate project drag. The 
thesis also makes a methodological contribution in the formation and operationalisation 
of an integrative framework for project evaluation which provides a foundation for further 
research in this area. The thesis is concluded with policy recommendations of pathways 
that contribute towards the successful development of drug projects. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Aim 
This thesis considers new therapeutics as one of the most powerful avenues for 
addressing global disease burden. It follows that this work will contribute towards 
furthering an understanding of the process by which therapeutic drugs are developed. 
There has been great success in reducing mortality associated with infectious diseases, 
however, cancer remains a significant challenge for drug innovation.  
In 1900 tuberculosis, gastrointestinal infections and pneumonia/influenza collectively 
accounted for 539.3 deaths in per 100,000 people per year in the USA, cancer mortality 
stood at 64/100,000. In 2010, due to the effects of increased diagnosis and an aging 
population, cancer accounted for 185.9 per 100,000 and pneumonia and influenza stood 
at 16.2 per 100,000 (Jones et al., 2012). However, cancer patient survival (UK) has 
improved from 24% in 1970, to 50% in 2010 (Cancer Research UK, 2014)), 
demonstrating the benefits of earlier diagnosis and the availability of effective drugs.  
In investigating the development of therapeutics to aid diseases we pose the question: 
what influences the success of drug innovation in cancer? This can be addressed in a 
variety of ways, with many assuming that a lack of market incentives explains disparity 
between disease classes, while researchers involved in drug discovery and development 
may conclude that the underlying issue is a lack of drug target or disease pathology 
understanding. In order to understand these mechanisms and facilitate policy debate, 
this thesis will explore a holistic approach to appreciating the social and economic issues 
surrounding drug development. This will facilitate an in-depth analysis exploring the 
interdependencies of the conditions that differentiate success from failure. 
To achieve this, we take drug projects as the unit of analysis and investigate the non-
technical conditions contributing towards the success or failure. We define non-technical 
failures as projects terminated for reasons not associated with safety or severe efficacy 
(i.e. when no patient responses are seen in trials). The focus of this thesis is the 
development stages of drug innovation (i.e. once in clinical trials) and will not investigate 
the conditions influencing the outcome of discovery phases, although these early stages 
will be discussed in the chronological assessments of the drug case histories. To assess 
the perception that markets are the root cause of a lack of drug development, rare 
cancers are taken as the focus of this thesis. This will allow for inferences to be made in 
the increasingly important area of personalised medicine, where drugs are produced for 
stratified patient populations. 
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1.2 Why Cancer Therapeutics? Motivations for this Research 
There are three main justifications for focusing on cancer drug development: firstly, the 
debilitating nature of the disease and public health burden caused; secondly, the need 
to understand the process of developing drugs in the wake of shifts and changes to the 
scientific understanding of cancer and industrial changes that have characterised the 
past 40 years; and finally, the declining productivity of the industry and increasing costs 
of drug development, while cancer has, at the same time, become a major focus in the 
sector.  
Cancer arises from an abnormal growth of cells resulting from the accumulation of 
mutations in genes controlling cell function (Scotting, 2010). Traditionally cancer has 
been categorised in terms of its symptomatic locality i.e. breast, colon, lung etc., where 
primary cancers are associated with the position of the initial tumour, and secondary 
cancers are described upon metastasis. It is this secondary phase that is the most 
prevalent cause of mortality due to the interference with multiple organs in the body 
(Tobias and Hochhauser, 2014:1). However, more recently advances in the genetic and 
molecular understanding of the pathology of cancer facilitate diagnosis based on the 
genetic causation12.  
Cancer is treated with one, or a combination of approaches, including surgery, radiation, 
and therapeutics. Historically approaches centred on cutting out tumours (surgery), 
burning target cells to shrink tumours (radiation) and poisoning rapidly dividing cells 
affecting both tumour and normal cells (cytotoxins/chemotherapy) (Gerber, 2008, Corrie, 
2008). Scientific advances in the understanding of the cause of cancer have facilitated a 
different strategy, of specifically targeting cancer cells, with the aim of reducing the 
toxicity of chemotherapeutics3 (Corrie, 2008, DeVita and Chu, 2008, Gerber, 2008). 
                                                 
 
1 www.who.int/genomics/public/geneticdiseases/en/index3.html#Cancer  
2 Definitional issues associated with cancer have arisen from criticisms of the ‘overdiagnosis’ and 
‘overtreatment’ of cancers that result from mass screening programmes and the subsequent 
diagnosis of tumours that may not otherwise have caused harm to the patient. This is linked to 
the genetic categorisation of cancer subtypes, a pattern that has been described as ‘splitting’ (as 
opposed to ‘lumping’ based on shared genetic mutations causing diseases in other areas) 
(Hedgecoe 2004). In response to these issues Esserman and colleagues (2013) suggest that 
cancer should be redefined only to include malignant growths, or lesions found in the body ‘with 
responsible likelihood of lethal progression if left untreated’. 
3  Chemotherapeutics are commonly described as analogous to cytotoxic agents that 
characterised therapeutic options until recently.  
3 
 
These shifts in treatment strategies illustrate the different operational principles4 that 
have been used in the fight against cancer.  
The first justification for choosing cancer is the severity of the health burden it causes. 
Cancer is one of the leading causes of death worldwide with 8.2 million cancer deaths in 
2012 (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2014) with incidence set to increase from 10 
million new cases globally in 2000 to an estimated 15 million in 2020 (Duenas-Gonzalez 
et al., 2008).  
Another motivation for focusing on oncology5 is that it is the most advanced example of 
personalised (targeted) therapeutics aimed at particular patient subgroups defined by 
molecular and genetic analysis. This was clearly shown in statistics from 2012 whereby 
cancer drugs occupied the largest portion of personalised therapeutics (33%) reviewed 
by the FDA (US Food and Drug Administration, 2013). It follows that studying the 
development of cancer drugs, which can imply small patient sizes due to population 
stratification, facilitates the application of findings more widely, for instance in rare 
diseases and personalised medicine.  
The investigation, into the mechanisms associated with successful therapeutics 
development, is also justified by the industry productivity crisis that has occurred recently. 
Although not observed in orphan or cancer drugs, where numbers have increased, the 
annual development of new chemical entities (NCEs) has declined over the past three 
decades (Grabowski and Wang, 2006). In fact, the pursuit of high risk disease areas, by 
the industry, has been observed to play a significant role in the declining productivity 
over the past decade (Pammolli et al., 2011). 
The high costs of the discovery and development of drugs in general, with estimates 
standing at around $800m (but ranging between $500m to $1bn) (Adams and Brantner, 
2006, DiMasi et al., 2003), motivates a need to understand the process in greater detail. 
In particular, the production of drugs in oncology has been highlighted as being one of 
the most expensive therapeutic areas (after respiratory diseases) standing at an average 
of $1,042m (Adams and Brantner, 2006). It is likely that this increase in cost is, in part, 
associated with the increase in duration of trials, a trend observed over the past 3 
                                                 
 
4 Operational principles were described by Polanyi in 1958, as being the rules that govern the use 
of implements in technology. Discussed further in Chapter 2, section 2.2.5. 
5 The terms oncology and cancer with largely be used interchangeably, where oncology is the 
study of cancer (http://www.cancer.net/navigating-cancer-care/cancer-basics/cancer-care-
team/types-oncologists) 
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decades (Kaitin and DiMasi, 2011), which is, in turn, likely to be associated with the 
increased interest in central nervous system and anti-neoplastic6 (largely cancer) drug 
research. The productivity crisis is further discussed in Chapter 2.  
Therapeutics, as opposed to diagnostic, surgical, or other treatment innovations have 
been selected as an area of interest because it provides the thesis with a clear context 
within which complex dynamics can be assessed. Furthermore, therapeutics span the 
complex world of different sectors, i.e. private and public, representing an interplay 
between science and technology. In addition, particularly in cancer, therapeutics are a 
popular treatment pathway, particularly for treating inaccessible tumours, which are not 
easily removed through surgery, and those that have metastasised, and are therefore 
distributed and most dangerous.  
Drug policies, such as orphan drug designation, fast track and accelerated approval, and 
compassionate use programmes (discussed in Chapter 2), also make therapeutics an 
interesting avenue for research because they are impacted by incentives that have been 
implemented in an attempt to encourage innovation. By implementing an in-depth 
analysis of drug discovery and development this thesis will contribute towards additional 
policies to address the fundamental issues associated with drug innovation, in cancer, 
rare diseases, and personalised medicine. 
This thesis emphasises the determinants of success (and failure) as defined by a drug 
achieving (or not) regulatory approval. This is, perhaps, controversial due to 
contemporary debate that it is not the rate of innovation7 that should be encouraged, but 
the diversity, direction and distribution of innovation that is important (Stirling, 2009). 
However, this thesis feeds into a context of unmet clinical need, severe disease burden 
and mortality in patients afflicted by diseases that have no, or little, treatment options.  
The development of cancer therapeutics is an example of medical innovation, which is 
characterised as an atypical representation of innovation dynamics. Here, the science-
based nature of the industry is being increasingly emphasised wherein innovation is 
                                                 
 
6 A neoplasm is defined as ‘an abnormal mass of tissue that results when cells divide more than 
they should or do not die when they should” (www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-
terms?cdrid=46264). This definition includes both benign and malignant growths, but when used 
in the context of drug research, due to the lack of drug research expected in benign growths, can 
be taken to be akin to oncology therapeutics research.  
7 This debate resonates with the idea that not all innovation contributes towards societal benefits. 
This is particularly salient in discussions of regulation in drug innovation, whereby questions over 
the innovative value of new products are often raised.  
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reliant on scientific advances and understanding (Pavitt, 1984). As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the changing nature of the science on which drug innovation is based is 
necessitating an adjustment to the industry, and system, responsible for technological 
change in this area.   Cancer is at the forefront of this change, whereby targeted 
therapeutics present the most progressive example of personalised medicine. We 
therefore seek to inform and infer to emerging modalities of drug innovation and address 
issues associated with the productivity crisis.  
1.3 Chapter Outline 
This thesis begins with an outline of the empirical context of the research. Here, Chapter 
2 highlights the context of drug development in cancer therapeutics from an historical 
perspective. This Chapter emphasises the dynamics of drug development, particularly in 
cancer therapeutics, and the shift towards a process based on scientific understanding 
of disease. In response to this shift the industrial environment surrounding the 
development of therapeutics has adapted.  
A systematic review of the biomedical innovation literature is presented in Chapter 3. 
This Chapter discusses the key influences defining the progression, and success, of 
innovation. In doing so we discuss the actors involved in drug innovation, their 
characteristics, and the nature of influence they have. Much of the literature is limited to 
discussions of one or two dimensions of actors, i.e. individuals, organisations and 
networks, necessitating the use of a framework in this thesis to address these different 
levels.  
Two key gaps are identified in the literature, firstly the lack of studies taking a 
multidimensional approach, and secondly the need for a better understanding of 
influences on innovation at the project level. This Chapter also identifies conditions 
influencing innovation, on the multiple dimensions highlighted. From this a framework is 
constructed in which four conditions, namely knowledge base and accumulation, market 
demand, stakeholder perspectives and organisational environment, will be discussed.  
The methodological approach and research design will be presented in Chapter 4 
providing justification for the implementation of a multiple case study approach. This 
draws on Eisenhardt’s (1989) theory building process, integrating Ragin’s Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) method (Ragin, 1987, Ragin, 1989, Ragin, 2000).  
Chapter 5 provides a pair of model cases of well-documented path-breaking drugs (one 
small molecule and one biologic) to demonstrate the framework to be applied in Chapters 
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6 and 7. Each case history is presented using a consistent framework set out in Chapter 
3.  
The projects for analysis were identified using case selection criteria as follows: the 
project had to have had i) involvement from a UK organisation during development; ii) 
either succeeded (i.e. file for approval) or failed (i.e. be discontinued post-phase II); iii) 
between the years 1999-2010; iv) have a primary indication (as per the Pharmaprojects 
database) defined as a ‘rare’ cancer (both in US and UK), and v) be of a relevant therapy 
type (discussed more in section 4.4.2.2).  
Projects originating in large pharmaceutical firms (pharma) are presented in Chapter 6 
and projects from smaller biotech8 and academia are presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 
outlines the QCA procedure and interpretation of this. Finally, Chapter 9 will provide the 
discussion and contributions of the thesis.  
1.4 Contributions 
This thesis reveals a series of features of drug development. Firstly, that organisational 
environment is a key contributor to both success and failure. Secondly, that issues 
accumulate in a process of project drag. Finally, that key individuals can act to overcome 
the accumulation of these issues. 
The first major contribution of this thesis is the particular significance of the organisational 
environment surrounding the project, both for successful and unsuccessful drugs. Here, 
a supportive organisational environment is a necessary condition for the successful 
development of a project, and a sufficient condition in combination with other conditions. 
Here, while all successful projects need a supportive organisational environment, some, 
despite having this support, still fail. Furthermore, a lack of supportive organisational 
environment also plays a key role in contributing towards failure via project termination.  
This thesis will argue that project success and failure can also be differentiated 
depending on the size of the developing firm. In general, projects undergo a process of 
project drag throughout development, whereby issues (‘downers’) lead to a loss of 
momentum. In successful projects mechanisms are implemented to overcome these 
                                                 
 
8  ‘Biotechnology’ firms, or biotech, has become a generic term used to describe any small 
therapeutics firm working in therapeutics that was founded post-1980, rather than those that are 
specifically involved in the development of drugs using biological methods. 
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(‘uppers’). In failed projects, however, downers accumulate to cause eventual project 
termination.  
In large firms projects are insulated to some extent, from ‘downers’ e.g. from the action 
of external industrial dynamics. However, in small firms, vulnerabilities to environmental 
issues such as a lack of funding mean that the project has external pressures placed on 
it. In addition, we observe that, in small firms, there is the additional creation of protected 
spaces. Protected spaces occur when projects developed with involvement from small 
firms are shielded from the influence of project drag due to the shared expectations 
surrounding drug development. This acts to either suspend evaluation or lower 
thresholds for decisions-making. Due to external dynamics often necessitating M&A or 
licensing agreements, protected spaces breakdown and re-evaluation of the project is 
undertaken. Where issues were previously seen as conquerable, re-evaluations can lead 
to the uncovering of project drag and the subsequent termination of drug development.  
In addition, this thesis finds that key individuals with effective abilities in promoting a 
project, utilising their networks and enthusiasm, positively influence project outcomes. 
Here, the action of such individuals can contribute towards overcoming issues causing 
project drag.  
Methodologically, this thesis makes a contribution in the development and 
operationalisation of a framework to study facilitate a multi-dimensional (organisational, 
individual and network) perspective on the progression of drugs, from discovery to 
approval or discontinuation. Furthermore, we develop and implement a theory building 
protocol incorporating a systematic multiple case study comparative analysis.  
The literature review undertaken in Chapter 3 highlights the previous biomedical 
innovation literature and the consistent focus on the organisation as the unit of analysis. 
By focusing on innovation as mediated by the organisation, this approach 
overemphasises the potential for inferring innovation trends from organisational 
dynamics. In contrast, this thesis takes the project as the unit of analysis and thereby 
assesses the innovation at the core, with consideration of the actors, individuals, 
organisation, and networks, influencing innovation. This is particularly important due to 
the multiplicity of the organisations involved in innovation, particularly, as will be 
demonstrated, in the development of drugs.  
Much of the literature focuses on either large firms or small firms, and their innovative 
characteristics and tend to highlight the factors associated with success rather than 
failure. This thesis fills these gaps comparing innovative practices in large firms with 
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those of smaller firms, and seeks to learn from the differences between the factors 
leading to success and those that impact failure, assuming the two outcome have 
different causal pathways.  
1.5 Research Questions 
This research is primarily concerned with the nature of the drug innovation process (both 
in discovery and development stages), and the relationship between factors that 
influence innovation and the outcome of that innovative process. To address this aim of 
the thesis three research questions were posed: 
1) Why do some drug projects succeed in development, while others fail? 
The first research question is purposefully broad, setting out the main directive of the 
research, to investigate the ‘why’ behind drug innovation. It also defines the unit of 
analysis, applying the definition of innovation in a particular way, centring on the output 
rather than the techniques or knowledge systems. Due to the breadth of this research 
question further development, in additional research questions, is required.  
2) What environmental (socio-economic) conditions, identified from the innovation 
literature, influence go/no-go decisions in drug development?  
The second research question refers to the construction of the framework, from the 
biomedical innovation literature, which will be used to focus the collection of data and 
the analysis of that data for the purposes of this thesis.  
3) How do the environmental (socio-economic) conditions, identified from the 
framework, contribute towards the development of rare cancer drug projects? Do 
these conditions show interactions and/or cumulative causality (project drag)? 
The final research question addresses the main substance of this thesis. It builds on the 
previous objective, of finding a suitable framework for studying therapeutic drug 
innovation, delving further into the kinds of findings the research will ascertain. The focus 
of this is to understand how conditions contribute towards decision making in drug 
discovery and development, i.e. how environmental factors affect the actions of the firm, 
and the knock-on effect this has on specific projects. This question also considers the 
possibility of factors being interactive and/or potentially cumulatively causal, i.e. 
contributing towards increasing problematic scenarios which eventually lead to 
termination.  
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2 Context of Cancer Therapeutics and Drug Development 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on the history of drug development with a particular emphasis on 
cancer research providing the necessary background to understand the case histories 
that follow (Chapters 7 and 8). There are four key themes that comprise this Chapter. 
The first is the demonstration of the evolution of an increasing interest in cancer research 
over the period discussed. Secondly, during the same period we witness a shift in the 
approach to drug discovery and development, in the technological modalities used. This 
has led to a strategic and structural shift in the industry, mainly involving the introduction 
of biotech firms as a new business model and the shift towards nichebusters and orphan 
drugs. Finally, these changes have also been witnessed in the regulatory environment 
surrounding drug development, which has encouraged and incentivised the rise of drugs 
to fill unmet need in rare diseases. 
As demonstrated in this Chapter, there is recognition that the system surrounding 
biomedical innovation has witnessed a shift over the past 40 years. These shifts are 
characterised by changing operational principles which, in cancer treatment, has led to 
a shift from blockbusters to targeted therapeutics. Operational principles are the rules 
governing the use of artefacts in technology (Polanyi, 1958) arising in response to 
changes in science leading to new problems (e.g. different knowledge of disease). In 
innovation operational principles are generated and selected between to solve 
identifiable problems (Yaqub, 2008).  
In early cancer therapy surgery was the dominant operational principle, where cutting 
out the tumour was the main treatment option. This was followed by strategies to burn, 
in the form of radiotherapy, and poison tumours cells, using cytotoxins. Contemporary 
approaches, enabled through the increase in scientific understanding of cancer disease 
pathology and drug targets, centre on targeted therapeutic strategies. These operational 
principles represent a general shift in drug discovery and development, from broad brush, 
to targeted (personalised medicine), strategies relying on a range of scientific knowledge. 
In addition, shifts, from ‘blockbusters’9 to ‘nichebusters10’ (Dolgin, 2010, Kumar Kakkar 
and Dahiya, 2014), from general to personalised medicine (Ginsburg and McCarthy, 
                                                 
 
9 The term ‘blockbusters’ has been adopted as a description of drugs that reach over US$1bn in 
revenues (Booth and Zemmel, 2004) 
10 Nichebuster is used to describe the rise in interest in drugs aimed at small patient populations. 
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2001), and from cytotoxic to targeted oncology therapies (Duenas-Gonzalez et al., 
2008) 11  have been conceptualised as paradigm shifts, drawing on the literature on 
scientific and technological paradigms by Kuhn (1962) and Dosi (1982). 
Dosi’s (1982) premise, building on Kuhn’s (1962) scientific paradigms, was that while 
‘technological paradigms’ 12  maintained stability, ‘technological trajectories’ (i.e. the 
direction these problem solving activities took) are subject to selection pressures 13 
differentiating the options available. Despite Dosi’s (1982) focus on a technology from a 
societal perspective we will utilise the same concept on a project level accounting for the 
actors and selection pressures surrounding that project and exploring the relevant 
operational principles.  
In observing the action of paradigm shifts it is necessary to appreciate the path 
dependency of the system surrounding innovation, and its role in constraining change, 
resulting in stability. For instance, the new wave of approaches based on biotechnology 
is the result of a shift in science, constrained by what has gone before, which limits its 
‘revolutionary’ potential (Nightingale and Martin, 2004, Hopkins et al., 2007). In this, 
despite the introduction of biotechnology leading to the use of new tools and approaches, 
there are complementarities with older processes, rather than displacement (Pisano, 
2006). This has led to increasing complexity in drug development, both in the 
technologies used, the changes to the organisational structure of the industry and the 
relationships between the relevant stakeholders (Pisano, 2006).  
This increasing complexity, in the increasing reliance on scientific and multidisciplinary 
knowledge and the changes in system surrounding drug development necessitates an 
in-depth investigation into the processes at work. This thesis aims to do this by firstly 
exploring the historical context of the scientific, technological and systemic shifts, and 
secondly, in Chapter 3, delving more deeply into the effects these shifts have had on the 
innovation process.  
In order to trace the evolving history of the shifts in drug discovery and development this 
Chapter is subdivided into two main sections: the first explores the historical context of 
                                                 
 
 
 
12 Dosi (1982) defined ‘technological paradigms’ as collections of procedures designed to deal 
with particular problems.  
13 Dosi (1982) observes that selection pressures may be non-economic, technological, social, 
institution, or economic.  
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drug development prior to 197014, the second highlights the post-1970 developments, 
distinguished due to the differences in technologies and trends present pre- and post-
1970 (Pisano, 2006:22-38).  
The first, pre-1970, section illustrates how an increasing focus on drug discovery and 
development, by policy-makers, scientists, industry and the public, led to post- war 
(1940-1960s) successes in the production of cancer therapeutics. In particular we see 
the formation of institutions for medical research, developments in industry, regulation, 
and funding, both in the UK, Europe and USA, to be significant in paving the way for 
cancer research. 
The post-1970s period, signifying the biotech era and in the wake of Nixon’s War on 
Cancer, has witnessed the coevolution of a shift in scientific understanding of disease 
pathology, new technologies, regulation, and industry structures and strategies. As 
demonstrated, this has paved the way, in cancer research, for a change in paradigm, 
from poisons (cytotoxins) to targeted (molecular) therapeutics, producing a new age of 
innovative drugs. 
2.2 Setting the Scene: Pre-1970s Drug Development 
2.2.1 Scientific Research and Healthcare Systems  
Cancer research was not at the forefront of medical research in the early 1900s. At this 
time life expectancy was low and medical interest centred on the major threat of 
infectious diseases (Porter, 2002). At this time cancer treatment was largely limited to 
surgical procedures (Mukherjee, 2011), however, throughout the 20th Century the 
development of the healthcare system and the formation of institutions to support 
medicine facilitated the development of cancer research and new therapeutics. 
Furthermore, the political, social and economic unrest in the first half of the 20th century 
contributed towards a promotion of the role of medicine in European and North American 
science policy. This was characterised by a shift from a ‘mission-oriented’ model to a 
reliance on the progression of basic research for technological development (as 
published in Vannevar Bush’s Science the Endless Frontier) (Mukherjee, 2011).  
                                                 
 
14 These time periods represent a shift in the way science interacts with the development of drugs, 
largely in the shift from random screening to discovery processes based on molecular biology, 
and the associated shifts in industry this motivated 
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2.2.1.1 USA Health Legislation and Institutions 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the USA was established in 1930 (Austoker, 
1988:165). Additional State support for medical research came in 1944 as part of the 
Public Health Service Act, which prompted the NIH grants programme (increasing 
funding from around $4m in 1947 to $100m in 1957). Furthermore, the 1944 Public 
Health Service Act also led to the authorisation of the NIH to conduct trials, thereby 
facilitating publicly funded clinical research programmes (ibid). 
The 1940s also saw the establishment of several key institutes in the US, facilitating 
research in mental health, dental diseases, and heart disease (Harden, 2015). In addition, 
the increasing interest in cancer, its causal factors and the development of technologies 
motivated the signing of the 1937 National Cancer Institute Act leading to the creation of 
the NCI, which was ‘designed to coordinate cancer research and education’ (Austoker, 
1988:166, Mukherjee, 2011). The NCI was a key institution for oncology, promoting it as 
a scientific endeavour by securing public resources for research (Austoker, 1988). 
2.2.1.2 UK Legislation and Institutions 
In the UK advances in legislation and in the development of a coordinated National 
Health Service facilitated a platform for drug research and clinical investigation. 
Institutional changes to the medical system began with the 1911 National Insurance Act, 
creating a national fund for medical research. In addition, 1913 saw the establishment of 
the Medical Research Council (MRC) and the Ministry of Health was created in 1919 
(coinciding with a budgetary increase in funds for the MRC) (Valier and Timmermann, 
2008). The National Health Service, founded in 1948 (Quirke and Gaudillière, 2008, 
Valier and Timmermann, 2008), built on these medicine-, and health-related initiatives, 
laying the foundation for a cohesive health system which facilitated patient access to 
treatments and clinical research. 
Charitable organisations focusing on cancer research also appeared early on in the 20th 
century, with the Imperial Cancer Research Fund established in 1902, and the British 
Empire Cancer Campaign (later Cancer Research Campaign) following 21 years later. 
However, in the 1930s concerns were raised over the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
cancer research efforts. This further exemplified in a Daily Herald article in 1932 which 
stated: ‘a large part of the £100,000 being spent in this country on cancer research is 
wasted because of the jealousies and conflicting ideas and theories held by doctors and 
scientists’ (Austoker, 1988: 151).  
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In 1939 the UK emulated the US (the 1937 National Cancer Institute Act), introducing the 
British Cancer Act in 1939, which emphasised the provision of cancer services over 
research (Austoker, 1988:170). Support for research in the Cancer Act was reportedly 
purposefully neglected due to a lack of interest from the medical profession and the 
responsibility for cancer research falling to voluntary cancer organisations (ibid). This 
resulted in difficulties in the UK cancer research environment which was not was not 
comparable to the USA federal cancer programme. 
This lack of enthusiasm from the medical profession for cancer research reflects a 
‘discord’ whereby ‘perceptions and aspirations of scientists diverged from those of 
clinicians’ (Austoker, 1988:29-31). In response, the post-war secretary of the MRC, 
Walter Morley Fletcher, publically stated the need to link pathology with other scientific 
disciplines such as biochemistry, physiology, cytology, virology and immunology, further 
supporting this with the provision of funding (Austoker, 1988:87).  
2.2.2 Cancer Research and Animal Models 
In cancer research Bush’s premise, that basic science was a key driver for technology, 
manifested in the investigation into the causal factors involved in human tumours 
(Austoker, 1988:91-138). This work, and that of the production and testing of therapeutics, 
was facilitated by the development of animal tumour models. Building on the work of 
Ehrlich, who identified animal models as a necessary preliminary testing regime for new 
drugs, the first transplantable rodent tumour system was developed in the 1910s allowing 
for the screening of large numbers of chemical compounds (DeVita and Chu, 2008, 
Mukherjee, 2011). 
Transplantable models continued to be central to the development of cancer therapeutics 
until around 30 years ago (Caponigro and Sellers, 2011). The differentiation between 
animal models and human disease variants is a key consideration in the implementation 
of this testing regime (Yaqub, 2008, Stroh et al., 2014). Therefore the technological 
advances in the ability to transplant human tumours to test drugs is a key development 
in cancer research.  
In addition leukaemia and lymphoma screens provide another key research tool. By 1949 
this technology had developed sufficiently for the NCI to adopt, as a primary screen for 
cancer therapeutics, a versatile screening system in the form of a murine leukaemia 
induced by a carcinogen, Leukaemia L210 (DeVita and Chu, 2008, Caponigro and 
Sellers, 2011). Leukaemias and lymphomas were important in the development of 
cancer therapeutics, as they provided a key early stage preclinical model. Their suitability 
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comes from their sensitivity to a variety of agents (Keating, 1997), stemming from a high 
proportion of dividing cells, in contrast to the solid tumour equivalent (Pratt and Ruddon, 
1979). This is likely to be the reason for the trend towards the development of 
therapeutics in haematological malignancies more readily than in solid tumours15.  
2.2.3 Public Perception of Cancer Research  
Despite the advances made in oncology from the 1930s to the 1950s there remained a 
high level of scepticism surrounding the clinical utility of chemotherapy in treating cancer 
(DeVita and Chu, 2008). The early 20th Century saw cancer research develop a 
reputation akin to quack medicine due to frequent fraudulent claims. It was not until the 
1930s that ‘respected scientists entered this far from reputable field’ (Austoker, 1988:179).  
This included Sidney Farber, a pathologist working in a Boston Children’s Hospital in the 
1930s, who was credited with discovering the first antifolate. Farber worked with Mary 
Lasker, a former American socialite and later founder of the Lasker Foundation with a 
particular interest in cancer, to overcome the negative perception of cancer research 
(Mukherjee, 2011).  
Lasker’s ambition was to make cancer a public issue and realised that to do this she 
required the expertise of a scientist (ibid). Farber and Lasker met in 1948, introduced by 
John Heller, Director of the NCI at the time. Together they developed a mission to bring 
cancer to the forefront of US politics and gain a level of commitment comparable to that 
of the Manhattan Project, a strategy that was novel for science policy in biomedical 
research in the 1950s (Mukherjee, 2011).  
In the 1960s medical oncology did not exist as a clinical speciality and those that were 
involved in chemotherapy treatments were regarded as ‘under-achievers’ and ‘talking of 
curing cancer with drugs was not considered compatible with sanity’ (DeVita and Chu, 
2008). This perception was in response to the pessimism caused by the failure of early 
cytotoxins (e.g. alkylating agents and antifolates) to produce lasting remissions in 
patients in the 1950s (ibid). Furthermore, at this time drugs for cancer were considered 
to be poisons, where treatment involved a balance between administering enough to 
eradicate tumour cells without killing the patient (DeVita and Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 
2011).  
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from the ease of assessing the drugs activity through the action of biomarkers in the blood, 
something that is more challenging in the case of solid tumours.  
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Farber used his experiments and successes with antifolates16 as evidence to support the 
idea that cancer could be treated with chemotherapeutic agents without understanding 
their mechanism of action (ibid). Farber and Lasker also homogenised cancer into a 
single therapeutic area, thereby conceptualising it as a widespread and worldwide 
problem demanding a specific science policy response (Mukherjee, 2011).  
Pressure from Lasker and Farber led to the US government providing $1m in 1954 for 
the specific purpose of developing drugs to treat cancer. However, in the wake of slow 
progress Lasker lobbied for further support and funding was increased to $5m, coinciding 
with the development of the Cancer Chemotherapy National Service Center in 1955 
(DeVita and Chu, 2008). In 1966 the Cancer Chemotherapy National Service Centre 
became part of the NCI, renamed the Developmental Therapeutics Program (DTP), and 
by 1974 had an annual budget of $68m.  
By 1974 the DTP was a major producer of the transplantable tumours derived from mice 
models and had a programme of screening that could analyse over 40,000 compounds 
per year, at which point the pharmaceutical industry filled the gap in clinical research in 
cancer therapeutics by recognising the emerging market for drugs in this area (DeVita 
and Chu, 2008).  
2.2.4 Early Industrial Production of Drugs  
Industrial production of drugs began in the late 19th Century with the establishment of a 
number of chemical companies in the USA and Europe (Porter, 1999:449). This 
stemmed from a key conceptual shift, namely Paul Ehrlich’s 1872 suggestion of the 
potential for ‘magic bullets’. The hypothesis proposed was that the body was made up of 
receptors which could be interfered with using chemical agents to treat disease (Pisano, 
2006:22, DeVita and Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 2011, National Cancer Institute, 2014). 
Despite this ground breaking hypothesis the lack of analytical tools to aid drug discovery 
and development, based on an understanding of human diseases, presented a barrier 
to the development of such compounds (Pisano, 2006:22).  
However, the development of technologies to administer drug compounds, and the 
discovery of active ingredients by searching for, and isolating, natural substances, did 
motivate the production of therapeutics (Porter, 2002, Porter, 1999). This led to drug 
discovery and development efforts based on random screening of natural and 
                                                 
 
16 Antifolates were one of the first chemotherapeutic cytotoxins discovered to treat cancer. This 
will be discussed further in section 2.2.7. 
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synthesised compounds for therapeutic effectiveness, and the period 1950s to 1960s 
being described as the ‘golden age’ of productivity (Martin et al., 2009). As a result large 
firms developed chemical libraries of screened compounds, leading to substantial 
barriers to entry for new firms due to the time and investment required to compete 
(Pisano, 2006:84).  
In addition, economies of scale in experimentation were reached in large firms 
(Nightingale, 2000). Due to the reliance on random, ‘trial and error’ drug discovery, 
economies of scale, in the ability to produce more molecules for experimental use, gave 
a higher probability of finding a drug that would be sufficiently safe and efficacious to be 
marketed and profitable (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002).  
It was the volume of experimentation associated with this approach, that promoted the 
development of larger firms, relying on substantial chemical library and laboratory 
facilities (della Valle and Gambardella, 1993). However, while economies of scale were 
realised in large firms, economies of scope in drug discovery and development, which 
relied on the accumulation of disease- and pathway-specific knowledge, were harder to 
establish (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002). 
2.2.5 Development of Regulatory Policy 
Regulation is key to drug development as approval by a regulatory body is required for 
all prescription drugs used to treat patients. The major regulatory agencies relevant to 
this thesis are the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) in the USA and the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) in Europe. The historical development of these institutions has 
facilitated drug development, due to the risk mitigation enabled through the formalisation 
of regulation.  
For instance, the initial development of the FDA came in response to the Elixir 
Sulfanilamide tragedy where 107 people died from being administered an antibacterial 
which caused kidney failure in patients. The resultant Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1938) 
established the requirement of a New Drug Application (NDA) to indicate a drug’s 
composition, safety test results and manufacturing processes. However, at this time, the 
regulatory process did not ensure patient safety because applications were automatically 
approved if the NDA was not reviewed within 60 days of submission17. This requirement 
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was aimed at improving competition and encouraging the industrial production of 
pharmaceutical drugs.  
There was little change to this approach by the FDA, until the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments, which, in response to the thalidomide tragedy18, required for safety and 
efficacy tests to be undertaken. This led to the increased time and costs associated with 
waiting times for approval and a subsequent decline in productivity in the industry during 
the 1960s19.  
2.2.6 Cancer Therapeutics (1900-1971) 
The flurry of research during the early half of the 20th century led to a flood of new 
medicinal products by the 1960s. As Porter writes: 
‘If before 1900 the contents of the pharmacopoeia were useful largely, if at all, as 
placebos, by the 1960s a cornucopia of truly effective drugs had emerged out of the 
twentieth century laboratory: antibiotics, anti-hypertensives (beta-blockers) to 
prevent strokes, anti-coagulants, anti-arrhythmics, anti-histamines, anti-depressants 
and anti-convulsants, steroids, such as cortisone against arthritis, bronchodilators, 
ulcer cures, endocrine regulators, cytotoxic drugs against cancers, and other 
besides.’(Porter, 2002:107) 
In particular, developments in the environment surrounding cancer therapeutic 
development i.e. research, institutions, industry and policy, led to some successes from 
the 1940s to the 1970s. Cytotoxin cancer drugs produced at this time were based on the 
idea that the characteristics of rapidly dividing cells could be interfered with using poisons. 
The lack of specificity of these drugs, and the resultant effect they had on normal cells 
led to high levels of toxicity and unwanted side effects. 
At this time drug discovery and development approaches were largely serendipitous, 
however, at least nine key technological approaches and families of compounds were 
developed: 1) alkylating agents, 2) antifolates, 3) antipurines, 4) antipyrimidines, 5) 
platinum-based compounds, 6) hormone-based therapies, 7) antibiotic, 8) vinca alkaloids, 
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babies PORTER, R. 2002. Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medicine, London, UK, Penguin 
Books Ltd.. 
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and 9) prodrugs. These particular examples have been chosen for their continuing 
significance in cancer treatment in modern medicine, and for their relevance to further 
discussions in this thesis.  
2.2.6.1 Alkylating agents 
War has surprising spillovers in the development of certain technology areas, including 
in the treatment of cancer. In World War I soldiers affected by the chemical weapon, 
nitrogen mustard gas, were found to have skin oedemas, ulceration, blindness and 
respiration problems (Joensuu, 2008). However, in 1919 further investigations found 
survivors had anomalies in bone marrow, indicating interaction between the compound 
and lymphoid tissue (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, Mukherjee, 2011). It was not until the 
1940s that these observations became significant. 
In World War II, two events converged in the research of nitrogen mustard, later 
contributing to the conclusion that the compound could be used in treating cancer. Firstly 
in 1942, in the wake of research carried out in a related compound, sulphur mustard, 
nitrogen mustard was tested for activity as an antitumour (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). 
Secondly, in 1943 a ship containing large amounts of nitrogen mustard was blown up at 
Bari Harbour in Italy (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). Survivors were found to have unusual 
burns, the cause of which went undiagnosed due to wartime secrecy, leading to the 
deaths of 13% of those exposed (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). However, later research 
concerning the Bari incident showed that the gas had the effect of depleting white blood 
cells in bone marrow and blood plasma (DeVita and Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 2011). This 
was discovered in 1943, however results were not published until 1946 (DeVita and Chu, 
2008, Mukherjee, 2011).  
The discovery that nitrogen mustard acted in depleting white blood cells indicated 
potential for it to be used as an anti-leukaemia, and anti-lymphoma agent. Research into 
nitrogen mustard at this time resulted from a transatlantic collaboration between the ICR 
and Yale University (The Institute of Cancer Research, 2014). This paved the way for the 
family of compounds referred to as alkylating agents, such as chlorambucil, busulphan, 
and cyclophosphamide, which remain common in cancer treatment today (DeVita and 
Chu, 2008, National Cancer Institute, 2014, The Institute of Cancer Research, 2014, Pratt 
and Ruddon, 1979).  
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2.2.6.2 Antifolates 
Antifolates, antipurines and antipyrimidines all make up the antimetabolite class of 
compounds. These act to interfere with DNA production in cells by imitating the 
metabolites necessary for cell division (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979).   
Farber’s20 discover of the anti-folates was motivated by his unwillingness to accept the 
poor prognosis commonly fated to young patients with leukaemia at this time (Miller, 
2006). Inspired by an account of the application of folic acid to stem sarcoma growth in 
mice, Farber had the idea of treating leukaemia with folic acid (first synthesised in 1937) 
(Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, DeVita and Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 2011).  
By working closely with the biochemist Dr Yellapragada SubbaRow, at Lederle 
Laboratories (then part of American Cyanamid) who was producing isolated forms of folic 
acid and could therefore produce sufficient quantities of the compound (Pratt and Ruddon, 
1979, Mukherjee, 2011, Miller, 2006), Farber tested his theory by running a trial treating 
children suffering from leukaemia with folic acid (Mukherjee, 2011). This had disastrous 
results; folic acid was found to accelerate leukaemia. However, by discovering that folic 
acid was key to leukaemia cell growth Farber predicted that an antagonist of folic acid, a 
compound that SubbaRow later synthesised, could show promise for the treatment of 
acute leukaemia (Farber et al., 1948, Miller, 2006, Pratt and Ruddon, 1979).  
Despite this breakthrough, when the first anti-metabolite21 of folic acid, aminopterin, was 
developed and tested in the late 1940s/early 1950s results were found to be short-lived. 
Subsequent to promising in vitro and in vivo preclinical work, aminopterin was found to 
produce an effect in children with acute leukaemia, with a report in 1948 indicating that 
10 out of 16 patients treated showed ‘unquestionable’ but temporary remissions (Farber 
et al., 1948, DeVita and Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 2011). These results were met with 
scepticism, disbelief and outrage from the scientific community due to the rarity of any 
type of remission (temporary or otherwise) in patients with leukaemia (Miller, 2006).  
In response to the high toxicities in this and other trials, a less toxic, more efficacious 
derivative of aminopterin was developed, called amethopterin, which replaced 
                                                 
 
20 This is, incidentally the same Sidney Farber who collaborated with Mary Lasker to promote 
cancer research as a policy priority (section 2.2.5) 
21 An anti-metabolite is a molecule that inhibits normal metabolism. In this case the anti-folate 
inhibits the normal metabolism, and therefore function of folic acid. 
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aminopterin in clinical practice (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). This compound is still 
commonly used today to treat several tumour types as well as autoimmune diseases. 
2.2.6.3 Purines 
In 1944 in an industrial laboratory owned by Burroughs Wellcome, George Hitchings 
began working with Gertrude Elion on synthesising substances to inhibit the breakdown 
of purines (components involved in the synthesis of DNA) (Garfield, 1989, DeVita and 
Chu, 2008). Advances in sulphonamides, which prevented the growth of bacteria, 
inhibiting the formation of folic acid required for the synthesis of precursors of DNA and 
RNA22, stimulated Hitchings and Elion to pursue an interest in the interference of nucleic 
acid (the building blocks of DNA) production23.  
Hitchings formulated a hypothesis similar to that used by Faber, i.e. that cell growth could 
be interfered with by applying compounds that were slightly different to those that 
naturally occurred24 (Garfield, 1989). Hitchings and Elion also proposed that cancer cells 
divided at a faster rate than healthy cells, thereby paving the way for antimitotics (i.e. 
compounds that interrupted DNA replication) (Strebhardt and Ullrich, 2008).  
Through this initial interest in developing an understanding of the metabolism of DNA, 
Hitchings and Elion’s research took the form of a programme for chemical synthesis and 
the development of a biological reference system, in parallel (Hitchings and Elion, 1954). 
These streams of research led to the development of a series of experimental purine 
analogues that could then be tested in animal leukaemic models (Pratt and Ruddon, 
1979).  
By 1951 Hitchings and Elion had adapted these experimental drugs and produced two 
clinical candidates, 6-thioquanine and 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP), found to be active in 
human leukaemia (DeVita and Chu, 2008, Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, Garfield, 1989). 
Despite the work of Hitchings since being observed as being conceived as a “fishing 
expedition” in the eyes of fellow academics (Mukherjee, 2011), the aim was in fact to 
make drug discovery more rational25 and less ‘hit and miss’ (Koenig, 2006).  
                                                 
 
22 http://www.drugs.com/drug-class/sulfonamides.html 
23 http://www.chemheritage.org/discover/online-resources/chemistry-in-
history/themes/pharmaceuticals/restoring-and-regulating-the-bodys-biochemistry/hitchings--
elion.aspx 
24 This approach, i.e. the use of analogues, involved the administration of a molecule with a slight 
chemical different to a substrate which naturally occurs. In doing do, the analogue binds to the 
cell receptors and therefore inhibits the action of the target pathway.  
25 The rational drug design approach will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections 
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2.2.6.4 Antipyrimidines 
5-FU, the first anti-pyrimidine to be discovered, was the first drug developed aimed at 
non-haematological malignancies (DeVita and Chu, 2008). In a similar analogue-led 
research pathway, to that of the antifolates and the purines, anti-pyrimidines were 
developed to inhibit the action of uracil, another key compound in DNA synthesis (Pratt 
and Ruddon, 1979). This hypothesis came after it was observed by Heidelberger and 
colleagues that rat tumour cells used radiolabelled uracil more readily than normal cells 
(Grem, 2000, DeVita and Chu, 2008). This provided a distinction between tumour cells 
and normal cells, so in 1957, an analogue, 5-fluorouacil was synthesised to target this 
pathway (Grem, 2000). Since this time, developments have been made in understanding 
anti-pyrimidine mechanisms of action, for instance, it is now known that 5-FU inhibits 
thymidylate synthase which in turn inhibits DNA synthesis and interferes with DNA repair 
(Grem, 2000).  
2.2.6.5 Platinum-based compounds 
The 1960s saw the development of platinum-related anti-mitotic compounds for cancer 
treatment (Scriabine, 1999a, Kelland, 2007). The discovery of the anti-tumour potential 
of platinum-based molecules arose out of biophysics experiments attempting to 
investigate the influence of electromagnetic radiation on cell division (Kelland, 2007). 
When platinum electrodes were used in experiments of E .coli, Barnett Rosenberg, at the 
Michigan State University, discovered that upon activation of the field, electrolysis 
products from the platinum electrodes caused the bacteria cells to misshapen (Kelland, 
2007).  
These products were subsequently tested in mice carrying transplanted tumour models, 
and found to cause tumour regression. Trials in humans were carried out by the US 
National Cancer Institute (NCI) in the 1970s and the drug was approved by the FDA in 
1978 (Kelland, 2007). Many platinum-based products are still used in chemotherapy 
today, particularly in the treatment of testicular and ovarian cancers (ibid). Examples of 
platinum-based compounds are: cisplatin, oxaliplatin and carboplatin.  
2.2.6.6 Hormone therapies 
In the late 19th Century it was noted that the administration of the hormone oestrogen had 
effectiveness in women suffering from breast cancer (DeVita and Chu, 2008). Based on 
these early observations Huggins and Clark, in the late 1930/early 1940s, found that 
castration, or administration of oestrogen, in dogs led to shrinking of the hyperplastic 
prostate gland (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). Hormone therapies are still commonly used in 
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a number of solid tumours today, for instance, tamoxifen and luteinising hormone 
blockers in the treatment of breast cancer26 
2.2.6.7 Antibiotics 
The use of antibiotic agents to treat cancer are, like nitrogen mustard compounds, 
considered to be related to the effort surrounding World War II, involving the screening 
of fermentation products to isolate and produce antibiotics (DeVita and Chu, 2008). The 
successful development of actinomycin D, the first antibiotic anti-cancer agent, is 
attributed to Sidney Farber, who, in 1954, tested the compound, isolated from 
Streptomyces, in paediatric Wilm’s tumours (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). This discovery 
led to the development of a number of antibiotic anti-tumour drugs, including mitomycin, 
mithramycin, bleomycin, daunorubicin and Adriamycin, which have been found to be 
effective in a variety of tumour types (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, Scriabine, 1999a).  
2.2.6.8 Vinca alkaloids 
The periwinkle plant had been used in folk medicine for centuries and was, therefore, the 
subject of isolation and screening (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, Scriabine, 1999a). This led 
to the production of the vinca alkaloids. In testing, Noble and colleagues showed that the 
isolated compound caused bone marrow suppression and later, Johnson and colleagues 
found antileukaemic activity in mice models (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979). Two major vinca 
alkaloids are still used in chemotherapy treatment regimens for leukaemias and 
lymphomas today, namely vincristine and vinblastine (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, Scriabine, 
1999a). 
2.2.6.9 Prodrugs  
Prodrugs are therapeutics that are administered in an inactive state and activated in the 
patient, ideally in or around the tumour site (Utku, 2011 ). The contemporary approach 
to prodrugs in anti-cancers began in the 1950s highlighting the potential for drugs to be 
made up of compounds that are inert ex-vivo but subsequently activated in the body 
leading to a therapeutic outcome (Albert, 1958, McKeown et al., 2007, Singh et al., 2008). 
These types of drugs began to be recognised as an avenue for targeting tumour cells, 
overcoming issues associated with cytotoxic drugs that tend to show little specificity and 
can therefore lead to high levels of toxicity in patients (Singh et al., 2008). 
                                                 
 
26  http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/about-cancer/cancers-in-general/treatment/hormone/what-
hormone-therapy-is#breast (accessed April 2015) 
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In order for prodrugs to be targeted, a mechanism of activation would need to be 
identified, such as the nature of the tumour environment. As cancer research has 
enabled an understanding of the factors that can be used to activate drugs, the prodrug 
approach has increased in popularity. For instance, the hypoxic (lack of oxygen) nature 
of the tumour environment, for certain types of tumour has been utilised in the case of 
banoxantrone (see Chapter 7).  
2.2.6.10 Chemotherapy Strategies 
In order to address the high levels of toxicity of chemotherapy regimens, the 1960s and 
1970s saw an increasing trend towards implementation of a strategy to combine cytotoxic 
agents (Pratt and Ruddon, 1979, DeVita and Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 2011). The rationale 
behind this was that the levels of cytotoxic agents in the body could be increased by 
administering more than one type, thereby increasing remission, while maintaining 
manageable levels of toxicities, which may be different for different agents (DeVita and 
Chu, 2008, Mukherjee, 2011).  
An additional strategy for chemotherapy that was implemented at around the same time 
was the use of adjuvant therapeutics, whereby surgery, which was perceived to be the 
only ultimately curative measure, would be accompanied by a cytotoxic chemotherapy in 
order to lessen the risk of metastasis of the primary tumour. 
2.2.6.11 Conclusion 
A change in the scientific understanding of disease (specifically in oncology) requires the 
generation of a new operational principle. For instance, in prodrugs, by knowing what 
conditions are present in the tumour environment, or within the tumour, it is possible to 
develop a drug to activate in vivo and therefore target specific cells. The following section 
will demonstrate how an increase in the understanding of cancer pathology and the 
appreciation of the role of genetic mutations in the abnormal growth of cells, has enabled 
the development of new operational principles to target tumour cells without affecting 
normal cells, so as to reduce the effect of toxicity and adverse reactions.   
2.3 Contemporary Drug Development 1970-present  
So far this Chapter has discussed the system (institutions, organisations, funding and 
regulation) that surrounded the development of drugs pre-1970. We witnessed a gradual 
increase in interest in cancer research, with some successful drugs being produced from 
a largely serendipitous approach to drug discovery. In this section we further 
demonstrate the evolution of this system and the shifts not only in the technological 
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modalities used in the production of drugs, but also the industry and regulatory changes 
that have accompanied these. 
This section will focus on trends in drug development since 1970, providing context for 
the emergence of new, targeted cancer therapeutics. A key development in the 1970s 
cancer research was the declaration of the ‘War on Cancer’ by President Nixon in 1971 
(Mukherjee, 2011). Motivated in part by the action of Lasker and Farber, this saw a 
commitment, by the US Congress, to address the public’s call for a concerted effort in 
researching and developing mechanisms to fight a disease that was becoming an 
increasing public health problem. As Nixon’s speech puts it:  
“The time has come in America when the same kind of concentrated effort that split 
the atom and took man to the moon should be turned toward conquering this dreadful 
disease. Let us make a total national commitment to achieve this goal.” (Nixon, 1971) 
In the wake of the 1971 National Cancer Act, oncology saw a significant influx of money 
whereby the funding of the NCI alone more than tripled in the years 1971-1979 (from 
$230m to $940m) (Bazell, 1998:11). This increased funding was not sufficient to 
overcome the perception of cancer research as a ‘scientific backwater’, explored by 
researchers motivated by the sudden surge of interest in the area (ibid). However, 1973 
did see the formal recognition of medical oncology as a subdiscipline (Keating and 
Cambrosio, 2007). 
The status of cancer research as a political priority did have the benefit of providing 
funding for public initiatives, such as the Special Virus Cancer Program in the 1960s and 
1970s which was initiated with the purpose of identifying viruses that cause cancer 
(DeVita and Chu, 2008).  
The 1970s saw a turnaround involving an increased interest in cancer, met with the 
coevolution of scientific understanding of disease pathology, new technologies, 
regulation and industrial structures and strategies. In addition, the post-1970s period was 
defined by the rapid development of medical oncology and protocols associated with 
clinical trials, also accompanied by the establishment of a number of institutions and 
initiatives to support cancer research both in the USA and Europe (Keating and 
Cambrosio, 2007). These acted to promote cancer research and the shift from poisons 
(cytotoxins) to targeted therapeutics. Furthermore, this period is characterised by an 
increase in competitive environment for organisations involved in drug development. This 
is demonstrated in the following section. 
2.3.1 Drug discovery and development 
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With the convergence of technologies and science since 1970, there has been shifts in 
the approaches to drug discovery and development, based on the increasing importance 
of scientific understanding; of diseases, drug targets and their interactions. 
These advances, in experimental technologies, and increasing biochemical and 
pharmacological knowledge, developed through the 1960s and 1970s, facilitated a more 
rational approach to drug discovery (rational drug design) (Adam, 2005, Hopkins et al., 
2007). This was first exemplified by James Black in his work on the beta-blocker, 
propranolol, whilst at Imperial Chemistry Industries (later AZ) in the 1960s (Adam, 2005, 
Hopkins et al., 2007, Hill, 2012:12). This discovery came from a process involving 
experiments guided from cumulative knowledge of the disease, target and potential 
compounds that would be active (Hopkins et al., 2007).  
The production of drugs using increasingly rational approaches to specific diseases was 
more widely adopted in the 1970s, further facilitated by advances in genetics, genomics, 
functional genomics and proteomics, that contributed towards a wealth of knowledge 
about genes, genetic causes of disease and therefore drug targets (Nightingale, 2000, 
Hopkins et al., 2007). This was encouraged by the development of DNA sequencing 
techniques (e.g. by Sanger in the mid-1970s) and the establishment of the Human 
Genome Project in the late 1980s/early 1990s (completed in 2001)27 which sought to 
sequence the entire human genome. However, in this process, genomics has been said 
to have simply shifted the bottleneck from the identification and production of drugs 
against specific targets, to the biological characterisation of targets and their relationship 
to disease (Hopkins et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, the 1970s also saw the development of hybridoma28 techniques. As well as 
contributing towards the use of monoclonal antibodies (mabs) as therapeutics, hybridoma 
technology facilitated the production of volumes of antibodies, enabling the study of 
molecules as targets, and the large scale production of proteins (Hopkins et al., 2007).  
Technologies such as these, and others, such as high-throughput screening and 
combinatorial chemistry, serve both to simplify and complicate research strategies in drug 
discovery and development (Orsenigo et al., 2001). Simplification occurs because 
                                                 
 
27 http://www.genome.gov/12011239 
28 Hybridoma technology involves the production of a hybrid cell lines through the combination of 
antibody-producing cell (lymphocyte) and a non-antibody producing cancer cell (usually 
myeloma) or lymphoma cell, thereby facilitating the continuous supply of specified monoclonal 
antibodies (discussed further in section 2.3.5.4). 
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alternative routes and hypotheses can be selected in accordance with disease, drug and 
target knowledge. However complications arise out of the multiplicity of options afforded 
to different trajectories (Orsenigo et al., 2001).  
Genetic advances, particularly in pharmacogenomics, also helped to increase 
understanding around the heterogeneous nature of patient populations, leading to 
preclinical safety and increased effectiveness of early stage trials (Hopkins et al., 2007). 
In addition, in some cases this information has helped to ‘rescue’ drugs that would have 
otherwise been deemed inefficacious, because they were found to show responses in 
only a subset of patients (ibid).  
Despite the advances and shifting trends facilitated by the rise in scientific understanding 
of drugs, targets and diseases, and their interactions, the influence of biotechnology has, 
until very recently, been disappointing compared to expectations (Nightingale and Martin, 
2004, Hopkins et al., 2007). This is demonstrated to be partly due to the increased 
complexity it has introduced into the process, but also the distance between experimental 
models (cell cultures) and patients (Hopkins et al., 2007). Another explanation, of the 
disparity between the vision and reality of biotechnology, is that it over-hyped, whereby 
the technology never had the opportunity to live up to expectations (Nightingale and 
Martin, 2004, Hopkins et al., 2007). 
2.3.2 Regulatory Environment and Incentives 
Recognising the demands of new approaches to drug development, regulation post-1970 
saw both a tightening up and move to incentivise the development of drugs for diseases 
of small populations and with unmet need. Declining productivity (approval rates) of new 
products, caused by increasing waiting times and costs, motivated the introduction, in 
1983, of the Orphan Drug Act. This was followed by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
in 1992 which, through the introduction of user fees for organisations applying for drug 
marketing approval, allowed the FDA to speed up the drug approval process for human 
drugs and biological products29. This Act specified that the FDA was required to review 
an application within 12 months of submission for standard reviews (for drugs similar to 
those already on the market), and 6 months for priority applications (for drugs that 
represent some novelty in offering advances when compared to available treatments) 
(Lipsky and Sharp, 2001).  
                                                 
 
29 http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm144411.htm 
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Prior to this applications were reported to take between two and eight years to review30 
and 70% of medicines were first approved outside the USA causing a concern in the US 
industry31. More recently regulatory changes have included the 1997 Modernization Act 
which introduced the fast track policy, industry guidance and post-marketing studies32. 
However, the increased processing rates of regulatory bodies has been controversial. 
For instance, one critique is that this acceleration has resulted from corporate pressure 
leading to a lowering of drug standards (Abraham, 2008). 
The ethical principles for clinical research were introduced on an EU level with the 
Declaration of Helsinki in 1964. This was followed, in 1965 by a requirement, of the 
authorisation of medicinal products prior to marketing in Europe33. In the 1970s emphasis 
was placed on European harmonisation of the approval process, beginning with an 
introduction of a standardised way of summarising key characteristics of authorised 
products (in 1983) and a requirement that consultation with an EU level committee should 
precede authorisation by individual country’s regulatory bodies (1987).  
In 1990 a centralised procedure for human and veterinary medicinal products was agreed 
throughout the EU and plans were drawn up to establish the EMA, which did not open 
until five years later (1995). In 2000 the EMA introduced their Orphan Regulation and in 
2001 the trials directive provided requirements for the conduct of trials in the EU.  
2.3.2.1 Orphan Drug Designation 
The Orphan Drug Acts are the policies that have seen the most internationally 
widespread introduction and are the main tool aimed at overcoming the issues associated 
with rare disease drug innovation.  
A ‘rare’ disease is defined as one which affects fewer than 5 people in every 10,000 in 
Europe (European Commission), and fewer than 200,000 people in the USA (Field and 
Boat, 2010, National Institutes of Health, 2013) (for comparison see Table 1).  
Despite each disease affecting a small patient population, due to the large number, 
between 5-8,000 (Field and Boat, 2010), affecting up to 25 million people in the USA 
alone (National Institutes of Health, 2013), ‘rare diseases’ are a substantial policy concern. 
                                                 
 
30 http://www.fdareview.org/history.shtml) 
31 http://www.phrma.org/pdufa 
32 http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/410910 
33 The history of the EMA draws heavily on the 50th Anniversary brochure: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/50years/docs/50years_pharma_timeline_v2.pdf 
 (accessed 24th April 2015) 
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Furthermore, with the increasing interest in ‘personalised medicine’ in general, involving 
the splitting of disease categories into smaller subtypes, using pharmacogenomics, it is 
possible that more diseases could be defined as ‘rare’, including cancer indications 
(Loughnot, 2005).  
This molecularisation of cancer, i.e. the understanding of cancer in terms of the molecular 
pathways that contribute towards abnormal growth of tumour cells, permits the 
stratification of patient populations by tumour subtype (Hogarth et al., 2012). The process 
of splitting diseases in response to genetic and molecular understanding, has been 
discussed by Hedgecoe (2004). Furthermore, the alternative approach, ‘lumping’, has 
been implemented in rare diseases to rally public and political support. This happened 
early on in cancer, where Lasker and Farber in the middle of the 20th Century, encouraged 
the lumping of subtypes of cancer into larger groups, to motivate support (Mukherjee, 
2011:155). 
 
Region Metric Population (millions) Comparable 
EU <5 in every 10,000 503 ~251,500 
USA ~6 in every 10,000 318.9 200,000 
Table 1 Comparable metrics for orphan drug designation in Europe and USA 
(Sources: europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm and 
www.census.gov/popclock/) 
 
In addition to small patient populations and the associated market failure, the 
development of drugs for rare diseases also suffers from a lack of disease understanding, 
difficulty in diagnosis, difficulty in recruiting patients to trials, and issues with gaining 
statistical significance in trials (Field and Boat, 2010). In response to these, the US were 
the first country to introduce the Orphan Drug Act in 1983.  
This was a culmination of 20 years of discussion and recognition, that drug development 
for rare diseases required incentives due to a lack of commercial viability. The main 
incentives offered by the Orphan Drug Act are 1) seven years market exclusivity, 2) 
availability of grants for product development, 3) tax credits for certain costs associated 
with trials, 4) FDA user fee waiver, and 5) advice to product developers on design of 
studies to meet regulatory standards (Field and Boat, 2010). This diversity of incentives 
is important because they represent both push and pull mechanisms (ibid). 
With the USA paving the way, other countries introduced orphan drug policies, with Japan 
in 1993, Australia in 1997 and the European Union (EU) in 2000 (Field and Boat, 2010). 
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However, each country shows variations in the incentives offered (see Table 2). For 
instance, while Japan offer the longest period of market exclusivity, the policy does not 
imply an application fee waiver. In the EU some of the incentives offered to applicants in 
other countries are up to the discretion of member states. 
Table 2 Differences in countries' approaches to the incentives provided under 
Orphan Drug Acts (taken from Field and Boat, 2010: 30) 
 
The phase at which orphan status is gained varies between projects but is usually 
towards the later stages. For instance, in the dataset for this thesis of the six (out of a 
total of 11) projects that receive orphan drug status, half obtained it around the same time 
as approval, and the other half prior to phase III trials. 
The Orphan Drug Acts have been successful in promoting the development of drugs for 
diseases affecting small populations. This is illustrated when comparing the decade prior 
to the US Orphan Drug Act (1983) in which only 34 “orphan drugs” received regulatory 
approval (3.4 per year), compared to 229 drugs entering the market (11.45 per year) in 
the twenty years that followed (Loughnot, 2005). By 2010, there had been 1,892 orphan 
designations (drug candidates) in the USA, with 326 approved products launched and 
marketed for more than 200 different diseases (Braun et al., 2010). In the EU, by 2011, 
there had been 850 orphan designated products, 60 (6 per year) of which received 
authorisation (Westermark et al., 2011). Despite these figures indicating that the 
                                                 
 
34 The Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), which was launched in 2008, is directed at funding 
programmes in areas of unmet medical or social need 
(http://www.imi.europa.eu/content/mission). The IMI is, therefore, not focused specifically on 
orphan drugs but could be applied to some areas of rare disease drug development. 
Incentive United States Japan Australia EU 
Years of market 
exclusivity 
7 10 5 10 
Grants 
Programme 
Yes Yes No 
Not at EU level34; 
member states’ 
responsibility 
Tax credits for 
clinical research 
Yes (50% for 
clinical costs) 
Yes (6% of 
clinical and non-
clinical costs 
No 
Not at EU level; 
member states’ 
responsibility 
Assistance with 
trial design 
Yes Yes Yes Yes (partial) 
Application fee 
waiver 
Yes No Yes Reduced fees 
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introduction of the Orphan Drug Act has been a success, there have been concerns over 
the unintended outcomes of the legislation. 
The first of these concerns is the high prices demanded by the drug companies for 
approved orphan drug once they reach the market (Arno et al., 1995, Dear et al., 2006, 
Simon, 2006, Wellman-Labadie and Zhou, 2010). These high prices mean that marketed 
drugs may be inaccessible to some patients (Arno et al., 1995). In fact, some orphan 
drugs are even achieving blockbuster35 status (Field and Boat, 2010). The high prices 
and inaccessibility of orphan drugs have been described as socially irresponsible 
(Hemphill, 2010) and unsustainable in the context of declining productivity in the pharma 
industry (Moors et al., 2014). 
Another concern, following the introduction of the Orphan Drug Acts, is the exploitation 
of the legislation by industry. This has manifested in off-label use of orphan drugs, 
increasing the revenues obtained by the developing firm, paving the way for secondary, 
more broad indications to be investigated (Loughnot, 2005). These exploitation issues 
imply that the orphan drug legislation is being misused in disease areas other than those 
for which it is intended. 
The final concern surrounding the implementation of orphan drug legislation is the safety 
and efficacy of these drugs, when compared to other approved drugs (Kesselheim et al., 
2011, Dupont and Van Wilder, 2011). This stems from the difficulty in obtaining sufficient 
clinical data due to the tendency to enrol smaller patient numbers in trials for orphans 
drug and for these studies to be less commonly randomised and/or double blinded 
(Kesselheim et al., 2011, Dupont and Van Wilder, 2011).  
2.3.2.2 Accelerated Approval 
Accelerated development and approval was introduced in 1992, as part of the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act, to increase the speed of development and approval for 
drugs fulfilling unmet need (Borad and Von Hoff, 2008, Moore, 2003). Drugs qualify for 
accelerated approval when applied to a serious or life threatening disease, such as many 
types of cancer (Borad and Von Hoff, 2008). This regulatory policy is also of particular 
significance to cancer drugs because it allows the use surrogate endpoints36 to indicate 
efficacy of the drug, rather than survival, or more direct endpoints (ibid).  
                                                 
 
35 Blockbuster status indicates sales of over $1bn per year. 
36 Surrogate endpoints are used as indicators of efficacy in trials. In cancer, examples of surrogate 
end points are tumour shrinkage or biomarker levels, substituting for survival rates or improved 
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The endpoints used in accelerated approval must be ‘reasonably likely to predict clinical 
benefit’ and should be followed up by post-approval studies to garner further evidence 
about the associated risks (Borad and Von Hoff, 2008, Field and Boat, 2010). The use 
surrogate endpoints, however, has been highly controversial particularly in the area of 
cancer drug development, due to doubts about whether they are reliable indicators of 
the safety and efficacy of drugs (Davis and Abraham, 2011)  
2.3.2.3 Fast Track  
Fast track status was introduced by the FDA as part of the 1997 FDA Modernization Act 
(Reichert et al., 2008). Fast track status is applicable to drugs that aim to treat life 
threatening or severely debilitating illnesses that have the potential to address an area 
of unmet need (Moore, 2003, Borad and Von Hoff, 2008, Reichert et al., 2008). In drug 
development it is common for some interaction to exist between the FDA and the drug’s 
investigator during the review process (Lipsky and Sharp, 2001). However, fast track 
status can facilitate a higher levels of communication between stakeholders throughout 
development, in the form of frequent meetings, written correspondence concerning 
phase II and phase III planned trials, as requested (Moore, 2003). Furthermore, fast track 
status can decrease the time taken to review a drug application for approval, from 10 
months to 6 months (Borad and Von Hoff, 2008). 
Despite being a useful regulatory policy tool, particularly for small biotech firms who may 
have less experience in developing drugs and getting through approval stages, the Fast 
Track policy has been criticised for its apparent lack of transparency (Reichert et al., 
2008). Despite these issues, the policy does show value in bringing otherwise difficult to 
develop drugs to the patient populations most in need (ibid).  
2.3.2.4 Compassionate Use/Expanded Access 
In addition to regulatory policies encouraging innovation for rare cancers and serious/life 
threatening diseases presenting unmet clinical need, compassionate use/expanded 
access is also a strategy used to aid innovation, particularly, in cancer drug development. 
Compassionate use, or early or expanded access to promising drugs, introduced under 
the Special Protocol Exception at the FDA, allows patients access to drugs prior to 
regulatory approval (Moore, 2003). Expanded access to cancer drugs is associated with 
                                                 
 
quality of life which take a longer time period to measure 
(www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=729831) 
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increasing numbers and action of patient advocacy groups in recent decades37. Despite 
the introduction of the Investigational New Drug Treatment Program legislation by the 
FDA in 1987, as part of the FDA Modernization Act, the history of cancer patients gaining 
expanded access to treatments really began with the development of Herceptin 
(trastuzumab) (see Chapter 5) (Baldwin, 2002). When Herceptin showed promising 
results in trials patients began to put pressure on the developing company, Genentech, 
in order to gain access to the drug (Bazell, 1998, Baldwin, 2002).  
 Despite the apparent public support for such expanded access programmes, there are 
clearly potential issues with safety when providing expanded access to a drug prior to it 
having gone through proper trials and regulatory approval (Baldwin, 2002, Genève, 2003). 
Furthermore, while programmes such as these involved substantial cost to the 
organisations involved, this is balanced by the benefits to the organisation in patient 
recruitment to trials and publicity (Baldwin, 2002). 
2.3.2.5 Critical Path Initiative 
In 2004 the FDA published a White paper, Innovation and Stagnation, investigating the 
so-called Pipeline problem, of the aforementioned productivity crisis (FDA, 2004). In this 
paper the FDA highlighted a discrepancy between the advances that had been made in 
the discovery of new drug, due to the developments in the associated basic science, and 
the applied science necessary to match this advancement in development phases (FDA, 
2004). This paper stimulated much debate surrounding the previously unrecognised lack 
of scientific approaches in drug development, in response the Critical Path Initiative was 
introduced by the FDA in 2006 (Woodcock and Woosley, 2008).  
This initiative aimed at improving the drug development process and balancing the 
tensions between ensuring product safety, while also encouraging the production of 
innovative drugs, in light of the increasing realisation of the productivity crisis (ibid). 
Calling for the development of ‘a new product development toolkit’, encompassing animal 
or computer-based predictive models and new clinical evaluation techniques, the FDA 
set out to influence this through the standards implemented to guide development 
programmes (FDA, 2004). The implementation of the Critical Path Initiative led to the 
perceived improvement of the scientific approach to drug development processes, 
                                                 
 
37 The role of patient groups is further explored in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
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including in clinical trial methodologies, the production and utilisation of biomarkers and 
the application of bioinformatics (ibid).  
2.3.3 Clinical Trials – Standardisation, Costs, Attrition 
The standardisation of clinical trials, as will be explored in this section, is relevant in this 
Chapter for two reasons. Firstly, because it provided a platform for the regulatory 
approval of drugs, and secondly, due to the facilitation of accumulated knowledge of a 
drug, its mechanism of action and interactions in the body. Furthermore, this section 
highlights the substantial difficulty, in duration, cost and attrition rates of clinical trials, 
facing drug developers. Clinical trials are carried out once a drug is deemed to show 
sufficient safety in vitro 38  and in animal models (referred to as preclinical trials) 
(summarised in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Process leading up to first-in-man trials (taken from description in 
(Kelland, 2008) 
 
During the period 1950 to 1970 leukaemic cell lines were predominantly used in 
preclinical testing, however by the late 1970s/early 1980s human tumours transplanted 
onto animal models became more commonplace (DeVita and Chu, 2008, Kelland, 2008). 
More recently screening is being undertaken with reference to specific molecular targets, 
rather than generic panel screening (DeVita and Chu, 2008). 
Once safety and efficacy have been proved sufficiently in preclinical studies, trials in 
human subjects can begin. This generally involves phase I, phase II, phase III and phase 
IV (post-marketing) trials. Despite this apparent division into distinct phases, it has been 
observed that in practice the barriers between these stages are blurred (Borad and Von 
Hoff, 2008). It remains useful, however to outline the clinical phases as distinct stages 
as it is a useful tool to picture the whole process. 
                                                 
 
38 In vitro studies are carried out on cells under controlled experimental conditions that are outside 
the cell’s natural environment, for instance, a test tube. This is contrast to studies in vivo in which 
organisms are tested as a whole, for instance, testing in animals.  
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Initial phase I trials typically involve around 100 healthy subjects (costing between 
$200,000 and $800,000 (Hill, 2012:241)), before moving on to testing the drug in a small 
number of the target patient population (Neal, 2012). The purpose of these primary 
human trials is to assess the pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic profile of the drug 
(ibid). Pharmacokinetics is the study of ‘drug absorption, distribution, metabolism and 
excretion’, i.e. how does the drug interact with, and get eliminated from, the body (Ratain 
and Plunkett, 2003). Pharmacodynamics is the study of the relationship between dosage 
of the drug and patient response (ibid).  
Phase I studies should illustrate the safety and tolerability of a molecule, and ideally 
giving an indication of efficacy (Field and Boat, 2010, Neal, 2012). In cancer trials it is 
often the case that phase I will involve people with a broad range of cancer types, if the 
specificity of the drug has not been ascertained in preclinical investigations. 
Phase II trials tend to involve a larger number (between 250 and 700 patients, (Hill, 
2012:241)) of patients suffering from the specific indication(s)39 for which the drug is 
being developed, representing a significant step in the development process (Neal, 
2012). These trials typically costs between $2.5m and $6m+ (Hill, 2012:241). There are 
three main objectives of phase II trials: 1) to provide evidence that the drug is efficacious 
(i.e. it works at treating the disease it is aimed at), 2) to establish a balance between the 
minimum dose to achieve effectiveness and the maximum dose that can be tolerated by 
patients, and 3) to determine a safety profile of the product (Field and Boat, 2010, Neal, 
2012).  
Phase III is usually the ‘pivotal’, or confirmatory, phase, i.e. the final stage before a drug 
can be presented for regulatory approval. Typically the aim of this stage is to provide 
statistically significant data that the drug is efficacious (i.e. more effective than a placebo 
or standard therapy) and safe (preferably safer than a comparator, marketed drug) (Neal, 
2012). Typically larger than phase II (involving 500-1000 patients and costing between 
$2-$10m (Hill, 2012:241)), phase III trials almost always take place across a range of 
international study centres and usually take between one and four years to complete 
(Neal, 2012). Post-marketing surveillance studies are carried out post-approval and 
therefore are not relevant to the research presented in this thesis.  
                                                 
 
39 An ‘indication’ is defined as the specific disease for which the drug is being developed. A 
primary indication is the lead indication for development, where additional indications being 
investigated are termed secondary indications.  
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Development times have increased over the past 20 years, whereby the average 
duration of clinical development, from patent to commercialisation has gone from 9.7 
years in the 1990s to 13.9 years in the 2000s (Pammolli et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
duration of trials also shows a high level of variation (on average between 6 and 8 years) 
(Pammolli et al., 2011) between different indications, by type of product and dependent 
on the type of organisation responsible for development (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004). 
The increase in the duration of trials has been associated with the rising tendency, in the 
industry, to pursue high risk, chronic diseases (Pammolli et al., 2011). 
The use of different approaches to drug innovation has influenced the variation in 
durations of clinical trials. For instance, between the years 1989-2002, successful phase 
I trials were found to last, on average, 19.7 months, ranging from 18.76 months for non-
big pharma to 19.62 months for big pharma. To successfully complete phase II trials took 
on average 29.87 months (29.92 for non-big pharma, 25.11 for big pharma) and 
successfully completing phase III took on average 47 months ( 49.07 for non-big pharma 
and 41.43 months for big pharma) (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004). When measured, 
biologicals took the least time to successfully complete phase I (17.87 months), with 
natural products taking the most time to reach the same milestone (21.5 months). In 
phase II trials this pattern switches, where biologicals take the longest duration to 
successful completion, at 31.87 months vs. 19.44 months for natural products. In phase 
III, however, chemicals take the longest duration to successfully complete (at 47.74 
months, with natural products at 46.14 months, and biologicals at 45.63 months) (ibid).  
For anti-cancer drugs, successfully completing phase I trials was the longest duration of 
any other indication sub-group (21.79 months vs. an average of 19.68 months), however, 
anti-cancer drugs took relatively less time to successfully complete phase II trials. To 
successfully complete phase III trials anti-cancer drugs took 47.75 months, just over the 
average for the whole dataset at 47 months (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004). Overall clinical 
development times for cancer drugs have been found to be comparatively longer than 
other indications (by 1.5 years in the US), although approval times were shorter for 
oncology projects on average (0.5 years) (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007). This data has, 
so far explored successfully completed trial phases, perhaps unsurprisingly ‘failed’ 
(where the project was withdrawn by the developing company, or the FDA rejects the 
project) trials take considerably longer (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004).  
Trials are an expensive undertaking, lengthy and show high failure (attrition) rates. In 
cancer drug trials from 1990-2000 the rate of failure was less than half that of drugs for 
other diseases (Kola and Landis, 2004, Workman and Collins, 2008). However, oncology 
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drugs disproportionately receive support from the FDA in the form of priority review, 
orphan drug and fast track status and are therefore achieve similar approval rates when 
compared to drugs for other diseases (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2007, Workman and 
Collins, 2008). This indicates that drugs produced for cancer generally tend to benefit 
from a faster review process by the FDA, increased periods of market exclusivity and 
input from the regulatory body throughout the drug’s development.  
There is a direct link between the time taken to complete trials sufficiently to obtain 
regulatory approval, and the subsequent overall costs of drug development. It is 
expected, therefore, that oncology drugs, due to their longer development times, would 
be more expensive than the average drug project to get to the market. Estimates of drug 
development costs are between $650-1,023m (DiMasi et al., 2003)40 , with oncology 
drugs being represented at the higher end of this range.  
As discussed, as a drug progresses through trials, costs increase. Furthermore, for each 
day of delay the organisation is losing a huge amount of money in lost potential sales, 
for instance, around $2.75m in the case of a blockbuster (sales of $1bn per year). 
Reasons for failures change over time. 1990s failures stemmed from poor predictions of 
patient-drug interactions, and, more recently (2000s), lack of efficacy and intolerable 
levels of toxicity are the limiting factors (Kola and Landis, 2004, Workman and Collins, 
2008).  
One strategy implemented to attempt to reduce failure rates, and therefore costs of drug 
development of cancer drugs is the stratification of patient populations, by either 
demographics (i.e. patients over or under a certain age) or the molecular action of the 
drug (Borad and Von Hoff, 2008). Here, the study of pharmacogenomics has been 
central to the development of cancer therapeutics, whereby a genomic information is 
                                                 
 
40 Despite the DiMasi et al (2003) figures being the most highly cited, estimations of the costs of 
developing a drug are highly contentious. For instance, Light and Warburton (2011) critique 
DiMasi et al. (2003) and claim that their figures are overestimated for the following reasons: 1) 
only drugs developed and originated in-house are included, where in-licensed drugs are 
estimated to be four times cheaper), 2) no data is presented on estimations of failure rates which 
are used to inflate figures to account for expenditure on unsuccessful drugs, 3) R&D tax subsidies 
are not accounted for, 4) variations between different firms and therapeutic categories are not 
taken into account, 5) cost of capital (i.e. money that was lost from not making investments for 
the duration of the R&D expenditure) is estimated to be 11% accounting for doubling the cost 
estimate (from $403m to $802m), 6) inflation rates take the estimate of $802m in 2000 US dollars 
to $1.32bn in 2006 and an estimated $2.16bn in 2012, and 7) R&D costs used for estimate are 
volunteered from firms with no information presented as to which firms have been used or how 
R&D costs are being calculated.  
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taken to inform the diagnosis, treatment and study of their disease (Webster et al., 2004, 
Hopkins et al., 2006).  
By targeting a specific abnormality and recruiting relevant patients to trials there is a 
higher chance that patients will be responsive to the treatment, and therefore efficacy 
levels are higher (Heemstra et al., 2011). Furthermore, in focusing development on 
particular molecular cancer subtypes, clinical development does not rely on previous 
comparators and can therefore sometimes be cheaper and more straightforward. This 
strategy may also help to decrease the toxicity levels of cancer drugs due to their 
specificity to cancer cells rather than any proliferating cells in the body.  
2.3.4 Industry dynamics 
In addition to shifts in the scientific approaches, policy, regulatory and funding 
environments for drug development and cancer therapeutics, instigated by the ‘war on 
cancer’, the dynamics of the industry surrounding drug development also changed post-
1970. With an increasingly rational approach to drug discovery, where firms can 
strategically focus on particular diseases, there has been a shift from acute (e.g. 
infections), to chronic diseases (such as cancer) (Hopkins et al., 2007, Martin et al., 
2009).  
In the pre-1970 period drug development was denominated by academic research labs 
and large chemical companies, with substantial cancer research support coming from 
the public purse and charitable sector. However, the change in the use of molecular 
biology led to an influx of new companies focusing on biological understanding of, and 
developing therapeutic treatments for diseases (Achilladelis, 1999, Nightingale, 2000). 
The introduction of new technologies, including biotechnology, had effects on the 
industry both strategically and structurally.  
Despite the high expectations around the promise of biotechnologies, the period since 
the 1970s has seen a declining productivity in the industry and pharma pipelines 
dwindling (Nightingale and Martin, 2004, Hopkins et al., 2007, Pammolli et al., 2011, 
Martin et al., 2009). There are several reasons that have been put forward to explain this 
trend: 1) increased complexity and shifting bottlenecks (Nightingale and Martin, 2004, 
Hopkins et al., 2007), 2) increasing interest in high risk areas, therefore higher probability 
of failure (Pammolli et al., 2011) (Martin et al., 2009), 3) increased attrition rates, 
therefore increased costs (Hopkins et al., 2007, Pammolli et al., 2011), 4) increased 
competition in the marketplace (Pammolli et al., 2011), 5) more existing therapies 
available, therefore higher thresholds for new drugs in these areas (Scannell et al., 2012), 
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6) easy targets/low hanging fruit have been explored (Pammolli et al., 2011, Hopkins et 
al., 2007), 7) the ‘cautious regulator’ problem (Scannell et al., 2012), 8) the ‘throw money 
at it’ tendency (Scannell et al., 2012), and 10) the tendency to rely, too heavily on 
advances in basic research and screening methods (Scannell et al., 2012).  
However, in oncology, the development of targeted therapies has had a positive effect 
on attrition rates. In general cancer drugs show an 82% attrition rate (akin to failure rate), 
in contrast to the that for kinase inhibitors (one of the largest types of targeted therapy) 
which was 53% (Walker and Newell, 2009). Furthermore these targeted therapies were 
found to be more successful in transitioning from phase II to phase III, indicating the 
potential to reduce costs.  
Despite the benefits for cancer patients of more oncology appearing in pharma pipelines, 
and the shift to targeted therapies, which were predicted to be more efficacious and less 
toxic, these trends also contribute towards an increasingly competitive market (Stewart 
and Naeymi-Rad, 2011). This will not only lead to declining market shares for firms, but 
also competition for patients in trials, thereby implying lengthier durations, higher costs 
and potential patent issues (ibid).  
Structurally with the advent of molecular biology and the increased use of biological 
processes in drug discovery and development the industry has seen an influx of smaller 
organisations emerged. This stemmed from the realisation of the potential of these new 
technologies, by academic molecular biologists and venture capitalists (Pisano, 2006:84-
85, Hopkins et al., 2007). However, with the substantial costs associated with late stage 
drug development, and the need to realise economies of scale and scope through 
experience, capabilities and networks, small firms were generally not able to compete 
with incumbent pharma (Scriabine, 1999b, Cockburn and Henderson, 1999). Therefore, 
emerging companies tended to be small and specialised (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002). 
However, early on in the introduction of new molecular approaches the incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms, who were previously responsible for producing drugs, stayed away, 
adopting a ‘wait and see approach’ (Hopkins et al., 2007). This allowed some early mover 
new biotech firms to grow into fully integrated pharmaceutical companies (Pisano, 2006-
85), as was the model demonstrated by big pharma, e.g. Genentech and Amgen. 
However, at least initially, these firms were reliant on collaborations with other companies 
to gain access to the skills they lacked (Pisano, 2006). Since then increasing interest 
and investment from big pharma into biotechnology (Martin et al., 2009), for instance in 
mabs (Hopkins et al., 2007), has led to the development of in-house capabilities and led 
to a rise in external collaborations.  
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For big pharma collaborations provide access to knowledge and capabilities from small 
firms, for instance, focusing on specific diseases, reliance on platform technologies for 
internal R&D projects or providing services (Pisano, 2006:84-85). Significantly, small 
firms with genomics capabilities began initially (in the 1970s) by providing contract 
research services generating knowledge about drug-target interactions to guide 
screening (Martin et al., 2009). However, in the 1990s where biotech moved away from 
contract research work, towards functional genomics (i.e. furthering the understanding 
of genes and the proteins they coded) and development of technologies (ibid). 
When pharma realised the importance of new technologies, profitable and mutually 
beneficial collaborations between smaller, newer biotech firms and older, larger 
incumbent firm were established. Here, pharma could gain access to specialist expertise 
and new technologies, and biotech could fill the gap in commercialisation and marketing 
capabilities, skills and resources (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002, della Valle and 
Gambardella, 1993, Galambos and Sturchio, 1998).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dynamics of collaborations, between of biotech firms, universities/research institutes 
and pharma have been a key part of the industry over the past 40 years. In 1996 Powell 
examined the inter-organisational relationships and commented that ‘no single firm  has 
all the necessary capabilities’ and therefore membership of a networks of collaborations 
is necessary (Powell, 1996a). 
In response to these trends, since the 1970s drug development has been dependent on 
a network of collaborative agreements involving public organisations, and funding, as 
well as private companies, both large and small (della Valle and Gambardella, 1993, 
Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002). This has led to a restructuring of the industry whereby 
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Figure 2 Simplified representation of the organisations typically responsible for the 
drug discovery and development pathways  
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networks of organisations and agreements between organisations become the main 
governance structure (Staropoli, 1998, Powell, 1996b). These relationships can also be 
conceptualised as being cyclical: new technologies initially promoted the establishment 
of new firms, which, thanks to the associated hype, led to an increase in investment into 
the industry, in turn permitting the development of novel technologies and business 
models and further division of labour.  
The emergence of networks of collaborative relationships have led to a distributed and 
open R&D process characterised by the proliferation of research trajectories and based 
on division of labour and new forms of organisational and industry dynamics (Orsenigo 
et al., 2001, Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002).  
It follows that biotech firms are indispensable to the industry, particularly in the context 
of declining productivity of pharmaceutical companies. This is demonstrated in an 
analysis of 252 new drugs approved between the years 1998 and 2007, Kneller found 
that around half of the scientifically innovative drugs, and half of those aimed at unmet 
medical needs, originated in biotech (Kneller, 2010).  
It is therefore worrisome that biotech suffers from vulnerabilities in industrial dynamics, 
stemming from inexperience, but most commonly from a lack availability of funding. 
Biotechnology firms receive funding from a complex web of actors including, high net 
worth individuals, government grants, charities and universities at the early stages, and 
venture capital, stock markets and business angels at the mid and late stages. Small 
firm funding conditions have oscillated throughout the past 30 years.  
Traditionally stock-markets and VC were the main funding source for biotech to gain 
access to sufficient funding to develop projects past phase II trials (Hopkins et al., 2013). 
However, in the wake of high profile failures these funding sources closed in the late 
1990s, proving fatal to some in the industry with the early 2000s characterised as a 
period of financial difficulty for small firms (Martin et al., 2009). Furthermore, funding 
sources can be unpredictable and often do not allow small firms access to cash when 
needed, leading to, in some cases, M&A based on desperation (Hopkins et al., 2013). 
Typically companies either become sustainable in generating revenue (through offering 
services or technology platforms to other companies, licensing agreements or generating 
royalty revenues from previous projects) or are sold as part of a merger or acquisition 
(Hopkins, 2012).  
This section has demonstrated shifts in the industrial environment surrounding drug 
development for cancer. Here the post-1970 period has witness a rise in a new business 
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model, in the advent of biotech firms, in response to the development of new molecular 
technologies, and a change in the strategic direction of firms that have, in some instance 
led to a crisis of productivity. We will now turn to the development of cancer drugs, in 
particular, and the research trajectories contributing towards the shift to targeted 
therapeutics.   
2.3.5 Cancer Research post-1970 
One of the early streams of cancer research was undertaken by Michael Bishop and 
Harold Varmus who, at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) in 1970 began 
work that led to the concept of oncogenes and proto-oncogenes (Bazell, 1998). Bishop 
and Varmus were studying chicken viruses in an attempt to identify how normal cells 
could become cancerous (ibid). The link between viruses and cancer was thought to stem 
from the ability of some viruses to penetrate cells, and initiate replication, thereby 
promoting cell proliferation (ibid).  
Bishop and Varmus’s work identified a gene in human cells, usually found in virus DNA 
that could initiate this behaviour causing cancer. This led to the coining of the term 
‘oncogene’, to imply a gene that causes abnormal replication of a cell (Bazell, 1998). In 
1976 Varmus and Bishop published an article that concluded that oncogenes were 
normal genes (proto-oncogenes) that mutated to become abnormal (Stehelin et al., 1976, 
Bishop, 1982). 
Oncogenes are now defined as ‘genes that cause normal cells to grow out of control and 
become cancer cells… they are formed by the mutations of certain normal genes of the 
cell called proto-oncogenes’ (Sudhakar, 2009). Conversely genes that are normally 
responsible for controlling cell division, DNA repair and cell death but when 
malfunctioning allow cells to divide out of control, are termed tumour suppressor genes 
(Sudhakar, 2009).  
The research by Varmus and Bishop in the 1970s was built upon in the early 1980s by 
Axel Ullrich who initially worked at the UCSF with Bishop and Varmus but later went to 
Genentech, one of the first biotech firms (Bazell, 1998). In 1983 Ullrich worked with a 
British protein chemist, Michael Waterfield to garner evidence of the process by which 
oncogenes could cause cancer (Bazell, 1998). This culminated in an article stating that 
one particular oncogene, erb-b, was a mutated form of the epithelial growth factor (EGF) 
(Ullrich et al., 1984). This discovery was significant because it verified the link between 
research surrounding cell growth signals and cancer (Bazell, 1998).  
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This research led to the US Special Virus Cancer Program, initiated with the purpose of 
identifying viruses associated with cancer (DeVita and Chu, 2008). The programme was 
not particularly successful in this, and was therefore renamed the Program of Molecular 
Biology, with the altered aim of identifying oncogenes (ibid). However, viruses and their 
link with cancer continue to be a relevant stream of research (e.g. with Human 
papillomavirus). 
The Program of Molecular Biology led to a deeper understanding of the genetic basis for 
cancer abnormalities, providing an array of targets which could be used to design drug 
compounds. This proliferation of targets has recently been described as representing a 
shift from a lack of cancer drug targets to an excess (Workman and Collins, 2008). Such 
targets now include: activated oncogenes, inactivated tumour suppressor genes, genes 
leading to DNA repair defects, genes supporting oncogenic pathways, and genes 
controlling the tumour microenvironment (Workman and Collins, 2008). 
The past 40 years of cancer research has widely been described as a new era for 
oncology. This shift in the way that knowledge around oncology has been constructed 
also manifests in the transition from simple cytotoxins with relatively low selectivity to 
cancerous cells, to targeted therapies with higher levels of specificity (DeVita and Chu, 
2008). The reliance on knowledge of the molecular makeup of tumours, in theory, leads 
to less toxic and more efficacious treatments.  
The development of cancer therapeutics has seen a shift in operational principles, from 
cytotoxic approaches to targeted therapeutics. Broadly speaking approaches to 
developing drugs in this area have based on the strategies of cancer cells to grow and 
divide. These have been summarised into six acquired capabilities of tumour cells: 1) 
insensitivity to anti-growth signals, 2) self-sufficiency in growth signals, 3) evading 
apoptosis, 4) limitless replicative potential, 5) sustained angiogenesis (blood vessel 
formation) and 6) tissue invasion and metastasis (Hanahan and Weinberg, 2000). The 
following sections provide a scientific and technological knowledge foundation behind 
the novel cancer drug families directly relevant to the case histories in this thesis: kinase 
inhibitors, mabs, and immunotoxins. 
2.3.5.1 Kinase Inhibitors 
Protein kinases are proteins that provide a good target for anti-cancers due to their 
integral role in signalling pathways that regulate cellular functions, such as DNA 
replication, cell growth, proliferation and differentiation (Grant, 2009). Protein kinases act 
by catalysing the process of protein phosphorylation facilitating signalling mechanisms 
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(ibid). The link between phosphorylation and cellular functions was first published in 1966 
(Fischer and Krebs, 1966) and, combined with the discovery that some protein kinases 
can act as oncogenes in 1976 (Stehelin et al., 1976), led to the recognition of the potential 
for protein kinase inhibitors to be used as anti-cancer agents (Grant, 2009).  
By 2009 there had been over 30 kinase drug targets identified, representing a huge 
interest in kinase inhibitors as an avenue for cancer treatment (Zhang et al., 2009). 
These drug targets fit in four broad categories of kinases: receptor tyrosine kinases, 
cytoplasmic tyrosine kinase, serine/threonine kinase and lipid kinase (Zhang et al., 2009).  
Kinase inhibitors can be targeted with either mabs (see Section 5.4.3.5) (e.g. 
bevacizumab (Avastin) targeting the vascular endothelial growth factor receptor (VEGFR) 
and, trastuzumab (Herceptin) targeting the HER2 receptor) or small molecule inhibitors 
(e.g. pazopanib (Votrient) targeting the VEGFR receptor, and imatinib (Gleevec) 
targeting the BCR-ABL, c-Kit and PDGFR receptors) (Gerber, 2008).  
The projects in this thesis that can be categorised under the umbrella of kinase inhibitors 
are: pazopanib (a tyrosine kinase inhibitor) and barasertib (an aurora kinase inhibitor). 
2.3.5.1.1 Tyrosine kinase inhibitors  
The tyrosine kinases make up two of the four kinase categories (the receptor and 
cytoplasmic tyrosine kinases), representing 18 of the aforementioned 30 known kinase 
drug targets (Zhang et al., 2009). Tyrosine kinases are proteins responsible for signalling 
between cells mediating activities such as cell proliferation and migration (Gotink and 
Verheul, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis we are most interested in the vascular 
endothelial growth factor receptor (VEGFR) as this is the relevant target for pazopanib 
(Chapter 6). 
VEGFR is a receptor tyrosine kinase involved in angiogenesis (Gotink and Verheul, 
2010). Receptor tyrosine kinases, such as VEGFR, act on extracellular signals into the 
cell, while non-receptor tyrosine kinase inhibitors act on intracellular communication 
(Gotink and Verheul, 2010). Specifically VEGFR acts as a proangiogenic factor, 
promoting the development of blood vessels around the body (Eskens and Verweij, 
2006). By inhibiting VEGFR drugs such as pazopanib (see Chapter 7) act to arrest 
angiogenesis in tumours, hence starving cells of a blood supply, leading to cell death. 
Angiogenesis was first described to be a crucial process in tumour development, and 
therefore recognised to be a potential target for anti-cancers, in 1971 by Judah Folkman 
(Folkman, 1971). However, the discovery of the tumour-derived blood vessel growth 
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stimulating factor dates back to 1939 (Ide et al., 1939). It has been observed that in the 
intervening time (from 1939 onwards) ‘independent and unrelated lines of research 
converged toward to identification of VEGF’ (Ferrara, 2002). This stream of knowledge 
was brought together when the term VEGF was coined in 1989 (Ferrara and Henzel, 
1989).  
2.3.5.1.2 Aurora kinase inhibitors 
As a subtype of kinase inhibitors aurora kinases are a relatively recent development in 
the area of cancer therapeutics. The aurora kinase targets were first identified in 1995 in 
fruit flies where they were found to be required for cell division41 (Francisco et al., 1994, 
Glover et al., 1995). Just three years following this discovery research published by 
scientists from SUGEN, a biopharmaceutical company based in the USA, in collaboration 
with UCLA School of Medicine (Division of Hematology-Oncology and Jonsson 
Comprehensive Cancer Center) and University of Texas (Department of Microbiology) 
discovered a human form of the aurora kinases (at the time termed aurora 1 and aurora 
2, now referred to as Aurora A and B) were overexpressed in human cancer cells 
(Bischoff et al., 1998).  
Aurora kinases are known to be involved in regulating the process of mitosis, where cells 
divide to grow (Keen and Taylor, 2004, Coumar et al., 2009). The anti-tumour effect of 
aurora kinase inhibitors was thought to come from the idea that if mitosis is interrupted, 
cells cannot longer divide and grow and therefore tumours cannot develop. Since the 
initial discovery of the activity of human aurora kinases, aurora A, B, and C have been 
suggested as potential drug targets for anti-cancer therapeutics (Coumar et al., 2009) 
2.3.5.2 Monoclonal Antibodies (mabs) 
The work contributing to the development of mabs can be traced to the research by 
Cesar Milstein and Georges Kohler at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology at the 
Cambridge University (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Clark, 2005, Marks, 2015). In 1975 
the first monoclonal antibody (mab) was generated in mice using the hybridoma 
technique (Kohler and Milstein, 1975, Liu, 2014).  
                                                 
 
41 There are two types of cell division: 1) mitosis occurs when two daughter cells are formed that 
are identical to the parent cells, and occurs in most dividing cells around the body, 2) meiosis 
occurs when daughter cells contain half the genetic material of the parent cells, and occurs in the 
sex organs to produce reproductive cells (gametes). 
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Milstein’s interest initially lay in determining the diversity of antibodies, the naturally 
occurring proteins responsible for fighting foreign bodies (Marks, 2013b, Marks, 2015). 
By building on the discovery that myeloma cells produced just one type of antibody rather 
than the diverse array found in normal tissue (discovery by Kunkel, an American 
immunologist based at the Rockefeller Institute, New York in 1951), and advances in 
technologies surrounding the ability to produce myeloma cells, Milstein and Kohler’s 
research team began to discover ways to produce antibodies with known specificity to 
particular target antigens42 (Marks, 2013b, Marks, 2015). In order to do this Milstein and 
Kohler found that by fusing a normal B cell from the spleen of a mouse, immunised with 
a specific antigen, with a myeloma cell, they could produce a hybrid cell that could 
secrete antibodies of known specificity, and survive indefinitely (Marks, 2013b, Marks, 
2015, Liu, 2014). This technology would later be dubbed hybridoma technology, and 
described as a method to produce mabs.  
Controversially, this UK technology was not patented, with the National Research 
Development Corporation (the public body responsible for the commercialisation of 
academic discoveries at the time) concluding that they could not ‘identify any immediate 
applications’ (Marks, 2013b). With the subsequent publication of the Spinks43 committee 
report, the new conservative government at the time, led by Thatcher, and the realisation 
of the potential applications of biotechnology, the decision not to patent was hailed as a 
repeat of the mistakes made in the missed commercial opportunity surrounding penicillin 
(Tansey and Catterall, 1997).  
These mistakes were, however, not immediately apparent due to the lack of success of 
early attempts at using mabs as therapeutics. This lack of success came from the 
difficulty of using animal cell lines in the production of antibodies, causing 
immunogenicity (ability to induce an immune response in the body) (Liu, 2014, Nelson 
et al., 2010). Humanisation is required to overcome this. The most popular strategy used 
for reducing the murine component of mabs was in the combination of rodent and human 
sequences, producing humanised or chimeric mabs (Nelson et al., 2010). 
This new approach to mabs has enabled it to become a popular strategy for drug 
discovery, particularly in oncology, that has reaped substantial success, with six out of 
                                                 
 
42  Antigens are the substances that initiate an immune response in the body, for instance, 
chemicals, bacteria, viruses or pollen (www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002224.htm) 
43 The Spinks report, published in 1980, was the first effort to produce a coherent policy for 
biotechnology in the UK. 
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the ten best selling drugs being antibodies (Marks, 2013b, Marks, 2015), and peak sales 
predicted to reach $50 billion in 2012 (Morrow, 2012). In the dataset for this thesis several 
cases discussed were derived from antibody technology. 
2.3.5.3 Immunotoxins/Antibody-Drug Conjugates 
Immunotoxins and antibody-drug conjugates have been grouped together here because 
they are both the product of the conjugation of two components, one responsible for 
targeting the cell, and the other a drug or toxin. Here the antibody activates the drug/toxin 
conjugate upon binding to the cell receptor leading to cell death. Antibody-drug 
conjugates involve the combination of an antibody with a drug, usually a known 
anticancer drug, and immunotoxins are made up of an antibody-toxin conjugate (Teicher 
and Chari, 2011). Of the cases used in this thesis, gemtuzumab is classified as an 
antibody-drug conjugate, and CAT3888 and TransMID are both immunotoxins (see 
Chapter 7).  
The area of research contributing towards antibody conjugates and immunotoxins dates 
back to the 1950s with the idea that antibodies could be used to target tumours 
(Pressman and Korngold, 1953). The concept of immunotoxins can be traced to the work 
of Albert on prodrugs which suggested that drugs can be activated in vivo to produce a 
therapeutic effect (Albert, 1958, Singh et al., 2008). This is applicable to immunotoxins 
as these involve a cell receptor binding molecule, in this case an antibody that activates 
a drug/toxin conjugate upon binding to the cell receptor leading to cell death, producing 
a targeted response.  
Immunotoxins and antibody-drug conjugates arose out of the realisation that few 
antibodies have the ability to kill cells in sufficient numbers to induce a significant tumour 
response (Pastan, 2003). Antibody conjugates (both antibody-drug conjugates and 
immunotoxins) represented a new wave of cancer therapeutics in the 1980s where many 
scientists were exploring different combinations of toxins (and drugs) and antibodies 
(Pastan, 2003).  
Initially, in the 1970s, investigators at Ira Pastan’s NCI lab focused on developing an 
understanding of the process of absorption of growth factors, hormones and viruses, into 
cells (ibid). In 1983, the team realised the potential of targeting a particular toxin, 
Pseudomonas exotoxin, to cancer cells using antibodies as a mechanism of targeting 
(Fitzgerald et al., 1983). In addition to Pseudomonas exotoxin, other toxins used in early 
research of immunotoxins were diphtheria, pokeweed anti-viral protein, ricin, abrin and 
gelonin (Teicher and Chari, 2011). As with mabs, the main limitation to the testing of 
initial efforts in immunotoxins, was the immunogenicity of the antibodies used and the 
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difficulties associated with the large size of the antibody component causing issues with 
penetration into solid tumours (Teicher and Chari, 2011). This realisation led to a second 
generation of immunotoxins using antibody fragments produced through recombinant 
techniques (Teicher and Chari, 2011). The strategy of antibody-drug conjugate approach 
utilised anticancer drugs adjoined to mabs in order to improve their selectivity and 
therefore therapeutic index (Teicher and Chari, 2011) 
2.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided the necessary contextual basis for an assessment of the data 
that will follow in the subsequent Chapters, 6 and 7. The first, pre-1970 section 
highlighted the establishment of policies, industry, regulatory systems, institutions and 
funding which provided a solid foundation for drug discovery and development through 
trial and error investigations. Furthermore, we also demonstrated how these 
developments had particularly positive consequences for the development of cancer 
therapeutics. This involved an increasing awareness during the mid-20th Century in the 
US and UK, from policy, the public, and scientists, for the need for a centralised effort to 
combat cancer.  
The second half of the Chapter explored the implications of these advances in the post-
1970s period, where scientific understanding and new technologies led to the coevolution 
of regulatory processes, drug discovery and development approaches, and industry 
structure and strategy. These shifts, in the increasing reliance on a molecular 
understanding of disease for drug discovery and development, and industrial dynamics, 
represent trajectory shifts constrained by environmental selection pressures. These 
constraints have led to doubt of the impact these developments have had in terms of 
benefit to patients44.  
In these discussions we have witnessed the increasing interest in cancer research, from 
the public, policy-makers and industry. In the time before Nixon’s declaration of the War 
on Cancer, oncology was perceived to be akin to quack medicine. This is in stark contrast 
to present day NIH budget metrics which place cancer as the highest funded disease 
area 45 . This trend has coevolved with the shift in drug development more broadly, 
                                                 
 
44 This disappointment is related to both the difficulties in adapting to changing technological 
trajectories and the influence of path dependency, as well as the high costs and low levels of 
Quality Adjusted Life Years that have been associated with newly developed treatments. 
45 http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx  
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involving new approaches and technologies modalities, and the resultant shift in the 
industry and regulatory environment. 
This thesis aims to explore the selection pressures acting on these shifts and the direct 
influence they have on the development of drug innovations. This Chapter has facilitated 
an appreciation of the diversity of organisations and increasing complexity in this process. 
Due to the complex interactions between organisations involved in biomedical innovation 
there is an emphasis on knowledge, resources and knowledge transfer, and the 
multiplicity of the organisations, individuals and stakeholders involved in this process, 
facets of which are discussed in Chapter 3.  
In the following Chapter we will also explore the literature surrounding biomedical 
innovations and thereby formulate a framework to guide the research design. This 
literature review will also justify the focus on drug projects, due to the frequency of studies 
that take the organisational drug, i.e. the locus of innovation, as the unit of analysis. 
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3 What Do We Know About Biomedical Innovation? 
This Chapter presents a review of the biomedical innovation literature46 and, in doing so, 
facilitates a deconstruction of drug development as a process defined by the actors and 
resources that surround it. Innovation is, distinct from invention, the commercialisation 
and exploitation of new ideas (Freeman and Soete, 1997:6). This involves not only the 
outcome of innovation but also the process leading to the outcome. Accordingly, this 
thesis is focused on the development of innovative drugs, examining both those that 
succeed in being commercialised and those that are unsuccessful.  
Innovation can be used to describe a product or process, radical or incremental, and 
technological or organisational (Tidd et al., 1997). This thesis, which investigates 
biomedical innovation, focuses on technological product innovation that is largely radical 
and heavily reliant on a strong scientific foundation. In the relationship between science 
and innovation we observe that theory is a weak guide to practice, whereby R&D is 
mostly dependent on the ‘development’ aspect (Pavitt, 1999). This is due to the tacit 
nature of innovation that accumulates through a process of learning by doing, leading to 
path dependency at the organisational level.  
While broadly speaking innovation is understood as having six common characteristics: 
uncertain, risky, partly tacit, experimental, distributed, increasingly dependent on a 
scientific foundation, and regulated (Dosi, 1988), these are amplified in biomedicine. 
Here innovation is understood to be unique in its highly uncertain, risky and science-
intensive nature, as well as the strict regulatory environment it is situated in. 
Chapter 2 demonstrated the shifting nature of the system surrounding biomedical 
innovation over the past 40 years. This has been characterised by an emphasis on the 
increased specialisation of knowledge, necessitating complex dynamics between 
                                                 
 
46 The search terms used for this literature search were as follows: (biotech* AND innovation 
refined for social science, sociology, business economics, social issues, oncology, 
communication, history, social sciences and other topics, biomedical social sciences, operations 
research management science, history philosophy of science, science technology other topics); 
(innovation AND management AND drug AND success); (drug AND success refined for social 
science, sociology, business economics, social issues, oncology, communication, history, social 
sciences and other topics, biomedical social sciences, operations research management 
science); and (pharma* AND innovation refined for social science, sociology, business 
economics, social issues, oncology, communication, history, social sciences and other topics, 
biomedical social sciences, operations research management science, history philosophy of 
science, science technology other topics). In addition, papers with 20 or more citations were 
assessed in order to facilitate a focused and systematic literature review while gaining accounting 
for the articles with the largest impact.  
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organisations and division of labour. In this Chapter we take this discussion further by 
investigating the literature that has attempted to explain these dynamics in accessing 
knowledge and resources, and in directing the progress of innovation. In doing so this 
Chapter will discuss the key actors influential in defining the success or failure of a drug 
development project.  
The literature review provides an avenue for highlighting the key characteristics and 
mechanisms influencing innovation direction and outcomes. These are categorised into 
four conditions and discussed in the final section of this Chapter. These are:  
 knowledge base 
 market demand 
 stakeholder perspectives 
 organisational environment.  
These conditions comprise the framework that will be implemented to guide data 
collection and analysis. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of ‘project drag’ which is 
used to describe the process by which influential factors act on innovation causing 
projects to gain, or lose momentum. 
The following review highlights two gaps in the existing literature. Firstly, studies tend to 
be limited to one of two dimensions of analysis, focusing on the innovation impact of 
organisations, and their networks and/or individuals, and their networks. In an attempt to 
fill this gap, this thesis implements a multi-dimensional approach, considering a holistic 
picture of the environment surrounding, and influencing, innovations, including 
organisation, network and individuals levels. These subsections give structure to the 
Chapter. 
The second gap identified in this literature review is a concentration on organisations 
and the environmental forces indirectly influencing innovations, through the ability of a 
firm to innovate. Therefore there is a need to take the innovation as the unit of analysis 
in order to fully appreciate the environmental dynamics influencing project success and 
failure.  
3.1 Organisational Level Dynamics in Biomedical Innovation 
One of the key developments in innovation studies has been in the appreciation of 
innovation as highly complex and interactive. In this there has been a shift towards a 
focus on innovations as dynamic, cumulative, path-dependent and the subject of 
evolution involving selection pressures (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Evolutionary 
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economics began a tradition of emphasising knowledge and learning in the innovation 
process, where innovations are reliant, not only on physical resources and tangible 
assets, but also on intangible capabilities embedded in people, their knowledge, and the 
integration of this.  
Much of the biomedical innovation literature focuses on innovation performance within 
the firm, organisational performance and competitive advantage. The focus of this thesis 
is at the project level, however, as most of the literature focuses on the influence of forces 
on innovations through firm boundaries, it is necessary to consider literature investigating 
organisational dynamics. Here we focus on the organisation as a mediator, and therefore 
forces acting on firm performance and competitive advantage, as an avenue to 
understand project dynamics.  
This literature tends to draw on three main approaches. Firstly, the resource-based view, 
where a key asset of a firm’s competitive advantage lies in the resources, both tangible 
and intangible, they possess (Barney, 1991). Secondly, the dynamic capabilities 
approach, where there is an emphasis on the firm’s ability to develop and use the 
resources they have, highlighting the importance of internal technological, organisational 
and managerial processes (Teece et al., 1997). Finally, the knowledge-based view, 
where organisational performance and competitive advantage are associated with a 
firm’s knowledge base, its ability to create new knowledge and integrate knowledge from 
outside organisational boundaries (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996b, Bierly and Chakrabarti, 
1996a, Grant, 1996). 
The distributed, tacit and science-based nature of innovation justifies the following 
discussion which will focus on the sources and integration of knowledge, with an 
appreciation of the level of specialisation and division of labour acknowledged in Chapter 
2. This section is structured in line with discussions of resources enabling innovation, 
including assets, access to funding, knowledge and the ability to integrate and transfer 
that knowledge. We are firstly concerned with internal dynamics of these resources, and 
secondly, the external. This facilitates the identification of particular characteristics and 
mechanisms that contribute towards innovation outcomes.  
3.1.1 Internal Dynamics, Knowledge and Knowledge Integration 
The biomedical innovation literature frequently discusses firm level characteristics 
influencing organisation performance and product development. It is these internal 
dynamics that are the focus of this section, informing the factors warranting observation 
in the environment surrounding a drug development project.  
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Size, experience and product portfolio is found to be significant for firms in discussions 
of economies of scale and scope and the relationship this has with innovation 
performance. For instance, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) assessed the discovery 
phases of drug innovation and conclude that size is related to productivity, whereby 
larger firms enjoy economies of scale and scope and knowledge spillovers contributing 
to increased patent outputs. In a follow-on paper, however, the authors find that 
economies of scale are less relevant to the success of drugs in development phases 
(Cockburn and Henderson, 2001).  
In addition to the relationship between firm size and economies of scale and scope, other 
studies have emphasised the impact of knowledge spillovers, in terms of experience 
(Macher and Boerner, 2006), and depth and breadth of product portfolio (Sorescu et al., 
2003), on innovation success. Here it is clear that, while size is an important indicator of 
the extent to which firms can be successful in exploiting economies of scale and scope 
in innovation, this influence may be mediated by product portfolio and other knowledge 
dynamics.  
Size and economies of scope are also relevant to discussions of asset accumulation 
from internal and external knowledge sourcing strategies. Here in large pharma the 
interdependence of technologies influences the accumulation of assets. For instance, 
the influence of the utility of chemical libraries on the introduction of high throughput 
screening technologies (Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). However, larger firms have 
difficulties integrating external assets due to the structural inertia that exists (Thomke 
and Kuemmerle, 2002). This contributes towards stability in the industry whereby, 
although large firms are reliant on smaller biotech for access to new technological 
expertise, large firms cannot be displaced due to the complementarity between old and 
new technologies, and technological approaches. 
The impact of size, product portfolio and technological capabilities on organisational 
innovation potential provides evidence supporting the benefits in capitalising on the 
characteristics of a firm to facilitate performance. In addition to the critical role of small 
firms in providing access to new specialist knowledge and technologies (as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2), there is a critical role of large firms in the drug development 
process, due to the associated economies of scope and scale, experience, knowledge 
spillovers and older technologies and capabilities. 
However, the reciprocity between large and small firms, and the positive influence this 
has on innovation relies on the ability of firms to gain access to the resources that 
facilitate their ability to innovate. Studies show a cyclical relationship between resources, 
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capabilities and funding in both stock-market offerings and access to venture capital 
(Deeds et al., 1997, Baum and Silverman, 2004). The factors contributing towards a 
successful initial public offering (IPO) were shown, by Deeds and colleagues (1997), to 
be scientific capabilities, such as number of products under development, number of 
patents, R&D expenditure, location, and quality of R&D staff. In addition, where venture 
capital funding is assumed to allow firms access to credibility, funding and management 
capabilities (Niosi, 2003), Baum and Silverman (2004) found that not only did VC 
contribute towards the performance of firms, but that VC’s picked winners, as well as 
building them up. Small firms are vulnerable to these dynamics particularly due to their 
tendency to lack profitability, and the resultant reliance on external sources 
Due to its dispersed nature innovation is dependent on access to knowledge (explore in 
the following section) and on the internal capabilities contributing towards the integration 
and absorption of that knowledge. Here, the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ is significant. 
This refers to the ability of a firm to apply new knowledge from external sources (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990), and is dependent on internal R&D capabilities, whereby a 
foundation of knowledge is required to facilitate learning from, and develop new 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Gambardella, 1992). In turn, absorptive capacity 
has been found to improve external knowledge flows and thereby stimulate innovation 
contributing to the competitive advantage of firms (Escribano et al., 2009).  
Several studies have attempted to investigate the factors that contribute to absorptive 
capacity in life sciences firms. For instance, Fabrizio (2009) associates absorptive 
capacity with the accumulation of basic research through links with universities 
contributing to the improved search for new, and good quality, inventions. Another study 
has shown the importance of size and experience in contributing towards a firm’s 
absorptive capacity (Van Wijk et al., 2008). This evidence implies that larger, more 
experienced firms would hold a higher absorptive capacity than smaller firms.  
This is complicated, however, with Lane and Lubatkin’s (1998) conception of ‘relative 
absorptive capacity’. Here, there is an emphasis on the similarities of firms’ knowledge 
bases, organisational structures and research communities, in contributing towards the 
organisational learning that occurs between firms. This may be explained by the 
observation that cultural and institutional differences complicate the transferral of 
knowledge between organisations (Bstieler and Hemmert, 2010). The similarity of firms’ 
stocks of knowledge and knowledge dynamics has also been found to be significant in 
the selection of partners for collaborative relationships between firms (Baum et al., 2010). 
This adds a depth of complexity as it implies that despite large firms having the 
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experience and internal R&D capabilities for building an absorptive capacity, they may 
still incur difficulties when integrating knowledge from small firms due to cultural and 
institutional differences.  
The degree to which a firm has an absorptive capacity is significant in this thesis as it 
allows for the development of a proxy to indicate the extent to which a firm would be 
expected to be able to absorb project related knowledge in the case of collaborative, 
acquisition and licensing agreements. 
Knowledge can be broadly distinguished into two types: tacit and codified knowledge. 
The transfer of knowledge is dependent on the types of knowledge being transferred and 
how easily it can be communicated, interpreted and absorbed (Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
Innovation is largely based on tacit knowledge, particularly if radical. However, the 
codification of tacit knowledge is not simple, where ambiguity (Van Wijk et al., 2008), 
problem structure (Macher and Boerner, 2012) and modularity (Pisano, 2006) have been 
highlighted as central issues. The transfer of tacit knowledge is problematic and involves 
a high level of interaction, coordination and communication (Pavitt, 1999).  
Due to these complexities in the dynamics and characteristics of knowledge, the location 
of R&D, both within and between firms, is an influential factor in innovation productivity. 
Here, we observe that in the transferral of knowledge between and within firms, 
particularly when this knowledge comprises a high level of tacit knowledge, requires 
extensive communication, coordination and interaction between actors. 
Knowledge transfer and innovation within big pharma is also influenced by the location 
of R&D facilities, where some organisations have shifted towards decentralised models. 
This shift involves the evolution of smaller autonomous centres involved in R&D activities, 
aiming to replace bureaucratic control with market control (Jones, 2000). This process 
of decentralisation of R&D facilities has been observed to be both beneficial and 
problematic to innovation. Former CEO of GSK observes that decentralisation enables 
the shift of responsibility for innovation management to scientists who have the passion 
and creativity necessary for R&D (Garnier, 2008).  
However, where centrality in the presence of a broad R&D capability facilitates the 
development of absorptive capacity (Zhang et al., 2007), decentralisation proves 
problematic to the transferral of tacit knowledge which requires an understanding of the 
context of knowledge production and accumulation (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). While 
this highlights the need for coordination and communication in decentralised 
organisations (Leiponen and Helfat, 2011), there are also implications on the type of 
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innovation that will be produced. Decentralisation may be beneficial to making 
improvements to existing drugs, or increasing the number of new patents, but it has a 
negative impact on the production of new drugs (Cardinal and Hatfield, 2000, Leiponen 
and Helfat, 2011). The level of centralisation of R&D processes influences innovation 
through a process by which knowledge resources can be transferred.  
In this section of the literature review we have discussed the studies undertaken on an 
organisational level where access to, and dynamics in, internal resources have been the 
focus. Much of this literature has focused on characteristics of firms that facilitate their 
ability to innovate. Here, the ability to exploit economies of scale and scope, the 
production of knowledge efficiently and the extent to which this knowledge spills over 
were found to be influenced by the size and experience of firms. In addition, the ability 
for firms to absorb new knowledge was also found to be associated with experience and 
internal R&D capabilities, however the similarities between firms was also found to be 
significant. Due to the complex nature of knowledge, it was observed that high levels of 
communication, coordination and interaction are required to facilitate knowledge transfer 
processes, which are influenced by the level of decentralisation of R&D in larger firms. 
In the context of biomedical innovation, and the establishment of new specialised biotech 
firms since the 1970s, and the resultant reciprocity in the relationship between 
organisations in the industry knowledge transfer is an important consideration. Here we 
observed characteristics of organisations and relationships that tend to facilitate this 
process. In addition, as we have highlighted in smaller firms, resource vulnerabilities can 
be detrimental to the innovation process, both in financial and knowledge-based assets. 
These observations provide guidance to the case histories that follow (Chapters 6 and 
7) whereby they have highlighted the types of characteristics that would be expected to 
facilitate the success of innovative activities.  
3.1.2 External sources of knowledge 
As highlighted above, access to knowledge is a key determinant of innovative activity in 
firms. There are two distinct processes that can contribute towards providing external 
knowledge for firms: collaborations and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). These 
discussions are particularly significant in this thesis due to the observation that no one 
firm has all of the capabilities necessary for innovation development. In the biomedical 
innovation literature there has been a large disparity in the distribution of studies, with a 
large majority focusing on collaborative strategies and relationships.  
This section will divide discussion between these two options of accessing external 
knowledge (collaborations and M&A). The studies focusing on collaborative relationships 
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are more extensive, although lessons can be drawn from these to discussions of M&A. 
The collaboration section covers three areas: 1) the context and roles of collaborations, 
2) the specific nuances in different organisations involved in collaborations and 3) the 
factors contributing towards the performance of collaborations. In doing so this section 
highlights the characteristics of collaborative and M&A relationships that facilitate, and 
impede innovation.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, collaborations became a key strategy in biomedical 
innovation in the wake of the introduction of new technologies and processes in the 
production of new drugs and the associated rise of a new business model in the form of 
new biotech firms. The knowledge supporting new product development in biomedicine 
is, therefore, increasingly complex and multi-disciplinary where innovation tends to begin 
in smaller firms lacking in commercialisation expertise, requiring larger firms, who 
struggle to collaborate with universities and thereby miss out on accessing new scientific 
discoveries (Arora and Gambardella, 1994, Shan et al., 1994). The result of this is the 
emergence of an open innovation model in the industry (Bianchi et al., 2011). This also 
allowed for a departure away from the reliance on a vertical integration model for small 
firms, enabling them to focus on technological and knowledge specialisation (Whittaker 
and Bower, 1994)  
Here, in addition to technological knowledge, small biotech firms require access to 
complementary assets, (i.e. the necessary capabilities for the global commercialisation, 
marketing and sales required for successful appropriation of returns from innovations 
(Teece, 1986)) in order to introduce new products and grow (Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). 
In addition to the difficulties associated with small firms having sufficient economies of 
scale for large scale commercialisation strategies, collaborations for complementary 
assets are also motivated by the transaction costs associated with environmental 
barriers such as regulatory pressures (Greis et al., 1995).  
As mentioned in Chapter 2 the progression of collaborative relationships between 
organisations involved in the drug discovery and development process tend to follow a 
predictable pattern from universities to biotech to pharma firms. One of the reasons 
behind this is the role of biotech firms as an intermediary, in part due to the institutional 
and cultural differences between universities and big pharma (Pisano, 2006, Stuart et al., 
2007). For instance, where industry are focused on profit generating as a primary 
motivation for innovation, academic scientists tend to be focused on scientific discoveries, 
knowledge production and career advancement (Montaner et al., 2001). These cultural 
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differences can make it difficult for knowledge to be transferred from one actor to another, 
thereby necessitating the role of a biotech mediator.  
This is reminiscent of the arguments put forward by Lane and Lubatkin (1998) who 
highlight the importance of similarities of firm characteristics in developing absorptive 
capacity and the difficulties of organisational and institutional differences in knowledge 
transfer (Bstieler and Hemmert, 2010). Furthermore, collaborative research efforts 
between scientists at universities and biotech do not often take the form of formal market 
contracts involving informal networks that facilitate a level of flexibility not always 
possible in larger firms (Liebeskind et al., 1996). This further supports the idea that 
biotech-university linkages tend to be more straightforward than those between 
universities and pharma.  
Furthermore, with the frequency of academic entrepreneurs and the increasing pattern 
of university spin-offs, boundaries between universities and biotech firms are being 
blurred and broken down (Fontes, 2005, Powers and McDougall, 2005). This highlights 
the facilitation of collaborations between universities and biotech.  
In addition to cultural and institutional differences, information asymmetries, uncertainty 
and transaction costs have been found to inhibit the collaborative behaviour of smaller 
firms proving problematic in organisations so reliant on R&D and external knowledge 
(Audretsch and Feldman, 2003). Asymmetries in information, particularly in terms of 
experience in undertaking collaborative alliances, also influences the deals biotech 
companies can access with substantially discounted payments associated with the first 
initiation of an alliance by a new firm (Nicholson et al., 2005). This further highlights 
issues that can occur when collaborative relationships are undertaken to progress a drug 
project. 
Additional factors found to influence the performance of collaborations, and therefore the 
outcome of an innovation include: 1) the timing of the alliance (Danzon et al., 2005), too 
early and the firm loses the benefits of innovation, too late and a biotech partner may 
undergo cash flow issues, and 2) the experience of undertaking alliances, and in 
particular, partner-specific alliances. This final point is, however, contentious with Hoang 
and Rothaermel (2005) showing no relationship between experience and innovation 
performance while Wuyts and colleagues (2004) do identify an association.  
In addition, in an indirect relationship with innovation performance through the action of 
the transfer of knowledge, trust is also found to be significant in collaborations (Nielsen 
and Nielsen, 2009). Furthermore, cooperation between partners also has a role in 
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knowledge transfer and the effective working of a collaborative relationship. In this, trust 
and control have been shown to be key to efficient partner cooperation (Das and Teng, 
1998).  
So far this section has explored the literature describing the dynamics of collaborative 
relationships and the factors typically observed to be influencing the performance of such 
a relationship. When putting the dynamics of collaborations together, networks of 
alliances begin to be appreciated. Here, characteristics of the network have been found 
to influence its innovation performance.  
These characteristics include: the technological distance between the partners, the firm’s 
network centrality and the density of the network (i.e. how closely linked actors in the 
network are to each other) (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006, Hagedoorn et al., 2006). In 
addition, while direct linkages between firms are important in the innovation network, 
indirect linkages also play and important role in connecting firms and allowing for greater 
access to new information and opportunities (Salman and Saives, 2005). 
One mechanism in this process is that of the production and fostering of social capital47. 
By representing the resources available in a network, or in specific relationships, social 
capital has been shown to be a key contributory factor in the development of coordination 
and creativity (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), highlighting the distinct and important role 
it plays in facilitating (particularly tacit) knowledge transfer. Social capital is found to be 
a significant and important resource for biotech start-ups to build effective cooperative 
behaviour with partners (Walker et al., 1997). 
Social capital is also significant in the relationship between innovation performance and 
the activities of managers (Moran, 2005). In this argument, both structural (access to 
people and knowledge, access to opportunities, sales performance and reliance on 
tangible assets) and relational (closeness, trust, innovation performance and 
interpersonal relations) embeddedness are found to be important considerations (Moran, 
2005). 
The cohesiveness of a network can be measured through its density, (Scott, 2000). 
Density presents the proportion of all possible social ties between individuals that are 
                                                 
 
47 The sum of actual and potential resources embedded within, available through and derived 
from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998) 
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observed, and has been found to be related to team performance and commitment of a 
team to stay together (Balkundi and Harrison, 2006, Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001) 
In the alternative form of accessing external knowledge, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
have also been discussed in the biomedical innovation literature. Where M&A are a 
frequent occurrence in the life cycle of biotech firms, it is necessary, to discuss the impact 
these events have on drug development.  
M&A is often found to be detrimental to innovation, being described as a ‘poison pill’ (Hitt 
et al., 1991a), and a distraction for managers of innovation (Ernst and Vitt, 2000, James, 
2002). This has also been associated with firm-level path-dependence and organisation-
specific routines where the tacit nature and social embeddedness of capabilities means 
that they are sensitive to change (James, 2002). In addition, firms commonly undertake 
M&A strategies in times of desperation where they acquire new firms in order to replenish 
their pipeline (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006).  
However, investigation of M&A events and their influence on biomedical innovation 
warrants further exploration into mechanisms associated with this negative impact. 
Firstly, like collaborative relationships and the integration of external knowledge into firms, 
the performance of M&A depends on the internal knowledge capacity of the acquiring 
firm (Ahuja and Katila, 2001).  
In addition, the similarity of the knowledge bases of the target and acquiring firm has also 
been found to be important to M&A success (Mowery et al., 1996, Prabhu et al., 2005), 
as has the knowledge an acquiring firm has about the target firm, prior to acquisition 
(Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Larger firms with more diverse capabilities in product 
development and downstream commercialisation assets have been found to be better at 
M&A, whereby product capital (product development and support assets) is a significant 
factor in acquisition performance.  
In acquisitions, post-event knowledge transfer has been shown to be enhanced by 
communication, visits, meetings and the time since the acquisition took place (Bresman 
et al., 1999). In addition, knowledge transfer has also been shown to be reliant on trust, 
strong relationships and shared visions to overcome common issues associated with 
tacit knowledge and cultural differences (Van Wijk et al., 2008).  
The level of integration involved in an acquisition, whereby on the one hand a f irm may 
acquire another but not integrate it into the organisation, and on the other, the target firm 
may be fully integrated, is also found to influence the level of performance of the 
acquisition (Paruchuri et al., 2006). Here, one study found differences in research 
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expertise of the two firms impacted integration to cause the greatest disruption to 
innovation (Paruchuri et al., 2006). Another emphases the importance having different 
integration approaches dependent on the position of the acquired business in the value 
chain, with R&D entities maintaining a degree of autonomy post-acquisition (Schweizer, 
2005). 
3.1.3 Organisational Level Summary 
In summary, this section has provided an overview of the literature concerning the 
dynamics of external sources of knowledge in the form of collaborations and M&A, taking 
into consideration the distributed, science-based and tacit nature of innovation. In doing 
so we can begin to highlight mechanisms by which collaborative relationships and M&A 
events impact innovation.  
Firstly we built on discussions from Chapter 2 in demonstrating the reciprocal relationship 
that has been built between the main actors in drug discovery and development, pharma, 
universities and biotech. Here, we discussed the difficulties in collaborations between 
organisations that show particular cultural and institutional differences, for instance, 
pharma and universities. Here one mechanism for mediating this effect is in the use of 
biotech firms as an intermediary. We discussed the performance factors associated with 
collaborative relationships and the role of the network location and relationships of an 
organisation, for instance, in the facilitation of the formation of social capital between 
actors.  
The literature on M&A in part replicates the concepts from the previous sections in terms 
of emphasising the difficulties in knowledge transfer. In addition, the integration of the 
acquired firm into the enlarged organisation was also found to be a significant factor in 
determining the success of the acquisition. This literature is of particular significance as 
M&A events can be interpreted to be problematic for innovation, and drug projects, due 
to the organisational environment they create.  
3.2 Individual Level Influences on Innovation 
So far in this Chapter we have recognised the importance of resource support for 
innovations, on an organisational and inter-organisational level. This access to resources, 
including knowledge is particularly salient when we reconsider the distributed, science-
based, uncertain and tacit nature of innovation. As this section demonstrates is also 
necessary to consider this, and the support innovations get, on an individual level. This 
is particularly important due to the key role played by individuals, in shaping the direction 
of innovation within organisations.  
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This discussion will focus on individuals both within and outside the project team, where 
innovations can be influenced in a number of directions by the stakeholders that surround 
it. This section will focus on the mechanisms by which individuals can shape 
technologies, thereby impacting their success, or failure, and the nature and 
characteristics of these individuals, and networks, or groups of individuals.  
Individual level influences on innovation can be split into three areas: 1) the action of key 
individuals, 2) the interaction between academic scientists and industry, and 3) network 
positions of individuals and the influence this has on the ability to create and absorb the 
knowledge necessary for innovative activities.  
3.2.1 Key Individuals – Characteristics and Impact on Innovation 
The literature around the idea that key individuals may impact the progression of 
innovations began with the idea of ‘champions’48, highlighting the role of individuals 
reducing resistance to radical innovations allowing for adoption (Schon, 1963). While it 
is intuitive that most innovative projects will involve of key individuals, it is the action and 
characteristics of these people that define the nature of their influence on innovation.  
Early definitions of champions highlighted a direct link to innovation success. Here they 
were described as individuals that ‘make a decisive contribution to the innovation actively 
and enthusiastically, promoting its progress through critical stages’ (Rothwell et al., 1974, 
Rothwell, 1992). Champions influence innovation by expressing enthusiasm and 
confidence for a project, getting people involved and persisting under adversity (Howell 
et al., 2005, Rothwell, 1992).  
Additional characteristics associated with successful champions include: 1) pursuing 
innovative ideas, 2) network building, 3) persisting under adversity and 4) taking 
responsibility for the idea (Walter et al., 2011). In addition, in leadership skills, key 
individuals responsible for managing creative individuals are found to have technical 
prowess and an ability to get people to work together (Mumford et al., 2002). Common 
personality traits found to be associated with champions, include leadership qualities, 
charisma, confidence and inspiration (Howell and Higgins, 1990).  
                                                 
 
48 The term ‘champions’ fell out of favour in innovation studies, due to the difficulty in defining the 
concept and the variety in the actions and characteristics of different individuals, and their 
influence on innovation. Despite this section reviewing the literature on champions and thereby 
using this terminology, in general in this thesis we will refer to ‘key individuals’.  
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The diversity of skills necessary for key individuals to be influential is akin to the term 
‘heterogeneous engineers’, whereby in order to be successful innovators must act as 
‘system builders’ reshaping the social world that surrounds the innovation (Law, 1987). 
Champions have a direct impact on innovation projects and programmes, while indirectly 
impacting firm performance (Markham and Griffin, 1998). It has also been observed that 
champions can have a negative influence by backing failures (Markham et al., 1991). In 
particular, the impact champions have can begin to become dysfunctional producing an 
inverted U-shape in the relationship between both ‘persisting under adversity’ and ‘taking 
responsibility, and innovation sales growth  (Walter et al., 2011). This can be explained 
by the fact that champions will continue to support a project despite potential low 
performance (Markham, 2000). 
Much of the literature has focused on the different types of champions and the skills they 
need to influence innovation. Firstly, Burgelman (1983) identified the group leader, or 
venture manager, as requiring knowledge skills (i.e. technical and need linking); a new 
venture development manager, having persuasion and political skills in strategic building; 
and a corporate manager, with commercial skills in rationalisation. 
In addition categorisations of key individuals include: technical innovators/inventors, 
business innovators, and chief executives, with the varying levels of influence in 
promoting innovation, relating to seniority, age, power, and experience (Rothwell et al., 
1974, Rothwell, 1992, Freeman, 1997). 
The different skills required for roles in innovation are: the inventor, requiring knowledge, 
a breadth of understanding, ability to problem solve and provide inspiration, motivation 
and commitment; the organisational sponsor, with power, influence and an ability to pull 
strings based on belief in the potential of a project, not dependent on in-depth knowledge; 
the business innovator, providing a user perspective and market implications; and the 
technological gatekeeper, responsible for collecting information from the network and 
distributing it within the project group (Tidd and Bessant, 2013:120-122). 
In addition, receptiveness is also key to the extent to which a key individual can influence 
the direction of an innovation. This has been found to be both sector, and organisation 
specific, whereby larger organisations with hierarchical and bureaucratic structures will 
be less easily influenced by a champion than smaller organisations with flatter and more 
flexible structures (Rothwell, 1992, Rothwell et al., 1974). This may be associated with 
formalisation of processes, i.e. the more formal the structure and processes of an 
organisation, the smaller the influence by individuals (Markham and Griffin, 1998). In this, 
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there is a key role of the individual to influence others’ values and visions around a project 
(Van De Ven, 1986). 
In this thesis we are interested in noting the characteristics which lend themselves to an 
individual becoming an advocate for the innovation being developed. For instance, we 
may observe an inventor who has the technical knowledge, breadth of understanding, 
motivation and commitment to see a project through from early stages, contributing to 
overcoming potential issues in development that might arise. In addition, the ability to 
mobilise resources, both in the organisation, and from networks, is also considered a 
critical skill of an individual in this context. We apply the term ‘project advocate’ to 
encompass these expertise, skills and characteristics of an individual which are critical 
to differentiating success from failure of the development of drug projects.   
Data charting the action of key individuals is largely observed to be anecdotal in nature 
and therefore generally reliant on post-hoc observations and selection biases towards 
successful projects (Markham and Griffin, 1998, Howell and Shea, 2006). In a statistical 
study of the influence of champions, Markham and Griffin (1998) observe a relationships 
between project and programme performance and the presence of a champion while 
also supporting an observation by Rothwell (1992), that champions play a role in 
innovation, but are not sufficient for success. Methodologically the presence of a positive 
influence of a key individual is perhaps more apparent in empirical data than the absence 
of influence. Furthermore, key individuals are generally recognised retrospectively, 
implying the potential for survival bias whereby a range of individuals may have been 
significant in influencing an innovation, but only one is remembered.  
In clinical investigations key individuals (clinical investigators) have been shown to 
promote the development of purine analogues by diversifying the range of indications 
the drugs were trialled in: ‘clinicians treating a particular disease and not the company 
producing the chemical entity may be the primary drivers of drug development’ (Flowers 
and Melmon, 1997:138). Furthermore, the action of clinical champions is directly linked 
with overcoming issues associated with lack of resources and limitations in relevant 
disease understanding (ibid).  
Flowers and Melmon (1999) ascribe the success of champions to their roles in pushing 
the projects through development, rather than projects being pulled from clinical need. 
Despite this study lacking an explanatory link between success and the role of the 
champion, as exemplified in project SAPPHO (Rothwell et al., 1974), it is clear from this 
that champions do have a role to play in the development of biomedical innovations.  
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In this section the characteristics and nature of the influence key individuals have on 
innovation have been demonstrated. In particular, we observe the ability for an individual 
to promote a project throughout development utilising particular skills, resources and 
characteristics. However, we have also discussed the limitation of the concept and 
suggested some ways in which different typologies can be used to improve the utility of 
it. Furthermore, we have highlighted the importance of identifying common 
characteristics, personality traits and activities, due to the methodological difficulties in 
observing the phenomenon.  
3.2.2 Key individuals and Networks 
This section will explore the influence of individuals’ networks interactions on innovation 
success. This discussion further appreciates the distributed nature of innovation, in 
individuals, where previous discussion has centred on distribution among organisations. 
The previous section highlighted the importance of structural characteristics that enable 
individuals to become key to the innovation process. One of these was the relationships 
between an individual and his or her network. Here motivations to collaborate, the nature 
of relationships, and how these relationships are formed, are found to be noteworthy.  
The motivation of academic scientists influences innovation due to their willingness to 
work with others outside academia. Furthermore, it is important to consider the output 
objectives held by individuals as alignment between these and those of industrial 
partners can be key in influencing success. University scientists have been found to be 
motived to partake in joint research, contract research and consulting, by research-
related motives, however, somewhat predictably, the formation of patents and spin-outs 
are associated with commercialisation motivations (D’Este and Perkmann, 2011). 
Furthermore, interactions with commercial scientists have an impact on the desire of 
university scientists to become entrepreneurs (i.e. start a spin-out company) (Stuart and 
Ding, 2006).  
The motivations for industry to interact with academic labs is associated with the 
presence of ‘scientific capital‘ (i.e. the intellectual capital, academic tenure, research 
settings and human capital contributing towards the accumulation of learning processes 
in collaborative relationships) and the presence of post-docs in research labs, providing 
an indicator of credibility, quality and the potential for future collaborations (Oliver, 2004).  
In defining and developing relationships, there is a role of key individuals in building trust 
and governing collaborative relationships in university-industry collaborations (Bstieler et 
al., 2015). Here relationships are encouraged by key individuals, in particular, in 
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supporting discussions around intellectual property and governance issues (Bstieler et 
al., 2015). 
Another example of the way in which key individuals act to facilitate relationships, 
demonstrated in discussions of interferon-α (Gutterman, 1997), highlights the critical role 
of key individuals (in this case the clinical discoverers) in promoting a research agenda 
to bring together and facilitate cooperation between the public sector, private sector and 
academia. This idea relates to that discussed above, wherein an individual’s network 
prove to be key in enabling innovation.  
Structurally the location of key individuals in the network impacts the relationships 
between organisations, the information flows facilitated and the impact on innovation 
performance. Firstly the centrality of inventors within the firm network has a mediating 
effect on information flows, resulting in an inverted U-shape relationship between 
centrality and innovation activities (Paruchuri, 2010). Key individuals also act as 
gatekeepers and boundary spanners between university and industry, facilitating 
interactions between these two institutional cultures (Breschi and Catalini, 2010, Hess 
and Rothaermel, 2011).  
The nature of the interactions between scientists is also important in networks of 
individuals and their impact on innovation. In this, the role of a corporate core scientist 
(defined by having high numbers of publications and citations) is key to absorptive 
capacity, due to the their position in occupying channels through which knowledge flows 
to researchers (Furukawa and Goto, 2006). Furthermore, interestingly these scientists 
are not themselves integral to the patenting behaviour of firms but act to promote patent 
applications of co-authors (Furukawa and Goto, 2006).  
This section has taken the discussion of the impact individuals have on innovation further, 
by reviewing the literature exploring the nature of the networks of individuals and the 
action these networks have. Here we have shown that motivations for collaboration 
depend on the output of the relationship from the academic perspective, and on the 
credibility of the research group, from the industrial partner perspective. Aligning these 
objectives would be expected to contribute towards a smooth working relationship. We 
find evidence supporting the previous observation that, position in, and nature of, a 
researcher’s network enables the action of individuals in positively contributing towards 
innovation success. The review of this literature has highlighted some key characteristics 
of individuals and networks and mechanisms by which innovation is influenced.   
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3.2.3 Expectations – Who Constructs Innovation and How? 
Expectations are diverse and take the form of ‘visions’ or ‘promises’, composed of ‘hopes 
and fears’, ‘wishes and desires’ (Koch, 2006). They can be individual or collective (Borup 
et al., 2006, Berkhout, 2006, Konrad, 2006), change over time (Brown and Michael, 2003, 
Borup et al., 2006, Berkhout, 2006), and depend on the situation of the actor (or 
stakeholder) in relation to the technology in question (Brown and Michael, 2003, Konrad, 
2006).  
Promises, visions and expectations are key to innovation due to its future-oriented nature 
(Borup et al., 2006). In particular, in radical innovation where there is a lack of previously 
evidenced utility, expectations are important in overcoming the inherent high uncertainty 
(Brown and Michael, 2003, van Lente and Rip, 1998). In our discussion of individuals 
and their influence on the progression and direction of innovation it is necessary to 
discuss expectations as a mechanism by which this influence occurs.  
Several of the main functions of expectations, in the influence they have on innovative 
activities, are reliant on shared visions. These are: 1) the ability for expectations to 
coordinate research efforts, 2) the mobilisation of resources, 3) the maintenance of 
networks by brokering relationships and 4) promotion of research directions (Brown and 
Michael, 2003, Borup et al., 2006, Konrad, 2006). These processes have a direct 
influence on innovation, through both individual and collective expectations within firms, 
and visions to motivate and set the pace of innovative activity (Borup et al., 2006, Konrad, 
2006).  
Expectations are also key in leadership, as observed in Paul Janssen manager of 
Janssen Pharmaceutica. Here, a successful management style is characterised as 
giving scientists freedom, encouraging probing activities while focusing efforts on 
achievable goals (Lewi and Smith, 2007). Another leadership behaviour, termed 
‘transformational leadership’, is described as promoting individual interests of leaders 
and followers, motivating the action of emotions, emotional links and values, encouraging 
creativity, visions of a shared mission, direction and innovation culture (García‐Morales 
et al., 2008) 
On an individual level, expectations, due to the direct link with uncertainty, may vary in 
accordance with the proximity of the individual to the production of knowledge 
surrounding an innovation (Brown and Michael, 2003, Sung and Hopkins, 2006, Konrad, 
2006). This is perceived not only because the actor closer to the innovation will have 
more knowledge about the potential for failure (information asymmetries), but also it is 
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likely that they will also have experience of past failures which may influence their 
expectations (Brown and Michael, 2003, Koch, 2006). Furthermore, in the case where 
the actor has vested interest in an innovation, i.e. they may benefit from its success, the 
expectation produced is likely to be heightened more than where the actor is not set to 
gain (Konrad, 2006).  
Martin et al. (2008) suggest the existence of ‘communities of promise’ which establish 
around a technology, in which a shared sense of community, encouraged by the 
imagination of the research contributing toward the innovation, informs the creation of 
knowledge and networks. In their work, Martin et al. (2008) describe three epistemic 
communities surrounding the development of haematopoietic stem cells which each 
play a role in influencing the development (both in basic science and clinical practice) 
of the technology.  
 
While expectations are usually associated with positive influences on innovation, 
uncertainty can lead to issues that cause actors to become disappointed (Borup et al., 
2006, Sung and Hopkins, 2006, Konrad, 2006). Here, expectations influence innovation 
through the creation of protected spaces arising from the embedding of shared 
expectations amongst actors, or communities of promise (Martin et al. 2008). This, and 
a process of lock-in, leads to the suspension of evaluation criteria, contributing towards 
results being interpreted subjectively (Konrad, 2006). When disappointment occurs, the 
protected space collapses, and the evaluation criteria are re-activated (Konrad, 2006).  
The concept of protected spaces has also been used in the strategic management 
literature applied to sustainability transitions (Schot and Geels, 2008, Smith and Raven, 
2012). Here, technological niches produce protective spaces for path breaking 
innovation which facilitate the shielding, nurturing and empowerment, thereby limiting the 
effect of selection pressures on the development and adoption of the technology (Schot 
and Geels, 2008).  
In this thesis we draw on Konrad’s (2006) conception of protected spaces, whereby it is 
applied not to the societal level but to the formation of collective expectations shared 
amongst actors within an organisational boundary. We expect small groups/firms to be 
more affected by the action of protected spaces due to the ease of sharing, embedding 
and reinforcing shared expectations.  
The shift of expectations from the individual to the collective is contributed towards by 
concept formation, i.e. the sharing of visions required for the dissemination of 
expectations (Brown and Michael, 2003), and the translation of expectations into a 
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codified format (Konrad, 2006). The sharing of expectations within a group facilitates 
mobilisation of more actors producing large cohorts of collective expectation that may 
eventually become assumptions in society (or in a particular group), thereby feeding back 
into individual expectations (Konrad, 2006). Here Martin et al. (2008) describe the 
stabilisation of the ‘socio-technical identity’ of networks through the sharing of imagined 
understandings between actors and within communities.  
Collective expectations are used by patients and patient groups to influence innovation 
through raising funds, decision making, trial design and implementation, development of 
disease registries, conferences, publishing and participatory research, as well as 
influencing technological trajectories, state politics and organisations and markets 
(Epstein, 2008). Epstein’s (1995) case study of AIDS activists in the 1980s demonstrates 
how trials for new HIV drugs were reconceptualised to have a dual purpose, both as a 
scientific experiment but also in healthcare provision. The mechanisms employed to 
achieve this included: obtaining credibility by learning the relevant terminology, attending 
conferences, reading and researching and building a basic scientific knowledge base, 
and taking sides on pre-existing debates (Epstein, 1995). Epstein (1995) also highlights 
the importance of the established networks and experience spilling over from the gay 
movement in the preceding decades. It is likely that this involved the development of 
shared visions and protected spaces, whereby groups of people could mobilise and 
come together for a collective cause.   
Patient groups have also been shown to have had an influence in the development, and 
post-marketing strategies, of the breast cancer drug, Herceptin 49 . Bazell (1998) 
describes patient groups putting pressure on Genentech to provide continued access to 
the drug for patients who had previously been enrolled in phase II trials. This activism 
was successful and Genentech did make the drug available on a compassionate use 
basis (Bazell, 1998).  
This consideration, of the action of patient advocacy groups is also highlighted in studies 
by Boon and colleagues (Boon and Moors, 2008, Boon et al., 2010, Boon et al., 2008, 
Boon et al., 2011). Specifically, the key role played by patient advocacy groups (or 
intermediary organisations) is stated to be in the articulation of demands by users, both 
patients and clinicians, to policy makers and producers (Boon et al., 2008, Boon et al., 
2011). This is of particular importance when managing expectations and shared visions 
                                                 
 
49 Further discussion of the development of Herceptin is presented in Chapter 5. 
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of a technology, or in a disease area (Boon and Moors, 2008, Boon et al., 2010). Similarly, 
Rabeharisoa (2003) adds that the action of patients groups is mediated by their national 
setting, and the nature of the relationships developed with stakeholders involved in the 
innovation process.   
The relationships between pharma and patients are, however, not uni-directional. As well 
as patients influencing firms, firms also impact patients’ perspectives and policy 
(Abraham, 2010). Furthermore, pharma have also been found to work with, and provide 
funding for, patient groups, thereby implying a danger of conflict of interest in the actions 
of such groups (ibid). 
The action of expectations in rallying collective action and in the development of 
technologies have been demonstrated in membrane technology. Here, development was 
influenced by the perceptions of it by stakeholders (van Lente and Rip, 1998). Hedgecoe 
and Martin (2003) also use the role, and characteristics, of expectations and visions, and 
the stakeholders that possess them, to explain how pharmacogenetics has been over-
hyped, despite unsubstantiated claims. The idea that social factors influence individuals’ 
perception was also found to be significant in gene therapy, where a new industry formed 
around a technology (Martin, 1999), and in pharmacogenomics (Hedgecoe, 2003), 
where commercial interests and competition acted to shape the construction of the term.  
Proxies for the influence expectations have on innovation have been shown to include 
concept formation and the media. Concept formation has been operationalised by 
measuring the dynamics found in the mentions of particular technologies in 
encyclopaedias (Koch, 2006), allowing perceptions to be recorded over an extended 
period of time. The media is taken as a representation of the collective expectations 
surrounding a technology (Konrad, 2006). Furthermore, the media is seen to be the 
traditional mode of scientific communication, facilitating the diffusion and dissemination 
of information and discoveries to the public (Lewenstein, 1995).  
3.2.4 Individual Level Summary 
This section has highlighted mechanisms by which stakeholders’ individual and 
collective expectations can formulate to influence the outcome of innovation concluding 
the discussion of the role of project advocates in the innovation process. This section 
has focused on drawing out characteristics and mechanisms by which individuals, their 
networks, relationships and expectations influence innovation success. We use these 
observations to guide and interpret the data collected in the empirical analysis of this 
thesis, in the discussion of drug project case histories. In particular, we would expect that 
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individuals who are invested in the development of a drug project, for instance, by 
inventing it or being involved from very early stages, or for a long period, would have the 
knowledge, motivation and necessary access to resources to contribute towards 
overcoming potential issues that arise during development.  
3.3 Multi-dimensional assessment  
This literature review has so far examined the literature focusing on each of the 
dimensions of innovation: organisation/network level and individual level. In this thesis 
we will implement a strategy that takes into account a multi-dimensional assessment of 
the environment surrounding an innovation. While taking the drug project as the unit of 
analysis, this thesis draws on Rothaermel and Hess (2007) who investigate innovation 
antecedents on individual (intellectual human capital, star scientists), firm (R&D 
capability), and network (strategic alliances and acquisitions) levels.  
In addition, we observe a similar strategy to that taken by Blume (1992) who uses three 
case studies and undertakes a holistic (i.e. multi-dimensional) perspective on the 
influential factors surrounding the development (and adoption) of new technologies.  
For the purposes of this thesis we can rationalise that ultimately projects are located 
within organisational environments; organisations are motivated by returns on 
investment, strategy, environment (internally and externally) and knowledge 
accumulation. Individuals make up organisations. Therefore, organisations are also 
motivated by conditions other than return on investment, such as interpersonal 
relationships, and organisational dynamics, but also on self-promotion, knowledge and 
networks. Organisations and individuals are part of networks. Networks are the loci of 
resource exchange and transfer (resources include intangible assets, such as 
knowledge, and tangible assets, such as finance and equipment). Users and other 
individual stakeholders are also involved in the networks surrounding projects. These 
include public opinion which can influence organisation decisions but also may influence 
individual perspectives within the organisation or more widely in the network. This 
provides the foundation on how the different elements of the multi-dimensional approach 
might fit together.  
In this thesis we take on a matrix approach whereby we integrate a multi-dimensional 
approach with a framework that will guide the investigation into project development by 
identifying the conditions contributing towards the progression (trajectory) of a drug 
project. The construction of this framework is the main aim of the following sections of 
this Chapter.  
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3.4 Success Factors – Developing a Framework 
This section highlights the environmental conditions created by innovation actors that 
exist to surround and influence the project, either through a process of project drag, 
where issues accumulate to contribute towards momentum or, in defining definitive 
go/no-go decisions.  
Project SAPPHO (1970s) was one of the first studies to appreciate a multi-faceted 
approach to innovation outcomes by focusing on the factors influencing successful, and 
unsuccessful, innovations (Rothwell et al., 1974). The main internal and external 
influencing factors highlighted were: user needs, efficiency of development, 
characteristics of managers, efficiency of communications, marketing and sales, and 
industry-context (ibid). However, some of these have clear relation to the adoption and 
dissemination of technologies, as opposed to the development phases, as is the concern 
of this thesis. 
In biomedical innovation Blume (1992) draws on a range of disciplines to explain the 
development (and adoption) of imaging technologies. In order to do this Blume (1992) 
suggests a framework allowing a researcher to investigate a technology, by 
consideration of a) the interorganisational structure, namely, the relationships between 
the producers and users of a product, b) the career of an innovation, breaking 
development and adoption of the product into phases to allow for cross case comparison, 
and c) problematisation, or the extent to which issues in the development and adoption 
of a technology are resolved and how this effects the progression of the technology.  
Blume’s (1992) framework is drawn on in this thesis, whereby the interorganisational 
structure (as per Blume) is represented in the multidimensional perspective accounting 
for the multitude of actors involved in innovation, as per the preceding sections. The 
career is accounted for where the empirical evidence of this thesis is provided as a 
chronological narrative encapsulating the development of the drug project. Furthermore, 
and the problematisation is represented in the suggestion of certain issues (‘downers’) 
that cause delays and influence the decision of whether to discontinue a project or not 
(as discussed in the following paragraphs). In this Blume (1992) suggests looking at the 
questions posed in the development of technologies and the resources (or capabilities) 
used to deal with them.   
This thesis introduces a key concept, that of ‘project drag’. This construct is associated 
with the perception of ‘projects’ as future oriented endeavours with their own momentum 
(Nightingale et al., 2011). This creates a perception that conditions contribute towards 
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the ‘drag’ of a project throughout the life-cycle gradually contributing towards the project 
stalling, and thereby being terminated. 
Project drag describes the process by which issues that detract from the business case 
for developing a project accumulate, moving towards and in some cases culminating in 
a decision to discontinue. As opposed to distinct go/no-go decision making, project drag 
identifies a series of perhaps individually small issues, that independently would not 
cause termination, which are amplified when found in the presence of other negative 
occurrences. For example, they may be contextual and unrelated to the drug itself.   
Drawing on the aforementioned organisational dynamics and knowledge transfer 
literature, project drag conceptualises the issues accumulated during the movement of 
drug projects from organisation to organisation during licensing agreements and M&A, 
for instance. In addition, re-evaluation of drug projects in a new acquiring or licensing 
company, may contribute to increasing project drag.  
Furthermore, as we will see, conditions associated with the success or failure of a drug 
project may contribute towards differing levels of project drag in the various teams 
involved in drug development. Whereas market demand and any potential associated 
issues may contribute towards project drag for the marketing and sales team, the extent 
to which drug development has a strong knowledge base may be of more concern to the 
scientific project team.  
We can also consider the influence of the aforementioned concept of protected spaces 
balancing with project drag, whereby the perception of the issues contributing towards 
project drag may vary in different project teams. For instance, where one project team, 
or epistemic community, which may be small, are working closely together towards a 
common goal, a protected space may develop which influences the accumulation of 
project drag. If we assume that knowledge is heterogeneous and assembled around a 
project we can conclude that the knowledge, which can contribute to success, protected 
spaces and avoiding project drag, breaks down if the community breaks down, for 
instance, in response to M&A or other movement between organisations.   
Project drag shows some similarities to the concept of ‘critical path drag’, attributed to 
Devaux, and used to represent the extent to which something (the critical path item) is 
delaying the completion of the project (Devaux, 2012). In addition to this time dimension 
of the progression of a project, ‘drag cost’ is also used to define the value lost due to the 
delayed delivery from the critical path drag (ibid). While project drag shows some overlap 
with the notion of drag costs, i.e. that mounting costs contribute towards decision making, 
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the concept of project drag emphasises the extent to which external events accumulate 
allowing an innovation to gain, or lose momentum.  
Furthermore, project drag is linked to the idea, from evolutionary economics of path 
dependency, whereby the outcome of a project, and the pathway it takes, is dependent 
on the accumulation of historical contexts and past decisions that have influenced it.  
These ideas will become salient in section 3.3 when we discuss the implications of the 
framework in terms of the specific issues that may arise and contribute towards decisions. 
This thesis adds to Blume’s framework by suggesting conditions which should be 
considered when accounting for the successful (and failed) development of technologies 
in biomedicine. These relate to the selection environment suggested by the evolutionary 
economics approach. The selection environment described by Nelson and Winter (1982) 
provides direct justification for three of the four conditions highlighted from the framework 
in this thesis: the influence of markets, relating to profits; non-markets, relating to social 
forces, and the organisational environment within and around firms. Dosi’s (1982) 
contribution focused on the innovation as the unit of analysis where he highlights the 
influence of the following environmental selection pressures: non-economic, technology, 
social, institutional, economic and science.  
Table 3 Summary of literature review of studies identifying factors associated with 
success of innovation in biomedicine 
Authors  Success Factors Output Indicator 
Siegel and 
Renko 2012 
Market knowledge; 
technology knowledge 
Opportunity 
selection by 
entrepreneurs 
in small firms 
New inventions; patent 
applications 
Ahuja et al. 
2008 
Industry structure; firm 
characteristics; intra-
organisational attributes; 
institutional influences 
Innovation 
production by 
firm 
Innovation effort and 
Innovation output 
Deeds et al. 
1999 
Scientific; technological; 
managerial skills 
Innovation 
production by 
firm 
Products in trials and marketed 
Chandy et 
al. 2006 
Speed of idea production; 
number of ideas; expertise 
Conversion of 
ideas to 
product 
Patents to launched drug 
products 
Blau et al. 
2004 
Technical success; high 
development costs; uncertain 
market impact; scarcity of 
good new product ideas; 
human and capital resources 
Evaluation 
and selection 
of new drugs 
by firm 
New drugs 
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De Luca et 
al. 2010 
Market orientation; 
knowledge integration 
Innovation 
production by 
firm 
New products; patents; 
acquisition of relevant 
knowledge; good reputation 
for results; ability to attract 
outstanding human capital 
Khilji et al. 
2006 
Technology push; market pull; 
organisational approaches 
Biotech 
manager 
perspectives 
 
Nerkar and 
Shane 2007 
Scope; pioneering nature 
Innovation 
production by 
firm 
Patents commercialised 
Fetterhoff 
and Voelkel 
2006 
Customer insight ; technology 
awareness 
Innovation 
production by 
firm 
Commercialisation of 
inventions 
Bernstein 
and Singh 
2006 
Market pull; technology push; 
organisational constructs 
(management, 
communication, structure, 
control) 
Innovation 
production by 
firm 
Stage success (idea generation, 
support, development, 
implementation) 
Moors 2002; 
Moors 2007 
Financial risk, non-financial 
benefits; image; complexity; 
trialability 
Rare cancer 
innovation 
Drug projects 
In addition, this literature review has identified biomedical studies that discuss success 
factors in innovation (Table 3). 
By incorporating the findings from the literature review so far, the following section will 
discuss the four conditions identified to be significant in influencing the progression of 
innovation through the drug development process. These factors are considered to 
influence the selection of a project and the decision as to whether to continue to invest 
in its progression through to approval phases. 
3.4.1 Knowledge Base and Accumulation 
The first condition concluded to contribute towards innovation is the extent to which there 
is foundational and accumulated knowledge surrounding it (project, target and disease).  
This is, in part, intuitive, where clearly without some level of technical understanding of 
a project it would be difficult for it to be fully developed. Studies of biomedical innovation 
have highlighted this. For instance, Agrawal and Searls (2009) emphasise the 
importance of scientific inputs by claiming that decisions should align outputs with new 
therapeutic opportunities. This relates to the knowledge base focused on the disease 
pathology, disease-target and drug-target interactions. 
In knowledge accumulation there is an importance of practice, learning and experience 
in the development of knowledge bases to support innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
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A reliance on knowledge is observed in innovation projects whereby the experimental 
learning critical to innovation is inhibited by the inability to break problem solving down 
into incremental steps (Yaqub and Nightingale, 2012). 
Knowledge is constructed in the people that produce it and is therefore dependent on 
the producers and users of knowledge and the expectations they hold. This is dependent 
on the experience and understanding of a particular drug and therefore relates to the 
duration over which research has been carried out. Here, uncertainty in new 
technological areas may be problematic for projects (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2012). 
Issues can occur whereby information asymmetries, common to new areas with small 
numbers of specialists, can inhibit knowledge sharing and accumulation. 
It follows that issues surrounding knowledge transfer and accumulation would be 
problematic for innovations. This concerns the ability for researchers to come together, 
interact and develop social capital, which can facilitate the transferral of tacit knowledge 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Moran, 2005). Furthermore, the integration of knowledge 
by a firm, or research team, is reliant on their R&D experience, and understanding of the 
project and/or target (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Within organisation relationships 
innovation and knowledge accumulation is facilitated by the development of routines 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, there is also a risk associated with routines that 
firms can become subject to lock-in and path dependency that may inhibit learning in 
new technological areas.  
In this section we have highlighted the need to consider both the knowledge base, 
providing the foundation for a drug development project, and the processes by which 
knowledge can accumulate. This condition influencing drug development is situated in 
the scientific research teams involved in drug development. It is these issues that are of 
concern when considering how this condition influences drug development outcomes. 
Where we observe that the knowledge surrounding the development of a drug is not fully 
developed or understood, we anticipate this contributing towards project drag, whereby 
initially this lack of knowledge may not immediately contribute towards the 
discontinuation of drug development but over time uncertainties may culminate in 
confidence around the project being lost.  
3.4.2 Market Demand  
The second condition is the perceived potential market associated with an innovation. 
The thesis that market demand was the key driver of innovation was first suggested by 
Schmookler in the 1960s, who followed longitudinal patterns in patent statistics, 
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investment and outputs (Schmookler, 1966). Despite heavy criticisms of the ‘market pull’ 
linear model (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979), it is not rejected that market forces do 
contribute towards defining the direction of innovation. This has been demonstrated in 
an analysis of trends in R&D expenditure and entry of innovative drugs demonstrating 
an association with increasing market size (from population growth) (Acemoglu and Linn, 
2004, Cerda, 2007, Magazzini et al., 2010).  
Market demand can be understood in two ways: 1) in the differing visions of the various 
stakeholders involved, and 2) by a producer. However, this process is rarely perfect and 
involves a level of uncertainty particularly in the case of radical innovations. 
Conceptualising market demand involves a balance between risks and (potential 
immediate or future) returns, and the decisions made by firms regarding innovation 
progression. If there is a larger uncertainty over the commercial potential of a product, 
i.e. higher financial risk, then the innovating firm might have less inclination to continue 
development. The uncertainty over project commercial viability is also relevant when 
considering the difficulty in predicting market demand levels, particularly considering the 
long development times of drugs, as is seen in oncology.  
There are three main issues associated with market demand that can be predicted. The 
first is low potential market, further complicated by the context of uncertainty and 
questions of return on investment. Smaller firms may be more accepting of smaller 
markets because, on the one hand they have less requirement for large profits; on the 
other, due to the lack of options available to small firms, they tend to be more risk averse. 
Despite the reliance, of small firms, on VC, who expect high returns, this is not 
necessarily linked to profits. In contrast, large firms have high fixed costs and are 
required to make expensive investments into R&D in a diverse range of areas 
(Nightingale, 2000). Furthermore, smaller firms tend to have fewer resources and 
therefore benefit from the cost reductions arising from schemes such as fast track and 
accelerated approval.  
Small firms do have a requirement to satisfying their shareholders who may have high 
expectations of return on investment. However, this should be considered, given that 
shareholder return comes on exit, which may be on floatation on the stock-market, or on 
acquisition by pharma. Therefore, the emphasis lies on the perception of market potential 
by other firms and analysts, which could relate to additional valuation criteria, other than 
markets.  
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In addition, proof of concept considerations may also play a role in driving innovation in 
areas that have a lower market potential. Here, a new technological approach may be 
explored in a smaller patient population initially with the expectation of a future broader 
application in larger markets. Indeed this was illustrated in a recent article highlighting 
that one of the motivations to develop an antisense therapy for the rare disease 
homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia was a desire for proof of concept (Sinha, 
2013). 
Another market-related issue is in the potential for patents to expire in the context of 
projects that are progressing slower than anticipated leading to issues with appropriating 
returns from investment. This can be partially counteracted by the application for orphan 
drug status, acting in the same way as patent protection by providing market exclusivity.  
Additional considerations highlighted by Tidd and Bessant (2013) and Ahn et al. (2010) 
are market trend and growth, market share, market risk, pricing trend, expected product 
sales life, cost savings, and marketing and distribution, as factors that should be 
considered in product development.  
In conclusion, smaller firms may be less constrained by market-related issues while 
larger firms may consider limitations in expected market demand, as an influential factor 
implying a risk of termination for the project, leading to a no-go decision. In smaller firms, 
that may not have vast resource for marketing and sales, market-related decision-
makers would be expected to be in close proximity to the scientific research, but have 
the added complication of shareholder influence on the executive board. In contrast 
larger firms with established marketing and sales teams show more distance between 
the scientific endeavour and market-related decision making.  
In general, we predict the expiry of patents to be important, as well as competition for 
the drug and the range of indications it can be applied to. Project drag may occur where 
competitor drug projects are in development but not yet approved, i.e. as profit margins 
are increasingly threatened, or as time goes on and patent expiry nears.  
3.4.3 Stakeholder Perspectives and Expectations 
The third condition concerns how much potential relevant stakeholders, or actors, who 
surround the drug perceive the innovation to have. This includes the construction of 
visions that would be expected to influence the perception of an innovation by other 
stakeholders and firms.  
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Stakeholder perceptions in the sense described here, may be related to the importance 
of a strong public image and customer acceptance to firms (Moors et al., 2002, Tidd and 
Bessant, 2013). This is likely to be more important in larger firms than smaller firms, due 
to the reliance on public image for the sales and marketing. If particularly negative, or 
positive, perceptions of a project were felt by stakeholders external to the development 
process may influence the direction of drug development (Epstein, 1995, Bazell, 1998).  
Low public or user support may be countered through process of interacting with the 
public through media channels, and user groups, promoting the drug. We define users 
at clinicians and patients The media provides a good source for data in this area because 
it has been found to not only influence public opinion (and thereby indirectly influencing 
policy) (Holder and Treno, 1997) but also to influence firm decisions (Penna and Geels, 
2012). 
Furthermore, this is related to the influence of the media on innovation and the influence 
of stakeholders on the media (Lewenstein, 1995, Konrad, 2006). Here, while the media 
is recognised to influence the development trajectory of a project, this relationship is 
cyclical and involves the similar process of firms influencing the media. For instance, the 
media may be adopting and communicating the perception of the firm of the project 
rather than influencing this perception. This limitation to the use of the media as a proxy 
for stakeholder perception represents a complex relationship requiring careful 
assessment, demanding full credit to be given to the context of perceptions and the 
background of the stakeholders who hold them.  
It is also relevant to discuss uncertainty in the perspectives taken by stakeholders. Here, 
a novel project will benefit from the influence of researchers promoting the approach, 
thereby having a big impact on stakeholder perception through the media and funders 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2012). Stakeholder perception, and particularly that of the 
users (patients and physicians), may also be influenced by the administration route of 
the drug or particularly unusual or severe side-effects (although it would be expected 
that severe adverse events would contribute towards a project being terminated for 
safety reasons).  
In this section we have highlighted how stakeholders, external to the drug development 
process, can impact, both directly and indirectly, the progression of the innovation. It is 
therefore important to note that in this thesis there is an attempt to separate out the 
commercial expectations of project (as defined in the market demand construct), and 
other areas of expectations (technical, potential to address unmet need, etc.).  
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The influences highlighted in this section are most likely to contribute towards project 
drag, contributing towards an accumulation of concerns around drug development. 
Uniquely, compared to the other conditions identified in this thesis, stakeholder 
perspectives are likely to impact on a variety of departments within the organisation 
responsible for developing the drug.  
3.4.4 Organisational Environment 
The organisational environment that surrounds the innovation is not just important in 
terms of the type of organisation responsible for development, and its strategy, but also 
in terms of the influence that collaborative agreements exert on the progression of 
development.  
Agreements between organisations can impact innovations on the project level, as well 
as internal organisational strategy influencing the project indirectly (Hill and Jones, 1999). 
The organisational strategy of the therapeutics portfolio (Pisano, 2006), and other 
projects influence decisions around a particular drug’s development (Ahn et al., 2010). 
Specific issues addressed in the portfolio evaluation process, according to innovation 
management, include corporate objectives and strategies, relationships with existing 
markets, manufacturing, facility and equipment requirements (Tidd and Bessant, 2013). 
With the reciprocal reliance demonstrated between large and small firms (Chapter 2), 
collaborative agreements and M&A events are likely to occur in most project lifecycles. 
Issues affecting the performance of innovations in the wake of collaborations or M&A 
include: similarities in firm culture, size, experience, and objectives (Pisano, 2006, Stuart 
et al., 2007, Lane and Lubatkin, 1998, Bstieler and Hemmert, 2010), and the facilitation 
of social capital formation through coordination, communication and interaction 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Moran, 2005). We also observe that, in general M&A is 
detrimental to innovation progression (Hitt et al., 1991a, Ernst and Vitt, 2000, James, 
2002) 
Innovation projects in small firms are more vulnerable to the industrial dynamics that 
surround their organisation due to a tendency for a lack of resources in the UK (Hopkins 
et al., 2013). Industrial dynamics in this context refers to influences such as regulatory 
environments, access to funding or capabilities and changes in stock-price. Furthermore, 
the reliance of small firms, on collaborations, licenses and acquisitions, to progress their 
project to later stages of development, may lead to difficulties associated with integration 
and learning challenges, negatively affecting project. 
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In larger firms this influence is shielded due to the presence of routines, experience and 
financial independence. Indeed, cash resources are found to be significant in influencing 
decisions to continue projects from phase I to phase II trials. This was found by Guedj 
and Scharfstein (2004) who undertook a study showing that even early stage cash rich 
firms tended to take projects from phase I to phase II trials more readily than mature 
firms.  
Firms are limited by their resources and capabilities, or those they can access, whereby 
larger firms would be expected to have a broader range available to them than smaller 
firms. In this, smaller firms have less strategic portfolio options than larger firms and 
therefore are expected to set lower thresholds (higher risk) contributing to project 
decision making.  
As the above discussion has relayed, it is clear that the organisational environment 
surrounding a firm will be a more salient issue in the case of smaller firms, as they are 
more vulnerable to industrial dynamics (e.g. access to funding, regulatory forces), and 
partnering relationships. Organisational environment would be anticipated to contribute 
to both project drag, in the interaction between a particular drug and other pipeline 
projects the organisation has, and go/no-go decisions, for instance where a merger or 
acquisition has occurred and the drug no longer shows strategic fit for the firm.  
3.4.5 Summary and Framework Formation 
The purpose of this subsection has been to discuss the formulation of the framework 
which draws on the previously reviewed literature to categorise conditions and issues 
relevant to focus the case study research methodology (as will be discussed in Chapter 
4). While identifying the four conditions (knowledge base and accumulation, market 
demand, stakeholder perspectives and organisational environment) this framework also 
maintains an appreciation for the multi-dimensional nature of the environment 
surrounding the progression of drug development. By combining these two 
considerations a framework is proposed as per Figure 3.  
Although further operationalisation will be discussed in Chapter 4, in the first instance we 
take the issues highlighted in the previous sections, under the four condition headings, 
to indicate the direction of the investigation to come. This framework is used in the data 
collection and analysis of the case histories for this thesis, whereby each project’s 
progression is discussed with consideration of all four conditions. In addition, we will 
draw on prior discussions of ‘project drag’ whereby issues discussed in terms of their 
role in gradually accumulating towards a project gaining or losing momentum.  
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We have also observed that each of the conditions may be situated in different 
departments within an organisation, for instance, knowledge accumulation would be 
located in the scientific research teams and market demand in the sales and marketing 
teams. It is therefore possible that while each condition is impacting the development 
outcome of the drug, there may be an influence of the decision making process found 
within the organisation, and its size, whereby the influence exerted by the departments 
involved disproportionately impact the effect of the condition at work.  
 
Figure 3 Framework for this thesis highlighting both the multi-dimensional nature 
of the internal and external environments influencing the development of a drug 
project, and the four conditions found to be most relevant for focusing the 
empirical case studies, including the suggested challenges to development within 
each category.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
So far this thesis has discussed the empirical setting for this thesis, and characterised 
this historically in terms of paradigm shifts in drug development, industry strategy and 
Project IndividualsOrganisations
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structure and approaches to oncology therapeutics. We built on this in the present 
Chapter by taking the development of biomedical technologies and projects from an 
innovation studies perspective. Here we have discussed the selection pressures 
directing innovation and contributing towards success or failure.  
We first addressed this in line with the dimensional perspectives taken by many studies, 
in the influence of actors, organisations, individuals and networks. This discussion 
highlighted two gaps in the literature. Firstly, the need to focus on projects as the unit of 
analysis, thereby allowing for an appreciation of a holistic picture of drug development. 
Secondly, the lack of multidimensional approaches taken, whereby this thesis aims to 
incorporate issues on individual, organisational and network levels.  
We have also assessed the literature in order to identify conditions influencing 
innovations, on these multiple levels. Here we demonstrated the significance of four 
conditions: knowledge base and accumulation, market demand, stakeholder 
perspectives and organisational environment. These conditions contributed towards the 
formulation of a framework which will be used in the empirical investigations for this 
thesis, namely in the construction and analysis of drug project case histories.  
In the following Chapter we will discuss the method implemented to answer the research 
questions. This will involve discussion of the need for a multiple case study approach, 
incorporating in-depth investigation and systematic analysis to enable to the thesis to 
fulfil the knowledge gaps identified in this literature review.  
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4 Research Design and Methods  
4.1 Research Design 
This Chapter will discuss the process undertaken to collect and analyse data to address 
the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 developed a multi-dimensional 
framework to study the influences on drug innovation, spanning organisational, individual 
and network perspectives. This literature review demonstrated an abundance of studies 
focusing within organisational boundaries, highlighting a need for a project-level 
approach to appreciate the multiplicity of organisations involved in drug development. 
Following this observation, the thesis investigates 11 drug projects, and traces their 
progression through discovery and development. This enables an appreciation of the 
influences of the conditions identified in Chapter 3: knowledge base, market demand, 
stakeholder perspectives and organisational environment, have on drug progression.  
In a similar approach to that of Blume (1992) the thesis employs an historical and cross-
case study comparison of projects, comparing the trends in internal (knowledge, markets) 
and external (perspectives, environment) conditions from a multi-dimensional (network, 
organisational, and individual) approach. In addition, this thesis aims to draw out trends 
between cases, thereby informing a wider empirical context justifying the implementation 
of a multiple-case study comparative analysis.   
Due to a lack of previous studies that have taken this type of approach, this methodology 
uses Eisenhardt’s (1989) theory building procedure in order to extend existing knowledge, 
utilising the framework constructed in Chapter 3. As will become apparent in the following 
discussion, the strength of this approach is that it facilitates the construction of theories 
that are testable, and empirically valid.  
We also consider, in the construction of this methodology, previous innovation studies, 
most significantly the SAPPHO report, which similarly focuses on product innovation as 
the unit of analysis and analyses multiple cases (Rothwell et al., 1974). The method used 
in the SAPPHO study emphasised pairwise comparisons between successes and 
failures, in the context of predetermined multiple factors. Reflecting on this, and the 
ambition of this thesis, in understanding the conditions impacting innovations, 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap is complemented, in this method, by Yin’s (2009), multiple 
case study approach, and Ragin’s (1987) Qualitative Case Analysis (QCA).  
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4.1.1 Suitability of Multiple Case Study/QCA for Understanding Drug Innovation 
The implementation of multiple case studies and a QCA is further justified by the 
limitations associated with small N case study (qualitative research) methods and 
variable-based (quantitative research) methods.  
Small-N research allows cases to be considered using many variables to explain 
observed outcomes. This involves research strategies that gain a deep understanding of 
a topic, but lack breadth (Ragin, 2000:22). With a small number of cases, there is a 
danger of attributing inferences, where any shared characteristic is interpreted as a 
cause (Geddes, 2003). Furthermore, it may be difficult to ascertain policy-relevant 
conclusions which account for alternative, context-dependent outcomes.  
A multiple, medium N approach overcomes these issues enabling a degree of 
generalisation to be made while accounting for a variety of scenarios retaining the detail 
and exploratory power garnered from case studies. This is one of the main motivators 
for the method presented in this Chapter. 
As the etymology of the word implies, ‘quantitative’ research methods are concerned 
with data of high quantity, while sacrificing detailed understandings of the cases studied. 
Here, a large number of cases are analysed using a small number of variables, with an 
emphasis placed on breadth of insights, as opposed to depth (Ragin, 2000:22). However, 
where inferences regarding causation are taken from single instances of co-occurrence, 
quantitative research has been accused of too often inferring causation and over-
generalisation (Geddes, 2003). 
Further reasons against using a quantitative approach are: 1) the issue of correlations 
between independent variables (endogeneity) and the frequent occurrence of this in 
reality (Ragin, 2008:180); 2) the reliance of conclusions based on net effects and 
therefore the need for strong model specification (Ragin, 2008:157-158, 176-179); 3) the 
unrealistic representation of reality as symmetric associations (Ragin, 2008:3, Berg-
Schlosser et al., 2009:8-9); 4) the representation of causal factors as permanently causal 
(Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:8-9); 5) the difficulty of representing data as linear (Berg-
Schlosser et al., 2009:8-9, Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:141); 6) the often mechanistic 
application (Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:142); 7) the independent influence that 
variables have on the outcome with difficulty in consideration of context and 
interdependencies (Ragin, 2008:112, Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:8-9); and 8) the 
influence that a reliance on correlations has on the conflation of results (Ragin, 2008).  
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These factors, along with the justifications laid out below, have influenced the decision 
to pursue an approach based on QCA, which overcomes many of these issues. In 
particular, in this study we are interested in drug development, occurring over 10-20 
years, implying a high chance that variables are interdependent and influence outcomes 
in a variety of ways.  
4.2 Justification for Multiple Case Study Approach 
The benefits of multiple case studies, particularly in overcoming the aforementioned 
concerns with small N case study and large N quantitative research designs, are 
highlighted in this section. This provides further justification for the implementation of a 
multiple case study approach, with particular attention paid to the QCA methodology.  
4.2.1 ‘Objectivity’ 
One critique of case studies is the lack of objectivity in the view of the cases in question 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). One response to this is that all methods can be interpreted to have an 
element of subjectivity (ibid). For instance, in quantitative research variable definition, 
the data used and the extent to which this is an indicator of the phenomena to be 
explained, are reliant on the researcher’s view of the world. 
In QCA there is a theoretical basis for initial concept formation, and scoring (calibration) 
of cases indicating set (factor/condition) membership should be explicitly given in the 
presentation of the method (see section 4.4.1.2 below) (Smithson and Verkuilen, 
2006:18). In contrast, quantitative statistical research methods, tend not to clearly 
discuss decisions such as variable bounding and inclusion criteria. In this way, QCA has 
been described as uncovering the equivalent ‘black box’ in quantitative research, where 
data is modelled and the ‘answer’ is seemingly mechanically arrived at (Berg-Schlosser 
et al., 2009:14).  
In addition, and further related to this issue of objectivity vs. subjectivity is the ability for 
case study research approaches to appreciate the world as a social construction of 
reality, whereby the interpretive flexibility of categories and cases are recognised (Pinch 
and Bijker, 1984). Furthermore, case study approaches (e.g. QCA) provides a strategy 
accounting for the complex and context-dependent nature of reality.  
4.2.2 Interpretability 
Case study research methods, such as QCA, allow for a proximity in the relationship 
between the data and analysis. This is less apparent in regression analysis which takes 
a more detached approach. The discussion of interpretability naturally relates to the 
previous consideration of objectivity where a close relationship between data and 
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analysis might be deemed to be a negative characteristic of the research design. 
However, the inherent benefits of a are in where the output of the analysis50 facilitating 
interpretation, not only providing a realistic perspective of the empirical case, but also 
implying clear and concise theoretical implications (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:6).  
4.2.3 Data Sources 
Another advantage of the case study approach, particularly in the context of this thesis 
is the possibility to combine data from a diverse range of sources. This is particularly 
important when there are not relevant predefined databases, as is the case in this 
research. Furthermore, by implementing a QCA, insights can be garnered from both 
qualitative and quantitative sources, and combined to formulate a score (Berg-Schlosser 
et al., 2009:13). This is particularly important when considering the suitability of different 
types of indicators in their attempt to represent a socially complex phenomenon.  
4.2.4 Causality 
Whilst regression allows for inference of causality based on covariance and association, 
case studies provide a detailed examination of the mechanisms at work. The descriptive 
analysis implemented in this research facilitates causal analysis through a process of 
identifying patterns, trends, similarities and differences, with an iterative examination of 
the literature providing explanatory power. A QCA provides an assessment of causal 
connections through the determination of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
observed outcomes (Ragin, 2008:20). Furthermore the ability for a QCA to examine 
asymmetrical relationships, i.e. different determinants of opposing outcomes, enables a 
more accurate representation of the world, as opposed to the symmetric covariations 
arising from correlational techniques (Ragin, 2008:15).  
4.2.5 Equifinality and Multifinality 
The final argument supporting use of a case study approach, and most significantly in 
the application of a QCA, is that the conclusions arising represent multiple conjunctural 
causation, which is particularly important in the context of uncertainty as is seen in 
innovation (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:8-9). Specifically, multiple conjunctural causation 
may include situations of equifinality, the combination of different pathways 
(combinations of factors/conditions) which lead to the same outcome, and multifinality, 
one condition (or combination of conditions) may combine to produce two different 
                                                 
 
50 As will be discussed in the following sections the main output of a QCA is a solution representing 
the configuration of conditions contributing towards the outcome.  
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outcomes (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:5-6). These potentialities in the output of 
QCA mean that the conclusions drawn represent an accurate picture of the complex 
situations that make up a social phenomenon. The appreciation of multiple conjunctural 
causality is significant in policy-oriented research, where there is an emphasis on 
understanding how an outcome is influenced and the context-dependent nature of the 
causal conditions leading to particular outcomes (Ragin, 2008:182) 
4.3 QCA History and Logic 
Section 4.4 of this Chapter, will describe Eisenhardt’s roadmap, alongside a discussion 
of how a QCA is undertaken. However, in order to contextualise this discussion, it is 
necessary to provide some background on QCA, as this is a relatively new method for 
innovation studies.  
Ragin (1987:1) suggests that comparative methods, such as QCA epitomise ‘virtually all 
empirical social research’ due to the overarching focus of comparisons in social inquiry. 
Despite QCA providing a middle ground between qualitative and quantitative methods, 
the logic behind QCA shows a stronger affiliation with the former (Ragin, 2000, Ragin, 
2008, Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). Specifically, qualitative approaches and QCA both 
centre on the identification of consistent connections and analytic induction, i.e. the 
identification of trends from empirical instances (Ragin, 2008:2).  
QCA is a Configurational Comparative Method, and as such, utilises set theory and 
Boolean algebra to analyse cases according to configurations of characteristics 
(conditions) (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).  
4.3.1 Set Relations and Boolean Algebra 
Set theory is one of the fundamental components of QCA and centres on the idea that 
cases can be categorised into the ‘set’, or conditions, they fall into. The use of set 
relations is frequently apparent in the language used in theoretical discourse (Berg-
Schlosser et al., 2009:6). For instance, the phrase ‘the UK is a democracy’ is a set 
relation whereby the ‘UK’ belongs to the subset of cases defined by the condition 
‘democracies’.  
This subset and superset relationship between cases and conditions (sets) also provides 
the basis for distinguishing necessary and sufficient conditions. In this, necessary 
conditions are conditions (sets) which are present whenever the outcome is present (‘Y’ 
(the outcome) is a subset of ‘X’ (the condition)) (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:69-
70). Similarly, a sufficient condition is defined when the presence of the condition is a 
subset of the presence of the outcome. Here, whenever the condition is present the 
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outcome may be present but there are also instances when the outcome is present 
where the condition is not (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:57).  
In operationalising the logic of set theory, QCA employs Boolean algebra to represent 
set relations. Boolean algebra relies on the classification of conditions as true (or present) 
and false (or absent) and the analysis of a range of conditions using the application of 
basic operators, including: ‘intersection’/multiplication (or logical AND), ‘union’/addition 
(or logical OR) and ‘negation’ (or logical NOT) (Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006:4-6). 
Boolean operators are not arithmetic; rather they rely on a set of rules for simplification 
and minimisation (discussed in section 4.4.3.1.2.3) (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012:104-106). One of the main benefits of Boolean algebra is its logic enabling 
instances to be defined in terms of the conditions that categorise them, in conjunctions 
and disjunctions, (Ragin, 1987:13-15). This maximises use of the data available, where 
both absent and present conditions contribute towards the output51 (ibid). 
The method of QCA employed in this thesis is crisp set QCA (csQCA) which relies on a 
dichotomised coding system limiting the level of set membership to either full 
membership (1), or full non-membership (0). This simple codification, which is used to 
determine whether conditions and outcomes are present or absent, has been critiqued 
due to the lack of appreciation for social reality in the partial membership of cases into 
sets. The alternative is fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) in which cases can be scored in 
accordance with partial membership indicated by values assigned between 0 and 1. This 
method is usually preferred due to the increased degree of detail it enables, where 
csQCA is seen to be unrepresentative of reality due to its simplicity. However, in this 
thesis, due to the lack of agreed standards to facilitate discrete calibration52, it is difficult 
to define degrees of difference and therefore assign definite scores representing partial 
membership, therefore a csQCA is preferable. Furthermore, in fsQCA it is necessary for 
all conditions, including the outcome to be represented on a scale from 0 to 1, which 
would not be possible with success, using the definition employed in this thesis.  
                                                 
 
51 Note the distinction used in this thesis between output, used to signify the solution generated 
from the analysis of sufficient conditions, and/or the necessary nature of condition(s); and 
outcome (Y), used to describe whether a project was successful (presence of the outcome) or 
unsuccessful (absence of the outcome).  
52  Calibration is a process by which a fuzzy-set, or crisp-set score is assigned in line with 
externally determined, and accepted thresholds, for more explanation of this see Section 4.4.3.1 
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4.4 Eisenhardt’s Roadmap 
As mentioned above, this thesis follows Eisenhardt’s roadmap of eight steps for 
developing and building theory, while introducing good practice in case studies, as 
suggested by Yin (2009), and Ragin’s (1987) QCA. Despite the apparent linearity (Table 
4) of Eisenhardt’s approach, the constitutive steps should be viewed as incorporating 
feedback loops. This section will outline steps and further describe the implementation 
of each in this thesis.  
Step Activity 
1. Getting 
Started 
Definition of research question 
Possibly a priori constructs 
2. Selecting 
Cases 
Neither theory nor hypotheses 
Specified population 
Theoretical, not random sampling 
3. Crafting 
Instruments 
and Protocols  
Multiple data collection method 
Qualitative and quantitative data 
combined  
Multiple investigators 
4. Entering the 
Field 
Overlap data collection and analysis 
including field notes 
Flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods 
5. Analysing 
Data 
Within-case analysis 
Cross-case pattern search using 
divergent techniques 
6. Shaping 
Hypotheses 
Iterative tabulation of evidence for each 
construct 
Replication, not sampling, logic across 
cases 
7. Enfolding 
Literature 
Comparison with conflicting literature 
Comparison with similar literature 
8. Reaching 
Closure 
Theoretical saturation when possible 
Table 4 Reproduction of Table 1 from Eisenhardt (1989) - Process of Building 
Theory from Case Study Research summarising the progression of Eisenhardt’s 
roadmap. 
 
4.4.1 Step 1 – Getting Started 
Step one in Eisenhardt’s roadmap is for the researcher to embed themselves in the 
research question and to define a particular research focus53 (Eisenhardt, 1989:536). 
This involves the determination of constructs from existing theory, enabling the 
researcher to focus the data collection stages with consideration of the measurement of 
these pre-defined constructs. However, Eisenhardt introduces the first, of many iterative 
                                                 
 
53 This embeddedness, according to Eisenhardt, is observed to be particularly beneficial when it 
comes to digesting, analysing and drawing conclusions from the data collected, otherwise, she 
states ‘it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data’ (Eisenhardt, 1989:536). 
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processes here, where this definition and identification of constructs should remain 
tentative and flexible to adaptation.  
This emphasis, on the formulation of constructs, echoes aspects highlighted by both Yin 
(2009) and Ragin (Ragin, 2000). Yin (2009), defines construct validity as key to 
producing quality case study analysis, thereby supporting the importance of construct 
formulation. For QCA, constructs are akin to conditions, formulated by drawing on 
existing knowledge, and brought together to product a framework. Furthermore, the use 
of existing theory, as highlighted by Eisenhardt (1989), is of central importance in the 
calibration of conditions in a QCA (Ragin, 2000). 
Furthermore, in QCA, theory plays an important role in defining relevant cases and 
resolving limited diversity in assigning counterfactuals in truth table analysis (section 4.4) 
and in interpreting results (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:7).  
Thorough assessment of theoretical contributions is of central importance when 
considering that different theories may not necessarily be competing but may 
complement each other (Ragin, 2008:179). Therefore, in QCA, there is an emphasis on 
the researchers’ theoretical and substantive knowledge of both the topic and the cases 
in question (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:12).  
4.4.1.1 Step 1 Implemented 
The implementation of step one has been illustrated in the formulation and development 
of the research questions and framework (in Chapters 2 and 3). The resulting framework 
was formulated both in order to facilitate the collection of data, and to inform that analysis 
of that data in the descriptive analysis.  
Issues highlighted in the framework development (Figure 4) fit into Eisenhardt’s roadmap 
by providing the contextual questions that guide an exploration of the potential solutions 
(theories) contributing towards distinguishing successful, from unsuccessful, projects. It 
is these issues that are explicitly discussed in the case histories that follow in Chapters 
6 and 7.  
4.4.1.2 Operationalisation of the Framework 
This section outlines the operationalisation of the framework (Figure 4) both for the 
descriptive analysis (how conditions have been measured using the data sources) and 
the QCA (scoring of presence and absence of a condition). One of the key contributions 
of this thesis is in the formulation and operationalisation of the framework, where novel 
proxy measures account for the conditions identified.  
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For the QCA calibration (scoring the membership of a case to each set/condition) the 
default position is 0 rather than 1, i.e. the condition is absent unless its presence can be 
proved. In other words, the scoring of the ‘0’ in QCA does not necessarily represent the 
opposite of the condition, e.g. ‘low market demand’ but merely the absence of the 
condition, or the absence of ‘high market demand’ in this case. This is a key 
consideration in contextualising the scoring for the QCA as represented in the section 
subheading under each case in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Framework as developed in Chapter3 
 
Project IndividualsOrganisations
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System
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Strategic fit issues
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4.4.1.2.1 Knowledge Base and Accumulation (represented as ‘B’ in QCA) 
In order to capture both the knowledge base and level of knowledge accumulation is it 
necessary to look at the novelty of a particular scientific and technological approach, and 
thereby the level of knowledge supporting the initial discovery and development of the 
drug, and the extent to which knowledge transfer is facilitated between individuals 
involved in the process.  
As a starting point we explore the technological approach used as a basis for the 
development of the drug, for instance, kinase inhibitors, and/or mabs. Secondly, we 
consider the progression and results from the trials contributing towards drug 
development.  
To capture a picture of the accumulation of knowledge throughout the development of 
the project we firstly assume that for a project that has remained in the same organisation 
throughout its life-cycle, the knowledge transfer between teams would be efficient due to 
the development of routines in experienced teams (Nelson and Winter, 1982). We infer 
that when the composition of the research groups changes (upon license acquisitions, 
mergers and acquisitions and during alliances) there is the potential for negative 
implications for the transfer of knowledge. From the literature explored in Chapter 3 we 
can assume that with the action of a consistent research group the progress of a project 
would be benefited through the establishment of shared visions which in turn facilitates 
knowledge transfer. However, the introduction of new skills previously lacking in a 
research group may necessitate collaborative relationships to be established, thereby 
benefiting the innovation process.  
The knowledge base was further determined by consideration of the novelty of the 
technological area implemented, and the duration of the existence of the scientific 
knowledge base forming the basis for the drug’s development. In addition, for targeted 
therapies, target validation was also considered; whereby if a drug with the same target 
had been previously approved the target was deemed to be validated.  
4.4.1.2.2 Market Demand (represented as ‘D’ in QCA) 
The framework (Figure 4) highlights the issues within the market demand conditions: (i) 
low market potential (ii) appropriability issues and (iii) novel/uncertain markets.  
The first factor taken into consideration in contributing towards market potential is the 
number of indications for which the project was being developed. Indications were only 
included if clinical development was being progressed (realised potential) and not if it 
was merely stated that the drug may be more widely applicable in the future (expected 
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potential). However, this is not unproblematic because a realised potential is more 
feasible for projects developed by big pharma with abundant resources, as opposed to 
smaller firms. However, it is the most accurate way of gaining an idea of market potential, 
overcoming the issue that a firm may claim broad applications that are unrealistic.  
Media and press reports of expected market demand were also taken into account in a 
drugs’ market potential. Orphan drug status was considered under the umbrella of 
market demand, whereby low expected market size would be partially mitigated by the 
promise of greater exclusivity and lower development costs.  
In addition, the level of competition, in terms of standard of care for the primary indication, 
was also considered. If the disease was previously untreated it would be expected that, 
even if a small patient population was represented, the drug could command a high price 
and would be easier to get approved. However, pricing is controversial and does not 
necessarily provide a guarantee of revenues; therefore, this thesis does not place 
significant emphasis on pricing expectations under the umbrella of potential market 
demand.  
Appropriability issues are accounted for through capturing a picture of the duration of 
patent protection remaining for the drug. This is relevant because if protection is near 
expiry it is assumed that the project no longer has high commercial attraction for a 
potential investor or developing firm. Patent protection is also considered in the context 
of the stage of project development, with data on average clinical trial durations 
considered.  
The novelty/uncertainty of the market is partially linked to the approach used in 
developing the drug and whether that particular approach has been used previously. If 
there is no instance of the approach being used previously it is assumed that the drug 
will suffer from the uncertainty surrounding its market potential.  
4.4.1.2.3 Stakeholder Perspective (represented as ‘S’ in QCA) 
Stakeholder perspectives were considered with data from press and media reports. 
While it is clear that this perception is influenced by the firms involved in drug 
development media reports captures the views of stakeholders, which in turn is 
hypothesised to feed back into firm’s decisions around project development. In addition, 
interviews presented a perspective of the expectations felt by those in the development 
of the drug. The media is a key source indicator for this condition, justified through the 
observation that researchers act to promote technologies by communicating with the 
media, funders and the public (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2012).  
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Data included in media reports range from describing drugs as highly promising, to not 
mentioning the drug project at all. The latter scenario was taken to imply a general lack 
of enthusiasm for the project, both from the developing firm (i.e. releasing no press 
releases concerning the development of the drug), and analysts. These reports were 
taken to imply the general perspectives of stakeholders (outside the developing 
organisation) about the project. In addition, in some cases it is also relevant to look at 
particularly difficult administration routes, and/or unusual side effects that may have an 
influence on users (physicians and/or patients) perspectives. For instance, patient 
preference prioritises the oral administration of drugs (Borner et al., 2001). 
In addition, we infer that if a project is part of a long established research pathway, that 
it will be relatively unexciting and therefore will receive a less enthusiastic reception from 
stakeholders. This is the case where a drug is being developed as a cytotoxin, for 
instance, whereby it would not receive the benefits from being ‘pioneering’.  
4.4.1.2.4 Organisational Environment (represented as ‘E’ in QCA) 
The issues suggested to be challenging for drug projects under the umbrella of 
organisational environment include: 1) vulnerabilities to external industry dynamics, 2) 
management changes and 3) issues relating to the project’s strategic fit within the host  
organisation.  
The first of these difficulties of firms in terms of industrial dynamics, is relatively straight 
forward to assess whereby firms suffering from funding issues, regulatory issues or 
mergers and acquisitions would be expected to have external disruptions that would 
cause problems for their pipeline. Disruptions may include delays in gaining regulatory 
approval for trials, having a cash burn rate that is not sustainable for their host 
organisation, running out of money, employee redundancies relating to M&A events or 
the moving of premises following a merger or acquisition. Related to this is the idea that 
changes in management structures, usually (but not exclusively) cause by mergers and 
acquisitions or licensing agreements, may also have detrimental effects on the 
development of the project in terms of re-opening debates about the priority, or direction 
of a project’s development.  
In addition, strategic fit issues were also considered. These were judged to be present 
where the project was found to show a level of discord with the firm’s reported strategy. 
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4.4.1.2.5 Outcome – Success: 
As suggested at previously in the Chapter, the outcome of each project was determined 
by approval (i.e. success) by a regulatory agency, or discontinuation/termination, or no-
development reported (as per Pharmaprojects) (unsuccessful).  
4.4.2 Steps 2 and 3 – Selecting Cases and Crafting Instruments and Protocols 
The second step is the selection of cases, where the concept of a ‘population’ becomes 
important because it provides a foundation for the selection of cases based on the control 
of less relevant variation between cases, and providing a boundary to the generalisability 
of the research findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The third step closely follows and asserts 
the ‘Crafting Instruments and Protocols’. In this step the research must identify the 
sources of data and outline the data collection methods. Eisenhardt (1989) emphasises 
that theory-building approaches generally require the collection of data from multiple 
sources, using multiple methods, an approach also followed by Yin (2009) in his 
discussion of good practice in case study design. 
It is in this step that triangulation becomes an important step allowing for ‘stronger 
substantiation of constructs and hypotheses’ (Eisenhardt, 1989:538, Yin, 2009). These 
methods may involve breaking away from the traditional assumption that case study 
analysis involves the collection of qualitative data, as opposed to quantitative data. 
These approaches are complementary, where quantitative research may indicate an 
overarching pattern, qualitative data allows for a detailed understanding of the reasoning 
behind a particular relationship. 
4.4.2.1 Steps 2 and 3 Implemented 
The implementation of steps two and three in this study involve the selection of cases 
and an exploration into the data sources used in order to construct the case histories 
that provide the basis for the analysis in steps 4 and 5.  
4.4.2.2 Case Selection 
There were six main criteria were used to define the sample of drug projects in this 
research project. These were implemented to bound the project to facilitate research that 
was both in-depth and broadly applicable. The case selection here allows us to talk about 
the dataset as a ‘population’ of drugs aimed at a rare cancer, approved or discontinued 
(post-phase II) between 1999 and 2011, that had some involvement from a UK company, 
although clearly the dataset is a sample of all rare cancer drugs, cancer drugs and 
orphan drugs developed globally.  
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In this research a ‘project’ is the unit of analysis and is defined as a drug which can be 
traced from discovery and through development. Although discussions may include 
precursor drugs, i.e. drugs that contributed towards the development of the index drug, 
it will not extend to other drugs in the same programme of research (e.g. multiple 
compounds against the same target). 
This thesis fundamentally focused on rare cancers in an attempt to pre-empt some of 
the issues that will arise in the wake of personalised medicine, an increasingly popular 
approach to treatments. This shift implies that new business models, strategies and 
policies may need to be introduced, which will rely on a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of drug innovation in diseases that affect small populations.  
4.4.2.2.1 UK-based 
The project must have had some involvement from a UK company (i.e. a company with 
a UK HQ). In some cases, this includes research carried out in a different country. For 
instance, GSK is a UK company and has projects included in the dataset despite a large 
majority of their oncology programmes being located in the USA during the time period 
this thesis is concerned with. Projects and companies were identified using the 
Pharmaprojects54 industry database (also used in Hopkins et al., 2013, Abrantes-Metz et 
al., 2004, Chandy et al., 2006, Mullen et al., 1997).  
The UK focus was chosen due to the amount of data on firm activity that is publicly 
available and therefore relatively accessible (given that firms in the industry can be 
secretive (Goldacre, 2012)). Related to this it was also felt that for fieldwork interviews 
(see section below 4.3.2) identifying and undertaking conversations with individuals in 
the UK would be more straightforward.  
4.4.2.2.2 Life Cycle Completion Post-Phase II 
In keeping with project SAPPHO-inspired (Rothwell et al., 1974, Rothwell, 1992) method, 
and QCA, cases were required to represent both successful and failed outcomes. This 
is important as it provides a balanced view of the case study analysis and is not skewed 
towards representing success stories thereby avoiding survivor bias.  
                                                 
 
54 In addition to being widely used by scholarly articles, Pharmaprojects is also an accepted 
industry database. In 1997 it was rated to be ‘probably the most systematic and widely used 
information sources’ with the widest coverage (Mullen, 1997). Currently Pharmaprojects provides 
access to over 60,000 detailed drug profiles providing information such as development history 
timelines, licensing information, clinical trials, and molecular structure 
www.citeline.com/products/pharmaprojects ) 
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In order to include case studies with different outcomes it was first necessary to define 
what was meant by success and failure. In the context of this thesis the ambition of is to 
investigate the innovative process during clinical development of the drug. Therefore, it 
is relevant to define a ‘successful’ drug project as one which achieved approval by a 
regulatory agency in either Europe or the USA, the two major markets targeted by UK 
firms55 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012).  
Failure was defined as occurring when drug projects had been discontinued for non-
technical reasons in development post-initiation of phase II trials, but not where 
development was discontinued for safety or severe efficacy reasons. 
There are several facets of this definition. Firstly, interest in drug projects discontinued 
for non-technical reasons is of relevance due to the idea that there is no policy, 
management, or industrial action that could change such an outcome. In addition, a 
‘severe’ lack of efficacy, i.e. where trials showed no responses in patients, was also 
deemed to be due to the scientific grounding of a project thereby proving irrelevant in a 
policy context. This is a difficult measure because sufficient efficacy is subjective, where 
enough efficacy to justify continuation of a project differs in accordance with the decision 
maker. The second aspect of the definition of a ‘failed’ project is in the prior initiation of 
a phase II trial. This distinction is warranted because drugs more often fail phase I studies 
for safety reasons, and projects abandoned at an early stage may not have been subject 
of substantial investment, or interest, internal or external to the host organisation, making 
the constructing a case history more problematic.  
4.4.2.2.3 Time Period 
It was decided that a time period of 1999-2011 for a project to complete its life cycle (i.e. 
either be discontinued or approved) would be suitable in order to provide a time period 
balancing an appreciation of recency whereby only contemporary approaches to drug 
discovery and development are relevant, while obtaining a case study population with 
internal comparability. Furthermore, data for projects developed earlier than the 1990s 
would be harder to access and gather.  
                                                 
 
55 In 2006 EU5 (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) and USA accounted for 19% and 41%, 
respectively, (60% total) of the global spending on medicines, according to an IMS Institute for 
Healthcare Informatics report). In 2011 this was reduced to 51% total combined, mainly due to 
rising markets in emerging economies (e.g. Russia, Brazil, China etc.) (IMS Institute for 
Healthcare Informatics,  
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4.4.2.2.4 Defining ‘Rare’  
A rare cancer was defined as being orphan in both the USA and Europe, which are, as 
noted above, the major markets for UK firms. Due to the differences in how each region 
defines ‘orphan’ (see discussion in Chapter 5 regarding the Orphan Drug legislation) and 
the variations seen in how prevalence and incidence is measures, in terms of how 
different types of cancers are defined, i.e. grouped together or split, ‘rare’ status was 
defined from the USA database at www.rarediseases.info.nih.gov, and in Europe, the 
www.orpha.net database. The resulting types of cancer for inclusion are shown in Table 
5.  
Cancer, brain 
Cancer, gastrointestinal, stomach 
Cancer, oesophageal 
Cancer, pancreatic 
Cancer, nasopharyngeal 
Cancer, leukaemia, hairy cell 
Cancer, leukaemia, acute lymphocytic 
Cancer, leukaemia, acute myelogenous 
Cancer, leukaemia, chronic lymphocytic 
Cancer, leukaemia, chronic myelogenous 
Cancer, lung, small cell 
Cancer, lymphoma, Hodgkin`s 
Cancer, mesothelioma 
Cancer, neuroendocrine, carcinoid 
Cancer, neuroendocrine, neuroblastoma 
Cancer, sarcoma, Ewing`s 
Cancer, sarcoma, Kaposi`s 
Cancer, sarcoma, lipo 
Cancer, sarcoma, osteo 
Cancer, sarcoma, soft tissue 
Cancer, gastrointestinal, stromal 
Table 5 Relevant primary indications (as defined by Pharmaprojects). 'Rare' status 
defined as rare in Europe (www.orpha.net) and USA 
(www.rarediseses.info.nih.gov) 
 
4.4.2.2.5 Pharmaprojects Primary Indication 
The projects identified for inclusion into this study must have been described by 
Pharmaprojects as having had a rare cancer as their primary indication, to control for 
situations where the drug has been approved initially for a more common condition and 
then approved for secondary indications. 
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In instances where the drug was indicated for cancer in general and specified down to a 
rare cancer at a later date, such as was the case with plevitrexed, then the case was 
included. This was in contrast to where a drug was indicated for a non-rare cancer, where 
the initial research stream was discontinued and development was picked up in a rare 
cancer, where cases would have been excluded from the dataset.  
Furthermore, due to the potential for a drug to be developed for multiple indications, 
some included projects did show a high market potential. The justification for inclusion 
of these instances was that the rare cancer was the primary indication and so projects 
developed in a scenario of multiple indications are still contributing towards the overall 
population of drugs for rare cancers (and diseases).  
4.4.2.2.6 Relevant Therapy Type 
In order to ensure that the drug projects captured were relevant and presented novel 
approaches to cancer therapy, i.e. the dataset was not to include ‘me-too’ drugs, 
generics, or combinations of existing therapies, the Pharmaprojects classification for 
‘Primary Therapy’ was used as a filter with relevant therapy types including gene 
therapies, haematological etc. (for full list see Table 6). 
Anticancer 
Antisense therapy 
Cytokine 
Gene therapy 
Haematological 
Hormone 
Immunoconjugate 
Immunoglobulin 
Immunological 
Immunomodulator 
Immunostimulant 
Immunosuppressant 
Immunotoxin 
Monoclonal antibody 
Neurological 
Oligonucleotide 
Otological 
Prostaglandin 
Recombinant 
Recombinant growth factor 
Recombinant hormone 
Recombinant interferon 
Recombinant interleukin 
Recombinant vaccine 
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Releasing hormone 
Somatostatin 
Stomatological 
Therapeutic vaccine 
Table 6 Relevant (included) primary therapy description (as defined by 
Pharmaprojects) 
 
4.4.2.3 Data Sources 
Data was collected from publicly available sources and some interviews were also 
carried out. A detailed picture of the case was constructed prior to interviews. This 
allowed interviewees to comment on the case history, identify gaps or highlight 
controversial points. These sources are complementary, with the necessity of gathering 
documentary evidence stemming from the issue of recall in interviewing individuals 
regarding events that occurred around 10-20 years ago, and the potential for individuals 
to present an unbalanced view of the development of a project.  
4.4.2.3.1 Publicly Available Sources 
Data sources that were considered ‘publicly available56’ included: newspaper and press 
reports, websites (including, but not limited to EURORDIS - www.eurodis.com, 
www.orphan.net,  www.dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed, www.cancer.gov, 
www.nice.org.uk, www.druginfo.nlm.nih.gov/drugportal, 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda, as well as company websites), press 
releases, firm annual reports, industry analytics/observers, scientific publications 
(identified through PubMed, Scopus and/or Web of Science).  
The construction of the case histories held media reports as an important and informative 
source of data. These channels are used strategically to promote social issues (Holder 
and Treno, 1997), mobilise resources (Nahuis and Boon, 2011) and effect change 
(Balasegaram et al., 2008). Therefore, media reports are a relevant source with 
consideration of the study’s aim, to capture the perceptions and expectations of 
individuals and organisations at different times during the life cycle of a project. Media 
reports were found through the Nexis database (www.nexis.com).  
Data collection was focused by the framework developed from the literature review 
(initially around the four broad factors and later, to specifically answer the identified 
issues from the development of the framework). The collection of data and construction 
                                                 
 
56 Some were access on a subscription basis (most widely through University subscriptions) 
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of the case histories was initially chronological but also took on a factor/condition 
structure.  
4.4.2.3.2 Interviews 
A total of 9 out of 11 cases were covered with at least one type of correspondence with 
scientists, and/or industry stakeholders, involved in the development of that project 
(Table 7). Interestingly there is no trend towards interviewees willing to discuss project 
development for successful projects over failures, whereby we see no interviewees for 
pazopanib (success) or Prolarix (failure), and only email correspondence for two other 
successes (nelarabine and temozolomide).  
Case 
Interview 
undertaken? 
Type of correspondence (number of 
individuals) 
Case history 
validated by 
interviewees 
Pazopanib N - - 
Nelarabine Y Email correspondence (1) Yes 
Barasertib Y Interview (1)  No 
Plevitrexed Y Interview (1) Yes 
Temozolomide Y Email correspondence (1)  Yes 
Campath Y Interview (3)  Yes 
Gemtuzumab Y Interview (2) No 
Banoxantrone Y Interview (1); Email correspondence (1) Yes 
TransMID Y Interview (2) Yes 
Prolarix N - - 
CAT3888 Y Interview (1) No 
Table 7 Summary of the interviews undertaken for each of the projects 
investigated in this research project 
 
Despite an appreciation that these interviews provided an additional layer of detail about 
the environment surrounding the projects in question, there were issues associated with 
access to willing participants. A total of 54 approaches were made, with multiple emails 
being sent to each individual (response rate of just over 1 in 3). In addition, 9 key 
individuals were re-sent emails including the completed case history review for comment 
(2 of the email correspondences mentioned above resulted from this).  
Access issues were, in part, associated with the identification of individuals involved in 
key stages of development of a project, particularly in the opaque structure of a large 
firm, for instance in identifying individuals involved in, e.g. pazopanib, developed by GSK. 
Furthermore, of the individuals contacted some raised confidentiality concerns in relation 
to talking about even historical projects. 
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In order to attempt to counter these concerns, interviewees were given the choice of 
whether they wished to remain anonymous, to be named in association with the project 
they were interviewed for (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviewees), or even just to 
comment on, or confirm the information already in the public domain. Blanket 
anonymisation was not implemented as, in some cases, it was useful to contextualise 
the informant by their involvement in the drug project.  
Informants were supplied with an information sheet and consent form, which they were 
asked to sign, prior to the interview 57 . The research was approved through the 
University’s ethical review board, and interviews were conducted in line with the relevant 
guidelines.  
Interviews were semi-structured, and focused on ascertaining the interviewee’s 
perspective and perception of the project in question. There was also effort made to fill 
some factual gaps in the chronological and contextual narrative surrounding the drug 
project. In addition to the interviews carried out aimed at specific projects an additional 
3 interviews were undertaken with a more general theme, taking the total number of 
interviews to 17. Interviewees were sent a near-completed version of the relevant case 
history write-up in order to review their personal contribution, to give them an opportunity 
to add more detailed information, and to confirm that the representation of the case study 
was an accurate one, eight replied, some with minor clarifications.  
To counter concerns of relatively low interviewee numbers, data was, where possible, 
triangulated between sources. The quality of the case histories was further confirmed in 
instances that did not initially entail interviews. Here, in 2 (of a total of 5) cases which 
were not based on interview data input was garnered from key individuals subsequent 
to the construction of the narratives, again with only minor clarifications and additions 
made. Furthermore, cases based on publicly available contemporary sources suffer less 
from recall bias and/or biases of individuals’ perspectives. 
Finally, the case histories unsupported by interview data, i.e. pazopanib and Prolarix, do 
not solely contribute towards the key observed trends brought out in the findings of this 
thesis. Here, pazopanib is merely used as a baseline case, and Prolarix has a very 
                                                 
 
57 See Appendix 2 for the information sheet, consent form and general questions asked to each 
of the interviewees. 
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similar development pathway to banoxantrone in the issues arising throughout the 
product life cycle.  
4.4.3 Steps 4 and 5 Entering the Field and Analysing Data 
Step four of Eisenhardt’s theory-building method requires feedback between data 
collection and analysis, where both processes are implemented in parallel. This can 
involve the inclusion of field notes, with observations noted and any important themes 
highlighted. The reflective nature of this process allows the researcher to note and recall 
any ‘cross-case comparisons, hunches about relationships, anecdotes and informal 
observations’ (Eisenhardt, 1989:539). Step five is closely linked, and indeed forms one 
of the components of this iterative process. It involves the construction of detailed case 
study write-ups which form a systematic tool for responding to the issue of the enormous 
amount of data collected from the case studies in question, as Pettigrew 1988 describes 
it: ‘death by data asphyxiation’ (1988, cited in Eisenhardt, 1989:540). In addition to 
providing means by which the researcher can digest case-wise data, it also allows for a 
familiarity with the cases to develop. This facilitates the recognition and appreciation of 
the case as an autonomous and holistic entity.  
After detailed case study descriptions were prepared, the comparative analysis was 
initiated. The challenges at this stage, as Eisenhardt observes, is to counter the natural 
human tendencies that lead to bad practice in case study analysis namely that the 
researcher: ‘leaps to conclusions based on limited data’, is ‘influenced by the vividness’ 
of the data, ‘ignore[s] basic statistical properties’, and ‘inadvertently drop[s] disconfirming 
evidence’(Eisenhardt, 1989:540). One tactic highlighted in Eisenhardt’s approach, is to 
base comparisons on similarities and differences between cases, either by categorising 
cases based on these, or by implementing a pair-wise comparison process (ibid). 
4.4.3.1 Steps 4 and 5 Implemented 
In this study Steps 4 and 5 involved collecting data, constructing the case histories and 
preparing the data for analysis. This was an incremental in process as it was important 
for an appreciation of the case studies as holistic entities to be developed (as per 
Eisenhardt’s guidelines (1989:540)). For both analysis approaches case histories were 
constructed and took on a structure dictated by the framework. This involved the 
categorisation of data into the four main factors (knowledge base, market demand, 
expectations and organisational environment), as well as a chronological appreciation 
for the different processes under each umbrella. This necessarily involved several 
versions of the case studies to be constructed, include one entirely chronological account 
of the case history.  
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4.4.3.1.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive analysis largely evolved from ‘getting to know’ the case histories, and 
being able to draw out similarities and differences between them. In the first instance, in 
accordance with Eisenhardt’s (1989) guidelines, this involved categorising the projects 
in line with the type of organisation (pharmaceutical company or biotechnology/academia) 
in which the project originated.  
This analysis also progressed in an incremental fashion whereby when trends and 
patterns were found, it was ensured that the data supporting these assertions were 
triangulated and strengthened, either through personal accounts or additional data 
collection approaches.  
4.4.3.1.2 QCA 
Section 4.2, justified the use of QCA as a component of the multiple case study approach 
implemented here, while 4.3 presented a historical account and overview of the logic 
behind QCA, this section builds on this by presenting a step-by-step account of the 
process of carrying out a QCA, including a discussion of the potential pitfalls and 
solutions to these.  
The QCA approach fits well with the Eisenhardt (1989) roadmap, as Ragin (2000) also 
emphasises the knowledge of cases as whole entities. In the process of a QCA the main 
purpose of this knowledge is that it facilitates the scoring of cases in accordance with 
their membership into the designated ‘sets’ (factors/conditions) (Ragin, 2000). This 
process is known as calibration.  
4.4.3.1.2.1 Calibration 
Once cases and conditions have been selected the data is gathered and coded into sets 
with scores allocated to represent membership of a set (1 for full membership, 0 for non-
membership). While measurement is an absolute presentation, calibration is 
implemented with an emphasis placed on the relationship between the dataset and 
accepted standards. One specific example of calibration is in temperature where 100oc 
(measurement) is taken due to its association with the boiling point of water (calibration), 
and 0oC, the freezing point of water (Ragin, 2008:72-73). This allocation of scores is 
based on concept formation, echoing the approach taken by Eisenhardt (1989).  
Calibration in a csQCA is facilitated due to the necessity to consider the presence or 
absence of a condition. So, rather than extensive vs. limited, high vs. low, positive vs. 
negative, supportive vs. unsupportive, it is relevant to think of full or non-membership 
into the set ‘extensive and accumulated knowledge base’, ‘high expected market 
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demand’ etc. This facilitates the process of taking data ‘on balance’ where discrepancies 
in different sources may arise.  
4.4.3.1.2.2 Necessary Conditions 
The first step in QCA is the determination of necessary conditions. In csQCA this can be 
done either intuitively, i.e. by looking at each condition and assessing how it related to 
each outcome in terms of empirically observed cases, or through software analysis58. 
Intuitively, conditions are deemed to be necessary if they are a subset of the outcome. 
This can be determined by producing matrices (per condition) to determine where cases 
in the relationship between condition (X), and outcome (Y), membership (see Table 8). 
This table shows that a condition is considered to be necessary when there are empirical 
cases where the presence of the outcome (Y=1) and the presence of the condition (X=1) 
are observed, but no cases observed in the presence of the outcome (Y=1) but the 
absence of the condition (X=0).  
  X 
  0 1 
Y 
1 
Cases should not 
appear for necessity 
Cases should 
appear for necessity 
0 
Cases not directly 
relevant 
Cases not directly 
relevant 
Table 8 Method for determining necessary conditions (adapted from Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012:71) 
 
Due to the asymmetrical nature of the QCA method (i.e. the findings for the presence of 
the outcome cannot necessarily be applied with the absence of the outcome), the 
analysis for necessity should be done for the presence and absence of the outcome 
individually.  
                                                 
 
58 There are two main software programmes that facilitate a QCA analysis. These are Tosmana 
(freely available at http://www.compasss.org/software.htm#tosmana-accessed 19.3.2015) and 
fsQCA (freely available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml-accessed 
31.5.2012) 
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4.4.3.1.2.3 Truth Table 
Once necessary conditions have been identified the calibrated data is presented in a 
matrix of cases and conditions, called a truth table. The goal of a truth table is to identify 
explicit connections between causal conditions and outcomes (Ragin, 2008:125). This 
provides an illustrative account of the combinations (configurations) of conditions that 
contribute towards a particular outcome (Ragin, 2008:25). Truth table construction 
involves assigning each row of the table a possible combination of conditions, so a study 
with 4 (causal) conditions, for instance, would have 16 rows in the truth table (see Table 
9).  
In a truth table analysis cases are assigned a combination (configuration) of conditions, 
in accordance with the calibrated scores. The consistency value is then assigned 
depending on the outcome observed for those cases. Consistency is a measure of how 
well the empirical observations fit with the measure (in this instance, the sufficiency of 
the configuration of conditions) (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:182). For instance, 
where all cases under a certain configuration show the presence of the outcome they 
would be scored ‘1’ and would be included in the analysis. If there was a contradiction, 
i.e. there were cases found for a certain configuration that showed different outcomes 
the consistency score would reflect this, i.e. if 50% of cases were shown to have the 
presence of the outcome and 50% the absence, the consistency score for that 
configuration would be 0.5 (see Table 9). In this instance the inclusion of the 
configuration into the analysis would need to be decided based on the evidence, or it 
might be preferential to go back to the data to attempt to resolve the configuration. 
Generally, it is down to the researchers knowledge of the cases to determine whether a 
configuration should be included into the analysis (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). 
 
Condition U Condition V Condition W Condition X Cases Consistency Inclusion 
1 1 1 1 A (1), B (1) 1 1 
1 1 1 0 C (1), D (0) 0.5 ? 
1 1 0 0 E (0) 0 0 
1 0 0 0 F (0), G (0) 0 0 
0 1 1 0 - - - 
0 0 1 1 - - - 
1 1 0 1 - - 1 
1 0 1 1 H (1) 0 0 
1 0 1 0 - - - 
1 0 0 1 - - - 
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0 1 1 1 
I (1), J (1), K (1), 
L (0) 
0.75 1 
0 1 0 1 - - - 
0 1 0 0 - - - 
0 0 1 0 M (0) 0 0 
0 0 0 1 N (0) 0 0 
0 0 0 0 O (0), P (0) 0 0 
Table 9 Example of hypothetical truth table 
 
Whether a case is included in the analysis is also determined by whether it is the 
presence or the absence of the outcome that is being explained. If the presence of the 
outcome is the purpose of the analysis, then a configuration should be included if the 
cases observed show the presence of the outcome. Similarly, if the purpose is to explain 
the absence of the outcome, then a configuration should be included if the relevant 
observed cases show the absence of the outcome.  
The configurations to be included are then combined into the analysis to produce a 
solution relevant to the outcome being explained. From Table 9 the solution to explain 
the present of the outcome would be (the presence of a condition is represented as an 
upper case letter, and the absence of a condition is represented by a lower case letter; 
and a ‘+’ indicates either/or)  
UVWX + uVWX   →    Y 
The solution, which is made up of the relevant configurations is then minimised in 
accordance with Boolean algebra. This minimisation essentially eliminates factors that 
are present and absence while appearing in combination with other factors that are 
consistent. In this instance this would mean that ‘U’ is irrelevant because VWX contribute 
towards the outcome irrespective of the presence or absence of U. Another example is: 
AbC + abC + abc -> Y which can be minimised to bC + ab -> Y. The logic here is that if 
you take AbC or abC you can minimise to bC because the state of A/a is irrelevant to the 
state of the outcome if bC is present. Similarly, abC or abc can be minimised to ab (i.e. 
the state of C/c is irrelevant to the sufficiency of ab to the outcome).  
Potential issues exist in real data that complicate the process of a truth table analysis. 
The above instance of contradictory truth table rows is one, i.e. where a combination of 
conditions is empirically observed to be associated with two different outcomes. 
Strategies for solving this problem include; 1) adding a new condition, 2) changing the 
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scope conditions in the research design, 3) changing calibration standards, and 4) 
redefining outcomes or memberships in sets (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:120-121).  
In addition, another common problem with using real data in QCA is the issue of limited 
diversity. In this discussion it is important to make clear that limited diversity is an issue 
observed in social reality, rather than a function of a problem with the method (Ragin, 
2000:81). Limited diversity arises due to the lack of diversity seen in social phenomena, 
whereby certain combinations of conditions will be empirically observed numerous times, 
and other configurations will not be observed at all. There are configurations that 
theoretically exist but are not empirically observed. These are termed logical remainders 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:152).  
If the logical remainders are entirely excluded from the analysis the output is termed a 
‘conservative solution’ (called the ‘complex’ solution in the fsQCA software) where all 
sufficient conditions (and combinations of conditions) are included and no assumptions 
are made about the logical remainders (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:162). 
Alternatively the computer software can automatically take into account all potential 
possibilities for the absence or presence of the logical remainders, producing a 
‘parsimonious solution’ i.e. the least complex solution (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012:167). However, this is deemed to be too reliant on arbitrary distinctions and 
therefore not suitable in most cases.  
Another possible strategy to deal with the presence of a large number of logical 
remainders, is to attempt to envisage the counterfactual, i.e. to use the empirically 
observed cases and theoretical knowledge to inform the designation of a configuration 
as present or absent (De Meur et al., 2009:152, Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009:143). This 
involves ‘simplifying assumptions’ which are made up of generally accepted directions 
of causation (directional expectations), between one or more conditions and the outcome. 
Simplifying assumptions can then be used to inform the treatment of the combinations 
that do not show empirical observations (the logical remainders) (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012:167-171). With the aid of computer software, the researcher can 
inform the output in this way and construct a so-called ‘intermediate solution’ (ibid). For 
instance in Table 9 we might conclude that based on theoretical knowledge it is likely 
that, should the combination of conditions showing the presence of U, V, X, and absence 
of W, have been observed in reality, it would have been associated with the presence of 
the outcome therefore warranting the inclusion of this configuration into the analysis (see 
1 in Table 9). This is the approach that will be utilised in the analysis presented here.  
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The final stage of the truth table analysis is to determine the parameters of fit of the 
solution produced. Parameters of fit are: consistency and coverage. Consistency, as 
touched on above, it the extent to which the solution (or configuration of conditions) is 
representative in the data. And coverage is the amount of empirical data represented by 
a solution (or configuration of conditions) (Ragin, 2008:54).  
4.4.4 Step 6 – Shaping Hypotheses 
Step six from Eisenhardt’s (1989) roadmap highlights the ability to bring out ‘tentative 
themes, concepts, and possibly even relationships between variables’ and apply them 
across different cases (1989:541). This involves a return to the constructs and may 
involve ‘refining the definition of the construct and building evidence which measures the 
construct in each case’ through the use of ‘multiple sources of evidence to build construct 
measures, which define the construct and distinguish it from other constructs’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:541-542).  
The development of the constructs also involves a process of validation, whereby the 
appearance of multiple cases exemplifying a particular construct provides a logic of 
replication (Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). In this, in agreement with Yin (1984) cases are taken 
to be analogous to experiments with multiple cases (experiments) contributing towards 
validity through replication.  
4.4.4.1 Step 6 Implemented – Descriptive Analysis 
Despite the absence of this step in a QCA analysis, the descriptive analysis did involve 
some shaping of the hypotheses and further development of the framework in terms of 
the specific issues facing projects during development. These issues were compared 
across the case studies for the descriptive analysis.  
It was these issues, highlighted from the framework development, and the associated 
solutions that lend themselves to differentiating successes from failures that provided the 
foundation for the analysis of the case histories.  
4.4.5 Steps 7 and 8 – Enfolding Literature and Reaching Closure 
Step seven involves the generation of hypotheses from the cross-case analysis. It is 
assumed, at this stage, that there will be themes and concepts emerging from the two 
previous steps. These are then taken and assessed in terms of how well they fit amongst 
the other cases. This process may involve construct definition where a single construct 
may begin to be defined in terms of multiple indicators. It is here that the iterative and 
tentative process of prior construct definition in step one bears fruit in this type of 
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research. In addition to the definition of constructs, verification of the relationships 
between constructs also contributes towards the generation of hypotheses.  
The final two steps in Eisenhardt’s description involve an investigation into the 
relationship between the hypothesis/theory generated and the existing literature, and the 
realisation of the point at which saturation, and therefore closure has been reached. The 
former is important because the acknowledgement of contradicting literature is a key 
point for gaining confidence in the research findings and presents an opportunity for 
discussion of the emergent theory in context. In the same manner, literature discussing 
similar findings is important because it enhances the generalisability of the research 
conclusions. The last step, ‘reaching closure’, involves the recognition of the point at 
which the gains from incremental learning are minimal, the saturation point.  
4.5 Eisenhardt and QCA 
As demonstrated in this section, and supported by the observation that QCA is a theory-
building approach a QCA is well-suited to insertion into Eisenhardt’s theory building 
approach. This is further supported by the observation that QCA is a method that 
fundamentally facilitates theory building (Greckhamer et al., 2013). Furthermore, QCA 
allows us to overcome two central issues with the method highlighted by Eisenhardt. 
These are i) the number of cases that can be analysed with the theory-building method 
(Eisenhardt 1989) and ii) the apparent weakness in the issues surrounding the complex 
nature of the emergent themes and findings. Here, the QCA acts to support theory 
building due to the ability to assess more than 10 cases (where Eisenhardt advises 
against investigating more than 10) and thereby produce more overarching theoretical 
contributions. Furthermore, the output of a QCA is in the form of distinct patterns found 
in the data.  
The convergence of the two approaches also highlights the applicability of the methods 
when combined together. As will become clear, it is these three observations that make 
QCA a complementary addition to the theory-building case study approach.  
4.6 Potential Limitations of QCA and Multiple Case Studies 
Despite the apparent strength of the justification of using a multiple case study/QCA 
approach in the context of Eisenhardt’s roadmap, rather than more qualitative or 
quantitative research methods, it is also appropriate to provide a discussion of the 
potential limitations of the method.  
The iterative nature of collecting and analysing data for multiple case studies can lead to 
a lengthy process of adjustments and feedback loops between the data output and 
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theory (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009:12, Yin, 2009, Eisenhardt, 1989). Although this 
iterative approach is seen as a benefit, it may cause problems in the length of time taken 
for such an analysis. In this context there may also be temptation for opportunistic 
manipulation, however, this may be resolved with an emphasis on triangulation and the 
use of multiple sources (Yin, 2009). Triangulation has been particularly challenging in 
the context of this study due to issues associated with access to data and interviewees, 
as discussed above, however, attention has been invested into this issue in the case 
histories presented below. In particular, the multiple proxies implemented provided an 
avenue to triangulation on a condition level.  
This investment of time into increasing the quality of the empirical data collected about 
cases is also central to responding to a third critique of QCA and multiple case studies. 
This critique highlights the difficulty, of QCA and other case study-based methods, in 
generalising from data collected in a QCA and the wider population. In this context it is 
important to appreciate that despite resolving some issues associated with case study 
research, by assessing a larger number of cases than would traditionally be the case, 
there are limits to the generalisations that can be drawn from the study which will be 
considered in Chapter 9, as part of the discussion. However, QCA provides opportunity 
for deep understanding of a particular social phenomenon. Furthermore, by bringing 
together existing theoretical and empirical literature the framework used provides a firm 
foundation for further generalisation. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has built on those that have gone before by explaining how the method will 
be used to answer the research questions presented in Chapter 1. We have presented 
a multiple-methods approach whereby medium N cases will be analysed and compared, 
within the theory-building roadmap suggested by Eisenhardt (1989). This approach is 
justified in four ways: 1) the ambition to draw generalisations across a number of case 
studies, while maintaining an in-depth analysis in order to fully understand the 
mechanisms at work, 2) the need to fill the gap in assessing case histories from a 
multidimensional framework, as identified in Chapter 3, 3) the limitations of Eisenhardt’s 
approach, whereby the limitation in the number of case studies is overcome in a QCA, 
and 4) the ability to draw clear-cut and overarching conclusions from the analysis. We 
provided further justification for the implementation of this method in describing the lack 
of suitability of small N and large N approaches.  
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Through discussion of the step-by-step procedure suggested by Eisenhardt, while 
integrating QCA methods, we have presented the process by which projects will be 
analysed in line with the framework formulated in Chapter 3.  
The methodology discussed in this Chapter will be implemented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
Chapter 5 is a slight diversion from the aim of this thesis in providing a pilot for the case 
studies to come. Here it is possible to test the data collection tools, framework and 
operationalisation due to the triangulation made possible due to the availability of existing 
in-depth narratives of drug development.  
Chapters 6 and 7 present the data for this thesis in presenting the case history narratives 
constructed using the process demonstrated in this Chapter. Throughout these 
discussions an ongoing descriptive analysis will also be presented comparing the 
similarities and differences between cases. In addition, these case histories provide the 
data contributing towards the calibrated QCA scores (indicating whether the case has 
full or non-membership into the conditions) which will be summarised and used in the 
analysis presented in Chapter 8.  
The findings and analyses from Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will be brought together in the 
discussion presented in Chapter 9 which will draw conclusions and contributions for this 
thesis.   
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5 Path-breaking Drugs 
This Chapter provides a pilot for the empirical cases to come in Chapter 6 and 7. The 
purpose of this is to discuss two well-chronicled examples of drug development, 
Herceptin and Gleevec, where new technological approaches were utilised to create 
novel cancer treatments (Fischer et al., 2003). Due to the drugs presenting cases by 
which they are one of the first to exemplify a particular approach e.g. monoclonal 
antibodies and tyrosine kinase inhibitors, we term these ‘path-breaking’. For this reason, 
we will momentarily stray from the focus on drugs developed in the UK, whereby these 
projects were developed by Genentech and Novartis (Ciba-Geigy), respectively.  
This Chapter has four key purposes. Firstly, these case histories demonstrate the types 
of issues that can occur during the drug development process and highlight solutions 
adopted to overcome these. Secondly, drawing on literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and 
3, this Chapter illustrates some of the concepts and discussions from the literature and 
provide empirical evidence for these. For instance, in both Herceptin and Gleevec we 
witness the action of key individuals, consistently supporting the project and 
implementing their networks to promote development, occasionally in the face of 
adversity.  
Thirdly, investigations into Herceptin and Gleevec also demonstrates examples of how 
the operationalisation of the calibration for the QCA will be undertaken, as indicated in 
the subtitles for each section. Finally, the discussions presented in this Chapter draw 
heavily on well-researched and detailed narratives documenting the drug development. 
Often these provide the linking assumptions on which causal inferences can be based 
facilitating conclusions drawn from the case histories in Chapters 6 and 7. An effort has 
also been made, where possible, to triangulate the observations garnered from these 
narratives.   
5.1 Herceptin 
The history of Herceptin has been documented in various papers and in particular a book: 
HER-2: The Making of Herceptin, a Revolutionary Treatment for Breast Cancer (Bazell, 
1998), which documents the history of the drug development process.  
5.1.1 Introduction  
Herceptin (Anti-HER-2 Mab, R-597, RG-597, rhuMab HER2, trastuzumab, Ro-45-2317) 
is a mab, developed by Genentech and researchers at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA), for the treatment of breast cancer tumours. Herceptin is an example of 
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a novel approach to cancer therapy, utilising a monoclonal antibody to inhibit the action 
of a tyrosine kinase (HER2) involved in intracellular signalling and implying proliferative 
characteristics in HER2-positive tumour cells.  
Table 10 Herceptin development timeline 
1987 HER2/neu and breast cancer association discovered and published in Science 
1990 Roche acquire 60% stake in Genentech 
1992 Phase I of Herceptin (single agent) initiated 
1995 Initiation of Phase III trials 
1998 FDA grant Fast Track approval for Herceptin 
 
5.1.2 Knowledge Base (QCA score = 0)  
The Herceptin knowledge base began with the discovery of several oncogenes and 
proto-oncogenes in the 1970s and 1980s. Firstly, an avian erythroblastosis tumour virus 
was discovered to encode an oncogene, later found to be similar to the human epidermal 
growth factor receptor (HER-1/ ErbB1) (Harries and Smith, 2002). Subsequently neu and 
erbB, later named Her-2 and c-erbB2 were also found to be associated with 
overamplification in cell lines of mammary carcinomas (Harries and Smith, 2002). 
At this time the research was picked up by Dennis Slamon at the UCLA, who, working 
with Axel Ullrich from Genentech, formalised the relationship between breast cancer 
incidence and HER2 (Slamon et al., 1987, Slamon et al., 1989). The next step was to 
produce an antibody to target HER2+ cells without affecting normal cells (Bazell, 1998). 
This specificity was tested in a number of antibodies produced using nude mice 
implanted with breast cancer cells (xenografts) (Bazell, 1998, Harries and Smith, 2002). 
The resulting mab was then humanised, producing Herceptin (Harries and Smith, 2002). 
At this stage combination treatment (i.e. the mab in conjunction with another standard 
cytotoxin, such as paclitaxel, cisplatin and doxorubicin) was found to show increased 
effectiveness (Baselga et al., 1998, Harries and Smith, 2002).  
Preclinical trials provided justification for testing Herceptin in humans and phase I trials 
were initiated in 1992 in 16 patients with HER2+ metastatic breast cancer (Harries and 
Smith, 2002). An additional phase I trial testing Herceptin in combination with cisplatin 
was also undertaken (Harries and Smith, 2002). Phase II trials for Herceptin, in 
combination with cytotoxins, indicated overall response rates of around 15%, with a 
median response duration of 9.1 months, median survival of 13 months, median time to 
progression of 3.1 months and median time to treatment failure of 11 months (Harries 
and Smith, 2002). 
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Two phase III trials provided sufficient data for the approval of Herceptin. Herceptin was 
evaluated in 469 patients, in combination with paclitaxel and doxorubicin, and in 222 
patient trials as a monotherapy (Pharma Marketletter, 1997c). Response rates from 
these phase III trials were significantly higher with Herceptin in combination with 
chemotherapeutic agent when compared to the cytotoxin as a monotherapy (45% vs. 
29%; 50% vs. 38% and 38% vs. 15%) (Frankel, 2000). Overall Herceptin shows a 
response rate of 35% as a single agent, and this is higher when used in combination with 
cytotoxins (Cameron, 2007).  
Fundamentally Herceptin was a novel approach and therefore suffered from a high 
degree of uncertainty. In addition, the target had not been previously validated 
successfully in a product. This supports the score of ‘0’ for the QCA.  
5.1.3 Market Demand (QCA score = 1) 
From discovery stages the market for Herceptin was known to be limited to the subgroup 
of breast and ovarian cancer patients shown to be HER2+. As will be discussed in the 
next section the knowledge leading up to the development of Herceptin was motivated 
by an association found between HER2 and breast cancer patients (25-30% of breast 
cancers were found to be HER2+) (Bazell, 1998, Slamon et al., 1987, Slamon et al., 
1989). In addition, an association was also found between HER2 and some ovarian 
cancer patients (Berchuck et al., 1990, Business Wire, 1992). 
This implies that Herceptin was limited to a small range of indications (breast and ovarian 
cancers). Furthermore, despite the common occurrence of breast cancer the market for 
Herceptin was small due the small subset of patients shown to be HER2+. This is 
quantified as around 58, 500 new cases in the USA annually. Furthermore, where the 
prevalence of breast cancer is around 3,000,000 (USA)59 HER2+ patients would number 
in the region of 750,000. Despite this prevalence being larger than the 200,000 (or less) 
categorising ‘orphan’ diseases, the market estimated was small, just $100m in sales per 
year sales (Pharma Marketletter, 1997d). 
Breast cancer is commonly treated with a combination of surgery and cytotoxic agents 
such as paclitaxel and cisplatin. However, the HER2+ breast cancer subtype was found 
to show a particularly severe and aggressive form of the disease (Harries and Smith, 
2002), implying a particular need for additional treatment for this subtype of tumours.  
                                                 
 
59 http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/breast.html  
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In this case history, despite the relatively small indication presented by the HER2+ 
subtype of breast cancer, comparative to rare cancers this indication provides a high 
market demand and has therefore been scored ‘1’ for the QCA, representing its full 
membership into the set high market demand. This is further supported whereby there 
is a clear unmet need in this area, thereby further stimulating a positive market potential.  
5.1.4 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score =1) 
As mentioned in a section 3.1.3.3 patients made a significant impact on the development 
of Herceptin through the lobbying of Genentech for access to the drug during trials 
(Bazell, 1998, Puzzanghera, 1997). In response a compassionate use programme was 
introduced to enable patient access to the drug, on a lottery basis, prior to FDA approval 
(Bazell, 1998, Puzzanghera, 1997). While this was beneficial for patients Genentech 
were cautious, implementing a lottery system and keeping publicity to a minimum (ibid). 
Their concern stemmed from manufacturing issues and difficulties producing enough 
drug to meet demand (Bazell, 1998, Business Wire, 1997a). 
In an unusual turn of events, Revlon, a large cosmetics company, became involved in 
the project through direct funding to Slamon (UCLA) (Bazell, 1998, PR Newswire, 
1997).Despite this corporate endorsement and the associated exposure for the drug, this 
relationship was not publicised until late in the drug’s development (Pharma Marketletter, 
1997c). However, the involvement of Revlon did contribute towards breaking down the 
social stigma associated with breast cancer in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bazell, 
1998:71). Furthermore, Revlon benefited from the positive public image associated with 
aiding the development of a breast cancer drug whereby the Revlon Chairman is quoted 
as stating in the press: “Revlon doesn’t just care about women’s looks, we care about 
women’s lives” (PR Newswire, 1997). 
The role of publicity in facilitating the recruitment of patients for trials (as observed in 
Bazell, 1997) is exemplified in the mentions of the drug in the media. A Nexis search 
identifies 40 articles before beginning of 1997, 10 of these, all in 1996, in major 
newspapers, 21 articles in 1997 and over 300 in 1998. In particular, publicity and patient 
groups were key in contributing towards the recruitment of the patients required for the 
expanded phase III trials (Bazell, 1998:161, United Press International, 1996). The 
positive perspectives of the project were also constructed by Slamon promoting it in the 
press through discussions of trial results: “we are extremely optimistic about these 
trials”...”early findings are very promising, with some outstanding results” (United Press 
International, 1996, Papp, 1996). In addition the development of Herceptin benefited 
from being presented as a positive product finally arising from the hype of biotech: ‘after 
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2 decades of hype and disappointment, a high-tech medical innovation called the mab 
is at last showing promise against cancer’ (PM Cycle, 1996). 
In summary, the hype surrounding Herceptin and the influence that the lobbying of 
patient groups had on the drug’s development represents positive stakeholder 
perspectives. In addition, this positive influenced the development of the drug by 
promoting it. This justifies the QCA score of ‘1’.   
5.1.5 Organisational Environment (QCA score = 1)  
Herceptin development progressed as a collaborative relationship between Slamon at 
UCLA and Genentech (Bazell, 1998). Initially Genentech were sceptical of the project. 
This was for a number of reasons: 1) previous disappointment with interferon, an 
oncology drug which was initially thought to be applicable to a broader range of 
indications (Rogers, 1985), 2) the difficulty of dealing with mabs, where the first product 
to enter clinical trials was murine the murine mab, with a humanised version coming later 
(Pharma Marketletter, 1992),, and 3) the difficulty of producing an antibody for a specific 
single target (Bazell, 1998:47-49).  
In response to these uncertainties Slamon was key in championing the project to 
Genentech. In this strategy Slamon was a ‘tenacious lobbyist’, not afraid of confrontation, 
and believed that if Genentech themselves did not want to develop the project they 
should license it out (Bazell, 1998:48). This lobbying was particularly necessary in 1989 
when the Genentech senior management came close to terminating the project. In 
addition, lower management also came ‘to the rescue’ in their own championing for 
Herceptin (Bazell, 1998:50). As Bazell observes, in this process it is often necessary to 
have someone influential and internal to the company (Bazell, 1998:52).  
Due to the difficulties Genentech had with the previous interferon project, oncology was 
not a strategic area for the company (Bazell, 1998:44) and Herceptin was their first major 
oncology project (Business Wire, 1997c). However, the lack of experience in oncology 
was partially countered by the positive impact of the firms’ ‘pioneer mentality’ (Bazell, 
1998:45) and support through being ‘the first major company which is at the forefront of 
recombinant DNA techniques for healthcare applications’ (Klott, 1980). 
The Revlon funding facilitated parallel research streams for Herceptin (PR Newswire, 
1997). Genentech worked on the humanisation of the mab and Slamon (at UCLA, funded 
by Revlon) undertook preliminary studies ascertaining the safety of the murine mabs in 
patients (Bazell, 1998:71).  
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In 1990, while Herceptin was in preclinical testing, Roche acquired a 60% stake in 
Genentech (Bazell, 1998:53). This reportedly stimulated a cultural change at the 
organisation with the arrival of a new CEO, Kit Raab, who was not enthusiastic about 
antibody drugs (Bazell, 1998:55-56). This may have stemmed from Raab’s business-like 
management style where he had a reputation as an aggressive marketing executive 
(Fisher, 1995) and therefore presumably risk-averse approach60, where Herceptin and 
mabs were a risk due to the lack of previous drugs using this approach. However, the 
access to finance and Roche’s experience did aid Genentech’s ability to successfully 
carry out later stage trials (Bazell, 1998:133).  
In these later stage trials, protocol was adapted several times due to physicians 
hesitation in recruiting patients who may be assigned to the ‘placebo’ arm (i.e. treatment 
with chemotherapy alone, rather than in combination with Herceptin) (Bazell, 1998:147). 
Suggestions that the phase III trials were run differently to those trials previously 
designed also implies difficulty in building on the knowledge from those that went before.   
There was another change in CEO during the planning of the phase III trial, whereby 
Raab CEO at the time, was ousted in 1995 (Fisher, 1995, Bazell, 1998). This move was 
associated with several reasons. Firstly, there had been several instances of negative 
publicity for the company stemming from unethical sales practices resulting in ongoing 
legal action (Sandoval, 1995). Secondly, upon the acquisition, by Roche, of the 
remainder of the share capital of Genentech, the intention was to take the company in a 
new direction as an R&D arm of Roche, thereby implying a need for a research-focused 
CEO, away from Raab’s management style (Fisher, 1995). Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, Raab had, controversially, been found to have attempted to gain a 
guarantee from Roche for a $2m personal bank loan, as part of the acquisition 
negotiations. This move was publicised as the former CEO taking advantage of his 
position and attempting to make personal gains from the situation (Sandoval, 1995). 
Raab was replaced with Levinson who ‘promised to restore integrity to the company’s 
business practices’ (Bazell, 1998:152-153), as well as providing scientific leadership for 
the new direction of the company (Fisher, 1995). As well as providing a more science-
driven approach for the firm Levinson also had a particular vested interest in Herceptin 
                                                 
 
60 Here, Herceptin was a risky approach due to the lack of previous products utilising monoclonal 
antibody techniques.  
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as he had co-authored a paper with Ullrich describing the cloning of the HER2 gene 
(Bazell, 1998:153).  
Despite the sometimes questionable firm perspective of the development of Herceptin, 
ultimately the positive impact of Slamon as a key individual, and the access to funding 
and support from the Roche acquisition, enabled Genentech to take the development of 
Herceptin forward. This accounts for the categorisation of Herceptin as fully in the set of 
supportive organisational environment for the QCA (i.e. score of ‘1’).  
5.1.6 Summary of Development of Herceptin  
The case history of Herceptin presented here indicates that there were doubts over the 
market potential of the drug, although these were overcome whereby the potential for 
the market stemmed from a lack of competitors in the marketplace. There were also 
questions over the feasibility in such a novel technological area that had not been 
previously validated (i.e. mabs), creating issues of risk and uncertainty. These questions, 
which almost led to the termination of the project, were overcome through both key 
individuals, who promoted the drug’s development, and patients/patient groups in the 
advocacy and lobbying work they undertook. Furthermore, while there was a lack of 
strategic fit for the drug project in the Genentech portfolio, it represented a therapeutic 
area in which Roche is a significant player, thereby providing an avenue of growth for 
the parent company. Furthermore, the financial resources accessed through Roche 
support facilitated the development of the project.  
5.2 Gleevec 
The history of Gleevec has been documented both in papers and the book, ‘Magic 
Cancer Bullet’ co-authored by former Novartis CEO, Daniel Vasella (Vasella and Slater, 
2003). These provide key sources for this case history. 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Gleevec (imatinib mesylate, STI571) is a small molecule tyrosine kinase inhibitor with 
specificity for Bcr-Abl, platelet-derived growth factor receptor (PDGF-R) and c-kit (Druker, 
2002). Gleevec was initially developed by Novartis (formerly Ciba-Geigy) for chronic 
myeloid leukaemia (CML), with additional approval in gastro-intestinal stromal tumours 
(GIST).  
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Table 11 Gleevec development timeline 
1983 Cancer research unit re-established at Ciba-Geigy 
1988 First mention of tyrosine kinase inhibitors in peer reviewed publication 
1993 Gleevec first synthesised 
1994 In vitro testing of Gleevec 
1995 In vivo testing of Gleevec 
1996 Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merge to form Novartis; Vasella bought in as CEO; first paper 
mentioning Gleevec published by Druker 
1998 Phase I trials initiated 
1999 Phase I results reported at American Society of Hematology meeting 
2000 Compassionate use programme created through Expanded Access Programme 
(FDA); Phase III trials initiated; FDA fast track designation approved 
2001 NDA filed; FDA approval  
 
5.2.2 Knowledge Base (QCA score = 0) 
Research on tyrosine kinase inhibitors requires the combination of several streams of 
research, ascertaining 1) the link between a particular kinase and cancer, 2) which 
subtypes are impacted by the specific tyrosine kinase, and 3) the identification of a drug 
to selectively target the tyrosine kinase.  
In the case of Gleevec this began in the 1960s and 1970s when it was discovered that 
the Philadelphia chromosome 61  was associated with CML patients (Nowell and 
Hungerford, 1960, Nowell and Hungerford, 1961, Rowley, 1973), through the action of 
the Bcr-Abl oncogene (Vasella and Slater, 2003, Deininger et al., 2005). This discovery 
motivated research into investigating compounds that would be active in inhibiting the 
Bcr-Abl oncogene/tyrosine kinase (ibid).  
The discovery of a molecule to selectively inhibit Bcr-Abl, without affecting normal cells, 
was challenging and met with scepticism as, at this time, no other drug had been found 
to successfully target a tyrosine kinase (Vasella and Slater, 2003). It was not until 1988 
when Professor Alexander Levitski showed the selective inhibition of an epidermal 
growth factor receptor, that researchers at Novartis (then Ciba-Geigy) moved into the 
exploration of CML and Bcr-Abl (Vasella and Slater, 2003). 
It took four years from this discovery for a compound to be produced showing in vivo 
activity. Furthermore, this compound had solubility issues that needed resolving and it 
wasn’t until 1993 that compounds with ‘drug candidate status’ and promising preclinical 
results were identified (Vasella and Slater, 2003), with results of initial investigations 
                                                 
 
61  The Philadelphia chromosome is the product of a translocation, or swapping of material, 
between chromosomes 9 and 22, forming the Bcr-Abl oncogene.  
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published in 1996 (Buchdunger et al., 1996, Druker et al., 1996). Gleevec was chosen 
as it emerged as the ‘most promising … since it had the highest selectivity for growth 
inhibition of Bcr-Abl-expressing cells’ (Deininger et al., 2005). 
In 1994 in vitro studies showed that the compound inhibited 90% of leukaemia cells 
supporting the decision to proceed with animal studies. In 1996 Druker published the first 
article mentioning Gleevec in which these preclinical results were reported (Druker et al., 
1996, Vasella and Slater, 2003). However, the initiation of trials in human subject was 
delayed due to issues associated with blood clots at the catheter administration sites. 
Other ‘speed bumps’ 62  encountered with the compound included the bitter taste, 
impacting the potential for oral administration, and corrosive nature, damaging the 
machines involved in manufacturing. These needed to be resolved before phase I trials 
could be initiated in 1998, despite being first discussed four years earlier (Vasella and 
Slater, 2003). 
These phase I trials showed ‘striking’ results both in safety and efficacy (Vasella and 
Slater, 2003:99). In particular, one patient showed complete cytogenetic response (i.e. 
in bone marrow not just blood) within 5 months which was previously unheard of in CML 
treatment (Vasella and Slater, 2003:101). In addition, at a dose of 300 mg or greater 53 
out of 54 patients showed complete haematological responses, typically within 3 weeks 
of therapy (Druker, 2002). Furthermore, 31% of patients had a cytogenetic responses, 
with 13% achieving complete response (Deininger et al., 2005). 
In a phase II, initiated in 1999 (Deininger et al., 2005) testing Gleevec as a single agent, 
data for over 100 patients was accrued, the results for which are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 Results from Phase II trials for Gleevec (Druker 2002) 
 Chronic Phase Accelerated Phase Myeloid Blast Phase 
Haematological response 95% 53% 29% 
Cytogenetic Response 60% 26% 15% 
Relapse rate at 18 
months from Cytogenetic 
response 
9% 40% 78% 
                                                 
 
62 The speed bumps described by Vasella and Slater relate to the concept of ‘project drag’ as 
introduced in Chapter 3. Here the former CEO of Novartis observes the frequency by which 
projects suffer from events contributing towards the loss of momentum for development. The 
appearance of a similar concept suggested by an industry expert, validates and further justifies 
the significance of the concept and its significance for this thesis.  
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Both phase I and phase II trials were designed with FDA and EMA approval in mind 
(Vasella and Slater, 2003). Therefore, despite the delay in phase III initiation, in the same 
year (2000) Gleevec fast track approval was granted to Novartis and an NDA was filed 
in February 2001 (Vasella and Slater, 2003, Deininger et al., 2005). 
Due to the novelty of the approach used, and the lack of tyrosine kinase inhibitors prior 
to Gleevec we conclude that the knowledge base providing the foundation or the 
development of the drug is not extensive and therefore the QCA score is concluded to 
be ‘0’.  
5.2.3 Market Demand (QCA score = 0)  
The realisation that Gleevec would only be aimed at a small market potential came early 
on in the drug’s development and continued to be an area of contention at Novartis until 
late stage trials (Vasella and Slater, 2003). When the drug showed promising results in 
preclinical testing ‘marketing managers were discouraging management from supporting 
the compound’ (Vasella and Slater, 2003:55). In fact, when efforts at Ciba-Geigy (later 
Novartis) began to be aimed at cancer research and tyrosine kinases, CML and the 
associated Bcr-Abl tyrosine kinase target were not considered a priority due to the 
associated small patient population (ibid). Despite the additional potential shown in 
GISTs, this indication is also ‘rare’ and therefore did not increase the drug’s market 
potential.  
CML, which is characterised by the Bcr-Abl mutation (Deininger et al., 2005) (see 
Knowledge Base section for further discussion), typically affects 1 to 2 people in every 
100,000 annually (Druker, 2002), equating to around 6,650 people in 2003 (USA) and 
around 1,000 people in UK (for comparison, 200,000 patients have prostate and 195,000 
breast cancer) (Vasella and Slater, 2003), (Ahuja, 2000).  
Despite this small potential market biotech analysts Lehman Brothers, in 2000, stated a 
belief that the drug could achieve blockbuster (Pharma Marketletter, 2000a). This reflects 
drug pricing expectations for Gleevec due to the lack of standard therapy in CML that 
was adequately safe and efficacious. Prior CML patient survival with standard 
chemotherapy was 4 years, on average, and 6 years with interferon (Vasella and Slater, 
2003).  
After just the phase I trials of Gleevec, substantial commercial promise was evident as 
Vasella observes:  
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‘never before had any drug proven that effective [phase I results] on CML 
patients. Not radiation, not chemotherapy, not interferon, not Ara-C, not even the 
only known cure for the disease, a bone marrow transplant, which results in the 
death of many patients’ (Vasella and Slater, 2003:13) 
In summary, this section demonstrates that the market demand surrounding the 
development of Gleevec presented a particularly low potential, due to the small number 
of patients affected by the primary indication. As the blockbuster potential suggested by 
industry analysts was constructed from an uncertain assumption of the potential pricing 
for the product once launched, we score Gleevec as having the absence of high market 
demand, due to the limited number of additional indications it was applicable to. This 
justified the score of ‘0’ for the QCA.  
5.2.4 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 1) 
Stakeholder perspectives were key in facilitating Gleevec’s development, however, they 
also led to apprehension. Indeed one of the motivations for continuing the drug’s 
development was the potential to fulfil an unmet need for patients (Vasella and Slater, 
2003). However, early on, this was recognised to be a ‘time bomb’ due to the ‘internet 
generation of patients’ shifting from allies to enemies and having the power to cause 
problems for drug developers, as was the case with AIDS activists (Vasella and Slater, 
2003).  
Publicity for the development of Gleevec began in 1996 when Druker first published 
preclinical results (Druker et al., 1996). This involved a feature story in The Oregonian 
and Associated Press which served the purpose of attracting patients to trials when these 
were initiated in 1998 (Vasella and Slater, 2003). This is key to overcoming the common 
problem with many orphan drug projects, where patient recruitment to trials, due to the 
sheer lack of patients afflicted, can be challenging. 
Patient demand also promoted the acceleration of Gleevec manufacturing and 
development efforts, particularly when patients clamoured for access upon positive trial 
results (Vasella and Slater, 2003). Indeed some trial results were purposefully kept 
secret in order to contain patient response and avoid raising false expectations (Vasella 
and Slater, 2003). This fear, of a ‘patient revolt’ was realised in 1999 when a patient-led 
petition received over 3,000 signatures in under a month leading to a request to Novartis 
for ‘assurance that everything will be done to produce a sufficient supply of STI571 
[Gleevec] to ensure that the trial investigators [were] not held up in any way at all in 
trialling this new drug and in advancing to the certification that we anticipate’ (Vasella 
and Slater, 2003:110-117).  
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In 1999 TV and newspaper coverage of the presentation of trial results at the American 
Society of Hematology meeting instigated 2000 calls a day to Novartis (Vasella and 
Slater, 2003). For instance, on 28th December 1999 the drug was described as a ‘wonder 
drug’ bringing ‘real hopes of a cure’ (Houldcroft, 1999). Vasella and Slater reflect that 
this demand arose from a generation of ‘internet activists’ and empowered patients 
(Vasella and Slater, 2003). In response to patient pressure, and despite the company’s 
reservations, Novartis did create a compassionate use programme in June 2000, under 
the Expanded Access Program at the FDA (Vasella and Slater, 2003).   
Media reports confirm the enthusiasm for the drug where it is described as a ‘wonder 
drug’ in 1999. In addition patient stories report positive reactions to treatment with the 
drug (Ahuja, 2000, Koglin, 2000, Kalb, 2000, Allison, 2000, Cardy, 2000). However, there 
are also reports of physicians being uncomfortable with not being able to prescribe the 
drug more widely, prior to the introduction of the compassionate use programme (Ahuja, 
2000). In addition the ‘patient revolt’ is also publicised in 2000 where supplies were 
described as limited and ‘patients around the world [were] clamouring for a new pill 
[Gleevec]’ (Allison, 2000).  
The oral administration of the drug also justified support from physician and patient 
stakeholders. Vasella observes: ‘capsule allows most patients to lead a normal life’ 
(Vasella and Slater, 2003:25). 
Stakeholder perspectives surrounding Gleevec development were positive, with 
enthusiasm felt for the drug, particularly from patients. This demonstrated a positive 
stakeholder perspective and justifies the QCA score of ‘1’. 
5.2.5 Organisational Environment (QCA score = 1)  
The development of Gleevec was carried out in-house at Novartis (formerly Ciba-Geigy) 
with some early work also undertaken by researchers at the Dana Farber Institute 
(Vasella and Slater, 2003).  
In the early 1980s Ciba-Geigy closed their cancer research unit due to the perceived lack 
of prospects in the field: ‘management simply decided the investment was not worth the 
paltry returns’ (Vasella and Slater, 2003). However, in 1983 Ciba-Geigy re-established 
an oncology unit, headed by Alex Matter, who championed Gleevec’s development 
(Vasella and Slater, 2003). This process involved promoting the drug in the face of 
opposition and suggestions to terminate development. Vasella and Slater recall: ‘he 
[Matter] knew that people were tired of hearing from him. But he did not care’ (Vasella 
and Slater, 2003:62). Matter also utilised his networks to bring in other key individuals 
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for the project: Nick Lydon and Brian Druker (Dana-Farber Institute) (Vasella and Slater, 
2003).  
Druker’s involvement, in testing candidate products, was short lived as Ciba-Geigy’s 
main competitor, Sandoz, began a collaboration with the Dana-Farber Institute. During 
this time the Ciba-Geigy cancer research unit increased in numbers to 100 researchers 
(Vasella and Slater, 2003). However, in 1996 Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy merged to produce 
Novartis, where upon Vasella was brought in as CEO and Druker could return to work 
on the Gleevec project (Vasella and Slater, 2003).  
Vasella developed a personal interest in Gleevec due to the continued championing of 
the project to him by Matter (Vasella and Slater, 2003). However, this support was met 
with continued scepticism in other areas of the organisation due to the lack of credibility 
of the previously unproductive cancer research unit:  
‘even with the degree of support that I was showing the project, there were 
enormous pressures on Alex Matter’s team, pressures that spelled trouble for 
the compound seemingly at every turn’ (Vasella and Slater, 2003:61).  
However, Vasella did have the power to continue the drug’s development despite a 
perceived lack of commercial viability:  
‘I [Vasella] suggested that if a compound proved promising if it seemed likely to be 
medically significant, it made no sense to halt the research because of weak 
commercial projections’ (Vasella and Slater, 2003:62). 
Organisational culture has been observed to be integral to the Novartis approach and, in 
particular in the development of Gleevec:  
‘[the organisation] learned to grapple with high risk by giving our researchers as 
much freedom a possible without losing focus and alignment’ (Vasella and Slater, 
2003:94)  
Indeed the shift in organisational culture at Novartis post-merger was key to researchers 
feeling a sufficient level of freedom to explore opportunities (Vasella and Slater, 2003).  
The organisational environment surrounding the development of Gleevec stems from the 
consistent involvement of Novartis (in-house) and the action of key individuals to promote 
the drug’s development within the firm. This contributes to the QCA score (1).  
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5.2.6 Summary of Development of Gleevec 
Gleevec presents an interesting development trajectory due to the low market demand 
characterised by CML. The technological approach was novel, underexplored and 
uncertain prior to the development of Gleevec and was therefore met with scepticism. 
This case history exemplifies the influence of a several project key individuals in 
championing the development of a drug, through sourcing new expertise from their 
networks and continuing support for drug development throughout its life cycle. In 
addition, Gleevec’s success can also be associated with the influence of patients in the 
development process, and in particular in the pressure placed on Novartis to accelerate 
development and introduce a compassionate use programme. This is also taken in the 
context of the drug showing significant effectiveness in an area of unmet need.  
5.3 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has provided case histories of to two ‘path breaking’ drug projects providing 
a foundation for subsequent empirical chapters (6 and 7). The projects are termed ‘path 
breaking’ as they represent the first instance in which new technological approaches 
(mabs and small molecule tyrosine kinase inhibitors) have been implemented in drug 
discovery and development.  
This Chapter has demonstrated the utility of the framework constructed in Chapter 3, 
outlining a multi-dimensional approach, while highlighting the importance of four 
conditions for successful drug development. In addition, we have drawn on the literature 
review by illustrating the concepts and theories discussed. This is exemplified whereby 
we can illustrate some of the solutions suggested to be integral to overcoming issues 
encountered during project development. Here we have identified, in Herceptin and 
Gleevec, illustrations of four of the seven possible mechanisms suggest to be integral to 
overcoming issues and thereby convey project success.  
These discussions have further provided us with the mechanisms we can draw on to 
form inferences in the case histories to come in the following Chapters (6 and 7), whereby 
detailed narratives by those involved allows us to see a clear picture of the mechanisms 
at work. For instance, we have witnessed the action of key individuals, in both Herceptin 
and Gleevec, the positive impact of corporate image on providing support for a 
development project, as in the involvement of Revlon in Herceptin, and the role of patient 
demand in guiding development, again in both case histories. 
For instance, we can equate the introduction of a compassionate use programme to the 
perception, by the firm, of a strong patient demand, promoting the accelerated 
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development of the project. In addition, where positive results of trials, we see patients 
responding and lobbying firms, particularly where there is a clear unmet medical need. 
As Vasella and Slater (2003) observe the power of a new age of internet activists, 
representing the acknowledged power of patients and the influence of the media on drug 
development. In addition, we have seen how novel technological areas, while met with 
enthusiasm from researchers, can also be associated with scepticism and uncertainty. 
We have demonstrated how data can be gathered from documentary evidence 
complemented by narratives (in this Chapter by books, in the following Chapters in the 
most part through interviews), something which will be emulated with interview accounts 
in the case histories to come. In addition, QCA calibration has been carried out 
demonstrating the operationalisation highlighted in the previous Chapter.  
Furthermore, this Chapter has validated and justified the introduction of the concept of 
‘project drag’ whereby we witness that small adverse events, if not overcome, are 
perceived to be detrimental to project development.  
The following Chapters (6 and 7) build on these pilot cases, whereby the main empirical 
evidence for this thesis is presented, in the same format and using similar sources to 
those presented here, albeit without the presentation of pre-conducted narratives 
discussing drug development.
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6 Analysis of Rare Cancer Drug Development in Big Pharma 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the first of three analyses Chapters (6, 7 and 8) comprising, in 
total, 11 drug project case histories, identified using the selection criteria described in 
Chapter 4. Each case history will be presented, with the main findings drawn out of each 
reflecting back to the framework constructed in Chapter 3. As discussed in Chapter 4 
this thesis uses a case-wise comparison methodology in which cases are compared to 
each other in terms of the four conditions highlighted in the framework (Figure 5), namely: 
knowledge base/accumulation, market demand, stakeholder perspectives and 
organisational environment. In addition, in the context of the case history the QCA score 
will also be assigned. The scores for the QCA will be analysed in Chapter 9. 
The data and analyses presented in the following chapters have been separated 
between cases originating in big pharma (this chapter) and smaller biotech/academia 
(Chapter 7). Four of the twelve projects in this thesis were initiated in pharmaceutical 
firms (GSK and AZ). Two of these (pazopanib and barasertib) were developed in-house 
(at GSK and AZ, respectively) and two (nelarabine and plevitrexed) were the result of 
collaborative relationships between big pharma and academic research labs.  
In investigating projects arising from research in big pharma, we observe an ideal-type 
case in pazopanib which followed an apparently unproblematic development pathway 
providing a baseline for comparison with other projects that are deemed to have suffered 
more difficulties. In addition, the findings indicate that in big pharma, projects tend to be 
terminated due to a process of ‘project drag’. Here we find that market-, efficacy- and 
strategy-related issues accumulate and contribute towards and eventual decision to 
discontinue development, due to a loss of momentum. We also witness, in the case of 
nelarabine, a challenging development trajectory overcome by the action of a consistent 
and effective research team and the presence of an influential key individual.  
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Figure 5 Summary of framework developed in Chapter 4  
 
6.2 The Baseline - Pazopanib  
Pazopanib hydrochloride (786034, armala, SB786034, Votrient) provides a baseline 
because development progressed unproblematically and was successfully developed by 
a big pharmaceutical firm.  
6.2.1 Interview sources 
No interviews were undertaken to inform this case history63. 
                                                 
 
63 It is possible that the lack of qualitative evidence in the form of interview data may account for 
the lack of identification of issues during the project’s development. However, it is expected that 
should issues raised during development have been significant they would have been identified 
from other documentary evidence. 
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6.2.2 Introduction 
Pazopanib is a multi-target tyrosine kinase receptor inhibitor primarily indicated for renal 
cell carcinoma (RCC). It was discovered and developed at GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
(previously SmithKline Beecham) during the period from 2002 to 2009, when it was first 
approved in USA for advanced RCC.   
1988 First mention of tyrosine kinase inhibitors in peer reviewed publication 
1989 SmithKline Beckman merge with Beecham 
1995 Glaxo merge with Burroughs Wellcome 
2000 Glaxo Wellcome merge with SmithKline Beecham 
2002 Pazopanib Phase I trials initiated 
2003 Pazopanib Phase II trials initiated 
2005 Pazopanib Phase III trials initiated  
2006 Sunitinib (Pfizer tyrosine kinase inhibitor - competitor) approved for RCC 
2009 Pazopanib approved for use in RCC; Sunitinib approved for 1st line treatment 
of RCC by NICE 
2011 Pazopanib recommended as 1st line treatment for RCC 
Table 13 Key events in the development of pazopanib 
 
6.2.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 1) 
Pazopanib entered trials two years after the SmithKline Beecham (SKB)/Glaxo 
Wellcome (GW) merger (2000). The project originated from research at SKB, where it 
was known as SB786034, who were named as assignee, in a patent filed around the 
time of the merger (Boloor et al., 2007, Boloor et al., 2006, Boloor et al., 2012). Both GW 
and SKB both had prior capabilities in kinase inhibitors, evidenced in the firm portfolios, 
with pazopanib at SKB and the kinase inhibitor lapatinib (Tykerb/GW572016) developed 
by GW, shown to be in trials in 2000 (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2000).  
Tyrosine kinases 64  (such as pazopanib) were initially used to target the vascular 
epidermal growth factor 2 receptor (VEGFR2)) (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2002). The VEGFR 
pathway has also been previously validated in many drugs, including the mab 
bevacizumab (Avastin) (first approved in 2004 for colorectal cancer), and small molecule 
                                                 
 
64 Also refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.3 for a detailed discussion of each of the cancer therapeutic 
subclasses referred to in these empirical Chapters.  
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tyrosine kinase inhibitors such as sunitinib (first approved in 2006 for gastrointestinal 
stromal tumours) and sofanib (first approved in 2005 for RCC).  
Pazopanib was tested for multiple kinase activity in preclinical studies (in vitro) 
(GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2007a). The drug was shown to be effective against the following 
tyrosine kinases: the VEGFRs -1, 2, and 3, platelet derived growth factor receptors 
(PDGFR) -α, -β, B-Raf and C-kit (Kumar et al., 2007). However, the VEGF pathway was 
the most well characterised in human tumours, with publications throughout the 1990s 
describing its activity, including in lung (Volm et al., 1997b, Volm et al., 1997a), breast 
(Brown et al., 1995, Yoshiji et al., 1996), gastrointestinal (Brown et al., 1993b, Suzuki et 
al., 1996, Ellis et al., 1998, Uchida et al., 1998), kidney (Brown et al., 1993a, Nicol et al., 
1997, Tomisawa et al., 1999), bladder (Brown et al., 1993a), ovarian (Olson et al., 1994, 
Sowter et al., 1997, Yamamoto et al., 1997), endometrium (Guidi et al., 1996), 
glioblastoma and other intracranial tumours (Shweiki et al., 1992, Plate et al., 1992, 
Phillips et al., 1993)). This may be the reason behind the delay in reporting the multi-
kinase activity of pazopanib. However, it is now recognised that multiple kinase inhibitors 
generally have higher levels of efficacy due to the various pathways they act on (Gotink 
and Verheul, 2010).  
A large number of publications were found mentioning the two main kinase targets, 
VEGFR and PDGFR in a PubMed search: 4,119 for PDGFR and 2,813 articles for 
VEGFR65. This represents a large knowledge base supporting investigations into the 
pazopanib drug target, up to and including the year the drug entered phase I clinical trials 
(2002). 
Between 2002 and the end of 2010 (the year prior to pazopanib’s FDA approval), over 
100 trials are reported in the clinicaltrials.gov database for the drug. From the published 
results, strong responses in a variety of solid tumours, in particular in RCC (responses 
in 6 out of 6 patients), were reported for phase I trials (Cancer Drug News, 2005). Phase 
II results were similarly encouraging: 31% of 35 patients with ovarian cancer showed a 
response66(AFX International Focus, 2007b), 30 out of 35 lung cancer patients showed 
tumour shrinkage by up to 85%, and of 225 patients with RCC, 27% showed a response 
                                                 
 
65 The search terms used were as follows: ((PDGF AND receptor) OR ("platelet derived growth 
factor" AND receptor)) AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication]: "2002/12/31"[Date - Publication]) 
66 Where a response was defined by a greater than 50% decreasing in CA-125 protein blood 
levels (taken as an indicator that the tumour was not growing). 
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and an additional 46% of patients showed a stable disease (AFX International Focus, 
2007c). 
Pazopanib phase III trials initially focused on 435 RCC patients (Pharmaprojects). The 
results indicated an average progression free survival of 9.2 months (compared to 4.2 
months in a control group), the risk of progression or death was decreased in 54% of 
cases and the overall response rate was 30%. Additional phase III trials were undertaken 
in 2009 for epithelial, fallopian and peritoneal cancers and in 2010 for non-small cell lung 
cancer (Pharmaprojects).  
In addition to the knowledge base surrounding the target and drug, it is also relevant to 
consider the disease-based knowledge relevant to the development of the project. In this 
case RCC (the primary indication) displays a relatively small number of publications, 
taken to contribute towards its understanding (9,48967, up to and including 2002, the year 
trials were initiated).  
This history of the knowledge base surrounding the development of pazopanib indicates 
that the project had a relatively unproblematic journey to approval, involving the steady 
accumulation of knowledge throughout discovery, validation and trials. Despite the 
novelty of the approach used in pazopanib, i.e. targeting tyrosine kinase receptors, which 
may have led to uncertainty, the validation of the pathway (i.e. target-disease link) and 
extensive trials undertaken provided an extensive and accumulated knowledge base for 
the drug. These factors justify the full membership of pazopanib into the set ‘extensive 
and accumulated knowledge base’ and therefore the QCA score of ‘1’.  
6.2.4 Market demand (QCA score = 1) 
As with many drug projects developed for rare cancers by large firms, pazopanib was 
explored in several indications (according to Pharmaprojects). According to 
Pharmaprojects, in addition to the RCC primary indication, the following secondary 
cancer indications are also listed: breast, non-small cell lung, general sarcoma, ovarian, 
peritoneal, fallopian tube, nasopharyngeal, soft tissue sarcoma, brain, cervical, 
leiomysarcoma, pancreatic, gastrointestinal, myeloma, synovial sarcoma, 
neuroendocrine carcinoid, neuroendocrine pancreatic, bladder, liver, psoriasis, 
colorectal, thyroid, head and neck, oesophageal, endometrial and gastrointestinal 
                                                 
 
67 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Carcinoma, Renal 
Cell’ as a search term in PubMed. 
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stromal tumours. Therefore, despite the primary indication, RCC, being classified as a 
‘rare cancer’ the drug had a broad market potential.  
Initial development in a rare indication, with other markets following post-initial approval, 
is a strategic approach to the development of orphan drugs by big pharma, particularly 
in cancer (Meekings et al., 2012). This usually reflects the desire to gain access to 
regulatory policies (e.g. orphan drug status), however, this did not occur in the case of 
pazopanib. In this instance the reason for the development of RCC as the primary 
indication is due to the high efficacy found in trials.  
In preclinical studies, pazopanib was found to inhibit tumour growth in a broad range of 
human tumour xenografts in mice (Kumar et al., 2007). Broad applicability of pazopanib 
is further exemplified in press reports where it is described as being active in multiple 
cancer types (UPI, 2005). Phase I trials were undertaken showing activity in patients with 
RCC, gastrointestinal, neuroendocrine, lung, thyroid tumours and sarcomas 
(GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2005). However, in phase II investigations GSK introduced a level 
of specificity in the pazopanib strategy where three trials were performed, in RCC, 
ovarian cancer, fallopian tube or peritoneum and soft tissue sarcoma (AFX International 
Focus, 2007c, AFX International Focus, 2007b, GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2007b). 
Subsequently phase II trials were also carried out in relatively common cancers such as 
recurrent prostate cancer, breast cancer, glioma and lung cancer (clinicaltrials.gov). Prior 
to pazopanib approval phase III trials were initiated in RCC, sarcoma and ovarian 
(GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2008, Thomson Financial News Super Focus, 2008). This shows 
that the broad potential for the drug was actively being explored as part of the pazopanib 
development strategy.  
Despite the characterisation of the pazopanib primary indication as a rare disease, early 
in the drug’s development (2005) industry stakeholders estimated the revenue size to be 
large. For instance, for four of the GSK oncology-related therapeutics (pazopanib, 
eltrombopag, lapatinib and casopitant), revenues are estimated to be $4bn a year 
(Investor Chronicle, 2005). This projection of high market potential continues for the 
subsequent years when in 2007 pazopanib is described as having ‘huge market potential’ 
in a variety of tumour types (AFX International Focus, 2007a).  
In addition to the large projected market size for the pazopanib, and the potential for it to 
be applied in a broad range of cancer types, the drug lacked competitors due to RCC 
being an area of unmet need. Prior to 2006 the year pazopanib was in trials, there was 
no standard treatment for patients with advanced or metastatic RCC whose treatment 
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did not respond to 1st line immunotherapy (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE), 2009).  
In 2006, sunitinib, another tyrosine kinase inhibitor, was approved (ibid). This approval 
impacted the potential predicted pricing level of pazopanib, as the value placed on drugs 
by NICE68 technology assessments are based on standard treatments. However, the 
recommendation by NICE for sunitinib (as a first line therapy for advanced and metastatic 
RCC patients) may have had the opposite effect, in encouraging GSK through the 
potential to demand a premium price. This was confirmed in 2011 when pazopanib 
replaced sunitinib as the NICE-recommended first line treatment for patients with 
advanced RCC (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), 2011).  
This section has highlighted the large expected market demand of pazopanib, 
demonstrated through: 1) the broad applicability of pazopanib in a diverse range of 
cancer indications, 2) the high expected revenues identified from analysts’ views projects 
in media reports and 3) minimal competition in the RCC market, with sunitinib only 
approved three years prior to pazopanib.  
6.2.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 1) 
As a kinase inhibitor, pazopanib benefitted from the exciting prospects associated with 
this approach to advancing cancer therapeutics. In addition to the scientific community, 
other stakeholders also had high expectations for the project. One of the drug’s first 
mentions in a newspaper claimed that GSK had high hopes for pazopanib, but is as an 
adjunct to an article focusing on another GSK kinase inhibitor, lapatanib (Tykerb) which 
is described as a ‘new ‘wonder drug’ (Hope, 2005).  
Other mentions of pazopanib in newspapers (The Guardian, The Times and The Daily 
Telegraph) appear in December 2005 when GSK released information about their 
growing oncology pipeline, describing pazopanib as one of their most exciting projects 
(Reece, 2005, Moore, 2005, Irving, 2005). However, the Daily Telegraph article, in 
addition to promoting positive expectations of pazopanib, does not present GSK in a 
positive light. The article is headlined: ‘Make the sick pay, says Garnier GSK chief says 
governments must compel patients to fund own healthcare’, and quotes the GSK chief 
executive as promoting a co-payment system for expensive oncology products, including 
                                                 
 
68  NICE (National Institute of Health and Care Excellence) provides recommendations for 
prescriptions in the UK’s National Health Service. Furthermore, their technology assessments of 
cost-benefit analyses of prescription drugs are also used by other countries.  
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pazopanib (Reece, 2005). Pazopanib appears in newspapers again in the following year 
where the GSK CEO is quoted as having high hopes for the drug despite having being 
hit by high profile failures (Ashton, 2006). 
Additional positive perceptions of the drug would be expected to have resulted from an 
article in The Times in June 2007 describing a ‘money back’ pricing arrangement where 
GSK agree to help cover the cost of drugs, including pazopanib, if patients failed to show 
progress (Pagnamenta, 2007). In the same month GSK announce plans to release five 
new cancer drugs by 2010, including pazopanib, which leads a series of newspaper 
articles being published mentioning pazopanib (Cunliffe, 2007, Barriaux, 2007, Attwood, 
2007, Toronto Star, 2007) 
Furthermore, pazopanib is administered orally, which is less invasive than intravenous 
administration and preferable for patients and physicians.  
The stakeholder perspectives surrounding pazopanib indicate a positive condition 
surrounding its development. This is not only in terms of the support for the therapeutic 
approach, i.e. in the use of kinase inhibitors, but also through the ease of administration 
contributing towards a positive perspective by users (physicians and patients). In 
conjunction with the projection of high expectations of the drug by GSK in the press, 
indicates that pazopanib is representative of full membership into the set ‘positive 
stakeholder perspectives’ therefore justifying the QCA score of ‘1’.  
6.2.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 1)  
Pazopanib was discovered and developed from an in-house project at GSK. GSK is a 
large pharmaceutical company that was formed from the merger of two established 
companies, SKB and GW, in 2000. Both had experience and capabilities in oncology 
with two marketed oncology drug products mentioned in the first annual report for the 
enlarged company (Hycamtin for ovarian and small cell lung cancer, and Navelbine for 
non-small cell lung and breast cancer) (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2000). Of these Hycamtin 
originated at SKB and Navelbine originated at GW (Burroughs Wellcome (BW) prior to 
the merger) (PR Newswire, 1994, PR Newswire, 1996). It would be expected that the 
merger would have been disruptive to the operating of GSK in 2000; however, this was 
relatively early on in the discovery stages of pazopanib. Furthermore, over the 
subsequent years the strategy of the enlarged company towards targeted therapeutics 
provides a positive environment for pazopanib. 
The first indication of a strategic shift at GSK towards oncology, and later to targeted 
therapeutics is illustrated in press articles in 2005 which are quoted: ‘GlaxoSmithKline … 
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is significantly expanding its oncology drug pipeline’ (UPI, 2005), ‘GlaxoSmithKline 
Presents Rapidly Expanding Pipeline of Oncology and Supportive Care Compounds’ 
(GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2005).  
The strategic role of oncology for the GSK business is further highlighted by Tachi 
Yamada, GSK’s Chairman of R&D, who is quoted as saying:  
‘Today’s seminar clearly shows the progress GSK has made in building its oncology 
pipeline… From modest beginnings, we now have a pipeline which is one of the 
largest in our industry with seven major assets expected to be in phase III 
development in the coming months, including the four NCEs [pazopanib] highlighted 
today’ (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2005). 
In the same article, Paolo Paoletti, Senior Vice President of GSK Oncology Medicine 
Development Center adds ‘GSK is pursuing therapies targeting cancer at a molecular 
level in order to block biochemical pathways that transform normal, healthy human cells 
into cancer cells’ (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2005).  
An analysis of the GSKs oncology pipeline also indicates some interesting trends. Firstly, 
a peak, in 2006, in the number of oncology drugs in trials (see Figure 6). Secondly a 
trend for increasing the number of kinase inhibitors in the pipeline (Figure 6). The 
percentage of the pipeline that are kinase inhibitors peaks as high as 86% (or a ratio of 
7:2) in the 2011 annual report (Table 14). Pazopanib was one of the first kinase inhibitors 
in the pipeline, with only lapatanib (approved as Tykerb in 2007) and elacridar 
(discontinued in 2006) entering trials beforehand. 
Figure 6 Graph of changes in GSK Oncology Pipeline. Right hand axis indicates % 
of kinase inhibitors (% of total pipeline in clinical trials); left hand axis indicates 
number of projects (both total new drugs in clinical trials for year and cumulative 
total project in trials).  
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Kinase inhibitor 
projects in trials 
1 2 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 6 7 6 5 
Non-kinase inhibitors in 
trials 
2 3 3 4 5 4 1 4 5 3 2 1 4 
% kinase inhibitors of 
development pipeline 
33% 40% 50% 43% 38% 43% 67% 50% 44% 67% 78% 86% 56% 
Total new drugs in 
trials for year 
- 2 2 1 1 0 1 5 3 4 2 2 3 
Cumulative total 
projects in trials 
3 5 6 7 8 7 3 8 9 9 9 7 9 
Table 14 Raw data showing numbers of drug projects in the oncology portfolio of 
GSK between the years 2000-2012. Data taken from GSK annual reports 
 
The increase in cumulative oncology projects (Figure 6) indicates a strengthening of this 
area in the GSK pipeline, despite both SKB and GW previously having successful cancer 
drugs. Furthermore, kinase inhibitors make up a major proportion of the oncology 
pipeline by the late 2000s. This indicates that targeted oncology projects such as 
pazopanib, were key to the GSK strategy.  
It is not expected that the mergers between SKB and GW would have caused disruption 
for pazopanib as the event occurred early on in the project. This contributes towards the 
seamless development progression of pazopanib, justifying the QCA score of ‘1’ 
indicating full membership into the set representing a supportive organisational 
environment.  
6.2.7 Pazopanib Conclusion 
The development of pazopanib progressed unhindered. Here, the project benefitted from 
a rapid development (9 years from first synthesis to approval)69 for a range of potential 
indications that implied a large market potential.  
The project was developed using a novel technological approach that may have been 
subject to technological and market uncertainties. However, positive expectations (both 
from the scientific community, the firm and users) and previous pathway and target 
validation in approved products, counteracted the influence of this uncertainty.  
                                                 
 
69 For comparison clinical trials (after preclinical testing of the synthesised drug is undertaken) 
last around 8 years for oncology drugs (22 months for phase I, 29 for phase II and 47 for phase 
III) (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004), with total duration from patent to commercialisation demonstrated 
to have risen to around 13.9 years in the 2000s (Pammolli et al., 2011). 
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Furthermore, pazopanib benefited from a supportive organisational environment, where 
it was part of a strategic focus on oncology and tyrosine kinase inhibitors for cancer 
indications. We can assume that, due to the extensive experience and the technological 
competencies at GSK, routinized knowledge sharing between teams existed. 
Furthermore, the case history suggests no complications within inter-organisational 
knowledge transfer requirements.  
6.3 Barasertib – When Promise Disappoints 
Barasertib, like pazopanib, was a small molecule kinase inhibitor developed in-house at 
a big pharma. In contrast, however, the development of barasertib was not 
straightforward.  
Barasertib (AZD1152) exemplifies a case where issues such as low market expectations, 
novelty/uncertainty of target market, uncertainty in knowledge base and lack of public 
support for the project contributed towards project termination. Ultimately, the project 
suffered from a lack of understanding of a novel technological area and disappointing 
market and activity expectations. Furthermore, barasertib provides a good example of 
how project drag, from an accumulation of issues, can contribute towards failure. For 
instance, low potential market demand, false predictions/uncertain knowledge 
foundation and the lack of media/stakeholder coverage.  
6.3.1 Interview sources 
One interview was undertaken for this case history, referred to as interviewee F.  
6.3.2 Introduction 
Barasertib was a small molecule aurora B kinase inhibitor aimed at acute myeloid 
leukaemia (AML). Development was undertaken by AstraZeneca (AZ) resulting from a 
collaboration with SUGEN (2005-2010). In 2011 the AZ annual report states that the 
development of barasertib was discontinued for economic reasons. 
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1995 Zeneca-SUGEN collaboration begins focusing on kinase inhibitors 
1998 Aurora 2 overexpression discovered and published by SUGEN scientists 
1999 Astra and Zeneca merge to form AZ 
2000 Gemtuzumab approved for AML patients (competitor for the AML market) 
2001 Gleevec (kinase inhibitor) approved (providing proof of concept for kinase 
inhibitors) 
2005 Barasertib (AZD1152) enters Phase I 
2009 Barasertib (AZD1152) enters Phase II 
2010 Barasertib (AZD1152) enters Phase III 
2011 Barasertib (AZD1152) discontinued by AZ 
Table 15 Key events in development of barasertib 
 
6.3.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 0) 
When the human form of aurora kinases were discovered by SUGEN, the aurora 2 gene 
was hailed as a ‘oncogene70’ both in the scientific literature (Bischoff et al., 1998), and 
by SUGEN themselves: ‘SUGEN and Zeneca discover new oncogene, Aurora2, 
overexpressed in more than 50% of colorectal cancers and subsets of other tumor types’ 
(SUGEN, 1998). The associated logic was that if the gene could be inhibited then cell 
proliferation, and therefore cancer, could be stopped (Keen and Taylor, 2009). 
In line with the terms of the discovery agreement (discussed further under the 
‘organisational environment’ section)  between AZ and SUGEN, the tyrosine kinase 
target passed to AZ (Zeneca at the time), for high throughput screening, lead 
optimisation and preclinical and clinical development (SUGEN, 1998). The high 
throughput screening, used to identify an aurora kinase inhibitor, identified a quinazoline 
derivate, ZM447439 (Coumar et al., 2009).  
Despite not being suitable for administering to patients ZM447439 was a useful tool for 
biological characterisation, from which a clinically useful drug product could then be 
developed (interviewee F) to ascertain the type of aurora kinase that was being targeted 
(i.e. A or B; 1 or 271). Initially it was found that ZM447439 inhibited both Aurora A and B 
                                                 
 
70 An oncogene is a gene found to lead to cancer, usually through the inhibition of natural cell 
death causing abnormal growth. 
71 When the aurora kinases were initially discovered the targets were referred to as aurora 1 and 
2, however as knowledge surrounding the targets developed these came to be known as aurora 
A (previously aurora 2) and aurora B (previously 1) kinases (Aurora Kinase (Aur) family: aurora 
kinase A from Guide to Pharmacology  
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(Coumar et al., 2009), upon which an investigation into the phenotypic responses 
associated with each kinase inhibitor was undertaken (Girdler et al., 2006). These 
studies indicated that aurora B kinase showed an anti-proliferative effect and so 
presented an ‘attractive’ anti-cancer target (Girdler et al., 2006, interviewee F). It was 
this stream of work that led to the filing of a series of patents by AZ, contributing to 
barasertib (Jung and Pasquet, 2005, Jung and Pasquet, 2003, Anderson et al., 2007, 
Heron et al., 2004, Coumar et al., 2009).  
While this work was undertaken by AZ, Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc., a US Biotechnology 
company, conducted the first preclinical testing of an aurora kinase, VX-680, (Vertex 
Pharmaceuticals, 2003). These tests showed tumour regression in animal models 
seemingly validating aurora kinases as a target for cancer drugs (Coumar et al., 2009).  
As previously mentioned, initial investigations into aurora kinases described them as 
oncogenes. However, subsequent research indicated that they were in fact active mitotic 
agents, similar to classic cytotoxins such as paclitaxel and vincristine (Keen and Taylor, 
2009, interviewee F). This changed the understanding of how aurora kinases act in their 
action in cell growth and tumour inhibition.  
A lack of understanding about drug-target-disease interactions is a reoccurring trend in 
genomics era drugs (Hopkins et al., 2007). Even in the early stages of barasertib 
development there were doubts in the ability of the molecule to act on cancer. Keen and 
Taylor, researchers from AstraZeneca and University of Manchester who were involved 
in the development of aurora kinase inhibitors (including ZM447439 and barasertib), 
observe that while there is now considerable data supporting a link between Aurora A 
and B kinase expression and cancer, more work is required in understanding their 
mechanism of action and how they can be used to in the treatment of cancer. 
Furthermore, it is still unclear whether the inhibition of Aurora A and/or Aurora B, could 
be advantageous in terms of providing therapeutic benefit in oncology (Keen and Taylor, 
2009). 
The contestation surrounding the activity of aurora kinase inhibitors may account for the 
relatively large number of publications found to mention aurora B72 which, prior to the 
                                                 
 
www.guidetopharmacology.org/GRAC/ObjectDisplayForward?objectId=1936 (accessed 
15/5/2015). 
72 Search term used: ("aurora B" OR "aurora 1" OR "aurora-B" OR "aurora-1") AND 
("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication]: "2005/31/12"[Date - Publication]) 
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year barasertib entered clinical trials (2005) amounted to 157 articles from a PubMed 
search. 
The mitotic paradigm for understanding the mechanism for the anti-cancer activity of 
barasertib was suggested in a 2009 publication (Keen and Taylor, 2009). This article 
hypothesises that a reduced toxicity of targeted anti-mitotic agents73 could be inferred 
through the inhibition of mitotic spindle assembly, without interfering with microtubules in 
non-dividing cells (ibid). Furthermore, despite a focus on the aurora A kinase in initial 
aurora kinase interest, due to its overexpression in colon cancer, it was the aurora B 
kinase target for which most of the initial clinical candidates were found (Keen and Taylor, 
2009). This highlights a lack of alignment between the understanding of target-disease 
interaction and drug-target activity. 
Despite the acceptance of the mitosis paradigm for aurora kinases, uncertainty remained. 
Further molecular biology investigations into the mechanisms of aurora B kinase 
inhibitors highlighted that, rather than acting as anti-mitotics, they drive mitosis whilst 
interfering with the mechanics of cell division (Keen and Taylor, 2009). This alternative 
perspective did ultimately contribute towards the same conclusion, that inhibiting aurora 
kinases should have led to cell death, however it illustrates that the uncertainty over 
barasertib’s mechanism of action persisted through early stage trials.  
In preclinical trials barasertib showed “striking in vivo activity” with in vitro studies 
showing the prevention of cell division through chromosome misalignment (Mortlock et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, barasertib showed phase II response rates ranging from 20% 
(Collins et al., 2015), with an additional 33% of patients showing a stable disease to 25% 
response rates (Lowenberg et al., 2011). This is comparable to pazopanib which 
achieved a response rate of 30% in its phase III (Sternberg et al., 2009) and nelarabine 
which showed 55% (Berg et al., 2005) and 41% (Hernandez-Ilizaliturri and Czuczman, 
2009)). 
In addition, toxicity levels of barasertib did not offer substantial benefits over other anti-
mitotics (Keen and Taylor, 2009), highlighting its inadequacy in comparison to 
established anti-cancer cytotoxins. Indeed, Keen and Taylor (2009) describe the drug as 
both encouraging, in responses, and disappointing, in toxicities.  
                                                 
 
73 The types of toxicities seen in other anti-mitotic agents came from the interaction of the drug in 
non-dividing cells leading to a loss of sensation in patients’ extremities. 
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The disappointment in barasertib toxicity, however, was not reflected in others’ efforts. 
In a recent review (2011-2013) there were at least 3 ongoing post-phase II aurora 
kinases in development74 and a broad range of patents75 (Cheung et al., 2014). However, 
the rate at which patents associated with aurora kinases was observed to have seen a 
decline when compared to previous years, although journal articles remain on the rise 
(ibid).  
It is also relevant to consider the knowledge base surrounding AML, as the barasertib 
primary indication. AML was relatively well researched prior to the barasertib trials76, 
represented in the large number of publications found to mention the disease subtype 
(31,207 77). This indicates that, despite the lack of knowledge of the target-disease 
interaction and target-based knowledge, the understanding of the disease was advanced.  
This section has highlighted the barasertib knowledge base and the development of 
understanding in a group of novel targets, namely aurora kinases. It has demonstrated 
a shift from a rhetoric around ‘oncogene’ to an appreciation of role of the target in mitosis. 
The technological uncertainty during this time, although not inhibitory to the continued 
use of this target in the quest for anti-cancer targeted therapies, was a factor in the 
development of barasertib78. This justifies the designation of this case as representative 
of full non-membership into the set for extensive and accumulated knowledge base.  
6.3.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
Barasertib was tested in a range of tumour types in early stage development. Preclinical 
studies were undertaken in human colon, lung and hematologic tumour xenografts in 
immunodeficient mice (Wilkinson et al., 2007). The intention to develop the drug for a 
broad range of indications is further confirmed by AZ in their annual reports from 2004-
2007 which state that barasertib is in development (from preclinical through to phase I) 
                                                 
 
74 These were danusertib by Nerviano Medical Sciences, alisertib by Millennium and ENMD 2076 
by CASI Pharma, formerly EntreMed 
75  Patents held by Ambit Biosciences Co, Amgen, Boehringer Ingelheim, Cancer Research 
Technology, Genosco and Oscotec Inc., Guangzhou Institute of Biomedicine and Health, Chinese 
Academy of Science, Merck, Moffit Cancer Centre, Nihon University (Japan), National Health 
Research Institutes, Sanofi, Shenzhen Salubris Pharma Co and Shanghai Institute of Pharma 
Industry, Sun Yat-Sen University and Sunshine Lake Pharma Co 
76 Taken up to and including 2005. 
77 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Leukemia, Myeloid, 
Acute’ as a search term in PubMed. 
78 This is also linked to the increased tendency to provide data on the mechanism of action of a 
drug in the New Drug Application to the FDA 
(http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved
/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/ucm176522.htm) 
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for solid tumours and haematological malignancies (AstraZeneca PLC, 2004, 
AstraZeneca PLC, 2005, AstraZeneca PLC, 2006, AstraZeneca PLC, 2007, Boss et al., 
2011). It is not uncommon in early stage trials for cancer drug development to be broad 
ranging.  
However, an additional phase I trial indicates that AZ were considering AML 
specialisation for barasertib development (Tsuboi et al., 2011, Dennis et al., 2012, 
Kantarjian et al., 2010, Miyawaki et al., 2010). In 2008/9 the AML focus continued with a 
phase II/III trial, however, AZ annual reports still projected potential for a broader drug 
application to haematological malignancies (Pharmaprojects, AstraZeneca PLC, 2008, 
AstraZeneca PLC, 2009).  
Despite AML affecting only a small patient population, it is an area of severe unmet need 
with stem cell transplants 79  and conventional chemotherapy (i.e. cytotoxic drugs) 
providing the main treatment option. This implies a large potential return if barasertib had 
been successful as it would have been the first targeted therapy to be approved in this 
area. A competitor, gemtuzumab was approved in 2000, providing an established 
treatment for AML patients prior to the initiation of development of barasertib80.  
This relatively narrow therapeutic focus of the development barasertib pursued by AZ, 
and a competitor in the AML market, indicates a small potential market demand for 
barasertib. This may have contributed towards the termination of the project which was 
reported to be for economic reasons. These have been taken as contributory factors in 
the justification of the QCA score as ‘0’ i.e. full non-membership into the set of high 
market demand.  
6.3.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 0) 
The characterisation of the drug as an oncogene, early on in its development, would 
have contributed towards the expectations that surrounded its development. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the oncogene approach 
was perceived as a promising avenue for cancer therapeutics by the scientific and 
                                                 
 
79 Stem cell transplants are extremely similar to bone marrow transplants but differ in the way in 
which the stem cells are obtained. 
80 This scenario presents a more significant competitor than was seen to be the case in pazopanib 
where the competitor molecule was developed when the drug was in phase III, indicating a race 
to market. 
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industrial community. This trend is noted by Fujimura (1988), who describes the concept 
of ‘oncogenes’ as a ‘bandwagon’.  
In addition, aurora kinases were met with high expectations in the early 2000s 
demonstrated in the publication and analysts report entitled: ‘Aurora Kinase inhibitors – 
the dawn of a new approach’ (Research and Markets, 2005). However, this report 
highlights the aforementioned debate around the limited understanding of the selectivity 
of aurora kinase inhibitors, and the extent to which mitotic damage may arise (Research 
and Markets, 2005). 
Mentions of barasertib by stakeholders in the media are non-existent. It would be 
expected that there would be strong support for the development of a drug in an area of 
unmet need; however, it is not apparent that AZ or other stakeholder publicly recognised 
this during barasertib development  
This evidence shows a lack of positive stakeholder perspectives for barasertib, despite 
the hype that may have come from the classification of the drug as an oncogene. This 
justifies the QCA score of ‘0’ (i.e. full non-membership into the group positive stakeholder 
expectations).  
6.3.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 1) 
Barasertib was an output from an AZ-SUGEN collaboration. SUGEN were a US-based 
biopharmaceutical company focused on the discovery and development of small 
molecule drugs targeting cellular signalling pathways (SUGEN, 1996). The agreement 
between AZ and SUGEN, for the licensing of five SUGEN-discovered small molecule 
kinase inhibitors (of undisclosed identity at the time), was signed in 1995. The agreement 
specified the responsibility of SUGEN for performing target identification, target 
validation, assay development and screening for initial leads, while Zeneca undertook 
lead identification/optimization and preclinical/clinical development activities (Zeneca 
Group, 1995, SUGEN, 1997). Zeneca made a $12.5m equity investment in SUGEN as 
part of the collaboration, in addition to a previous investment of $7.5m, in the SUGEN 
initial public offering, and a $5m technology set-up fee (ibid). When SUGEN was 
acquired by Pharmacia & Upjohn in 1999, AZ had an equity stake of 20% in the firm 
(AstraZeneca PLC, 1999b). 
The 1995 agreement outlined that SUGEN gained the right of first negotiation for Zeneca 
cancer drug candidates that did not reach the minimum market size required for internal 
clinical development (Zeneca Group, 1995). This implies that even if the drug does not 
have sufficient commercial potential for Zeneca, it might be acceptable to SUGEN, 
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demonstrating the difference, previously highlighted in section 3.4.1, in the notion of 
adequate market expectations, between small firms and large firms. For instance, 
smaller firms have smaller pipelines and therefore less choice about which products they 
produce and, conversely larger firms can be more meticulous but also have larger 
overheads to account for, thereby demanding higher profit margins. 
Furthermore, this term of the agreement also illustrates how a small biotech firm can be 
left with the discarded small-market projects from big pharma. This term of the 
agreement did not benefit the development of barasertib, despite AZ stating that 
development was discontinued for economic reasons, because the agreement was only 
valid for five years (to 2000), by which time SUGEN had been acquired by Pharmacia & 
Upjohn (1999) (AstraZeneca PLC, 1999b).  
The AZ strategy (in oncology and kinase inhibitors) witnessed shifts during the 
development of barasertib (1995-2011). This is illustrated in the AZ press release 
announcing the SUGEN-Pharmacia acquisition: ‘AstraZeneca is currently number two in 
oncology and aims to become the leading pharmaceutical company in this area’ 
(AstraZeneca PLC, 1999b). This press release also claims that AZ has capabilities to 
continue developing kinase inhibitors without future SUGEN collaboration, as Les 
Hughes, AZ Global Head of Cancer Research states: 
“We have had a friendly and productive research relationship with SUGEN for the 
past four years. The collaboration has augmented the work AstraZeneca has carried 
out on its own kinase target research programs and has broadened the opportunities 
available to us. We now have a strong in-house presence in this technology with 
good options to pursue our work in this important research area.” (AstraZeneca PLC, 
1999b). 
AZ also describe the expansion of their oncology R&D pipeline in their 1999 Annual 
Report:  
‘Building its successful endocrine treatments, AstraZeneca is committed to further 
development of both endocrine and cytotoxic products and to a number of ‘novel 
approaches’81, including anti-proliferates, anti-angiogenics and inhibitors of cancer 
invasion, to combat prostate, breast, colorectal, lung, gastric and other cancers.’ 
(AstraZeneca PLC, 1999a) 
                                                 
 
81 In this quote barasertib would come under the umbrella of ‘novel approaches’. 
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Figure 7 Graph showing AZ changes in oncology pipeline. Right hand axis 
indicates % of kinase inhibitors (% of total pipeline in clinical trials); left hand axis 
indicates number of projects (both total new drugs in clinical trials for year and 
cumulative total project in trials). 
 
 
YEAR ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 
Kinase inhibitor 
projects in trials 
1 2 3 2 5 6 7 10 12 13 13 12 11 10 
Total new drugs in 
trials for year 
4 2 2 1 3 1 5 6 4 2 6 6 3 6 
Cumulative total 
projects in trials 
4 6 7 4 7 7 10 14 15 16 18 21 19 21 
Non-kinase inhibitors in 
trials 
3 4 4 2 2 1 3 4 3 3 5 9 8 11 
% kinase inhibitors of 
development pipeline 
25% 33% 43% 50% 71% 86% 70% 71% 80% 81% 72% 57% 58% 48% 
Table 16 Analysis of AZ Oncology pipeline. Data taken from AZ annual reports 
 
Looking into the AZ oncology pipeline we observe these large increases in the numbers 
of drugs year on year (see Figure 7 and Table 16) indicating an increase in interest in 
oncology product in general. Furthermore, we also observe a peak in the proportion of 
products categorised as kinase inhibitors, including barasertib, during the period 2004-
2010. Specifically we see an increase from 33% and 43% in 2000 and 2001, peaking to 
86% in 2004 and 81% in 2008, returning to 48% in 2012 (see Table 16). Significantly for 
barasertib, the 2004 and 2008 peaks of kinase inhibitors correspond with the time prior 
to the project entering trials (2004) and the year prior to the initiation of phase II trials. 
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This implies that barasertib development was part of a larger strategy for kinase inhibitors 
and oncology drugs. This indicates that the development of barasertib was part of a firm-
wide oncology and kinase inhibitor strategy. 
This section has demonstrated a shift at AZ towards targeted oncology therapies, 
including aurora kinases. Although the project was subject to a collaboration, which may 
have implied knowledge transfer difficulties, this took place in the early stages of 
barasertib development and led to the adoption of the relevant capabilities by AZ. These 
factors contribute towards the conclusion that the development of barasertib is 
characterised by a relatively unproblematic organisational environment, and therefore 
the case shows full membership into the set for supportive organisational environment 
(‘1’). 
6.3.7 Barasertib Conclusion 
Through the progression of barasertib, issues and costs gradually accumulate, both 
leading to drag cost and project drag. This contributed towards increasing scrutiny and 
pressure on development of the drug, accounting for the termination of the project 
despite comparable efficacy, and justifies the statement by AZ that they discontinued 
barasertib development for economic reasons.  
In this case history we see a project that was embedded in a rhetoric of oncogenes that 
was used as a tool to generate support however there was disappointment associated 
with an incomplete understanding of the drug’s mode of action. As knowledge 
accumulated around barasertib there was also a realisation that the potential market 
demand was not as broad as initially thought. In addition, the lack of stakeholder 
recognition of the project did not provide any support to offset the accumulating project 
drag.  
6.4 Nelarabine –Influence of a Champion 
In contrast to the cases seen before the nelarabine case demonstrates how issues that 
could be detrimental to the outcome of a project are resolved. This differs from pazopanib 
which progressed without problems, and barasertib in which the project did not benefit 
from mechanisms to overcome project drag.  
Nelarabine (506U, arranon, atriance, GW506U78, nelzarabine) was the subject of an 
established research stream spanning decades, developed by Burroughs Wellcome (BW) 
(subsequently GW and GSK), and indicated for T-cell lymphomas and leukaemias. The 
project suffered from a range of issues including: 1) low market potential, 2) strategic fit 
issues, i.e. how well nelarabine fitted with the priorities of GSK and the industry, and 3) 
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management and other difficulties following large scale mergers. A consistent research 
group, the action of a key individual and a strong clinical response in an area of unmet 
need are shown to be key in overcoming these issues and lead to the eventual launch 
of the project, successfully overcoming the observed drags on the project. 
6.4.1 Interview sources 
This case history is informed by email correspondence, referred to as ‘email 
correspondence W’.  
6.4.2 Introduction 
Nelarabine is a prodrug of guanine arabinoside (ara-G) activated in the presence of 
adenosine deaminase. The project was discovered at BW, in collaboration with 
researchers at Duke University, developed by GSK (after the various mergers) and 
approved by the FDA for the treatment of Acute Lymphoblastic Leukaemia (ALL) in 2005.  
1984 Ara-G found to be selectively toxic against T-leukaemic cells 
1988 Elion and Hitchings win Nobel Prize 
1994 Nelarabine Phase I trials initiated at Duke University and University of North 
Carolina supported by BW 
1995 Glaxo and BW merged 
1997 Nelarabine Phase II study initiated (children and young adults)  
2000 SmithKline Beecham merge with Glaxo Wellcome 
2002 Additional Phase II trials undertaken (adults) 
2003 Fast track status granted to nelarabine 
2005 Orphan Drug Status granted; Nelarabine approved 
Table 17 Key events in development of nelarabine 
 
6.4.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 1) 
Nelarabine originated in the laboratory of the Nobel Prize winners George Hitchings and 
Gertrude Elion82 at BW in Tuckahoe New York, USA (later Research Triangle Park). This 
research group was mainly focused on the therapeutic application of purine analogues83, 
synthesising more than 100 purine analogues by the early 1950s including the first 
                                                 
 
82 Hitchings and Elion (along with James Black) jointly won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine in 1988 (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1988/elion-
facts.html) 
83 Recall Chapter 2 (section 2.2.5.3) discussion of purine analogues developed by Hitchings and 
Elion at Burroughs Wellcome.  
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cytotoxic analogues active in leukaemia, 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP), (Academy of 
Achievement, 1991).  
Synthesis of ara-G was first published in 1964 (Reist and Goodman, 1964), however 
clinical use was limited due to inadequate solubility proving a major obstacle to drug 
development (Kisor, 2009, Hernandez-Ilizaliturri and Czuczman, 2009). In response to 
this, the BW research group pursued the more soluble prodrug of ara-G, 506U 
(nelarabine) (ibid). Lab experimentation of ara-G as a therapeutic product was facilitated 
by the enzymatic synthesis of ara-G, published in 1981(Krenitsky et al., 1981, Kisor, 
2009). In the early 1980s the selective toxicity against T-leukaemic cells, implies the 
potential to use ara-G as an anti-leukaemic agent (Lambe et al., 1995).  
Running in parallel to the work on ara-G was research at Duke University, undertaken 
by Joanne Kurtzberg, in which a murine model of T-cell leukaemia/lymphoma was being 
developed (email correspondence W). This model was later used for preclinical testing 
for ara-G, when Elion had the idea of giving a sample of ara-G to Kurtzberg to test it 
(email correspondence W). Having demonstrated responses in T-cell leukaemic murine 
models (Gravatt et al., 1993), the key challenge of using ara-G as a therapeutic remained 
the drug’s poor water solubility, stimulating the suggestion that a prodrug approach might 
be more suitable (Lambe et al., 1995).  
Preclinical studies of 506U in cynomolgus monkeys showed rapid conversion to ara-G, 
demonstrated in high plasma levels of the compound, with results replicated in 
immunodeficient mice (Lambe et al., 1995). As demonstrated in clinical experience of 
other nucleosides, this was shown to be an important indicator of clinical efficacy (ibid). 
In response to positive preclinical results, an IND was submitted proposing the initial 
(Phase I) study in patients with refractory haematological malignancies (Kisor, 2009). In 
addition a patent was filed, published in 1996 (Krenitsky et al., 1996a) covering the use 
of ara-G derivatives to treat T-cell leukaemia.   
Trials began in 1994, 30 years after the initial synthesis of ara-G (Kisor, 2009). The first 
study was undertaken at Duke University and University of North Carolina, supported by 
BW. This trial was later expanded to include patients at the Boston University Medical 
Centre and the MD Anderson Cancer Centre (ibid). This study determined maximum 
tolerated dose, toxicity profile, and pharmacokinetics of nelarabine in 93 paediatric and 
adult patients with refractory haematological malignancies. T-cell ALL and T-cell 
lymphoblastic leukaemia patients (39 in total) showed 9 (23%) complete responses, and 
an additional 12 (31%) partial responses (Kurtzberg et al., 2005). Another phase I trial 
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showed 5 complete responses from a total of 28 patients with T-ALL or T-LBL 
(Hernandez-Ilizaliturri and Czuczman, 2009). It was these ‘dramatic responses’ in an 
indication that was otherwise unresponsive to standard treatment that motivated further 
development of nelarabine (email correspondence W).  
One published phase II trial treated 16 patients (peripheral T-cell lymphoma, or low grade 
B-cell lymphoma). Of the 11 that were evaluable, 2 showed a complete response, and 4 
a partial response (Kisor, 2005). Another published phase II trial undertaken in children 
and young adults showed a 55% response rate from 106 patients (Berg et al., 2005). In 
39 evaluated patients with relapsed/refractory T-ALL/T-LBL 41% showed clinical 
responses with 31% showing complete responses (Hernandez-Ilizaliturri and Czuczman, 
2009). In conclusion phase II trials showed that nelarabine was efficacious, however 
dose-limiting toxicities were also identified (ibid).  
Nelarabine was approved for fast track status in 2003 and Orphan Drug Status in 2005. 
Furthermore, trials supported the approval of nelarabine, in 2005 (FDA) and 2007 (EMA), 
for treatment of T-ALL and T-LBL.  
The knowledge base supporting nelarabine development is also embedded in the 
publications concerning the disease for which the drug was primarily developed. For 
lymphoid leukaemias a large number of articles (29,20084) were published in the years 
preceding nelarabine trials (up to and including 1994). This high level of knowledge is 
also supported by the observation, made in Chapter 2, that haematological malignancies 
are the best understood cancers due to the ease of research in this area.  
In addition to the growth of the knowledge base during the development of nelarabine, 
the consistency of the research team involved also contributed towards the accumulation 
of this knowledge, which will be discussed in more detail below.  
In summary the knowledge base for nelarabine is a long established stream with GSK 
contributing a consistent research group throughout trials. This suggests that the project 
was based on a substantive evidence base that contributed towards straightforward 
                                                 
 
84 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘leukemia, lymphoid’ 
as a search term in PubMed. This is the term generated to account for Acute Lymphocytic 
Leukemia, and includes the subsets: ‘Leukemia, B-Cell; Leukemia, Biphenotypic, Acute; 
Leukemia, Prolymphocytic; Leukemia, T-Cell; and Precursor Cell Lymphoblastic Leukemia-
Lymphoma. 
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clinical development. This was despite the emergence of patient toxicity in trials, which 
would be partially expected in a non-targeted therapeutic such as nelarabine. 
6.4.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
The primary indication for which nelarabine was developed was T-cell ALL, a rare 
haematological malignancy. All published phase I trials for nelarabine were for 
haematological malignancies (Kisor et al., 2000, Kurtzberg et al., 2005, Kurtzberg et al., 
1996, Kisor, 2005), with the exception of one that was in leukaemia (Gandhi et al., 2001),.  
This shows specialisation of nelarabine from early development, a strategy that is rare 
in pharma drug development. Haematological therapeutics are relatively straightforward 
to develop due to the ease of assessment of a drug’s activity, using blood-based 
biomarkers, and the practice of using haematological cancer models for research 
purposes (as mentioned in Chapter 5). However, it is likely that the haematological focus 
for nelarabine came from the finding, in the 1980s, that ara-G had T-cell specificity 
(Lambe et al., 1995). 
Further trials indicated a specialisation of nelarabine in T- and B-cell lymphomas and 
leukaemias, including ALL (De Angelo et al., 2002, Kisor, 2005), lymphoblastic 
leukaemia (De Angelo et al., 2002), B-cell or peripheral T-cell lymphomas (Thompson et 
al., 2005, Goy et al., 2003) and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (Kisor, 2005, Goy et al., 2003, 
Berg et al., 2005).  
Although this is a long list of indications (as illustrated in Table 18) all of these represent 
small patient populations, with the exception of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma which is 
comparable to urinary bladder cancer incidence. In fact, it is only when combining the 
incidence of all leukaemias and lymphomas (in the USA) that incidence is comparable 
to larger indications such as breast cancer, where the former is less than half of the latter.  
Indication 
Incidence (estimated new 
cases in US) 
Deaths (estimated in USA) 
Acute Lymphoblastic 
leukaemia 
6,250 1,450 
Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 70,800 19,790 
Leukaemias and 
Lymphomas 
137,170 45,390 
Breast Cancer 234,190 40,730 
Urinary Bladder Cancer 74,000 16,000 
Table 18  Summary of epidemiology statistics for relevant cancer subtypes85 
                                                 
 
85www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@editorial/documents/document/acspc-044552.pdf  
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Despite being indicated for a relatively small population, industry analysts forecasted the 
project to have peak annual worldwide sales of US$1bn, characterising it as a 
‘blockbuster’ (Pharma Marketletter, 2005c). Patient size associated with nelarabine at 
this time was quoted to be 1,600 adults and children for T-cell ALL or T-cell lymphoblastic 
leukaemia. Due to this subtype of leukaemia being an unmet need (email 
correspondence W) afflicting children86, it is likely that the high projected nelarabine sales 
stemmed from the potential for high prices to be expected from this target market. 
However, we will take sales estimations tentatively due to the widespread introduction of 
tight pricing controls87, implying this is a risky strategy.  
Nelarabine development took continued for a long period, however, this did not imply 
patent-related appropriability issues due to the filing of patents in 1993 (Krenitsky and 
Porter, 1995), followed by 1994 (Krenitsky et al., 1996b), 1995 (Krenitsky et al., 1998a, 
Krenitsky et al., 1998b, Krenitsky and Porter, 1996) and 1998 (Averett et al., 1998). This 
indicates that patents would not be expected to expire until around 2018.  
Despite the reported potential for this drug to reach high prices and therefore sales 
revenue, we observe that this is not guaranteed due to pricing controls. In addition, the 
specialisation of the drug to specific types of leukaemias and lymphomas which largely 
present a small potential patient population, indicates a small expected market demand 
for the drug. Therefore, this drug should be scored (for QCA) in line with non-membership 
into the set for high market demand (i.e. ‘0’).  
6.4.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 0) 
In 2003 media mentions of nelarabine begin. One of the first of these is in the GSK R&D 
Meeting for Analysts and Investors when the drug is described as a ‘done deal’ and a 
‘very interesting product for some of the T-cell leukaemias’, despite approval being two 
years away (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2003). This feeling is echoed in the move to obtain 
fast track drug status from the FDA in 2003. The positive perception of the project 
                                                 
 
86www.cancer.org/cancer/leukemiainchildren/detailedguide/childhood-leukemia-how-classified  
87 Although outside the scope of this thesis, pricing controls are a controversial issue in drug 
development and marketing. Here, in 2004 the US Department of Commerce, International 
Trade Administration studied 11 OECD countries and found that all implement some initiative 
for pricing controls, whereby often the rationale behind the determination of drugs sales prices 
were not disclosed even to the pharmaceutical firms developing them 
(http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/drugpricingstudy.pdf). Therefore, as a rule in this thesis we 
do not consider potential high price as a contributor to expected market demand. 
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continued in a GSK Earning Conference Call in 2004, when the results for nelarabine 
are described as ‘very impressive’ (GlaxoSmithKline plc, 2004).  
However, expectations from the GW side had not always been positive. GW intended to 
discontinue the development of the project, passing manufacturing responsibility over to 
the Cancer Therapy Evaluation Program and the NCI, subsequent to the 
Wellcome/Glaxo merger (email correspondence W). While the NCI were enthusiastic 
about the effect the drug was having in leukaemia patients, it was the low market 
potential that prompted a waning of excitement from the GW perspective (this issue will 
also be revisited in the next section).  
Nelarabine development had limited coverage in mainstream press, only appearing 
briefly prior to approval (Tomlinson, 2004). Other mentions of nelarabine in the media 
(press releases and GSK pipeline reports) focus on trial results and reports of approval.  
Nelarabine was a drug developed for a very rare cancer indication that mainly affected 
children. One of the aspects of developing drugs in this area is the difficulty in patient 
recruitment. This is described, alongside the toxic side effects, as one of the major 
difficulties in the development of nelarabine (Hernandez-Ilizaliturri and Czuczman, 2009). 
In addition, the acute nature of the disease, with fast tumour growth and the high rates 
of relapse added to the complexity in finding and treating patients (Hernandez-Ilizaliturri 
and Czuczman, 2009). However, these considerations, of the focus on children and an 
area of unmet need, are expected to have been met with support from patients and 
clinicians, although this is not observed in media reports. In addition, this contributes to 
the ability for the drug to demand orphan drug status and fast track approval.  
This section indicates that within the firm, perspectives around the product were mixed. 
Impressive results were described as well as the project being a ‘done deal’, however, 
the project was almost shelved during the merger between Glaxo and Wellcome and 
evidence for a lack of media coverage was found. The threshold for a supportive 
stakeholder response is therefore not deemed to have been met (QCA score = 0). 
6.4.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 1) 
There are several aspects of the organisational environment that facilitated the 
successful development of nelarabine, justifying the QCA score of ‘1’. The first of these 
is the consistent and supportive network of people working on the project. As mentioned, 
early development of nelarabine was undertaken at BW in the lab of Nobel Prize winners 
Hitchings and Elion.  
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Despite the lab being part of a big pharma firm, in an interview Elion describes an 
academic, nurturing and positive organisational culture: 
“Burroughs Wellcome is a very unusual company … It was the vision of Henry 
Wellcome that this would be a research organization, and it would make its money 
by selling pharmaceuticals, and that money would go back into research. Our 
research lab grew very rapidly as we began to be successful. The money did go back 
to research. Some of it went to our research; some of it went to other people’s 
research, via the Wellcome Trust... But on the whole, the idea was to do research, 
find new avenues to conquer, new mountains to climb... It [Burroughs Wellcome] 
was a place where you could do good work. People wouldn’t be looking over your 
shoulder saying, “What have you done for me lately?” (Academy of Achievement, 
1991) 
Encouraging ‘undirected research’ to nurture ‘fundamental curiosity’ facilitates a 
cooperative working environment both within the firm and in collaborative relationships. 
In particular, cultural barriers in academia-industry linkages are broken down facilitating 
interaction and knowledge transfer.  
The positive culture at BW at the time has also been highlighted in a series of interviews 
with the former top management of the company, undertaken by Wellcome (Wellcome 
Collection). Here former President of BW, Fred Coe, describes the 1950s and 1960s firm 
as being small, focused on early stage research and driven by pharmacists (Wellcome 
Library, 2001b). This is further highlighted by Bill Sullivan who describes Wellcome as 
“traditional”, “family oriented”, with “nice people working for it” and a laissez faire attitude 
(Wellcome Library, 2001d). It was not until the move to Research Triangle Park, from 
Tuckahoe, New York, that BW really grew and expanded.  
Furthermore, despite being a private organisation, until 1986 when the firm began 
floating shares on the stock market, the entirety of the firm was owned by the Wellcome 
Trust88 allowing for a non-commercial focus and the reinvestment of profits back into 
research (Wellcome Library, 2001d). However, this became problematic when the 
company wanted to initiate trials, whereby the scale of funds needed were unavailable 
and a collaboration with Sloan Kettering was undertaken to fill the gap (Wellcome Library, 
2001c, Wellcome Library, 2001b).  
                                                 
 
88 www.wellcome.ac.uk/Investments/History-and-objectives/Investments-history/ 
155 
 
The freedom of the researchers at BW, and the status of Elion and Hitchings as 
respected by the scientific community, supported the development of an academic 
culture at BW in the years from the 1950s, up until the Glaxo/Wellcome merger in 1995 
(Wellcome Library, 2001c, Wellcome Library, 2001a). Hitchings and Elion had wide 
networks and the organisation had close relationships with academic laboratories 
(Wellcome Library, 2001c, Wellcome Library, 2001b). 
The organisational culture and the location of BW (and later GSK) at Research Triangle 
Park, also helped to encourage collaborations throughout the nelarabine development. 
One commentator emphasises the importance of collaborations to the success of the 
project:  
‘only through a sustained collaboration of industry, academia, and government were 
the clinical data produced to demonstrate that the drug has a role in treating certain 
rare forms of leukemia and lymphoma when patients have exhausted standard 
treatment options’ (Koenig, 2006).  
This is significant due to the common difficulties associated with inter-organisational 
collaborations, particularly between industry and academia, where different institutional 
cultures, expectations and objectives can be problematic (Bstieler et al., 2015). 
These collaborations were consistent throughout the development of nelarabine and 
involved a core team of investigators at a range of institutions, including: Elion and 
Krenitsky from BW, Kurtzberg from Duke University, Kisor from Ohio Northern University, 
Berg from the Texas Children’s Cancer Center at the Baylor College of Medicine, Gandhi, 
Keating and Plunkett from the MD Anderson Cancer Center and Mitchell from the 
University of North Carolina (Krenitsky et al., 1981, Lambe et al., 1995, Kurtzberg et al., 
1996, Gandhi et al., 1998, Kisor et al., 2000, Gandhi et al., 2001, De Angelo et al., 2002, 
Berg et al., 2003, Berg et al., 2005, Kurtzberg et al., 2005, Kisor, 2005, Kisor, 2009).  
In addition Gertrude Elion ‘started the ball rolling’ for nelarabine and had particular 
interest in nelarabine after her retirement and until the end of her life in 1999 (Koenig, 
2006). Here Koenig, who worked at GSK, comments: ‘one reason Elion kept coming 
back was to champion nelarabine’, associated with issues facing development such as 
side effects, patient recruitment and weighing ‘medical and commercial potential against 
the opportunity of other drugs in the pipeline’ (Koenig, 2006).  
Elion was an experienced researcher involved in the development of many ‘successful’ 
drugs throughout her career. She has been described as having a ‘direct manner’ and 
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being ‘wholly unpretentious’ (Koenig, 2006) and as a good networker, a diplomat, and 
“warm person” (Wellcome Library, 2001c).   
Elion continued to be involved in the drug development process at BW (later GW) until 
her death in 1999 despite retiring after winning the Nobel Prize (Wellcome Library, 
2001c). She professes that after her official retirement she ‘tried to take an active part in 
the discussions, seminars, and staff meetings relating to research’ at the firm (Elion, 
2006). Furthermore, Elion’s network, as Research Professor of Medicine and 
Pharmacology at Duke University, was key to the development of nelarabine facilitating 
the involvement of Kurtzberg in nelarabine’s development.  
Elion was a decisive factor in contributing towards nelarabine’s success (email 
correspondence W). This was linked to the level of influence of Elion as a champion, 
facilitated by achieving the Nobel Prize (email correspondence W). In addition, her role, 
until her 1983 retirement, as the Head of the Department of Experimental Therapy (Elion, 
2006), is likely to have contributed towards her influence as a key individual in 
nelarabine’s development. The consistency of the research team and the presence of a 
‘champion’ for the project may also have helped in overcoming the difficulties caused by 
the mergers occurring during nelarabine development, firstly in 1995 when BW merged 
with Glaxo to create GW, which then went on to merge with SKB in 2000 to form GSK 
(email correspondence W).  
The discontinuities caused by these mergers are demonstrated in the media. Firstly, in 
September 1995 when GW were reportedly cutting 7,500 jobs worldwide as a cost saving 
strategy (Grimond, 1995b), whilst increasing research spending and productivity of R&D 
operations (Grimond, 1995a). Secondly, the Glaxo/BW merger led to a loss of many 
people working at Wellcome, as Dr Howard Shaeffer (former VP Research, Development 
and Medical) puts it: “I was really surprised that Glaxo didn’t keep more of the Wellcome 
people, BW people… that really was the end of the BW company, when Glaxo took over” 
(Wellcome Library, 2001a).  
One review reflects that subsequent to the merger, GW made a firm commitment to 
formally sponsor the development of nelarabine, a decision reportedly based on the 
‘clear therapeutic need’ for patients suffering from T-cell haematological malignancies 
(Kisor, 2009).  
However, this period was also associated with some reticence to develop nelarabine, 
whereby GW refused to continue development of the drug (email correspondence W). 
This may have been down to the differences in organisational cultures between the 
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former BW and the enlarged organisation whereby Krenitsky describes: “The drug 
creates its own market… They [Glaxo] didn’t have that vision” (Wellcome Library, 2001c). 
This highlights that while Burroughs Wellcome were scientifically-oriented and focused 
on producing effective drugs for unmet needs, Glaxo were more commercially oriented.  
This section has demonstrated that the supportive networks of investigators involved in 
nelarabine development had a positive impact on the success of the project. It is also 
fair to conclude that this consistency, on an individual-level, also helped insulate the 
development of nelarabine from the potential detrimental impact that mergers could have 
had on the project.  
This section has highlighted a positive organisational environment surrounding the 
development of nelarabine, despite strategic fit issues and the major merger events that 
took place. Here, the action of key individuals and the organisational culture of the firm 
early on in the drug’s development, contribute towards the membership of the case into 
the condition supportive organisational environment (QCA score = 1). 
6.4.7 Nelarabine Conclusion 
The development of nelarabine faced four clear issues including: duration of 
development, strategic fit, low market potential and organisational disruption from large 
scale mergers. These contributed towards the accumulation of project drag, however the 
case history has demonstrated how the action of three key mechanisms contributed 
towards overcoming these issues.  
The consistency of the research group and the presence and influence of a key individual 
were key to facilitating an established and accumulated knowledge stream, prior to the 
synthesis of nelarabine. We can assume that a consistent research group contributes 
towards the development of routines that benefit innovation. In addition, characteristics 
of Elion as a key individual, such as her influence (contributed towards by her experience, 
personality and Nobel Prize), network and persistent involvement in nelarabine 
development influenced its success. In this Elion took on more than one key individual 
role (e.g. inventor, organisational sponsor, business innovator and technological 
gatekeeper) again highlighting the importance of her involvement in the project. 
These mechanisms also contributed towards overcoming the organisational and 
knowledge transfer difficulties associated with mergers and collaborative agreements. 
Indeed, when GSK wanted to discontinue development it was the action of the product 
champion that motivated its continued development.  
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Despite the project taking over two decades to be developed, the BW research laboratory 
had similarities to an academic lab, facilitating not only the transferral of expertise and 
tacit knowledge, and the integration of disciplinary approaches, but also the learning 
between the academic and industrial teams. Furthermore, the pronounced clinical 
response seen in an area of unmet need highlights a potential strategy in drugs with low 
market potential.  
6.5 Plevitrexed – Strategies, Patents and Inter-Organisational Work 
One project that was also not successfully carried forward to approval phases, from big 
pharma, was plevitrexed (ZD9331). This project is comparable to nelarabine due to the 
collaborative environment in which it progressed. 
Plevitrexed was discontinued due to a culmination of issues throughout the course of its 
development (project drag). Discontinuation of the drug resulted from delays in project 
development leading to appropriability (patent) issues and an unsuccessful licensing 
effort when AZ terminated the license, and it reverted to BTG89. These delays may be 
associated with the collaborative environment of the project. The project also suffered 
from insufficient efficacy in patients coupled with a lack of strategic fit at AZ.  
6.5.1 Interview sources 
Two interviews were undertaken to supplement the publicly available data collected. The 
first with an investigator directly involved in the development of the thymidylate synthase 
inhibitors, interviewee J. In addition, reflections interviewee C and L, and email 
correspondence X are also drawn upon. 
6.5.2 Introduction 
Plevitrexed is a small molecule anti-folate thymidylate synthase inhibitor developed 
primarily for gastric cancer, as a result of a research collaboration between the Institute 
of Cancer Research (ICR) and AstraZeneca (AZ), with support from BTG. The project 
began initial clinical development in the 1990s, on the back of raltitrexed, a previously 
approved drug. The project was partnered with AZ until 2002, when they discontinued 
development and British Technology Group (BTG) licensed the compound, seeking a 
development and commercialisation partner for the drug.  
                                                 
 
89 Although BTG were not actively involved in the ICR/AZ collaboration they did support early work 
on raltitrexed (the precursor to plevitrexed) and therefore shared the IP with AZ.  
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Table 19 Key events in the development of plevitrexed 
1940 Sidney Farber begins work on anti-folates in cancer therapeutics 
1947  Aminopterin (first anti-folate) first used in cancer therapy 
1979 ICR work on anti-folates begins 
1991 Raltitrexed Phase I begins in Europe 
1993 Raltitrexed Phase III begins  
1996 Plevitrexed Phase I trial initiated; Raltitrexed approved for colorectal cancer  
1998 Plevitrexed Phase II trial initiated 
1999 Astra and Zeneca merge to form AZ 
2002 AZ discontinue development; BTG to take up development  
2007 BTG seeking development and commercialisation partner for plevitrexed; 
Orphan drug designation received 
 
6.5.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 1) 
Research contributing to plevitrexed development began in the 1940s with anti-folate 
research carried out in by Sidney Farber, mentioned in Chapter 2 (Benepal and Judson, 
2005). Antifolates were found to be active in their inhibition of thymidylate synthase (TS). 
Thymidylate synthase was discovered in 1957 and found to be crucial to DNA synthesis. 
It follows that the inhibition of TS preventing DNA synthesis is associated with abnormal 
cell growth (Jackman et al., 1985).  
In the research stream that followed this discovery there were 317 publications90 before 
1990 (with the first article published in 1961), of which the most frequent author affiliation 
is Institute of Cancer Research (ICR), UK (affiliated authors of 20 publications over the 
period up to 1990, Figure 8). The research team at the ICR built on the success of 
methotrexate and 5-fluorouracil (FU), both antifolate cytotoxic agents, and explored TS 
as a folate binding site which was a more efficacious target (Jackman and Calvert, 1995). 
This interest was also supported by Zeneca collaboration (prior to Astra merger in 1999).  
The thymidylate synthase inhibitor ICR-AZ collaboration began in the early 1990s. It was 
around this time that Zeneca and ICR begin to co-author publications in this subject area 
(Jodrell et al., 1993), and the main related patent was published (Pegg and Wardleworth, 
1999a), where earlier patents by the same group covering quinazoline derivatives  were 
                                                 
 
90 Found in the Scopus database using the search stream (TITLE-ABS-KEY-AUTH ((synthetase 
OR synthase)) and TITLE-ABS-KEY(thymidylate) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY(inhibitor))  
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attributed to the National Research Development Corporation (later to become BTG) 
(Jackman et al., 1993) and BTG (Bisset et al., 1992). 
Generic name Synonym Dates under development 
CB3717 ICI-155387 1979-1993 
Raltitrexed ICI D1694, Tomudex, 
ZD1694 
Late 1990s/Early 1980s-1996 
Plevitrexed ZD9331 1995-2008 
Table 20 The ICR/AZ anti-folate family of TS inhibitors 
 
The first clinically evaluated folate-based TS inhibitor arising from the ICR/AZ 
collaboration, was labelled CB3717 (Jackman and Calvert, 1995). This compound was 
found to have potent cytoxicity, partly due to the high levels of polyglutamation91 it caused 
in cells (see Table 20). Polyglutamation was also the cause of high levels of toxicity, the 
eventual reason for discontinuing CB3717development. However, CB3717 did provide 
proof of principle for the activity of antifolates on the TS target.  
 
Figure 8 Top 10 Affiliations of Authors Undertaking TS Research 1961-1989 
 
The next compound in this series was raltitrexed. Raltitrexed development addressed 
one of the issues with its predecessor, its lack of solubility. As a report of raltitrexed 
preclinical work states: ‘the identification of ICID1694 [raltitrexed] for clinical study was 
the result of an extensive search for a second generation, water soluble, folate-based 
                                                 
 
91 Simply put, polyglutamation is the process by which glutamates are accumulated in cells, which 
whilst facilitating cytotoxicity, can also lead to prolonged toxicity when occurring in cells of the 
bone marrow or bowel lining. 
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TS inhibitor’ (Jackman et al., 1991). These investigations claim raltitrexed to be ‘500-fold 
more cytotoxic than CB3717 against a variety of cell lines’ (ibid).  
Results from raltitrexed phase I trials, investigating 61 solid tumour patients, showed 
dose limiting toxicities including malaise, gastrointestinal and haematological, as well as 
other toxicities found in the liver, skin rash and anorexia (Jackman and Calvert, 1995). 
As a result, a reduced dose of 3mg/m2 was recommended for phase II. Phase II results 
showed responses (complete and partial) in breast (25%), platinum resistant ovarian 
(8.5%), non-small cell lung (10%), pancreatic (14%) and colorectal (26%) cancers, with 
overall toxicity ‘considered acceptable and manageable’ (ibid). These results motivated 
the initiation of a phase III study, undertaken in 1993, comparing raltitrexed 
administration with FU (fluorouracil)/leucovorin (LV). This indicated that raltitrexed 
showed higher efficacy, with 20% of patients showing objective partial or complete 
responses, and lower toxicities, compared to 13% with FU/LV (ibid).  
Raltitrexed was approved in 1996 for colorectal cancer, however, the drug was not widely 
used (Jackman et al., 2008, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), 
2005, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), 2001b).  
To improve on the profile of raltitrexed, plevitrexed research was progressed, as an 
extension to the ICR/AZ collaboration, to identify a product with lower polyglutamation-
related toxicities (Jackman and Calvert, 1995). Plevitrexed targeted a different carrier 
(the reduced-folate membrane carrier) responsible for transporting the folate analogue 
into the cell (ibid). The aim of this alternative strategy was to increase the selectivity of 
the antifolate to tumour cells (ibid).  
Preclinical development of plevitrexed involved in-vitro testing that identified both 
curative and growth delay of tumour models, with toxicity only found to be apparent in 
haematological tissues at the anti-tumour dose studies. Further activity was found in 
human tumour xenograft models of ovarian, colorectal, gastric and small cell lung cancer.  
Early plevitrexed phase I trials, undertaken whilst the project was sponsored by 
Zeneca/AZ, showed activity in a wide range of tumour types. One phase I study in 14 
patients found that associated toxicities included diarrhoea, nausea, vomiting, anaemia, 
neutropenia, thrombocytopenia, fatigue, fever and skin rash. Another phase I trial tested 
plevitrexed in combination with carboplatin in 13 patients, 4 patients saw antitumour 
activity, 2 with dose-limiting toxicity, with no pharmacokinetic interaction found between 
the drugs. An additional combination study was carried out with cisplatin or gemcitabine. 
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Around 1997 the project progressed onto phase II trials, in patients of a range of tumour 
types including gastric, pancreatic, ovarian and advanced colorectal cancers. These 
trials resulted in ‘encouraging activity and manageable toxicity’, with particular efficacy 
found in gastric cancer trials which showed a 25% response rate.  
A phase II/III study of plevitrexed comparing it with gemcitabine in 25 pancreatic patients, 
showed no complete responses, 1 partial response and 10 patients with stabilized 
disease. However, this trial did indicate that there was a tendency for the drug to prolong 
life, slow disease progression and lengthen the duration of disease control in patients 
treated, compared to gemcitabine. In addition, the low patient numbers indicate a lack of 
statistical validity of the results obtained in this trial. In total 1,094 patients were reported 
to have been treated with plevitrexed across 22 clinical trials, providing evidence of a 
substantial opportunity to accumulate relevant knowledge throughout the project’s 
development. 
When reporting the decision to terminate plevitrexed development, AZ state that 
plevitrexed ‘failed to meet its target profile’ and the rights, along with the preclinical and 
clinical development data, were returned to BTG, who terminated development after an 
unsuccessful licensing campaign (AstraZeneca PLC, 2002, Pharmaprojects). This was 
despite efficacy levels comparable to other competing drugs (Benepal and Judson, 2005).  
Up to this point, AZ had carried out over 20 trials in nearly 1000 patients (AstraZeneca 
PLC, 2002, Pharmaprojects). In addition to the extensive knowledge accumulated 
throughout plevitrexed development, gastric cancer also shows a high level of 
accumulated knowledge prior to the initiation of trials (up to and including 1995) of the 
drug when considering the number of publications (36,16092).  
This section shows that the development of plevitrexed benefited from being the product 
of an established research stream in a well-recognised approach to chemotherapy. 
Furthermore, the knowledge base was further contributed to through the development of 
the precursor, raltitrexed, whereby the tacit knowledge accumulated, throughout the 
relatively consistent discovery team (although, as will be evidenced later in this section 
the teams involved in trials were not as well connected), would have benefited the 
development of plevitrexed. Taken together these factors justify the QCA score of ‘1’ 
indicating full membership into the set ‘extensive and accumulated knowledge base’. 
                                                 
 
92  This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Stomach 
Neoplasms’ as a search term in PubMed. 
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6.5.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
In phase I trials plevitrexed was tested in a variety of tumour types (Aiba et al., 2001, 
Benson et al., 2003, Benson et al., 2000, Bertucci et al., 1999, Bilenker et al., 2004, 
Britten et al., 1998a, de Jonge et al., 1999, de Jonge et al., 2002, Goh et al., 2001, 
Koizumi et al., 2003, Plummer et al., 2003, Plummer et al., 1999, Rees et al., 2003, 
Schwartz et al., 2004), including leukaemia (Sawyer et al., 2003), gynaecological 
(Benepal et al., 2005) and ovarian (Benepal et al., 2002) cancers.  
In phase II trials there remained an expectation of a broad applicability for the drug. 
These indications included: non-small cell lung cancer, ovarian and breast (Hainsworth 
et al., 2003), gastric (Petruzelka, 2003), ovarian (Rader et al., 2003), and colorectal 
(Schulz and Douglass, 2000, Louvet et al., 2004, Schulz et al., 2004) cancer, and one 
phase II/III in pancreatic cancer (Smith and Gallagher, 2003). Therefore, despite the 
rarity of the primary indication for plevitrexed, it was apparent that the drug was ultimately 
applicable to a larger patient population than implied from its first indication.   
AZ annual reports confirm the anticipated broad applicability of plevitrexed. In 1999 AZ 
claim that phase II development of plevitrexed was aimed at solid tumours (AstraZeneca 
PLC, 1999a). This broad nature of indications for plevitrexed was also found in both the 
2000 and 2001 annual reports, when the drug was described as showing efficacy in a 
broad range of tumours (AstraZeneca PLC, 2000, AstraZeneca PLC, 2001). 
When they took over development (upon AZ license termination for strategic reasons, 
discussed in organisational environment section), BTG planned further development 
(phase I/II) in gastric cancer (with additional focus on pancreatic cancer) due to 
encouraging efficacy in advanced gastrointestinal tumours (British Technology Group, 
2003b). At this time gastric cancer was described as the second most common cancer 
worldwide; causing 750,000 deaths worldwide each year (British Technology Group, 
2003a). This indicates that BTG focused the development of plevitrexed down to gastric 
cancer which, despite being a rare disease in the USA and Europe (hence the inclusion 
in this thesis), could reach a large market potential internationally. In addition, pancreatic 
cancer is a relatively common cancer, demonstrating that the project was still being 
developed primarily for cancer indications that represented a large potential patient 
population. However, plevitrexed was officially recognised as being aimed at a rare 
disease when US orphan drug designation was granted for ovarian and gastric cancer 
indications in 2007.  
Contrary to the idea that plevitrexed had a large potential market demand, in the years 
1999-2000 a number of external analysts predicted low revenues for the drug. These 
164 
 
included Deutsche Bank, predicting sales of US$12m, and ABN Amro, predicting sales 
of US$8m in 2002, rising to US$66m in 2005 (Niculescu-Duvaz, 2000). In addition, 
Lehman Brothers, in 1999, predicted a probability of 30% that the drug would reach the 
market and be launched in 2002 (ibid). This evidence demonstrates a small potential 
market for plevitrexed and low expectations from industry stakeholders, despite the 
potential for the drug to be applied to additional indications.  
The perceived market potential for plevitrexed is likely to have suffered from the 
disappointment from its precursor product, raltitrexed, which was not recommended by 
NICE for advanced colorectal cancer (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE), 2001b, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), 2005). 
Disappointment in the adoption of raltitrexed was also noted by members of the 
academic science team: ‘despite the broad range of activity seen in studies with 
raltitrexed, it is not widely used, and careful monitoring of renal function with dose 
adjustments is required to minimize toxicities’ (Jackman et al., 2008:207). Furthermore, 
raltitrexed was not released in the major drug market in the USA due to it not gaining 
regulatory approval (Wong et al., 2009:174, Business Wire, 1995). This indicates that 
plevitrexed may have suffered similar difficulties, leading to a diminished perceived 
potential market demand.  
In addition, as observed by one interviewee (email correspondence X), the plevitrexed 
patents were nearing expiry. The data confirms this, the first patent associated with 
plevitrexed was filed in 1982, with others following in 1984 (Jones et al., 1986), 1989 
(Barker et al., 1992), 1991 (Barker et al., 1993, Andrew et al., 1994), 1992 (Bisset et al., 
1995) and 1993 (Pegg and Wardleworth, 1999b, Boyle et al., 1998, Bisset and Bavetsias, 
1996) indicating these patents were set to expire around 2013.  
Considering the phase II trials began in 1998 and take 2.5 years on average for anti-
cancer products, with an additional 4 years for phase III (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004) 
accounting for a year in between these, plevitrexed trials would not have been complete 
until at least 2005 or 2006. In addition, delays from the termination of AZ development 
and the license reverting to BTG (2002-2007) support the interviewee’s observation that 
a lack of patent protection was a concern. However, this was partially overcome by the 
designation of the drug under the Orphan Drug Act in 2007, and the extended period of 
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exclusivity this would have enabled, with the additional potential for supplementary 
protection certificates93 upon marketing approval. 
This discussion of the market surrounding plevitrexed development indicates it was seen 
to have broad applicability but these expectations were not widely shared and the drug 
had disappointing market potential projections. In addition, the compound also suffered 
from potential patent expiry/appropriability issues impacting the attractiveness of it to 
prospective licensees. These factors should also be taken into consideration in the 
context of questioned efficacy data (discussed below).  
6.5.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 0) 
Plevitrexed is not commonly cited in the media. In one rare instance financial services 
firm, Lehman Brothers, predicted a 30% probability that the drug would reach the 
worldwide markets (Niculescu-Duvaz, 2000), and Morgan Stanley are quoted stating that 
they believed the project would never reach the market (Dagens Industri, 2002).  
One of the only positive perceptions of plevitrexed is expressed in an article highlighting 
the advantage of the drug being orally administered. In this context plevitrexed is 
described as potentially the ‘first-ever oral anti-metabolite’ (Pharma Marketletter, 1997e). 
However, this article is headlined ‘Zeneca Allays Fears Of Near-Term Product Gap’ and 
therefore it is possible that the perception of plevitrexed may have been positively 
constructed to counter views that the AZ pipeline was dwindling.  
After the termination of the AZ license, BTG had sufficiently high expectations of the 
project to invest in additional trials and apply for orphan drug status. At this time they 
also compared plevitrexed to other chemotherapeutic agents (both single agents and in 
combination), claiming higher efficacy than other gastric cancer treatment options 
(British Technology Group, 2003b). However, this was not sufficient for BTG to continue 
development without a partner.  
The evidence presented here implies a lack of positive perspectives around plevitrexed 
development. In addition, the characterisation of the project as a cytotoxic agent may 
have contributed to this negative perception due to the shift towards targeted therapies 
                                                 
 
93 Supplementary protection certificates are available to extent UK patent protection, by five 
years, for drugs that have successfully received marketing authorisation 
(www.gov.uk/guidance/supplementary-protection-certificates) 
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in oncology. These factors contribute towards the designation of the QCA score as ‘0’ 
indicating non-membership into the set ‘positive stakeholder perspective’. 
6.5.6 Organisational Environment (QCA score = 0) 
Firm strategy was key to the termination of plevitrexed. As demonstrated in Table 20, 
plevitrexed was the third thymidylate synthase inhibitor to be developed as a product of 
an ICR/AZ collaboration. It is both the dynamics of this collaboration and the internal 
organisational environment of AZ, who took over responsibility for development of the 
drug after phase II trials, that influenced the development trajectory.  
Firstly, early on (in 1994) the collaboration between the ICR and AZ was perceived as 
‘productive’ (Jackman and Judson, 1994). However, there is indication that the 
relationship may have weakened. In the development of raltitrexed, there was an 
undercurrent of discontinuity caused by a breakdown of communication between the 
academic and commercial partner (interviewee J). Whilst toxicities were reported in the 
publication of results from the raltitrexed phase I trial, there were mechanisms that could 
be used to overcome these that were not carried forward into the later, larger scale trials 
(ibid): 
“what was highlighted in the Phase I of raltitrexed was that if patients suffered bone 
marrow toxicity or gut toxicity, which usually took the form of diarrhoea, and [if] you 
didn’t modify the dose then the next time you gave the drug they got very bad toxicity. 
So the drug only needed to be given once every three weeks because it got trapped 
in the cells but there was this risk, this threat of cumulative toxicity. And unfortunately, 
that warning did not really get hammered home, I think, when the drug went into 
Phase III, so there were a lot of toxicities, some patients died, the drug got a bad 
name, and the reason that it was not really taken up widely was, I think, because it 
was deemed to be too toxic. If handled properly, we felt it didn’t necessarily have to 
be toxic.” (interviewee J) 
Although this may not have had a direct effect on plevitrexed, as it occurred in the 
development of the precursor, difficulties in communication between academic research 
institutes and big pharmaceutical firms is observed elsewhere. For instance, pharma are 
described as ‘big destroyers in the navy – they are very powerful but sometimes they are 
hard to turn around’ (interviewee C) or pharma are like an “oil tanker that can’t turn” 
(interviewee L). This observation implies that pharmaceutical companies can be 
unresponsive to insights of collaborating scientific investigators.  
To enquire more into the relationship between big pharma and research institutes, a 
comparison of nelarabine and plevitrexed was undertaken. Here the cohesion of the 
167 
 
network of researchers is taken as an indicator of the closeness of a collaboration. In this 
investigation a lack of communication and coordination between the actors was apparent 
for plevitrexed. In order to show this the authors and organisations for all publications (33 
articles) for plevitrexed were compared with those for nelarabine (20 articles).  
‘Density’94 is a measure used in network analysis to indicate the cohesion of a network. 
The density for plevitrexed is lower than that for nelarabine95, in both organisations and 
individual networks (Table 21). This shows that the cohesiveness of the authors 
mentioned in the publication of trials for plevitrexed is less than that for nelarabine. In 
addition, there is no anecdotal evidence for a clear-cut ‘champion’ for plevitrexed, a factor 
found to be key in nelarabine development.  
 
Unique Actors 
(n) 
Possible 
Connections = 
n(n-1)/2 
Actual 
Connections 
observed 
Density 
Nelarabine 
Authors 
66 2145 673 0.314 
Plevitrexed 
Authors 
115 6555 1028 0.157 
Nelarabine 
Organisations 
28 378 260 0.688 
Plevitrexed 
Organisations 
37 666 178 0.267 
Table 21 Showing density values for nelarabine and plevitrexed networks, for both 
authors and organisations 
 
A critical time in drugs development is in phase II. At this stage the drug is passing from 
discovery through to development and decision making becomes influenced by other 
environmental factors, including marketing and finance, which contend with scientific 
evidence impacting decision making (interviewee J). The shift, from phase I or II on to 
later clinical development was associated with discontinuities in plevitrexed, wherein 
                                                 
 
94 As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.1.2, density is the ratio of actual connections between 
actors, to all possible connections between actors (Balkundi and Harrison, 2006, Scott, 2000). 
Cohesiveness (i.e. high density) of a network has been found to be related to team performance 
(Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001, Balkundi and Harrison, 2006). Density is an interesting measure 
in this context and is appropriate because for both plevitrexed and nelarabine there are a large 
number of clinical trial publications accessible. For other projects a similar analysis has not been 
carried out either due to the availability of alternative evidence indicating the consistency of the 
research group, or the lack of sufficient articles concerning clinical trial results.  
95  Here density was calculated by observing the authors, and organisations listed as being 
responsible for clinical trial publications for each of the drug projects mentioned. The metric for 
density is calculated by comparing the number of connections possible with the number of 
connections observed (actual/possible). The number of possible connections is found using the 
formula (where N is the number of unique actors) N(N-1)/2.  
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management shifted from ICR responsibility towards AZ (interviewee J, also observed 
from author affiliation in trials publications).  
When AZ took on responsibility for plevitrexed development its pipeline, during the late 
1990s and 2000s, shows increasing numbers of oncology projects. In 1995 AZ was 
described as ‘seeking to become the number one company in oncology, which 
necessitates a move away from its core activities in hormonal therapies’ (Pharma 
Marketletter, 1995b). This is shown in an increase in the number of oncology projects in 
development at AZ from 11 in 1999 (AstraZeneca PLC, 1999a) to 25 in 2005 
(AstraZeneca PLC, 2005).  
However, during this period there is also a shift away from cytotoxic agents (as signalled 
in Chapter 2), towards more selective, targeted therapies in cancer treatment (AZ pipeline 
analysis undertaken from annual reports). Publications mentioning other AZ drugs 
describe this strategy, for instance Wheeler and colleagues (2003): ‘AstraZeneca is 
developing a broad pipeline of agents targeting a variety of key process in tumour 
progression and metastasis’. In 2000 AZ describe their oncology strategy as: ‘plans to 
develop the portfolio [to] include new cytotoxic and endocrine agents and a range of novel 
approaches’, hinting at an increasing interest in new technologies, whilst maintaining a 
commitment to cytotoxic approaches (AstraZeneca PLC, 2000).  
However, in 2002 their strategy seems to have shifted to emphasise new technologies: 
‘development of new agents and novel approaches across a wide range of cancers which 
include targeting tumour vasculature to control tumour growth, invasion and spread’ 
(AstraZeneca PLC, 2002). This shift in the AZ oncology portfolio was also felt at ICR:   
“I think that [AZ strategy for targeted therapies] may have played a role here. 
Because at the time that this drug was being developed there was already an 
assumption, at AZ and in most companies, actually, that the future was targeted 
therapy. That cytotoxics [like plevitrexed] were old hat, that in 15 years we 
wouldn’t be using them anymore, that they were yesterday’s drugs and it was 
wrong to put a lot of investment into them. And you could question whether 
perhaps the hurdle was set, for success or failure, quite high, because they had 
already made a decision that they weren’t going to invest heavily into cytotoxics.” 
(interviewee J) 
Furthermore, this strategy shift may have manifested in the high threshold set, by AZ, for 
plevitrexed in terms of the level of efficacy they required to continue development: “it 
[plevitrexed] never quite got over the hurdle. The hurdle, I have to say... was very high” 
(interviewee J).  
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AZ was also a changing organisational environment during this period, commonly 
associated with the loss of jobs, and disruption in working environments. The major event 
(Astra merger with Zeneca) occurred in 1999 which coincided with a critical stage in the 
life cycle of plevitrexed, namely in the year following the initiation of the phase II trials. 
Indeed the cultural differences between the two companies and associated issues were 
stated, by the enlarged company’s joint executive deputy chairman, Haken Morgen, to 
be ‘the most difficult part of the merger’ (Medical Device Daily, 1999). However, AZ were 
described as being prepared for the challenges, having learnt from the difficulties in the 
Pharmacia/Upjohn merger four years previously which suffered a “lack of unity of 
management” (ibid).  
When AZ discontinued plevitrexed development the licenses returned to BTG. From the 
outset BTG announced that, despite initiating phase I/II trial in gastric cancer the 
company would seek a partner for further development and commercialisation (British 
Technology Group, 2003b). However, this announcement was followed by another in the 
same year describing a strategy to undertake in-house development of compounds: a 
‘strategy to enhance the value of selected pharmaceutical compounds in its portfolio by 
investing in their preclinical and/or clinical development prior to out-licensing’ (British 
Technology Group, 2004a). This included plevitrexed:  
‘our aim will be to seek early proof-of-concept before licensing on to a 
pharmaceutical company partner. This is the model we are using successfully in our 
other cancer drugs, BGC9331 [plevitrexed] and BGC45’ (British Technology Group, 
2004b).  
This plevitrexed strategy also involved a collaborative partnership with Fulcrum Pharma 
who were responsible for the clinical development of the project through the phase I/II 
trial (British Technology Group, 2004a). This phase I/II trial had been fully recruited by 
March 2006 (British Technology Group, 2006a) and successfully completed later that 
year (British Technology Group, 2006b). Results showed that of 28 patients that 
continued to the phase II arm of the trial, 15 showed a stabilized disease.  
BTG focused on the possibility that, despite the short patent life, the drug could be useful 
as an orphan drug for advanced gastric cancer (email correspondence X). With 
additional clinical results, and the issue of the limited patent life partially resolved with 
orphan drug status, obtained in 2007, despite initial reports indicating that it was not 
perceived to be an orphan drug (British Technology Group, 2007), BTG’s focus was to 
make the drug attractive to other firms (email correspondence X). However, results from 
the trials were not sufficient to bring in external partners and despite an ‘extensive 
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licensing campaign’, covering over 100 firms, BTG were unsuccessful and terminated 
the project (email correspondence X). The action of a key individual, as was the case 
with nelarabine, may have played a role in facilitating this process whereby personal 
networks have been shown to be useful in identifying potential partners. This is seen in 
the development of Campath in the following Chapter. 
Indeed, in the 2007 annual report, BTG CEO, Louise Makin is quoted as saying  
‘Based on the results of this and previous studies we believe that plevitrexed is 
potentially an important new treatment option for people with advanced or 
metastatic gastric cancer. We are now seeking a partner to complete the clinical 
and commercial development of plevitrexed in this and other cancer types’ 
Similarly, Russell Hagan (Head of R&D at BTG):  
‘BTG is pleased to have received US orphan drug designation for plevitrexed, our 
lead oncology compound. We are currently seeking a partner to take plevitrexed 
further through development and to the market for these important indications as 
well as potentially in other solid tumours’ (British Technology Group, 2007). 
In conclusion plevitrexed may have been impacted by the ICR/AZ collaboration that 
suffered from institutional differences added to through a lack of cohesion in the trial 
networks. Furthermore, AZ were moving towards a pipeline strategy based on targeted 
therapy, not applicable to plevitrexed. In addition, the merger between Astra and Zeneca 
occurred at a critical stage for plevitrexed development. These issues contribute towards 
project drag whereby the firm’s decisions surrounding the drug development progression 
are increasingly subject to the loss of momentum.  
Furthermore, this is not improved upon when the project was taken on by BTG. Here the 
evidence shows that the firm did not commit to its development and, combined with the 
lack of patent protection, plevitrexed was not an attractive development opportunity for 
an external collaborator. These factors can be taken together to contribute to the 
justification for the QCA score of ‘0’ i.e. non-membership into the set. 
6.5.7 Plevitrexed Conclusion 
As this case history has exemplified, the issues associated with the development of 
plevitrexed were: 1) the established nature and the long duration of the development 
process, implying patent issues, 2) knowledge transfer issues associated with 
collaborative agreements between big pharma and academia, and 3) lack of strategic 
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emphasis due to project being of an established technological pathway, namely 
cytotoxics agents.  
These three issues were inhibitory in the case of plevitrexed, whereby the lack of patent 
life, combined with the relatively mediocre results from trials, and the lack of strategic 
interest in technological approach, ultimately contributed towards its termination. These 
issues culminate in increasing loss of momentum for the project, i.e. project drag, leading 
to the decision making surrounding the progression of the project to be tainted by lack of 
enthusiasm.  
Furthermore, there may have been a role for the institutional distance between the 
different types of organisations involved, whereby collaborative partnerships between 
big pharma and academia research labs require careful management. In addition, 
complexities in the organisations involved in the trial network and the lack of cohesion 
seen here may also contribute towards the difficulties in the development of plevitrexed.  
6.6 Big Pharma Projects – Conclusion 
By analysing projects that were developed involving a big pharma as the main 
organisation, this Chapter highlighted a baseline project, pazopanib, whereby a relatively 
uneventful life-cycle with few issues, led to a positive outcome. In contrast we have also 
exemplified three parallel cases. Firsty, the uncertain nature of knowledge on which 
novel technological areas are based has been shown to contribute towards the 
misallocation of expectations, in the case barasertib. The second, nelarabine, underwent 
a development pathway with many issues but was successfully developed due to the 
action of a key individual, productive collaborative relationships, and a good 
organisational culture, in a therapeutic area of unmet need. Finally, plevitrexed, was 
terminated due to delays, and appropriability risk due to limited patent life, perhaps 
caused by a lack of efficiency in communication, coordination and integration in project 
progression, and a lack of strategic fit with the AZ strategy.  
Comparatively, pazopanib and barasertib present contrasting scenarios where one 
underwent unproblematic development (pazopanib) and the other suffered from many 
issues contributing towards the drugs termination. Nelarabine and plevitrexed are 
comparable, where both were subject to ongoing collaborative relationships, small 
market potential, established research pathway and a lack of strategic direction, in terms 
of targeted therapeutics. However, in contrast to plevitrexed, where there was no clear-
cut key individual within the developing firm (AZ), in the case of nelarabine, development 
benefited not only from influential people promoting development, but also the credibility 
of previously successful products and the potential to fulfil an area of unmet clinical need.  
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Of the unsuccessful cases discussed in this Chapter, barasertib and plevitrexed, we 
observe some interesting characteristics. Firstly, neither seem to be subject to definitive 
events contributing towards the discontinuation of development. We can conclude that 
projects based in big pharma are reliant on maintaining momentum, either through rapid 
development, as was the case in pazopanib, or through the support of key individuals 
and an established research team, demonstrated in nelarabine. Where project drag 
occurs contributing towards the loss of momentum, issues are seen to accumulate and 
therefore development is not prioritised.  
In addition, we also observe that despite pharma often citing economic factors as solely 
contributing towards decisions to terminate development, other contributory factors are 
additionally causing a loss of motivation to develop the drug. This data indicates that 
even when there is sufficient efficacy and technological understanding to justify 
continued support for development, a project may be terminated for an accumulation of 
reasons.   
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7 Analysis of Rare Cancer Drug Development in Biotech and 
Academia 
This Chapter follows the same format as Chapter 6 but differs in that the analysis follows 
drug projects that were originated by, or in collaboration with, a small biotech or 
academic research lab. This will form the basis for the descriptive analysis to follow, and 
provide justification for the QCA scores allocated.   
Prior to the case histories it is first relevant to compare the organisations involved in 
individual projects. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show a diagrammatic representation of the 
dynamics of the organisations involved in drug discovery and development, and the 
phases of their involvement. The dotted lines represent phases characterised by 
organisational shifts, for instance, in the case of nelarabine, where Wellcome and Glaxo 
merge, and again when Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham merge. In this 
instance the continued involvement of Duke University is represented as separate arrows 
to indicate that the collaboration continued despite the changes to the main firms. In 
contrast, where SUGEN enters in only in discovery phases the right hand side of the 
dotted line in the case of barasertib is where AZ were solely responsible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Organisational dynamics in drug projects involving big pharma 
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Figure 10 Organisational dynamics of projects involving academia and biotech 
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Unsurprisingly the drugs with involvement from big pharma had relatively simple 
trajectories in terms of the organisational involved in development (see Figure 9). In 
contrast, projects that had major involvement from small biotech firms, or academia, 
were, in general, subject to a larger number of collaborative and licensing agreements 
and associated changes in their organisational context. In fact, of the projects that either 
had substantial involvement from academic or research institute scientists, or were 
located in biotech firms, the majority (5/7) went through a complex chain of different 
organisational structures and transactions. In particular, Campath, banoxantrone, 
Prolarix, TransMID and CAT3888 show a complex network of organisations involved in 
development (compared to temozolomide, gemtuzumab and CAT3888) (Figure 10). 
Chapters 2 and 3 explored literature demonstrating the more networked nature of the 
industry and the reliance of innovation on external sources of innovation. The extent to 
which this is observed on a project level, and the issues this causes, is not well 
understood. We can assume that these issues are associated with the transferral and 
integration of tacit knowledge accumulated throughout development. This thesis 
provides a foundation for furthering this understanding by exploring the paths projects 
take involving different organisations.  
As well as continuing to relate the case histories to the concept of project drag this 
Chapter also draws on ‘protected spaces’ as a way to understand the influence a small 
firm environment has on drug development. As mentioned in Chapter 3, protected 
spaces are created when individual expectations are mobilised and become shared, 
collective expectations. These create a protected space by which stakeholders 
surrounding the technology suspend evaluations and selection pressure no longer act. 
We apply this notion to a firm level, by which small firms undergo a process of vision 
shared which leads to the perception that issues are conquerable.  
We propose that in this environment where issues would be expected to contribute 
towards project drag, this process is not consciously recognised until the protected space 
is broken and the issues are unveiled. We see this to be the case in TransMID, 
banoxantrone and CAT3888, whereby merger and acquisition (M&A) events led to a 
rapid termination of the project, taken to be a sign of the breakdown of protected space 
and the implementation of objective evaluation processes by the acquiring firm.  
7.1 Temozolomide – Charity Support 
Temozolomide (CCRG-81045, M&B-39831, NSC-362856, RP46161, Sch52365, 
temodal, temodar, temoxol) was successfully approved for glioblastoma. The project was 
marred by: 1) limited market potential, and 2) a problematic (established and 
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unstrategic96) technological pathway, however, these issues were resolved due to the 
early support and involvement of a prominent cancer charity, Cancer Research UK, and 
the action of a key individual. If we assume that, particularly in the UK, due to limited 
resources, all projects stemming from academic or small firm R&D require a pharma 
partner later on in development, temozolomide provides an ideal type for projects 
originating in small biotech and/or academia. This is due to the charity support providing 
sufficient funding and development to ready the project for pharma licensing. An 
alternative ideal type is found in gemtuzumab, in which drug discovery and development 
resulted from a collaborative effort involving academia at very early stages, followed by 
biotech and pharma.  
While temozolomide is an ideal type (for charity/academia/pharma development) it also 
presents an unusual development trajectory. In general, partnering between academia 
and industry occurs via a biotech intermediary bridging discovery with later stage 
development. As observed in the biomedical innovation literature, this pattern stems from 
the institutional and cultural differences inhibiting academia and big pharma relationships. 
In addition, academic and biotech labs lack the necessary financial resources to prepare 
the project for pharma in-licensing. Furthermore, pharma struggle to form and maintain 
relationships with the multitude of academic centres so biotech have a role in incubating 
potential projects, feeding into pharma at later stages.  
In contrast, to this common trend (of academic projects passing to pharma via a biotech 
intermediary) temozolomide was financially supported throughout early stage 
development providing sufficient evidence for Schering Plough (SP) to in-license. This is 
important as highlighted by one key individual who suggests the project may not have 
succeeded in a less supportive organisational environment (Stevens, 2008).  
7.1.1 Interview sources 
No interviews were undertaken to inform this case history, however, an email 
correspondence was used to clarify and add additional points (referred to as email 
correspondence V). 
7.1.2 Introduction 
Temozolomide is a DNA alkylating agent imidazotetrazine derivative, developed by an 
academic research group at Aston University, supported by Cancer Research (CRC) 
                                                 
 
96 Here, we assume that the development of a cytotoxic would be unstrategic due to the general 
direction of the industry towards targeted therapeutics for cancer drugs. 
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and SP. Temozolomide received accelerated approval in 1999 (FDA and EMA) for the 
treatment of glioblastoma multiforme and anaplastic astrocytoma (rare forms of brain 
tumour).  
1980 Synthesis of mitozolomide and temozolomide 
1984 Mitozolomide Phase I trials done in early 1980s (funded by CRC (CR-UK and 
May & Baker) 
1992 Phase II trials in temozolomide initiated, funded by CRC; licensing agreement 
with Schering Plough 
1993 US Patent granted 
1996 Carmustine implant (competitor for glioblastoma market) approved as adjuvant 
to surgery in glioma patients 
1998 Orphan Drug status granted to temozolomide 
1999 Temozolomide approved 
2001 NICE approval for recurrent malignant glioma patients who have failed 1st line 
treatment 
Table 22 Key events in development of temozolomide 
 
7.1.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 1) 
The chemistry that contributed towards the development of the imidazotetrazines began 
in the 1880s, when the chemical precursor to mitozolomide (the first compound in the 
temozolomide family) was synthesised. This involved knowledge of triazenes and 
triazines, which led to the discovery of the anti-tumour imidazotetrazines (Stevens, 
2008:158).  
Biochemical pharmacology work, undertaken by Tom Connors (CRC) and colleagues, 
revealed that the adaptation, through demethylation (removal of the methyl group), of 
these compounds could induce an antitumour effect (ibid). In addition, research 
conducted by Malcolm Stevens and colleagues in the 1970s, initially at Nottingham 
University and then at Aston University, began focusing on the synthesis of nitrogen-rich 
heterocyclic systems and later, their chemical and biological properties (ibid).  
In 1978 the pharmaceutical company May & Baker sponsored a pharmacy postgraduate, 
Robert Stone, to work with Stevens’ team investigating the anti-allergy properties of 
bicyclic compounds (Stevens, 2008:159). However, these compounds were abandoned 
in favour of research leading to the preparation of the first bicyclic system compound, 
from the combination of an imidazole ring and a tetrazine ring (ibid). The resulting product 
was mitozolomide (Stevens et al., 1984). Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the 
research team it was possible for antitumour activity in mouse models, to be ascertained 
(Stevens et al., 1984, Stevens, 2008, Hickman et al., 1985). 
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Mitozolomide phase I trials began in 1983 when the project was fast-tracked into the 
clinic at Charing Cross Hospital by Edward Newlands and George Blackledge sponsored 
by May and Baker (Stevens, 2008, Sansom, 2009). Mitozolomide, which was found more 
active than temozolomide in mouse models (email correspondence V), also showed high 
bone marrow toxicity in phase I trials (Newlands et al., 1985, Stevens, 2008, Sansom, 
2009). This toxicity was identified to have stemmed from the DNA-cross linking 
properties of the molecule, requiring a structural change which was achieved in the 
production temozolomide (Stevens, 2008).  
Temozolomide underwent preclinical testing at Aston University (now under the 
sponsorship of the CRC after May and Baker discontinued interest in the project) where 
it was screened against murine tumours in vivo, in cells lines ranging from leukaemias 
to sarcoma and melanoma (Stevens et al., 1987). The promising antitumour activity 
observed from this testing led to the CRC’s Phase I/II trial Committee agreeing to fund a 
temozolomide clinical trial (Stevens, 2008). This phase I was undertaken in a total of 51 
patients, indicating some toxicity, used to inform the maximum tolerated dose, but not at 
the level of severity seen for mitozolomide (Newlands et al., 1992). Additional phase I 
trials were also carried out by the CRC (Brock et al., 1998, Smith et al., 1990).  
Positive results from these phase I trials led the CRC to sponsor, unusually given the 
high costs, further phase II trials in glioma (Bower et al., 1997), non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma 
(NHL) (Woll et al., 1995) and melanoma (Bleehen et al., 1995). The glioma trial results 
showed 11% of patients achieving an objective response, and a further 47% with stable 
disease, with some predicted toxicity (Bower et al., 1997). In NHL 18 patients were 
treated, with only one partial response contributing to the conclusion that this indication 
was not suitable for treatment with temozolomide (Woll et al., 1995). In metastatic 
melanoma 60 patients were treated with 3 showing a complete response, and 9 a partial 
response (Bleehen et al., 1995).  
As a result of these findings SP licensed temozolomide, however, as the CRC trials were 
not conducted in line with Good Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines, SP undertook 
additional phase I and II trials (Brada et al., 1999, Baker et al., 1999, Britten et al., 1998b, 
Britten et al., 1999, Dhodapkar et al., 1997, Estlin et al., 1998, Hammond et al., 1998, 
Hammond et al., 1999, Moore et al., 1998, Nicholson et al., 1998, Yung et al., 1999).  
In 1998 results of a phase II/III registration study in 225 patients with glioblastoma 
multiforme were presented at the European Association for Neuro-Oncology Meeting 
(Schering Plough, 1998). This trial showed progression-free survival at 6 months to be 
higher in the temozolomide group than the control (ibid). In addition, temozolomide 
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treated patients had better overall survival than the control group (ibid). These results 
led to the approval of temozolomide in Europe and the USA in 1999.  
Table 23 Showing publication frequency of key individuals involved in 
temozolomide trials 
Authors 
Number of 
articles 
(total of 20) 
Papers 
Newlands 7 
(Newlands et al., 1992, Oreilly et al., 1993, Bleehen et al., 1995, 
Woll et al., 1995, Newlands et al., 1996, Bower et al., 1997, 
Brock et al., 1998) 
Brampton 7 
(Newlands et al., 1992, Oreilly et al., 1993, Bleehen et al., 1995, 
Woll et al., 1995, Newlands et al., 1996, Bower et al., 1997, 
Brock et al., 1998) 
Statkevich 6 
(Estlin et al., 1998, Britten et al., 1998b, Brada et al., 1999, 
Hammond et al., 1999, Britten et al., 1999, Baker et al., 1999) 
Dugan 6 
(Estlin et al., 1998, Britten et al., 1998b, Brada et al., 1999, 
Hammond et al., 1999, Baker et al., 1999, Yung et al., 1999) 
Rowinsky 5 
(Britten et al., 1998b, Hammond et al., 1998, Hammond et al., 
1999, Britten et al., 1999, Baker et al., 1999) 
Reidenberg 5 
(Estlin et al., 1998, Britten et al., 1998b, Brada et al., 1999, 
Hammond et al., 1999, Baker et al., 1999) 
Von Hoff 4 
(Britten et al., 1998b, Hammond et al., 1998, Hammond et al., 
1999, Britten et al., 1999) 
Stevens 4 
(Newlands et al., 1992, Oreilly et al., 1993, Bleehen et al., 1995, 
Estlin et al., 1998) 
Colquhoun 4 
(Oreilly et al., 1993, Newlands et al., 1996, Bower et al., 1997, 
Brock et al., 1998) 
Baker 4 
(Britten et al., 1998b, Hammond et al., 1999, Britten et al., 1999, 
Baker et al., 1999) 
Eckardt 4 
(Britten et al., 1998b, Hammond et al., 1998, Hammond et al., 
1999, Britten et al., 1999) 
 
During the development of temozolomide there was consistency in the investigators 
involved in trials indicated through the high level of co-authoring in trial publications, 
shown in Table 23. 
In the knowledge accumulated around the primary indication, temozolomide benefitted 
from 18,50497 published glioma articles (up to and including 1992), indicating a large 
disease-associated scientific literature. 
The evidence presented here indicates that the development of temozolomide was 
based on an established area of research, and benefited from learning from a precursor 
molecule in mitozolomide. This demonstrates a justification for the allocation of the QCA 
                                                 
 
97 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Glioma’ as a search 
term in PubMed. 
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score of ‘1’ representing membership into the set ‘extensive and accumulated knowledge 
base’.  
7.1.4 Market demand (QCA score = 1) 
Early preclinical and trials for temozolomide, carried out by the CRC focused on general 
solid tumours illustrating a broad applicability for the drug (Brock et al., 1998, Newlands 
et al., 1992, Smith et al., 1990, Stevens et al., 1987). Phase II trials were undertaken in 
a range of tumours, despite the glioblastoma primary indication. Undertaken by CRC, 
trials were undertaken in glioblastoma multiforme (Bower et al., 1997), melanoma 
(Bleehen et al., 1995) and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (Woll et al., 1995). In addition, on 
the SP license phase I studies were undertaken in a range of tumour types (Brada et al., 
1999, Britten et al., 1999, Hammond et al., 1998, Hammond et al., 1999, Britten et al., 
1998b, Baker et al., 1999, Estlin et al., 1998, Nicholson et al., 1998), and with phase II 
trials expanding the range of indications, including astrocytoma (Yung et al., 1999), 
pancreatic (Moore et al., 1998) and nasopharyngeal (Chan et al., 1998) cancers. This 
represents a large potential market demand for the temozolomide drug project (see 
Table 24).  
Indication 
Incidence per 
100,000 in USA 
Deaths per 
100,000 in USA 
Year 
Brain and other nervous 
system (including 
glioblastoma and 
astrocytoma) 
6.4 4.3 2007-2011 
Melanoma 21.3 2.7 2007-2011 
Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 19.7 6.3 2007-2011 
Pancreatic 12.3 10.9 2007-2011 
Nasopharyngeal 1 No data No data 
Table 24 Incidence and mortality rates for indications relevant to the development 
of temozolomide (i.e. indications for which the drug was tested in trials) (source: 
SEER data) 
 
There was no quantification of the expected market demand for temozolomide during 
the drug’s development. However, in addition to the potential for temozolomide to be 
applied to a broad range of indications following initial approval, it was also likely that 
temozolomide could demand high prices due to the unmet need in glioblastoma98.  
When temozolomide was developed brain tumour patient treatment options were limited, 
despite the approval of the carmustine implant in 1996. The carmustine implant involves 
                                                 
 
98 Indeed when temozolomide was approved it did demand high prices, whereby one cycle of 
treatment cost between £934 and £1,176 in 2001 (NICE, 2001) 
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the insertion of a wafer into the brain administering carmustine (an approved cytotoxin) 
to the tumour site as it dissolves 99 . This procedure is invasive, particularly when 
compared to the oral administration of temozolomide. Considering the ability for 
temozolomide to fulfil an unmet need, in addition to orphan drug status being granted to 
the drug in 1998, issues associated with the low market potential of the primary indication 
were overcome. 
Patents for temozolomide were granted in 1991 (Lunt et al., 1993) and 1993 (Stevens et 
al., 1997). Therefore, despite the long development duration, the loss of patent protection 
was not an inhibitory issue to the development of the project, as they were not set to 
expire until 12 years subsequent to drug approval.  
For temozolomide the QCA score of ‘1’ for membership into the set high market demand 
is justified through the range of tumour types explored in trials, indicating a high potential 
market. This is further supported by the lack of competition and unmet clinical need in 
the brain tumour indication.  
7.1.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 1) 
Stakeholder perspectives of the development of temozolomide were represented by 
academic investigators, CRC, SP and, perhaps most interestingly, patients who came 
across the drug during clinical development.  
Firstly, the academic investigators responsible for discovery and early stage 
development of the drug had high expectations of the drug. For instance, the group has 
been reported to have though that they had found ‘the elusive “magic bullet” against 
cancer’ (Sansom, 2009). However, the disappointing results in early mitozolomide trials 
were described as ‘disastrous’ (Stevens, 2008).  
High expectations were shared by the CRC who funded the early stage work and 
supported temozolomide in trials. This first trial of temozolomide was relatively early on 
in the history of the CRC Phase I/II Trials Committee (which was founded in the early 
1980s), and motivated additional larger trials to be initiated by CRC (Newell et al., 2003, 
Arney, 2013). These would have involved substantial investment from CRC implying a 
promising perception of the project.  
The involvement of a high profile cancer charity, and the publicity this enabled, 
contributed towards a positive public perception of the drug. For instance, temozolomide 
                                                 
 
99 www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/carmustineimplant 
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was described as a ‘shining example of how the public’s generous support of CR-UK has 
directly benefited the lives of people with cancer’ (Arney, 2013).  In addition, the 
agreement with SP was a ground breaking moment in the history of charity-supported 
drug development in the UK, described as ‘the first marketing deal of its type by a British 
charity’ (Farmer, 1992).  
In addition, when SP licensed temozolomide, the company had high expectations of the 
project, considering both its history of encouraging results (50% response rates in 
patients) and the drug’s ability to fulfil an unmet need:  
‘temozolomide offers the possibility of giving the worldwide medical community an 
important new anticancer agent for the treatment of gliomas, a devastating disease 
poorly treated by current therapies’ (Schering-Plough Corporation and Cancer 
Research Campaign Technology Limited, 1992). 
In line with these high expectations from SP, there was also high demand for 
temozolomide from patients and physicians, with the compassionate use programme 
approved in October 1992, which was publicised widely. For instance, The Guardian  and 
The Daily Mail (The Guardian, 1992, Hope, 1992) reported the offer of temozolomide on 
a compassionate use basis at CRC units across the UK. This implies that patients and 
physicians supported temozolomide due to the potential that the drug could fulfil an 
unmet clinical need.  
Patients’ high expectations of temozolomide are further illustrated in media reports of 
fundraising by patients. For instance, in November 1992 the drug was mentioned in the 
Daily Mail, reporting fundraising by an aircraft commander, who was hoping to access 
£50,000 for CRC to increase production of the drug (Daily Mail, 1992). Additional articles 
in the media report patient experiences, for instance:  
‘One of the first to try the drug [temozolomide] was mother-of-two Theresa Bouette, 
40, of Winchmore Hill, North London. Despite two operations, she said, she was 
‘unsteady on my feet, my speech was slurred and I had severe memory loss’; the 
drug had ‘transformed my life.’’ (O'Shea, 1992)  
From 1993 to 1997 temozolomide did not appear in media reports with the exception of 
a report of a young woman with a brain tumour, published in the Washington Post in 
March 1997 (Colburn, 1997). The woman was taking temozolomide on compassionate 
grounds, when the drug was between phase I and phase II. The report of the drug was 
positive, with only limited side effects and the patient leading a relatively normal life whilst 
trying to fight her brain tumour (ibid).  
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This evidence indicates that temozolomide was developed surrounded by a range of 
positive stakeholder perspectives. This ranges from academics who term the drug a 
‘magic bullet’ to the CRC support of trials. Furthermore, compassionate use and patient 
stories indicate that users, patients and physicians were also enthusiastic. These 
stakeholder perspectives are generally positive justifying the QCA score of ‘1’. 
7.1.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 1) 
Temozolomide was supported by public/charitable funding, with an industrial partner 
present at the very early stages of the development of the precursor molecule, and again 
only after the drug had been extensively studied in phase I and II trials.  
As mentioned discovery work contributing to temozolomide was undertaken at Aston 
University. At this time the synthesis, testing and preclinical research was funded by a 
combination of May and Baker, Aston University and the Science and Engineering 
Research Council (through studentships) (Stevens et al., 1984, Hickman et al., 1985, 
Stevens et al., 1987). In 1978, Stevens told Stone, the May and Baker post-doctoral 
researcher, to ‘make some interesting molecules’ to test for antitumour activity (Sansom, 
2009). This indicates that temozolomide resulted from the trial and error approach to 
cancer therapeutics, as opposed to rational drug design.  
May and Baker funded the phase I trial in mitozolomide but discontinued support when 
phase I trials showed inhibitory toxic effects (Stevens, 2008, Sansom, 2009). When May 
and Baker discontinued support the CRC Phase I/II Trials Committee (the forerunner to 
the current Drug Development Office) decided to finance further trials, which were 
undertaken at the Charing Cross Hospital, Mount Vernon Centre for Cancer Treatment, 
the Queen Elizabeth Hospital and the Aston University (Newlands et al., 1996, Brock et 
al., 1998, Oreilly et al., 1993, Newlands et al., 1992, Smith et al., 1990).  
In 1984 there were issues with temozolomide manufacturing. This was due to its reliance 
on methyl isocyanate, which was involved in an incident in India (Bhopal), described as 
a ‘catastrophic toxicological disaster’ causing long lasting effects in a densely populated 
area (Stevens, 2008). This motivated the development of a new way of synthesising the 
compound for early stage trials (ibid).  
In the early 1990s, prior to the publication of phase I and II results, Stevens led a team 
of these investigators on a ‘roadshow’ around the US ‘presenting the early clinical data 
to potential partners’ (Sansom, 2009). This resulted in the SP licensing agreement.  
At the time of the SP license oncology therapeutics were one of the firm’s top priorities. 
This is demonstrated in a press release in late 1991, where there are five therapeutic 
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areas identified as being key in the SP strategy, including anti-cancers (PR Newswire, 
1991). Furthermore, as a big pharma with an established over-the-counter, and 
therapeutics business, SP had the resources and experience to develop temozolomide.  
The organisational environment surrounding temozolomide development indicates that 
there was a consistent research team and despite this changing when SP licensed the 
drug there is no data indicating how smoothly this transition occurred. However, the 
phase I and phase II proof of concept trials had already been completed, sponsored by 
the CRC. In addition, the replication of trials by SP indicates that the new research team 
accumulated their own observations and knowledge around temozolomide, lessening 
the need for the transfer of accumulated knowledge. This justifies the QCA score (1) 
indicating a supportive organisational environment was present in the development of 
temozolomide.  
7.1.7 Temozolomide Conclusion 
Temozolomide is described, by the discovering scientist, Malcolm Stevens, as an 
illustrative case of project supported by a diverse group of collaborators, both in 
disciplines and institutional backgrounds (Stevens, 2008). Despite this diversity, the 
progression of the project was also reliant on a key individual operating across the 
frontiers of these disciplines, and providing leadership. In this case Malcolm Stevens 
provided this role and was able to do this as a result of support from money from CR-
UK. This support provided sufficiently strong evidence to interest the SP license.  
In addition, temozolomide benefited from the presence and support of CRC, throughout 
the lab research and early stage trials. As Stevens observes, on several occasions the 
project ‘teetered on the brink of extinction’, and ‘had the project been exclusively the 
possession of industry, doubtless it would have fallen at the first hurdle’ (Stevens, 2008).   
7.2 Campath – Key Individuals Rescue a Path-Breaking Drug 
The development of Campath (alemtuzumab) began in an academic research team, in 
collaboration with a small biotech subsidiary of a big pharma. When the partner, 
Wellcome Biotech, discontinued the license a US biotech in-licensed and took the drug 
through to approval.  
During development the issues facing the project were: 1) novel and uncertain nature of 
the markets, 3) novel and uncertain nature of the knowledge, 4) potential difficulties 
associated with transferring knowledge between different firms and 5) potential 
vulnerabilities to the small firms involved at later stages of development, i.e. to industrial 
dynamics, and lack of experience, competencies and capabilities. These issues 
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contributed towards project drag which motivated the license termination by Wellcome. 
However, the effects of this project drag, were not fatal for Campath and were overcome 
by the action of key individuals, and the high expectations and excitement over the use 
of a novel therapeutic modality.  
Additional mechanisms acting to aid in the success of Campath were the range of 
potential indications it could be applied to, the granting of orphan drug status, the 
knowledge accumulated throughout development, the excitement for the new 
technological approach applied and the role of both key individuals and patient user 
groups.  
7.2.1 Interview sources 
Interviews were carried out with individuals involved in the drug discovery and 
development process. This included interviewee A, interviewee B and interviewee C.  
7.2.2 Introduction 
Campath is a mab targeting the CD52 antigen approved for the treatment of chronic 
lymphocytic leukaemia (CLL) patients, in 2001 (FDA). The project originated in the 
pathology laboratory at the University of Cambridge, with an initial license taken out by 
Wellcome Biotech in 1985. However, when this was discontinued in 1994 LeukoSite took 
on development to approval.  
 
1985 Wellcome licenses rights to commercially develop Campath 
1986 Winter’s humanisation method developed 
1988 Campath first tested in humans; Therapeutic Antibody Centre (TAC) opens; 
Campath-1H developed 
1992 Campath in Phase I for Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) and Phase I/II for NHL 
1993 Campath in Phase II for CLL 
1994 Wellcome discontinues license due to disappointing results in trials for RA and 
NHL 
1995 TAC moves to Oxford with funding from MRC and LeukoSite 
1997 LeukoSite take on development of Campath, in collaboration with ILEX 
Oncology; orphan drug designed by FDA 
1998 Pivotal Phase III trial in CLL begins 
2001 Campath approved by the FDA 
Table 25 Key events in development of Campath 
 
Campath went through several incremental changes in development. The first molecule, 
Campath-1M, used a murine mab to target CD52. The second, Campath-1G, involved 
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adaptations to the antibody to improve response rates in patients. The final change to 
Campath was in the humanisation of the antibody, to produce Campath-1H. In this case 
history we will refer generically to ‘Campath’ due to the focus of the drug on CD52 and 
the same metabolic pathway.  
7.2.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 1) 
Campath is ‘one of the oldest therapeutic mab ever created’ (Marks, 2013a), and one of 
the first to be prioritised for commercialisation by a private company (Hale and 
Waldmann, 2000, Clark, 2005, Marks, 2015).  
After joining the Department of Pathology (University of Cambridge), Waldmann was 
introduced to the production and use of mabs in 1974, when he encountered Georges 
Kohler. Waldmann’s interest in mabs stemmed from his attendance at a presentation by 
Milstein and Kohler prior to their 1975 hybridoma publication (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 
2015). In 1978 Waldmann took a sabbatical at Cesar Milstein’s100 Laboratory (Clark, 
2005).  
Waldmann explored the potential for mabs to be used as tools in investigating immune 
tolerance. However, Campath was found to have the ability to kill lymphocytes, leading 
to a realisation that the drug could be applied to GvHD in bone marrow transplants (ibid). 
Waldmann and Hale state: ‘[it was] clear that certain anti-T cell mabs, of appropriate 
isotype could be exploited as agent to kill lymphocytes in vivo’ (Waldmann and Hale, 
2005).  
At this time Waldmann ‘discussed plans to apply for an MRC programme grant to make 
mabs for the purpose of removing T-cells from human bone marrow to treat the problem 
of Graft vs. Host Disease (GvHD)’101 (Clark, 2005, Hale and Waldmann, 2000). This was 
successful in 1980, and the MRC programme grant (Clark, 2005, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 
2015) is mentioned in acknowledgements in research papers up to 1999. The MRC grant 
facilitated expansion of the research team, in 1981, and the recruitment of 
multidisciplinary scientists (Clark, 2005, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). Sooner after a 
family of antibodies were found providing the precursor of Campath (Hale and Waldmann, 
2000, Clark, 2005, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). At this stage it was not clear which 
                                                 
 
100 Milstein later received The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on MAbs. 
101GvHD was known to be caused, in bone marrow transplants, by the new transplanted tissue 
(graft) attaching the recipient (host) tissues. By the time of Waldmann’s investigations, it was 
appreciated that GvHD was caused by the ‘contamination of the bone marrow from mature t-
lymphocyte cells’ (Marks, 2013a, Marks, forthcoming) 
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antigen was targeted by the antibody, however, after characterisation by Geoff Hale it 
was realised that the antibodies targeted the CD52 antigen (Hale and Waldmann, 2000) 
This sequence of events, in the discovery of the antibody preceding the antigen is further 
illustrated in publication metrics wherein articles mentioning CD52102 prior to Campath 
phase I initiation (1992) amount to just 15. However, when the PubMed search is 
undertaken including Campath103 as a search term the number increases to 103. 
When a suitable antibody was selected and initial laboratory testing completed, 
preclinical studies of Campath-1M were carried out. The results led to the initiation of the 
first human pilot study (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). In 1982 the first patient, a man 
suffering from NHL, was treated with Campath-1M (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 
2013a). Despite the treatment showing some activity, the effects were only temporary 
and the patient died soon after (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). However, no toxicities were 
observed and the patient tolerated the treatment well. The temporary effects of Campath 
were also seen in other mabs at the time (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). Additional pilot 
studies were carried out in patients with leukaemia and aplastic anaemia, showing 
effectiveness, tolerance and little toxicity (Marks, 2013a). 
The temporary effects found in trials were suggested to be due to the IgM antibody 
present in Campath-1M which, produced by the body’s immune system in response to a 
foreign body, exists only temporarily. Waldmann’s team began exploring ways of 
adapting Campath to combat this as it was anticipated that changing the antibody to the 
IgG antibody which would produce long-term immunity and a persistent response in 
patients (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). However, this was challenging and involved the 
study of the structure of mabs and the screening of 20 million clones (Marks, 2013a, 
Marks, 2015). The resultant mab was discovered in 1985 and dubbed Campath-1G.  
The first patient to be tested with Campath-1G had CLL, and was treated in 1987 (Marks, 
2013a, Marks, 2015). The response in this patient exceeded Waldmann and Hale’s ‘most 
optimistic expectations’ (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). 
Nonetheless the patient later died due to underlying disease. 
                                                 
 
102  Search term used: (cd52[All Fields] OR cdw52[All Fields]) AND ("1900/01/01"[PDAT] : 
"1992/31/12"[PDAT]) 
103Search term used: ((cd52 OR cdw52 OR Campath)) AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication] : 
"1992/31/12"[Date - Publication]) 
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Soon after the initiation of CAMPATH-1G trials, Gregory Winter developed a method for 
producing humanised mabs (in 1986) and collaborated with Waldmann to produce a 
humanised form of Campath ((Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 
2013b).The aim of this method was to decrease the levels of the foreign component (in  
this case murine) of the mab while increasing the human component (Marks, 2013a, 
Marks, 2015). This was thought to influence the tolerability of the molecules in the body, 
by decreasing the immune responses against them (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015).  
The agreement between Winter and Waldmann was mutually beneficial; Waldmann 
gained access to a new technology that could improve Campath, and Winter found a 
molecule to test his technique (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). The result of this 
collaboration was the production of a humanised version of Campath-1G, Campath-1H, 
in 1988 (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015, Waldmann and Hale, 2005).  
The first human patient (suffering from NHL) tested with Campath-1H had been treated 
with previous versions of Campath, with some promise, but discontinued treatment due 
to adverse side effects (Hale and Waldmann, 2000). No observable side effects were 
seen in her treatment with Campath-1H, which was well tolerated and the patient showed 
disease improvements (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). These trials showed that the 
improved, humanised version of Campath could have potential in a range of indications 
including leukaemia and lymphoma as well as in immunological disorders and the 
prevention of GvHD. 
In summary, from the trials that had published results, the RA studies range from 
claiming ‘significant benefit’ in 7 out of 8 patients (Isaacs et al., 1992) to a ‘majority’ with 
‘symptomatic improvement’ (Isaacs et al., 1996a), and 56% patients with ‘clinical 
improvement’ (Matteson et al., 1995) to 65% patients showing ‘clinical response’ 
(Weinblatt et al., 1995). The NHL studies show similar variation in results with one 
involving 5 patients showing no responses (Osterborg et al., 1997b) and another 
involving 50 patients showing 6 partial remissions and complete remission in bone 
marrow in 32% of patients (Lundin et al., 1998).  
For CLL responses were more pronounced and at least half of patients showed a 
response in all trials: 1) in 9 patients there were 3 complete remissions and 5 partial 
remissions (Osterborg et al., 1996), 2) from 4 CLL patients there were 2 long lasting 
remissions (Osterborg et al., 1997b), 3) from 6 patients there were 3 partial remissions 
(Bowen et al., 1997), 4) in 6 patients there were 5 complete remissions (Dyer et al., 1997), 
and 5) in a phase II with 29 patients there were 11 partial remissions and 1 complete 
remission (Osterborg et al., 1997a). 
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When LeukoSite licensed Campath phase II results was claimed to show between 40-
70% objective response rate in CLL patients who had failed front line therapy. This 
positive data motivated the companies to schedule a meeting with the FDA to discuss a 
strategy for obtaining market approval (Business Newswire 22nd July 1997).   
This section has demonstrated that the uncertainty surrounding the novel approach to 
Campath was overcome through a process of learning within the team involved at 
Cambridge University. This learning continued despite the changes in licensee. This was 
facilitated by the smooth transferral of the project, and associated data, to LeukoSite, 
where Wellcome staff went ‘above and beyond what they probably even had to do in 
order to help [LeukoSite] bring the antibody in’ (interviewee C). This is important for the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge throughout the clinical development of a project.  
Campath was central to the LeukoSite strategy, demonstrated in their 1997 annual report, 
the project is described as its lead product candidate (PR Newswire, 1999). During this 
period it has been noted (interviewee C) that there was a ‘productive’ and ‘trusting’ 
relationship between the academic investigators, mainly Waldmann and Coles, and the 
researchers and management team at LeukoSite.  
On consideration of the disease-based knowledge surrounding Campath is that 16,782104 
articles mentioning the primary indication subclass (CLL = lymphoid) were published in 
the years prior to the initiation of trials (up to and including 1985). In addition there were 
a large number of articles published mentioning the target (around 200 publications up 
to when the drug was approved 105), there was a relatively strong knowledge base 
surrounding the disease area. 
This section has demonstrated that despite the novel approach applied in the 
development of Campath, several incremental changes and associated learning process 
facilitated the accumulation of knowledge. Furthermore, the consistency of the research 
group (as will also be discussed further below) and the good communication between 
organisations further facilitated this process. This justifies the score ‘1’ for membership 
into the extensive and accumulated knowledge base set. 
                                                 
 
104 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘leukemia, lymphoid’ 
as a search term in PubMed. This is the term generated to account for Acute Lymphocytic 
Leukemia, and includes the subsets: ‘Leukemia, B-Cell; Leukemia, Biphenotypic, Acute; 
Leukemia, Prolymphocytic; Leukemia, T-Cell; and Precursor Cell Lymphopblastic Leukemia-
Lymphoma. 
105 This is compared to around 100 articles published for targets in 1990, declining to 8 per target 
in 1999 (Booth and Zemmel, 2004) 
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7.2.4 Market demand (QCA score = 1) 
Throughout Campath development market demand expectations varied significantly. 
Discovery of Campath was motivated by a desire to develop a laboratory tool to 
investigate immune tolerance (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). However, the investigators 
realised that Campath could be used to treat Graft versus Host Disease (GvHD) which 
caused transplant rejection in bone marrow transplants (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, 
Clark, 2005, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015).  
Broader applications were foreseen for the project in 1982 when the first patient, a man 
suffering from NHL, was treated with the murine antibody, Campath-1M (Marks, 2013a, 
Hale and Waldmann, 2000). Additional pilot studies were undertaken in patients suffering 
from leukaemia and anaplastic anaemia, showing effectiveness, tolerance and little 
toxicity (Marks, 2013a). In addition, the first CLL patient was first treated in 1987.  
This testing of Campath was experimental, however, it also provided evidence to support 
drug’s application to a broad range of indications. It is likely that this was the motivation 
for Wellcome Biotech (then a subsidiary of BW) agreeing to license the project, via the 
BTG, who acted as a technology transfer body to take publicly funded research through 
to commercialisation.  
Subsequently, the project was humanised and the Wellcome license was extended to 
include the resultant Campath-1H (Hale and Waldmann, 2000). At this time Campath 
was ‘expected [to] reach a much wider market and perhaps break through the ‘billion 
dollar threshold’ which big pharma are seeking’ (ibid). This motivated ‘a programme of 
trials of Campath-1H in RA (RA), leukaemia and lymphoma’ (ibid). The development of 
trial protocols that focused on large markets, including, mainly NHL and subsequently 
RA (interviewee A) indicates the large potential market for Campath.  
Despite Wellcome undertaking several trials (Lim et al., 1993, Matteson et al., 1995, 
Weinblatt et al., 1995, Osterborg et al., 1997b, Bowen et al., 1997, Isaacs et al., 1992, 
Isaacs et al., 1996b), developing the manufacturing technique and investing heavily 
(around £50m at the time) into Campath, they decided to discontinue their license in 
1994 (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). This was motivated by 
two things 1) the 1993/94 restructuring at Wellcome and the re-evaluation of their 
pipeline priorities (Pharma Marketletter, 1993c, interviewee A), and 2) the diminishing 
commercial potential of the project, following disappointing results in NHL and RA trials 
(AFX International Focus, 1994, interviewee A).  
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The license was returned to BTG who, based on the promising results in CLL, aimed 
their efforts to find another partner at smaller companies who would be more motivated 
by the smaller commercial potential (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015).  
LeukoSite (US biotech) in-licensed Campath and undertook a pivotal trial in CLL leading 
to drug approval in 2001. LeukoSite did acknowledge the ongoing potential for Campath 
in larger therapeutic areas, in the form of ongoing or planned trials in multiple sclerosis 
and NHL (Millennium Pharmaceuticals, 1999, interviewee B). Furthermore, the company 
received orphan drug designation for Campath, for ‘the treatment of patients with B-cell 
CLL who have been treated with alkylating agents and who have failed fludarabine 
therapy’106. This facilitates the creation of a market in a small patient population.  
Despite the long duration of the development of Campath, the main patent was not filed 
until 1994 (Waldmann et al., 1998) meaning that the potential to appropriate returns from 
the product would not expire until at least 2014, around 14 years after the approval of 
the drug.  
As this section demonstrates, Campath was initially thought to have broad applicability, 
however, LeukoSite focused on gaining approval in a smaller indication initially. However, 
LeukoSite also recognised potential additional indications, such as multiple sclerosis, 
which has since become the main indication for the Campath compound, labelled 
Lemtrada107. 
7.2.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 1) 
In addition to the commercial and scientific story of Campath, there is also a significant 
narrative that implicates the role of users (both patients and physicians) in the successful 
development of the project. This is highlighted in the early establishment of the Campath 
users group (Waldmann and Hale, 2005). The Campath users group was established in 
the mid-1980s when the trials in transplant centres began to expand, acting to facilitate 
access to patients for large scale trials (Hale and Waldmann, 2000).  
                                                 
 
106 
/www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number=10719
7 (accessed 25/2/2015) 
107 Interestingly Sanofi, who took development of Campath through a series of acquisitions, 
withdrew Campath from the market for leukaemia patients in order to re-brand it as Lemtrada, 
thereby demanding a higher price from the multiple sclerosis indication 
www.fiercepharma.com/story/sanofi-pulls-campath-clear-way-higher-priced-lemtrada/2012-08-
21.   
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Further participation from users was seen when Wellcome discontinued development of 
Campath, when Hale and Waldmann state that they were ‘becoming very concerned 
how to support all these groups who clearly believed that CAMPATH-1 would help their 
patients’ (Hale and Waldmann, 2000). This highlights the support that Campath received 
from patients during its course of development, an aspect which may have contributed 
towards it eventual success.  
The role of expectations during the development of CAMPATH is also something that is 
commented on in the narrative written by Hale and Waldmann (2000) and Mike Clark 
(Clark, 2005). One issue was the decision, by BTG not to patent the early versions of 
Campath (Hale and Waldmann, 2000). This move is reminiscent of the attitude felt 
towards mabs when they were discovered in the 1970s, where the MRC and the NRDC 
did not think the potential immediate applications warranted patent protection (Tansey 
and Catterall, 1997). This hesitant expectation was clearly overcome by the time 
Campath-related patents were applied for in 1988 by BTG (Waldmann et al., 1998, 
Waldmann et al., 2003) and by Wellcome Biotech who saw substantial enough potential 
to enter into a licensing agreement (interviewee A).  
In addition to the expectations described by the scientists’ narratives (Hale and 
Waldmann, 2000, Waldmann and Hale, 2005) it is also likely that public support 
surrounding Campath may have been influenced by the newspaper articles mentioning 
the drug at the time. The first newspaper articles mentioning Campath appear soon after 
the Wellcome license, in 1988, and it is evident from the vocabulary used that the media 
pick up on the excitement around the potential of the drug.  
In articles found in The Times, The Toronto Star and the Washington Post Campath is 
repeated referred to as a ‘magic bullet’ (Wright, 1988, Reuter, 1988, Washington Post, 
1988). Two years later the positive expectations projected in the media continue with 
another Times article about Campath headlined ‘The mission to find a killer for cancer’ 
(Wright, 1990). Interestingly, where ‘magic bullet’ was mentioned on several occasions 
in the 1980s the publications in the 1990s (of a total of 133) the term does not appear at 
all. In the early 1990s the drug was described as a “new wonder drug which treats 
leukaemia, lymph cancer and rheumatoid arthritis” (Foster, 1992), continuing the highly 
positive expectations felt in the early stages of the drug’s development.  
In the latter half of the 1990s, newspaper articles mentioning Campath are seen more in 
the USA, with the acquisition of the license for Campath moving to LeukoSite. 
Furthermore, during this period there is a shift from articles about the drug itself towards 
an interest in the companies involved in the development of the drug. 
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In addition to the newspaper articles, the reflections and commentaries written by the 
researchers involved in the project also emphasise the importance of user groups, 
created during the trial process (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Waldmann and Hale, 2005, 
Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). 
In summary, the strong stakeholder support, mainly from the participation of users in the 
development of the drug, and illustrated in the positive media reports associated with the 
drug. This justifies the QCA score ‘1’, indicating full membership into the set positive 
stakeholder perspectives. 
7.2.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 1) 
Initial research into Campath was undertaken in the Pathology Department at University 
of Cambridge, funded by the UK’s Medical Research Council (MRC). BTG had been 
created in 1981 from a merger of the National Research Development Corporation and 
the National Enterprise Board, to help in the commercialisation of academic research. 
As the organisation responsible for gaining intellectual property protection and 
commercialising scientific discoveries that arose from government funded research, the 
CAMPATH researchers had little option but to offer BTG a license (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 
2015).  
In the early 1980s BGT licensed Campath despite the NRDC’s previous scepticism 
regarding the applicability of mabs, and the decision not to patent Campath-1 (the first 
product arising out of this programme of research) (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 
2015). This, and later agreements were also guided by the Cambridge University’s 
Wolfson Cambridge Industrial Unit (set up in 1971 with money from the Wolfson 
Foundation108), which was set up with the purpose of fostering technology transfer (Marks, 
2013a, Marks, 2015).  
Due to the inexperience in commercialising discoveries and licensing agreements, the 
Campath lead scientists (Herman Waldmann and Geoff Hale) profess their naivety to 
process: “luckily we did obtain a clause allowing us to continue our own academic and 
clinical research with the cell lines which now belonged to BTG” (Hale and Waldmann, 
2000). This was ‘lucky’ due to the continued incremental improvements to Campath that 
proved to be crucial to the development of the approved product.  
                                                 
 
108 The Wolfson Foundation is a charity established in 1955, specialising in providing funding for 
scientific and technological excellence.   
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One of the things the BTG and MRC did was to patent the humanised version of Campath 
(Campath-1H) (Biotechnology Newswatch, 1988, Waldmann et al., 1998, Waldmann et 
al., 2003). However, in a move that was described at the time to be ‘the first time in 
memory’ sole rights to the patent were retained by the MRC, despite their policy of open 
access to discoveries resulting from publicly-funded research (Biotechnology 
Newswatch, 1988). This is likely to have been motivated by the loss of exclusivity over 
UK academic inventions by BTG (NRDC) in 1985 due to the failure to patent mabs (Owen 
and Hopkins, 2016). 
Initially BTG’s commercialisation strategy targeted Celltech, who, at that time had the 
most experience in mabs in the UK. Despite two years of negotiations, no agreement 
was reached (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015, Hale and Waldmann, 2000). However, in 1985 
Wellcome Biotech, a subsidiary of the Wellcome Foundation Ltd (later Wellcome PLC, 
the UK arm of BW, a large pharmaceutical company at the time) licensed the molecule 
(Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). The Cambridge scientists were pleased with this: ‘as at 
that time the company was one of the leading British companies in biotechnology and 
had the strong expertise in the large-scale production of cell cultures necessary for any 
scaling-up of alemtuzumab’ (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015).  
Wellcome Biotech was a small biologics company based on Wellcome’s mature vaccine 
business (Pharma Marketletter, 1993c, interviewee A). Despite being a subsidiary of the 
larger entity, Wellcome PLC, Wellcome Biotech was a relatively autonomous, ‘semi-
independent entity’ (interviewee A). Initially Wellcome Biotech had high hopes for 
antibody technology and were interested in developing capabilities in this area: “they 
[Wellcome Biotech] were far-sighted enough to want to get into therapeutic antibodies... 
that was going to be the new future”, building on their existing protein therapeutics and 
vaccine pipeline (interviewee A).  
When Campath was humanised BTG were concerned that the development of Campath-
1H would compromise Wellcome Biotech’s Campath-1G development (Hale and 
Waldmann, 2000). In response the Wellcome license was extended to include 
CAMPATH-1H. When Wellcome Biotech began research into CAMPATH-1H it was 
“expected [to] reach a much wider market and perhaps break through the “billion dollar 
threshold” which big pharma are seeking” (Hale and Waldmann, 2000). Therefore, 
Wellcome abandoned work on previous Campath projects and “started a programme of 
trials of CAMPATH-1H in RA, leukaemia and lymphoma”.  
Up to the late 1980s Waldmann’s team were responsible for producing Campath in their 
laboratory (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). However, it was necessary to scale up the 
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manufacturing technique due to the demand for the drug in trials (Hale and Waldmann, 
2000, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). In response the Therapeutic Antibody Centre (TAC) 
opened in 1990 after three years of planning (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 2013a, 
Marks, 2015).  
The TAC was responsible for the production of CAMPATH for trials. ‘[Waldmann and 
Hale] wanted to liberate clinical research from the bottleneck of pilot scale production’  
(Hale and Waldmann, 2000). The TAC was funded initially by the MRC and the Wellcome 
Foundation, with further support from the MRC, annually (£200,000) for five years, along 
with funding from Wellcome Biotech and Cambridge University (Hale and Waldmann, 
2000, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2013b). In 1996, Waldmann also gained support for the TAC 
from Tim Springer, who had just founded a new US biotechnology company, LeukoSite 
(Hawkes, 1996). The TAC was key to the development of Campath in providing the 
facilities necessary to manufacture enough molecule for trials.  
Over the seven years that Wellcome Biotech was involved in Campath, the company 
invested over £50m and contributed towards the establishment of a more efficient 
manufacturing technique (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). 
However, in 1994, Wellcome discontinued the license for Campath which reverted to 
BTG (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015).  
Despite the willingness of Wellcome to see the potential in antibodies the technology 
was still, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new and risky avenue to take: ‘I guess it 
wasn’t clear that therapeutic antibodies were going to be as big as we know they are 
today and so there was the element of risk there’ (interviewee A). This is echoed by 
observers from the University of Cambridge: ‘Many people were very sceptical in the 
mid-1980s about the commercial future of antibodies and other biotech drugs but 
Wellcome was excited by the potential of this new area’, comments from Dr Richard 
Jennings, Director of Technology Transfer and Consultancy Services, Cambridge 
Enterprise Ltd (University of Cambridge, 2009). 
In addition to the risk associated with the new technology, in 1994 Wellcome Biotech 
underwent an organisational shift when it was re-absorbed into the parent organisation, 
Wellcome PLC (Marks, 2013a, Marks, forthcoming). This had a detrimental effect on the 
academic scientists working on Campath-1H, as Hale and Waldmann comment: 
‘although Campath-1H continued to be developed, and we enjoyed a productive 
relationship with many of the Wellcome scientists, the ultimate decisions were removed 
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to a level beyond our access, and trial protocols were developed with a focus on large 
markets, starting with NHL and subsequently RA’109 (Hale and Waldmann, 2000).  
From the Wellcome Biotech perspective one informant observes: 
“for Wellcome Biotech Campath and therapeutic antibodies and the relationship with 
Hermann [Waldmann] was very important because it represented the future of 
Wellcome Biotech that was the most important thing they were doing. But when they 
[Wellcome Biotech] became part of the Wellcome Foundation, it was no longer the 
number one priority because there was a whole portfolio of other things and so it 
slipped down the pecking order and also there wasn’t a dedicated management that 
was going to promote it in the way that it had been in Wellcome Biotech and so 
consequently, the people that were managing the portfolio didn’t have the same sort 
of vested interest and probably didn’t have the same insight or knowledge that the 
people at Wellcome Biotech had had.” (interviewee A) 
Efforts to find a new licensee for Campath was challenging due to the negative effects 
associated with the discontinued license, whereby other potential licensees may wonder 
why the drug was unattractive (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). However, BTG realised that 
a potential avenue for a drug in a niche indication, such as Campath in CLL, was to focus 
on a small biotechnology. This was based on the assumption that small companies would 
be more motivated by smaller commercial markets than big pharma (Marks, 2013a, 
Marks, 2015). Furthermore, small biotech firms are easier for academic labs to 
collaborate with. As Hale and Waldmann (2000) reflect: ‘in our experience it has been 
very much easier to interact with small biotech companies where the ethos is more akin 
to our academic culture and the management is closer to our level’.  
It was actually Waldmann who found a licensee in LeukoSite through his connection in 
Tim Springer (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015, interviewee C). LeukoSite was founded in 
1993 to commercialise Springer’s work with Waldmann in the 1970s at the Laboratory of 
Molecular Biology at Cambridge (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015, Hale and Waldmann, 
2000). At this time Springer had worked on the discovery of leukocyte adhesion 
molecules110, providing the focus for LeukoSite (Hale and Waldmann, 2000) Furthermore, 
Waldmann sat on the LeukoSite scientific advisory board, and the company had already 
                                                 
 
109 This is echoed by interviewees 
110 Leukocyte (white blood cells) were targeted in order to inhibit their disease-promoting actions, 
with potential in cancer, autoimmune and viral diseases (www.rhoventures.com/healthcare-
Leukosite) 
197 
 
invested US$1m to the relocation of the TAC to Oxford in 1994 (Marks, 2013a, 
interviewee C, Marks, 2015) 
The agreement was risky for LeukoSite (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015), as Hale and 
Waldmann (2000) observe:  
‘Chris Mirabelli took a bold risk when he committed a substantial proportion of the 
new company’s start-up capital towards the construction and running of a new centre 
for an academic group on the other side of the Atlantic... As our hope was fading that 
BTG would find a new licensee, LeukoSite became persuaded that CAMPATH-1H 
was a genuine opportunity and even though its first application (in CLL), might be 
outside their original remit’.  
However, the licensing agreement was also strategic for LeukoSite. Firstly, a smaller 
indication, such as CLL, was easier and therefore cheaper for a small company, like 
LeukoSite, to develop and get approved (interviewee B). Furthermore, the project was 
synergistic with LeukoSite’s existing technological capabilities (interviewee C) and 
facilitated LeukoSite’s desire to enter into the antibodies sphere, which is also evident in 
their 1996 TAC investment (Hawkes, 1996). Here LeukoSite ‘developed drugs to block 
disease promoting actions of white blood cells, with potential applications within the 
areas of cancer, autoimmune and viral diseases’ (Rho Ventures, Perseus LLC). In 
addition, LeukoSite were aiming to float on the stock market, for which they needed late 
stage products, such as Campath, as part of the package to impress investors 
(interviewee C).  
Despite the strategic benefits of Campath for LeukoSite’s the firm was inexperienced in 
bringing an oncology drug to market, motivating the establishment of a joint venture with 
ILEX Oncology (Hale and Waldmann, 2000, Waldmann and Hale, 2005, interviewee B 
and C). ILEX Oncology, founded 1994, was headquartered in Texas, USA and had 
experience in developing oncology projects (e.g. its lead molecule mitoguazone111) and 
collaborating with other firms (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015, Business Wire, 1997b).  
As part of the BTG/LeukoSite licensing agreement with BTG LeukoSite (and ILEX) had 
the opportunity to develop the drug for broader indications subsequent to its approval in 
                                                 
 
111 Despite the development and application for marketing, the FDA did not approve it for AIDS-
related NHL. 
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CLL (Marks, 2013a, Marks, 2015). This was a strategy that they did pursue and, in 1999, 
trials were ongoing or planned in NHL and multiple sclerosis (PR Newswire, 1999).  
This section has shown that despite the disruption caused by the license discontinuation 
by Wellcome, key individuals (mainly Waldmann in this instance) used their networks to 
find a new partner. This helped the project recover and continue smoothly. Campath was 
strategic for LeukoSite both in therapeutic area and in its role in readying the firm for 
stock-market floatation. Furthermore, the lack of capabilities of LeukoSite in oncology 
drug development was overcome by the initiation of the ILEX Oncology Joint Venture. 
These factors contribute towards the QCA score of ‘1’.  
7.2.7 Campath Conclusion 
In summary, several factors played a role in determining the success of Campath, 
overcoming issues contributing towards project drag and the Wellcome license 
discontinuation. Firstly, the collaboration between commercial partners, academic 
scientists and physicians was an important dynamic valued by those involved. 
Furthermore, the small biotech firm culture (in both Wellcome Biotech and LeukoSite) is 
more conducive to academia-collaborations, facilitating a productive environment 
between researchers involved.  
In addition, the consistency of the CAMPATH research group influenced the productivity 
of the project due to the accumulation of tacit knowledge aiding development and 
incremental innovations. The potential market size of the drug project also played a role 
in its development, as demonstrated by the discontinued license by Wellcome. However, 
this mainly lead to a delay where LeukoSite subsequently in-licensed the project. 
Campath demonstrated a case where research scientists, physicians, and managers 
retained a positive perspective around the ability for the project to yield a safe and 
effective drug for leukaemia.  
Low potential market demand was overcome by high expectations, from user groups and 
physicians, despite the uncertainty surrounding antibody technology (interviewee A). 
However, low market potential did not persist, with broader potential in further indication 
being realised during development. Furthermore, public funding by the MRC enabled a 
substantial amount of research to be undertaken without relying on industrial partners.  
7.3 Gemtuzumab Ozogamicin – Benefit/Risk Sharing  
Despite the categorisation of gemtuzumab (anti-CD33 MAb, CDP-771, CMA-676, 
Mylotarg, P-67) as a project initiated in a biotech firm (Celltech), the case shows 
similarities with plevitrexed. In this Celltech, like ICR, undertook much of the initial work 
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in discovery stages, with American Cyanamid (AC) taking on development when the 
project reached the clinic. However, the difference, lies in the profit- and cost-sharing 
agreement in gemtuzumab, as well the equity stake AC held in Celltech. This indicates 
that Celltech’s role in the gemtuzumab was more involved, than ICR in the case of 
plevitrexed.  
The issues facing gemtuzumab were: 1) low market potential, 2) novel and uncertain 
market, 3) novel and uncertain knowledge, 4) requirement of knowledge sharing between 
organisations in the Celltech/AC collaboration, and 5) vulnerability on Celltech’s part, to 
external industrial dynamics. Despite no key individual(s) the project did benefit from a 
productive relationship between Celltech and AC, facilitated by direct CEO interaction, 
and the mutual benefit of the project to both firms. This interaction facilitated the sharing 
of expectations, in a similar process to the activity of key individuals in the cases of 
nelarabine, Campath and temozolomide. Furthermore, for Celltech, gemtuzumab was a 
test bed opportunity providing proof of concept for the novel antibody-drug conjugate 
approach. It is likely, although not evidenced, that this aim for proof of concept, and 
positive expectation, was shared by AC due to the close working relationship between 
the two firms.  
In addition, the organisational environment surrounding gemtuzumab was facilitatory 
rather than inhibitory. Here, Celltech was a newly established firm benefiting from the 
hype characteristic of the UK biotech industry, in the early 1980s. Furthermore, AC was 
a more established, well known and profitable chemicals company that was not subject 
to the vulnerabilities seen in smaller firms. 
7.3.1 Interview sources 
Interviews were carried out with two individuals, interviewee I and interviewee K working 
at Celltech during the development of gemtuzumab. 
7.3.2 Introduction 
Gemtuzumab is an antibody conjugate112 comprising a humanized MAb, targeting the 
CD33 antigen, and the cytotoxic agent, calicheamicin, isolated from Micromonosporo 
echinosporo. The project began clinical development in the early 1990s, through a 
                                                 
 
112 Some distinguish between antibody-drug conjugates and antibody-toxin conjugates by only 
terming the latter as immunotoxins (Teicher and Chari 2011), however, others (including the 
Pharmaprojects database and Appelbaum 1999) use ‘immunotoxin’ to refer to both. In this thesis 
the distinction will be made, however, the similarities between the two approaches should also be 
appreciated.  
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collaboration between AC (USA) and Celltech (UK), and received approval in 2000 for 
the treatment of patients suffering from AML. 
 
1984 CD33 antigen identified 
1985 AC/Celltech agreement signed 
1987 Calicheamicin discovered in Texas 
1989 First immunotoxin (anti-CD25 single chain Fv and Pseudomonas exotoxin) 
produced 
1994 AC acquired by American Home Products (Wyeth) 
1995 Gemtuzumab Phase I/II trial initiated in USA 
1997 Phase I/II trial data reported; Pivotal Phase II/III trials initiated  
1998 Gemtuzumab Phase III trial preliminary results reported 
1999 NDA submitted 
2000 Gemtuzumab approved; Orphan drug status approved in Europe 
Table 26 Key events in development of gemtuzumab 
 
7.3.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 0) 
The knowledge base contributing towards the development of gemtuzumab can be 
traced to a discovery collaboration between the large US company, AC and a small UK 
biotechnology firm, Celltech.  
The discovery and early development of gemtuzumab involved identifying and combining 
three components, the mab targeting the CD33 antigen, the drug/toxin (in this case 
calicheamicin), and the linker. It is necessary that the linker is designed to be sufficiently 
stable not to release the drug into the body unpredictably, but weak enough to release 
the drug when antibody-antigen binding occurs on the tumour cell.  
Research surrounding the antigen target, CD33, goes back to 1987, when one 
publication mentioned that it was ‘potentially useful for myeloid leukaemia’ (van der 
Schoot et al., 1987). In addition, the specificity of CD33 to haematological malignancies 
was quantified as being present in 65-80% of myeloblastic patients (Caron and 
Scheinberg, 1994). By 2005 85-90% of AML cases were found to be CD33 positive 
(Linenberger, 2004). The well-researched nature of the drug target, CD33, is further 
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exemplified in a search for associated publications113, wherein 566 articles were found 
prior to, and including the year gemtuzumab entered clinical trials (1995).  
Despite this, and other research linking antigens to haematological malignancies (Griffin 
et al., 1984, Dinndorf et al., 1986), in 2004 one haematologist doubted the clinical 
significance of CD33 expression claiming that more research is needed (Linenberger, 
2004) It was Bernstein, at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center who led the 
CD33 target research directly contributing to the discovery of gemtuzumab. In this 
research Bernstein and colleagues (Bernstein et al., 1987, Bernstein et al., 1992) wanted 
to identify differentiation markers in myeloid cells. 
Serendipity was involved in the discovery of the drug conjugate, whereby calicheamicin 
was identified from a soil sample by scientists at Wyeth (AC) in the mid-1980s (Maiese 
et al., 1989, interviewee K). Upon isolating and investigation, the compound was found 
to have potent anti-tumour and anti-microbial activity (ibid). However, calicheamicin was 
too toxic to be useful as a monotherapy in cancer treatment (Bardi, 2001) 
To facilitate the use of calicheamicin as an anti-tumour agent, it was necessary to 
conjugate an antibody to the toxin to infer toxicity whilst targeting the CD33 antigen 
(interviewee I). A suitable antibody, P67.6, was found to also have the additional 
advantage of being rapidly and efficiently internalised into the cells expressing the CD33 
antigen (Hamann et al., 2001, Hamann et al., 2002). This conjugate was complemented 
in the collaboration between AC, who were developing calicheamicin production 
capabilities, and Celltech, who had antibody capabilities (Maiese et al., 1989), and the 
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, who had been working on CD33 and 
associated antibodies (Bernstein et al., 1987, Bernstein et al., 1992, Hamann et al., 2001, 
Hamann et al., 2002). However, this antibody was a mouse antibody requiring 
humanisation due to expected issues of immunogenicity. 
The introduction of mab technology, to target antigens, can be traced back to 1975 and 
the seminal work of Kohler and Milstein (Kohler and Milstein, 1975). Much of the work at 
this time was being carried out in the UK in Cambridge at the Medical Research Council-
funded Laboratory of Molecular Medicine, run by Milstein. In the early 1980s Celltech 
was working with the UK’s Medical Research Council (MRC) and had adopted 
                                                 
 
113 Search term used: (CD33) AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication] : "1995/31/12"[Date - 
Publication]) 
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capabilities in humanising mabs. Celltech were responsible for this task (humanisation) 
in the development of gemtuzumab (interviewee I).  
One of the major issues at this time was how to link the calicheamicin toxin and antibody. 
Researchers at both AC and Celltech worked to resolve this problem. This was time-
consuming due to the tendency for the ‘linker’, responsible for attaching calicheamicin 
and the antibody, to reduce the activity of the humanised antibody (interviewee K).  
Preclinical studies were undertaken indicating efficacy with minimal toxicity in solid and 
liquid tumours (Pharmaprojects). In 1994 phase I/II trials began in AML patients, with an 
expectation that the Product License Application would be filed in mid-1997 (Pharma 
Marketletter, 1993b). In the 1995 Celltech annual report initial results indicated that there 
were no significant side effects, gemtuzumab was well tolerated (Celltech Group PLC, 
1995).  
By the 1996 annual report, the first stage of the phase I/II trial was complete, concluding 
that the drug was well tolerated, with 2 complete responses and 3 partial responses, 
from a total of 36 refractory AML patients (Celltech Group PLC, 1996a, London Stock 
Exchange Aggregated Regulatory News Service, 1996). These were described as 
“encouraging” results of a “bullet type” drug, in the media (Extel Examiner, 1996). Of 
particular importance was the drug’s remarkable safety profile, compared with the high 
toxicities seen in the alternative AML therapies, which were often associated with death 
(Celltech Group PLC, 1996a). 
In response to these results, the second stage was planned to recruit 50 relapse patients 
over 10 US and Canadian centres (Celltech Group PLC, 1996a, London Stock Exchange 
Aggregated Regulatory News Service, 1996). It was expected that these trials would be 
used to support accelerated registration of the product (ibid). In addition, a European arm 
of the trial was planned (Celltech Group PLC, 1996b), as well as trials in other indications 
including ovarian (later initiated in 1997) and lung cancer (Extel Examiner, 1996).  
One phase II trial in 59 AML patients showed 36% of patients in remission, with an 
additional two supporting phase II showing closely comparable results of 36-44% 
remission rates (reported in 1999) (Celltech Group PLC, 1999). Despite these response 
rates being comparable to standard combination chemotherapy regimens, the improved 
safety profile provided sufficient evidence to support FDA accelerated approval for the 
treatment of patients age 60 or older with CD33 positive relapsed AML (Celltech Group 
PLC, 2000).  
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In 1998 reports indicated that a relatively small number of patients, just over 90, were 
ever treated with gemtuzumab in trials (Durman, 1998). From the FDA documentation 
upon submission a total of 156 patients114 are shown to have been treated with the drug, 
representing a small number providing the evidence base for approval.  
The novelty described in this section is mainly represented in the knowledge surrounding 
the target and how this relates to the drug and disease pathway. However, knowledge 
base for the primary indication was extensive, with 19,424115 publications found in the 
years leading up to gemtuzumab trials (up to and including 1993).  
In conclusion, the development of gemtuzumab involved a range of novel ideas, 
technologies and compounds accompanied by a high level of uncertainty. Difficulties 
were encountered, for instance, with the design of the linker molecule, demonstrating 
these uncertainties. This indicates that a relatively low level of accumulated, learned 
knowledge would have been ascertained during clinical development of the drug. This 
justifies the QCA score of ‘0’.  
7.3.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
As with most antibodies, the indications gemtuzumab could be applied to were limited 
by the specificity of the target antigen. In this case CD33 was known to be present on 
certain leukaemic cells, with 65-80% of myeloblastic leukaemia patients showing 
expression of the antigen (Caron and Scheinberg, 1994, interviewee I). This presents a 
small potential market demand for gemtuzumab where it would only be applicable to 
certain types of myeloblastic leukaemia.  
Preclinical development of gemtuzumab was undertaken in both solid and 
haematological tumours (Pharmaprojects) with higher efficacy found in haematological 
malignancies. All subsequent trials were carried out in AML, and included paediatric and 
adult patients (Sievers et al., 1998, Sievers et al., 1999a, Sievers et al., 1999b, Sievers 
et al., 2000, Voliotis et al., 2000, Leopold et al., 2003, Appelbaum, 1999, de Vetten et al., 
2000). In 1993, AML incidence was around 35,000 new cases per annum with 80% 
relapse rate in the first 18 months in surviving patients (Pharma Marketletter, 1993a). 
Furthermore, AML treatments at the time were limited to non-specific cytotoxins that 
were highly toxic with severe side effects.  
                                                 
 
114 www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2000/21174_MYLOTARG_medr.pdf 
115 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Leukemia, Myeloid, 
Acute’ as a search term in PubMed. 
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Despite the rare cancer primary indication and associated small market potential, 
gemtuzumab development fulfilled the Celltech strategy emphasising areas of unmet 
need. As per their 1993 annual report: ‘Celltech concentrates on those diseases where 
there is both an unmet medical need and either a large patient population or prospects 
for reducing mortality significantly’ (Celltech Group PLC, 1993). This strategy is also 
associated with the potential for achieving high prices: ‘if CDP771 [gemtuzumab] can 
demonstrate a significant increase in life expectancy, it could gain wide market 
acceptance despite a high price’, considering alternative AML treatments at that time 
were expensive and ineffective (ibid). Furthermore, competitors in AML were scarce: 
‘ImmunoGen and Protein Design Labs, are in early clinical development with conjugates 
which target the same antigen as CDP771’. However, they also claim that gemtuzumab 
was distinctive due to it novel approach involving an antibody and proprietary cytotoxic 
drug, calicheamicin (Celltech Group PLC, 1993). 
The gemtuzumab market potential was quantified in media reports. In early years of the 
collaboration between AC and Celltech the market for mab-based products was 
expected to be valued at $300m or around 15% of a $2bn market by 1995 (PR Newswire, 
1986). For instance, in the year prior to approval of gemtuzumab sales were predicted 
to stand at $250m within four years (Durman, 1999). Another estimate presented 
expected annual earnings to be at least $150m (The Independent, 1999). Despite these 
estimations motivating industry analysts to recommend investment into Celltech as a 
“strong buy” (Durman, 1999) they do not present gemtuzumab as a potential blockbuster. 
This indicates a limited market potential for gemtuzumab despite its orphan drug status 
granted in Europe in the same year the project was approved 2000 (Pharma Marketletter, 
2000b).  
This section has shown that gemtuzumab was developed for a small patient population, 
(limited by its CD33 target) and press reports claiming that the drug would achieve 
relatively low revenue status. This is despite the potential for gemtuzumab to command 
a high price and the granting of orphan drug status. This justifies the ‘0’ QCA score.  
7.3.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 1) 
Expectations of gemtuzumab, from the scientific investigators at the organisations 
involved in discovery and development, were high (interviewees I and K). This is 
influenced by the novelty of the technology area, where immunotoxins and antibody-drug 
conjugates presented a new strategy (Pastan, 2003).  
Furthermore, firm expectations of the project were high. In particular, Celltech anticipated 
that gemtuzumab was going to be their first clinical project, at a time when they were 
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expecting to expand into drug discovery and development, as opposed to their previous 
focus on provision of contract research services (interviewee I). 
In addition, newspaper articles report at least three patient stories which contribute 
towards a positive public perception of the drug. For instance in 1999, a patient receiving 
the drug as part of a trial garnered support, in the form of donations, to pay for continued 
treatment after funding was refused (Minneci, 1999). Another story reports a plea for 
support from the public to pay for transportation and treatment of other medical problems, 
by a couple whose son, suffering from AML, was being treated with gemtuzumab 
(Thompson, 2000). The final patient story in 1999 reported an 11 year-old boy who had 
qualified for treatment on a gemtuzumab trial (United Press International, 1999).  
All of these reports appear in newspapers and serve to provide a positive public 
perception for gemtuzumab, where patients are desperate to keep receiving treatment 
of the yet unapproved drug. In addition to public and industry support for the drug, the 
fact that it received accelerated approval also indicates that the FDA had high 
expectations that the drug would fulfil a previously unmet need. These factors justify the 
membership of the project into the set positive stakeholder perspective and therefore the 
QCA score ‘1’. 
7.3.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 1) 
The development of gemtuzumab began with a three-way collaboration involving AC an 
established US manufacturing firm, the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, a 
well-known and respected US research institute, and Celltech, a small UK biotechnology 
company founded in 1980 and specialising in antibody drug discovery and development. 
The collaborations came together through the discovery of gemtuzumab, however AC 
(Subsequently American Home Products, then Wyeth) was responsible for clinical 
development. The collaboration between AC and Celltech began before the identification 
of gemtuzumab as a potential cancer drug. This collaboration came in the wake of the 
1981 proclamation that AC was increasing R&D in therapeutics, particularly in arthritis 
and oncology (Chemical Week, 1981), with an increasing in R&D, in 1983, by 10-15% 
(Chemical Week, 1983). This implies that AC were focusing down more on oncology and 
investing substantially into increasing their R&D activities, including in the development 
of gemtuzumab. 
The Celltech/AC collaboration, initiated in 1986, initially involved 3 compounds, including 
gemtuzumab, on a contract research basis involving 3 compounds (interviewee I, PR 
Newswire, 1986, Pharma Marketletter, 1995a). This agreement was ‘to develop a new 
approach to antibody cancer imaging and therapy using “second generation” mabs... 
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Celltech will design purpose-built molecules which will “engineer-out” the undesirable 
characteristics of the mab and its linked agent’ (PR Newswire, 1986). At this time 
Celltech’s network of UK and US scientists was an important factor in attracting AC 
(Celltech Group PLC, 1986b). Furthermore, the AC Deputy Managing Director, David 
Lilly comments: 
“Celltech’s pioneering approach will reinforce our work in cancer therapy, leading to 
products that should be more precisely targeted and hence more efficacious and 
with fewer side effects than today’s treatments. The research and development 
capability from the agreement, coupled with our proven marketing skills, will ensure 
commercial success of this venture” (Celltech Group PLC, 1986b) 
This agreement entailed £5m funding from for initial research for 2 years, minimum, with 
provision for continuing work, licensing fees and royalties (Celltech Group PLC, 1986a). 
At this time AC were big players in the chemicals market with over 2,500 products and 
1985 sales of $3.53bn (Celltech Group PLC, 1986a). Furthermore, the UK R&D arm of 
AC, Lederle Labs, had extensive experience of developing cancer drugs including 
methotrexate, vincristine and cisplatin, accounting for over half of the overall spending 
on R&D of the parent company, amounting to $200m (Celltech Group PLC, 1986a).  
When Peter Fellner joined Celltech as CEO, in 1990 the terms of the agreement were 
renegotiated, with Celltech becoming a more active partner and the introduction of a 
cost-sharing aspect between the two companies (interviewee I). This built on Celltech’s 
capabilities in antibodies, established through collaborations with the MRC (interviewee 
I) and reflected the desire, by the Celltech board, to expand into drug discovery and 
development (ibid). At this point AC wanted to give Celltech an opportunity to manage 
the project and gain leadership experience in the discovery and development of an 
oncology drug, and AC wanted to learn from a newer biotechnology company, Celltech 
(interviewee I).  
In addition, Celltech was using gemtuzumab as a test bed for adapting the technology 
more widely in other types of cancers. The project was described as ‘very important as 
a test of Celltech’s research in turning human antibodies into drugs’ (Clark, 2000). In 
addition, a failure of another Celltech drug in the portfolio, in 1997 (described as an 
“annus horribilis”), implied that the success of gemtuzumab was critical to the survival of 
the company (Pharma Marketletter, 1997b, Pharma Marketletter, 1997a). 
Another aspect contributing to the project’s success was the close cooperative 
relationship between the two CEOs (at Celltech and AC) (interviewee I). In addition, the 
Celltech’s organisational environment was positive, involving an ‘inclusive management 
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style’, with young researchers working in a creative and encouraging culture (interviewee 
I). These interpersonal factors would be expected to have a significant positive effect on 
the development gemtuzumab. 
Celltech leadership of the project continued until the completion of discovery and 
preclinical work, at which point clinical development passed to AC. At this time (in 
1994/95) AC was acquired by American Home Products (later Wyeth). This move was 
associated with a distancing between them and the clinical team in the USA (interviewee 
I). Furthermore, upon acquisition AC lost around 300 employees (Pharma Marketletter, 
1994). However, American Home Products were described as being motivated by a 
desire to increase their medical pipeline (Randall and Fix, 1994), with the chairman, John 
R Stafford, stating that the merger would allow them to ‘strengthen its role in cancer 
drugs’ (Freudenheim, 1994), indicating a strategic role of gemtuzumab despite the 
merger. This is echoed by interviewee K where an appreciation of the project by the 
acquiring company is observed. Furthermore, a Celltech representative remained 
present on the clinical committee for gemtuzumab.  
The AC and Celltech collaboration represents strong inter-organisational synergy, and a 
mutually beneficial relationship. This was supported by the profit/cost-sharing nature of 
the agreement and the equity investment AC had in Celltech. In addition, the level of 
interpersonal contact, and cooperation also had a significant positive effect on the 
development and progression of gemtuzumab. Each firm had its own internal motivation 
for enabling the uninterrupted development of the project, driven in part by expectations 
about the technology, but also about favourable strategies. For these reasons 
gemtuzumab has membership into the set supportive organisational environment, 
scoring ‘1’ in QCA.  
7.3.7 Gemtuzumab Conclusion 
The low expectation of the potential market for gemtuzumab and the novelty of the 
knowledge base supporting its development were overcome by three main factors. Firstly, 
the high expectations of the drug and the new technological modality it implemented. 
Secondly, the effective and productive collaborative environment that surrounded 
development and thirdly the ambition for the drug to provide proof of concept for the 
therapeutic approach. These conditions surrounding the project clearly contributed 
towards the successful outcome of gemtuzumab.  
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7.4 Banoxantrone – Moving Organisations with Different Priorities 
Banoxantrone (AQ4N) development arose from a collaboration between a lab at 
Leicester Polytechnic/De Montfort University and BTG, who were, at the time, 
responsible for commercialising university technology. Banoxantrone initially benefitted 
from BTG funding, high potential market demand, high expectations, and a supportive 
academic research team.  
However, issues contributing towards the demise of the project included: 1) difficulties in 
knowledge transfer between organisations and lack of molecular understanding of the 
drug’s mechanism of action, 2) the need to combine the drug with radiation and the 
implication of this on market demand, 3) lack of user support due to an unusual patient 
side-effect, 4) AZ and KuDOS lack of organisational and strategic fit, and 5) vulnerability 
of small firms to industry dynamics.  
When the project passed to KuDOS communication and coordination breakdown 
between industry partners and the academic team, and banoxantrone was no longer 
prioritised. In response KuDOS out-licensed, initially North American rights, with 
worldwide rights following, to Novacea, a US company. Initially this was a positive 
development for the project. However later Novacea was forced to merge with Transcept 
due to a failure of another project in their portfolio, and thereby returned the 
banoxantrone rights to BTG.  
These factors not only contributed towards project drag and eventual termination of the 
project but we also observe the breakdown of protected spaces upon the 
Novacea/Transcept merger. As highlighted in this case history collective expectations 
surrounding the project were positive while at Novacea, however, the re-evaluation of 
the project upon acquisition, arose from a breakdown of these uncovered the 
accumulated project drag, and subsequent termination.  
7.4.1 Interview sources 
Interviews were carried out with individuals involved in the drug discovery and 
development process, email correspondence Y and interviewee H.  
7.4.2 Introduction 
Banoxantrone is a prodrug developed to treat brain cancer. Discovered by a research 
team at Leicester Polytechnic/De Montfort University, banoxantrone was licensed to 
KuDOS (later acquired by AZ) subsequently passing to Novacea. Banoxantrone was 
discontinued in 2008 when Novacea was acquired by Transcept. 
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1990 BTG license to fund development of banoxantrone  
1991 First anti-cancer patents taken out mentioning Patterson as inventor 
1993 First publication mentioning AQ4N (banoxantrone) by Patterson 
1996 Carmustine implant approved as adjuvant therapy for glioma patients 
1998 BTG initiate banoxantrone Phase I trial with Cancer Research UK 
1999 Approval of temozolomide for recurrent glioblastoma 
2001 NICE approval of temozolomide 
2002 KuDOS license of banoxantrone from BTG 
2003 North American rights licensed to Novacea (by KuDOS) 
2004 Additional Phase I carried out by Novacea 
2006 KuDOS acquired by AZ 
2007 Novacea expand license to worldwide rights; ALL Phase II initiated by Novacea 
2008 Novacea merges with Transcept; AQ4N is discontinued 
Table 27 Key events in development of banoxantrone 
 
7.4.3 Knowledge Base (QCA score = 0) 
Banoxantrone is a prodrug activated in the presence of low oxygen levels (hypoxic) in 
tumour cells. The existence of hypoxia in tumours was first suggested by researchers in 
the 1950s (Thomlinson and Gray, 1955). Early research demonstrated that hypoxic 
regions of tumours are resistant to radiotherapy and some chemotherapies, highlighting 
an area of unmet need in cancer therapeutics (Singh et al., 2008). It was not until the 
1970s that prodrugs were designed to be hypoxia-activated, to produce a cytotoxin (Lin 
et al., 1972, McKeown et al., 2007).  
This stream of research was picked up by Laurence Patterson. As a PhD researcher, 
Patterson had studied the deactivation of drugs through drug metabolism, before working 
in the pharmaceutical industry on the safety of drugs, returning to academia the School 
of Pharmacy at Leicester Polytechnic (later, De Montfort University) (interviewee H). 
Patterson’s multi-disciplinary team of researchers went on to identify AQ4N 
(banoxantrone), the first anticancer molecule in the anthraquinone class of bioreductive 
agents (McKeown et al., 2007).  
Prior to this the only other bioreductive agent progressing clinically, was tirapazamine, a 
benzotriazine derivative which had entered trials in the USA in 1994 (Doherty et al., 1994, 
McKeown et al., 2007). Despite tirapazamine seemingly providing a potential competitor, 
it was not perceived as a threat by the inventors due to the distinct difference between 
the two classes of compounds. Banoxantrone was distinct from tirapazamine due to the 
migration of effects of the bioreduced active drug to cells adjacent to those in the hypoxia 
region (interviewee H). Furthermore, tirapazamine provided proof of concept for 
banoxantrone, commercially and scientifically justifying the project (interviewee H).  
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Banoxantrone acted through its reduction, under hypoxic conditions, to the cytotoxin, 
AQ4, an analogue of mitoxantrone, the commonly used chemotherapeutic, (first 
approved AML in 1987 (Fox, 2004). Mitoxantrone acted to inhibit topoisomerase II, 
disrupting cell division and DNA synthesis and repair (McKeown et al., 2007). Additional 
drugs previously approved targeting topoisomerase II target include commonly used 
cytotoxins such as etoposide (FDA approved pre-1984), doxorubicin (FDA approved pre-
1984), and daunorubicin (FDA approved in 1987) (Hande, 2008). This demonstrates 
validation of the banoxantrone target and is further supported wherein 1,905 articles 
were found mentioning ‘topoisomerase’116 prior to, and including the year banoxantrone 
entered clinical trials.  
Whilst topoisomerase II inhibitors were efficacious, the high levels of normal tissue 
toxicities they produced was problematic (ibid). By specifically targeting tumour cells in 
hypoxic regions, banoxantrone overcame toxicity issues whilst maintaining efficacy. 
Banoxantrone preclinical studies were funded by BTG, with additional animal model 
research undertaken by Stephanie McKeown and David Hirst at the University of Ulster, 
funded by the Ulster Cancer Foundation and the CRC (e.g. (Patterson, 1993, McKeown 
et al., 1995, Hejmadi et al., 1996). These studies showed that the drug was ‘significantly 
better in their experimental systems than the leading drug in the USA tirapazamine’ 
(1998). At this time the scientists working on banoxantrone had high expectations of the 
project describing the work as ‘potentially a major breakthrough’ (McIntyre, 2001).  
In 2001 (the year prior to the KuDOS license) in response to encouraging preclinical 
toxicology results a phase I trial was initiated in oesophageal carcinoma patients (BTG, 
2001). Funded by BTG, organised by the CRC, this trial took place at Leicester Royal 
Infirmary and the Imperial Cancer Research Fund’s unit at the Churchill Hospital, Oxford 
(ibid). This trial showed favourable pharmacokinetics, with the drug being well tolerated 
and no drug-related adverse events reported (Steward et al., 2007). In 2004 Novacea 
initiated additional phase I trials, in the USA, in a range of solid tumours and NHL 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2008). These demonstrated that maximum tolerated dose and 
dose-limiting toxicity had not been reached at the maximum administered dose of 
480mg/kg (ibid), over twice the dose required to elicit a response in human tumours 
                                                 
 
116  Search term used: ("topoisomerases") AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication] : 
"1998/31/12"[Date - Publication]) 
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xenografted in mice (interviewee H). Additional trials were undertaken in 2006 for 
glioblastoma and in 2007 for ALL (Novacea, 2007b, Novacea, 2006b). 
During the period 2003-2007 separate development plans were undertaken in the UK 
(KuDOS/AZ) and USA (Novacea), however, these fed into each other in the form of a 
data sharing agreement. By 2006, four phase I trials had been completed showing that 
banoxantrone was well tolerated in solid and B-cell malignancies (Novacea, 2006a). 
These trials also validated the banoxantrone mechanism of action, with activated AQ4 
found in hypoxic tumour regions and a direct relationship observed between levels of 
tumour hypoxia and the concentration of active drug (Albertella et al., 2008). Indeed the 
drug did show a ‘favourable safety profile’ with ‘the most notable side effect’ being ‘a 
transient blue discoloration to the patients’ skin’ (Novacea, 2006a). 
Despite the strong banoxantrone knowledge base, at the early stages of the project there 
was lack of molecular understanding of cells experiencing hypoxia. Indeed, the 
hypothesis that hypoxia was associated with tumour cells was based on practical 
evidence from radiologists not biomolecular evidence (interviewee H). This would was 
resolved with the proof of concept study published in 2008 (Albertella et al., 2008), 
however, this was late on in development of the drug. 
Further evidence of the lack of knowledge available to support the development of 
banoxantrone, relates to the knowledge base in its indication. In the primary indication 
for which banoxantrone was being developed, glioblastoma, only 5,201117 articles were 
published in the years preceding trials (up to and including 2000). This indicates a 
relatively sparse knowledge base, when compared with, for instance, the knowledge 
base accumulated during the same period for AML (25,139), and, although less 
pronounced, the knowledge base surrounding renal cell carcinoma which stood at 6,794. 
This evidence indicates that there was a strong knowledge base for the development of 
banoxantrone, however, this was problematic due to the lack of molecular understanding 
of the drug mechanism until late on in drug development. Banoxantrone is categorised 
as having non-membership into the set extensive and accumulated knowledge base. 
7.4.4 Market Demand (QCA score = 0) 
Despite Pharmaprojects reporting the banoxantrone primary indication as brain cancer 
trials were undertaken in a variety of tumour types. The first, funded by BTG and 
                                                 
 
117 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Glioblastoma’ as a 
search term in PubMed. 
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organised by Cancer Research Campaign (CRC) (part of Cancer Research UK) involved 
22 patients suffering from oesophageal cancer (Steward et al., 2007, interviewee H). 
Subsequent trials tested the drug in advanced solid malignancies, lymphomas, ALL and 
brain cancer (Albertella et al., 2008, Papadopoulos et al., 2008, Benghiat et al., 2004, 
Sarantopoulos et al., 2006, Furman et al., 2006, Novacea, 2006b, Novacea, 2007b). The 
large market expectation of banoxantrone stemmed from the hypoxic characteristic of a 
‘large majority’ of tumours (Novacea, 2006b) contributing to the ‘significant potential’ in 
a ‘broad range of potential indications’ (Novacea, 2003).  
However, this was countered due to the need for banoxantrone to be used to enhance 
the effects of radiation (Novacea, 2003, interviewee H). Although hypoxic cells are found 
in a range of tumour types, within tumours only a portion of cells are hypoxic and other 
approaches are required to treat the non-hypoxic cells (McKeown et al., 2007).  
In terms of competition, brain tumours were known to be a particular area of unmet 
clinical need, as highlighted by Novacea in their 2006 annual report, where glioblastoma 
is described as ‘aggressive’ with a ‘relatively small patient population and [a] lack of 
effective therapies’ (Novacea, 2006a). Indeed, this unmet need was one of the 
motivations, alongside the positive phase I results, that contributed towards the Novacea 
strategy to accelerate drug development as a first line therapy in glioblastoma. However, 
with the approval of the carmustine implant and temozolomide the glioblastoma market 
became more competitive (ibid).  
Despite the focus on glioblastoma Novacea continued to emphasise the broad utility of 
banoxantrone. For instance, in 2007 John Walker, chairman and CEO states: 
“the extensive pre-clinical and clinical data to date gives us confidence in the 
significant opportunity AQ4N [banoxantrone] presents as an anti-cancer agent in 
multiple tumor types and haematological malignancies” (Novacea, 2007a).  
External observers were not so optimistic for the market potential of banoxantrone. For 
instance, Evolution Securities, the investment bank, predicted that the drug could 
generate sales of $250m (Hume, 2005). This shows that, despite the large potential of 
banoxantrone in its application to a variety of tumours, potential sales indicated low 
expectations of the product. 
However, this should be considered in the context of differing levels of revenues 
expected depending on the organisational context of the firm. Banoxantrone was initially 
developed by small companies, KuDOS and Novacea, who may have accepted smaller 
revenues, however, ultimately AZ discontinued the project. It is not unreasonable to 
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assume that one of the reasons for the lack of AZ interest in the project stemmed from 
the lack of worldwide rights to the project, as North American rights were sold to Novacea 
three years previously (see Table 27) (interviewee H).  
This summary of the market issues surrounding banoxantrone demonstrate its broad 
applicability in cancer indications. However, the necessity for it to be used in combination 
with radiation limited the market the drug could demand and predicted sales were small. 
This justifies the non-membership into the set high market demand, and therefore the 
QCA score ‘0’. 
7.4.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 0) 
Banoxantrone was developed in the context of high expectations from the scientists 
involved, as highlighted above. In addition, media reports also exemplify this with the 
project described as ‘potentially a major breakthrough’ by the scientists involved 
(McIntyre, 2001, Erwin, 2001). In addition Novacea report ‘significant potential’ for the 
drug (Novacea, 2006a), and ‘experts’ label the drug ‘one of the most important 
breakthroughs in recent years’, (Gould, 2001). Other observers describe the drug as 
‘revolutionary’ (Irish News, 2002, McCavana, 2002) and ‘one to keep an eye on in the 
future’ (Burke, 2005).  
Additional expectations from the companies responsible for drug development are 
evidenced in their actions. At BTG this was exemplified by the unusual decision by BTG 
to fund the phase I trial (unusual because BTG did not frequently invest in early stage 
projects). Indeed in this thesis, despite the frequent involvement of BTG in projects that 
stemmed from academic research, in Campath, plevitrexed and Prolarix, there is no 
other evidence, with the exception of banoxantrone, of BTG funding clinical trials118.  
At Novacea John Curd (Novacea Chief Medical Officer at the time) considered 
banoxantrone a ‘breakthrough drug’, believing in the mechanism so strongly that he also 
championed another bioreductive agent, currently in phase III trials (interviewee H). 
Furthermore, even when Novacea began to step back their banoxantrone development 
programme, they still hoped to reinitiate the ALL study in the future (Cancer Drug News, 
2008). Furthermore, high expectations were projected recently, in retrospect: 
                                                 
 
118 Upon investigation of the funders mentioned in the acknowledgement sections of clinical trial 
publications.  
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‘banoxantrone, showed promise but work dwindled when owner Novacea was brought 
down by other clinical failures in 2008’ (AmyB, 2012).  
However, a patient and clinician perspective of banoxantrone centred on the notable side 
effect of the drug, a blue discolouration of patients’ skin (Novacea, 2006a). Despite this 
being the only significant side effect (interviewee H) and that patients did not show direct 
reluctance, clinicians were apprehensive of this (email correspondence Y).  
This evidence indicates that a broad range of observers, as well as those involved in the 
development of the drug itself, had positive expectations of the potential for the project. 
However, the issue around the blue colouration side effect was a negative stakeholder 
view in a critical constituency, namely clinicians. Therefore, banoxantrone cannot be 
classified as a member of the set positive stakeholder perspectives and scores ‘0’ in the 
QCA.  
7.4.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 0) 
BTG’s involvement in drug development at this time was to aid the transfer of technology 
from academia to industry for commercialisation. In banoxantrone BTG became involved 
in the early stages and helped fund preclinical work, and a phase I trial. This support was 
in conjunction with funding from Ulster University and CRC. Subsequent to this KuDOS, 
a small UK therapeutics firm, licensed the project in 2002. 
KuDOS, a spinout from Cambridge University, was founded in 1998 ‘to discover and 
commercialise novel drugs that target exciting new developments in DNA repair for the 
treatment of cancer and other diseases’ (KuDOS Pharmaceuticals, 1999). With this 
cancer focus, the banoxantrone license was synergistic for KuDOS. KuDOS was 
motivated to take on the license to fill a gap in their pipeline by providing them with their 
first clinical stage product (email correspondence Y).  
In May 1999 KuDOS received their first financing from venture capitalists amounting to 
£5m (KuDOS Pharmaceuticals, 1999). In 2002, the same year as the banoxantrone 
license, KuDOS received additional funding of £29.5m (KuDOS Pharmaceuticals, 2002). 
At this time the KuDOS pipeline also included PaTrin-2, a cancer therapeutic to enhance 
the efficacy of DNA-alkylating cytotoxins, licensed from Cancer Research Technology 
(CRT) late in 2002 (ibid). This supports the fit of banoxantrone in the KuDOS pipeline.  
In 2003 another licensing agreement is taken out with Novacea, for North American 
rights to develop and commercialise banoxantrone (KuDOS Pharmaceuticals, 2003). 
Novacea was a small private company developing drugs for unmet needs in oncology 
and haematological conditions (Novacea, 2003). In 2003 Novacea had one additional 
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anticancer drug in late stage trials for advanced prostate and non-small cell lung cancer 
(ibid).  
Novacea were committed to the development of banoxantrone, so when KuDOS was 
acquired by AZ in 2006, Novacea negotiated with AZ to acquire banoxantrone worldwide 
development and commercialisation rights (Novacea, 2007a). Due to the lack of North 
American rights to banoxantrone, the drug did not hold sufficient value for AZ 
(interviewee H) and so worldwide rights were transferred to Novacea. In addition, 
banoxantrone was not central to motivating the AZ, where KuDOS’s oral poly-ADP-
ribose polymerase (PARP) inhibitors and platform technology were the reason for 
acquisition (KuDOS Pharmaceuticals, 2005).  
Little evidence of the interactions between KuDOS and Novacea has been identified, 
throughout the licensing agreements. However, Novacea did have particular interest in 
the discovery and development work that had preceded their license (interviewee H). 
This enthusiasm, for the science behind the project, is exemplified in the proof-of-concept 
trial undertaken at Novacea (Albertella et al., 2008) and the three presentations they 
announced at the 2005 American Association for Cancer Research Meeting (Novacea, 
2005a).  
Banoxantrone was described as representing ‘a promising product opportunity for 
Novacea’, and one that ‘leverages [Novacea’s] existing expertise in oncology and 
haematology and fits strategically with our focus on therapies that address unmet needs 
in cancer’ (Novacea, 2005b). In this trans-Atlantic licensing agreement, it may have been 
difficult to continue a relationship between the researchers in the UK, who were 
previously involved in early stage discovery, development and trials, and the new USA 
researchers. Furthermore, in the UK, banoxantrone did benefit from having at least two 
project key individuals, Patterson and McKeown which may have contributed towards its 
early success. In addition, during KuDOS phase I trials, Professor Chris Twelves may 
have played a role in championing the project (interviewee H).  
Novacea announced in 2006 that they would focus their resources on the development 
of their two anti-cancer leads, including banoxantrone. In addition, at this time they 
gained the worldwide rights to the project from AZ (Novacea, 2006c). However, in the 
subsequent years the firm suffered failure of their other phase III cancer drug (Market 
Wire, 2008), and were left with only banoxantrone in their pipeline. Despite having 
sufficient funds in the bank to continue development Novacea merged with Transcept 
who returned the banoxantrone license to BTG (Novacea, 2009, interviewee H). 
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This chronology of firms through which the development of banoxantrone passed 
exemplifies that, although initial development was smooth, the difficult environment 
surrounding small firms was ultimately the reason for project termination. Although 
banoxantrone was central to KuDOS’s strategy, financial difficulties forced the firm to 
out-license North American rights to the project. When AZ acquired KuDOS they did not 
show interest in the drug. This may not have been terminal for the drug as Novacea 
remained enthusiastic, however when they suffered pipeline issues the difficult 
organisational environment led to project termination. This justifies the QCA score ‘0’ 
indicating non-membership into the set supportive organisational environment.  
7.4.7 Banoxantrone Conclusion 
The early years of banoxantrone were positive and smooth. Initially market demand 
potential of banoxantrone were positive, with a broad set of indications the drug explored. 
However, the need to combine the drug with radiotherapy or conventional 
chemotherapeutics, implied a decline in its expected market demand and media reports 
a low level of potential peak sales. 
The organisational environment of banoxantrone development and the involvement of 
small companies led to financial difficulties, resulting in the division of the worldwide 
rights. This diminished the attractiveness of the project to AZ when they took on 
responsibility for development. In addition, pipeline pressures, particularly while at 
Novacea, led to the eventual termination of the drug. Furthermore, the blue 
discolouration of patients treated with the drug led to negative users’ perspectives, 
contributing to project discontinuation. Another aspect explored here that contributed 
towards the discontinuation of the development of banoxantrone is the lack of molecular 
understanding of the drug’s mechanism of action, with development being based on 
practical/experiential knowledge until 2008.  
The ‘downers’ mentioned here accumulated throughout drug development, instigating  
project drag, which surfaced when the protected space surrounding the project is broken 
down, upon the Novacea merger with Transcept.  
7.5 TransMID – Complex History of Transactions 
In a similar pattern to banoxantrone, the case history of TransMID demonstrates a 
complex web of firms responsible for progressing development, in collaboration with the 
NINDS at NIH. This contributed towards a lengthy and prolonged process implying 
potential appropriability issues.  
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In addition, these transactions led to changing priorities, business models and strategies 
in the firms developing TransMID. For instance, when development shifted to the UK, 
from the USA in the early 2000s, in-licensed by KS Biomedix, the motivation came from 
a risk-mitigation strategy. However, although transactions surrounding the project 
occurred, in contrast to banoxantrone, it was only the management responsibility and 
not the research group that changed. This implies that, although turbulent, the knowledge 
accumulation surrounding the project is likely to have been consistent. 
However, KS Biomedix and Xenova, ran into financial difficulties and could not support 
the expensive late stage TransMID. This led to the eventual acquisition of Xenova by 
Celtic who concluded insufficient commercial viability of TransMID. In a similar pattern 
to that seen in the development of banoxantrone, TransMID exemplifies the impact that 
vulnerabilities to the external environment can have on smaller firms. 
As was the case in banoxantrone, these issues contributed towards the accumulation of 
project drag through TransMID’s development. However, due to the action of the 
protected space surrounding the project, particularly while at KS Biomedix and Xenova, 
these issues lie latent. This breaks down when the project is taken on by Celtic whereby 
new evaluation criteria are implemented leading to project termination.  
7.5.1 Interview sources 
Two interviews were carried out to inform this case history, herein referred to as 
interviewee D and interviewee E.  
7.5.2 Introduction 
TransMID (ZR-311, CRM107, KSB-311) is an immunotoxin comprised of transferrin 
linked to the diphtheria toxin, developed to treat glioblastoma multiforme patients. The 
project stems from a discovery at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (USA), and was 
developed by a series of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. Development of 
the drug was discontinued in 2007, reportedly for economic reasons.  
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1989 First immunotoxin (anti-CD25 single chain Fv and Pseudomonas exotoxin) 
produced 
1994 Sterling Winthrop licensed TransMID to Nycomed 
1996 Carmustine implant approved as adjuvant to surgery in glioma patients 
1997 Nycomed acquired Amersham; First trial results reported by NINDS (NIH) 
1999 Approval of temozolomide (competitor) for recurrent glioblastoma 
2000 Nycomed Amersham out-license TransMID to Avicenna; Phase II trial  
2001 Avicenna acquired by KS Biomedix; NICE approval of competitor 
temozolomide; KS Biomedix receive fast track and orphan drug status for 
TransMID 
2003 KS Biomedix acquired by Xenova 
2004 TransMID Phase III trial initiated by Xenova 
2005 Xenova acquired by Celtic 
2007 Celtic discontinue development of TransMID 
Table 28 Key events in development of TransMID 
 
7.5.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 0) 
The research contributing to TransMID development began at the National Institute of 
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) (part of the NIH, USA). 
TransMID is an immunotoxin comprised of a receptor targeting molecule conjugated to 
a toxin.  
In TransMID, work on the receptor targeting molecule began the 1950s, when 
publications appear mentioning transferrin and its function as a glycoprotein responsible 
for controlling the level of iron in biological fluids (Laurell, 1951). The established nature 
of the knowledge surrounding the target, transferrin119 is demonstrated in the number of 
associated articles found, amounting to 14,352. 
However, this work was picked up by Ian Trowbridge at the Salk Institute for Biological 
Studies (California), who in 1981 reported a renewed interest in transferrin, and 
associated antibodies, stemming from the new mab technique developed by Kohler and 
Milstein in the 1970s (Trowbridge and Domingo, 1981). This research resulted in the 
discovery of an antibody to bind to the transferrin receptor on tumour cells. This was 
further developed whereby the transferrin antibody was conjugated to both the ricin and 
diphtheria toxins showing anti-tumour activity (ibid).  
It was the NINDS that demonstrated that transferrin (the antibody) could be selective for 
central nervous system and brain tumours (interviewee D). However, the delivery of the 
                                                 
 
119 Search term used: (transferrin) AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication] : "1995/31/12"[Date - 
Publication]) 
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product into the brain was problematic, whereby the blood-brain barrier is a common 
issue in administering large molecules, such as antibodies (interviewee D). This was 
resolved using a delivery technology called intratumoural convection-enhanced delivery 
(CED) infusion that pumped the molecule into the tumour (Bobo et al., 1994, Weaver 
and Laske, 2003). However, this delivery method, and the placement of the pump was 
novel and difficult (interviewee E), requiring the accumulated tacit knowledge of the 
physicians involved.  
Preclinical studies showed efficacy and safety in tumour models. In response, a phase I 
trial was designed as a single centre, dose-escalating single arm phase I trial and carried 
out at the NIH (Weaver and Laske, 2003, Laske et al., 1997). 18 adult patients were 
treated, nine showing partial response, defined by ≥50% decrease in enhancing volume 
of the treated tumour, and two showing complete response, defined as disappearance 
of all solid areas of enhancement of the tumour, with no severe neurologic or systemic 
toxicity (Weaver and Laske, 2003).  
In 2000 a multicentre phase II was initiated involving 44 patients (Weaver and Laske, 
2003). Of the 34 patients that were evaluable for tumour response 5 complete responses 
and 7 partial responses were found (responses in 35% of patients) (ibid). These results 
validated the Phase I studies and justified the use of TransMID as a glioma drug (ibid). 
Phase II results were presented in October 2002 (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2002e), 
however, it took until 2004 for the phase III trial design to be approved and initiated. Here, 
the KS Biomedix design was previously, however, when acquired by Xenova the design 
was adapted requiring further approval (Xenova Group plc, 2004a). The trial was set up 
to recruit 323 patients (Xenova Group plc, 2004c), however enrolment was limited by 
strict eligibility criteria, and by May 2006 only 104 patients had been enrolled across 56 
sites worldwide (Vrazo, 2006).  
So far this section has demonstrated the problematic discovery stages of TransMID 
where high levels of uncertainty and problem solving were required, undertaken by an 
established team of researchers who had expertise in the area of immunotoxins 
(interviewee D). This implies that the knowledge development around receptor-antibody-
tumour interaction and delivery issues, was overcome quickly and the project entered 
trials (at the NIH/NINDS) facilitated by involvement from the investigators involved in 
discovery phases (interviewee D). This is important as it means that any issues arising 
in these trials requiring input from investigators can be resolved. However, in later stages 
relationships broke down, and there was little interaction between later licensees, such 
as KS Biomedix, and the NINDS researchers (interviewee E).  
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Despite these difficulties the disease knowledge base contributing towards TransMID 
development publications mentioning the primary indication is quantified as high, where 
22,319120 articles were found mentioning glioma in the years preceding trials121.  
TransMID research began in the 1960s, with the transferrin target found, in the 1980s, 
to display tumour overexpression. Transferrin (the antibody targeting the transferring 
receptor) was conjugated to the diphtheria toxin killing tumour cells when targeted by 
transferrin. This was a relatively new approach implying a high level of uncertainty and 
issues at early stages of development, with the first immunotoxin only being developed 
in 1989, and gemtuzumab synthesised in the early 1990s.  Despite the interactions 
between researchers in the early stages of drug research, this relationship was lost later 
on. In addition, extensive tacit knowledge was required for administration of the drug, 
implying the importance of knowledge transfer. This justifies the non-membership of 
TransMID in this set, extensive and accumulated knowledge base.  
7.5.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
Despite a range preclinical investigations for TransMID glioma cells that showed the 
highest response (Weaver and Laske, 2003, Pharmaprojects). Patents for TransMID, 
taken out by NIH, covered cancers of the head, neck and central nervous system 
(Xenova Group plc, 2003a). Tumour specificity of TransMID was limited by the 
expression of Transferrin receptors on tumour cell surfaces. This limitation of the project 
implied a small population of patients who would make up the potential market for the 
drug.  
In response to preclinical results, phase I and II studies were undertaken in brain tumour 
patients (Laske et al., 1997, Weaver and Laske, 2003). In 2002 KS Biomedix estimated 
brain cancer incidence in Europe as 20,000 per year, of which 50% have high-grade 
gliomas with a life expectancy of around six months (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2002c). 
In 2001, the expected worldwide market for TransMID (including for the treatment of 
recurrent, inoperable high grade glioma and primary brain tumours) stood at $600m 
annually (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2001c), with the ‘triad region’ (typically North 
America, Western Europe and Japan) standing at an estimated $210m -  ‘quite a small 
market but very focused’ (The Wall Street Transcript, 2001). 
                                                 
 
120 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘glioma’ as a search 
term in PubMed. 
121 Up to and including 1995 
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However, KS Biomedix planned for trials to be expanded to paediatric newly diagnosed 
and metastatic brain cancer (The Wall Street Transcript, 2001, KS Biomedix Holdings 
PLC, 2003a). The potential for the drug in these expanded areas impacted the predicted 
market. For instance, KS Biomedix expect a market potential of US$3.8bn annually, 
when including the additional indications (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2001c). 
Despite the small glioblastoma patient population it is characterised by severe unmet 
clinical need, where the prognosis of patients has not changed in the last 20 years 
(Weaver and Laske, 2003). It was part of the Xenova strategy to emphasise the unmet 
need of this indication. During the few years that Xenova was responsible for TransMID 
glioblastoma is described as an ‘unmet need’ (Sosei Co. Ltd, 2005), a ‘type of brain 
cancer for patients with an otherwise poor prognosis’ (QSV Biologics, 2004) and an area 
with ‘limited therapeutic alternatives’ (Xenova Group plc, 2004c). The perception of 
TransMID as fulfilling an unmet need implies its development is socially beneficial. In 
addition, a lack of competition in this therapeutics area implies a potential for high prices 
to be obtained for the approved product. However, this may have changed with the 
introduction of the carmustine implant in 1997 and temozolomide in 1999 which both 
became a standard of care for brain tumour patients in the early 2000s. 
Due to the lengthy duration of the development of TransMID associated patents were 
nearing expiry. TransMID patents were filed in 1989 (Johnson et al., 1993), 1990 (Pastan 
et al., 2000), 1992 (Johnson and Youle, 1994) and 1994 (Johnson and Youle, 1998), 
implying expiry dates of the mid-2010s. When Celtic in-licensed the drug, in 2005, they 
needed to complete a phase III trial, usually taking an average of four years,  (Abrantes-
Metz et al., 2004). This implies that there would only have been five years remaining of 
patent protection when an application for approval was submitted, although the potential 
to apply for a supplementary protection certificate could counteract this effect. 
In summary, TransMID’s potential market size, despite showing a large amount of 
variation in estimates, is projected to be small but potentially lucrative due to the unmet 
clinical need and the lack of competition of brain cancers. However, competition did 
appear in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Furthermore, with patent protection for the 
drug waning, concerns for appropriability of returns from the drug would have been 
justified (although not mentioned specifically). These factors contribute towards the 
characterisation of TransMID as a non-member in the set high market demand. 
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7.5.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 0) 
Scientific expectations of the project benefitted from the novelty of immunotoxins. Indeed, 
when KS Biomedix acquired Avicenna KS Biomedix had high hopes for the project, 
largely based on anecdotes from trials, reporting miraculous recoveries. The company 
acquired the drug both to broaden their oncology portfolio and due to their belief that the 
drug would change the lives of brain cancer patients (interviewee E). Furthermore, the 
potential that Xenova saw for TransMID development also motivated the KS Biomedix, 
(KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2003c, Xenova Group plc, 2003b, interviewee E). This 
indicates the support felt from industry partners involved in TransMID development. 
In the media high expectations for the drug are observed. In 1997 there are several 
articles describing the project positively, including descriptions of TransMID as having 
‘shown promise’ and providing ‘hope in fight against brain cancer’ (Stobbe, 1997). 
However, later in development the media are not hopeful for the firms responsible for 
TransMID. One article quotes an analyst from the investment bank, ING, in saying  
‘KSB has long been trying to raise funds, and it has failed. The best deal they could 
get for their shareholders was at a discount to the current share price. On paper, 
TransMID is an interesting compound, two or three years away from launch. 
Someone could have snapped it up, but they haven’t, and in the end the only one 
they could sell to was a company [Xenova] which is itself in dire straits’ (Foley, 2003) 
However, the following year demonstrates optimism for the drug due to the approval of 
the protocol for, and planned initiation of, the phase III, driving Xenova share prices up 
(Hasell, 2004). This was described as follows in The Times: ‘it was this excitement [of 
the prospect of the initiation of the phase III trial] surrounding that product [TransMID] 
which drove yesterday’s rally’ (ibid). 
The patients and clinician perspective of the drug is influenced by the availability of 
treatments and their administration. Prior to 2000 there were little treatment options for 
brain tumours. However, this changed in the late 1990s/early 2000s when the carmustine 
implant and temozolomide were approved by regulatory agencies and recommended by 
the NICE in the UK.  
In addition to the emergence of competitors in the brain tumour indication, TransMID also 
have suffered from a negative perception by clinicians and patients due to the 
administration of the drug. The CED infusion administration route was seen as an 
invasive procedure as the drug was administered directly into the brain. When compared 
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to an orally administered drug, such as the competing temozolomide, the patients and 
clinician perspective of the drug, by, benefitted from the ease of oral administration.  
The expectations of stakeholders during the development of TransMID indicate a 
complex mix of perceptions. Negative, from industrial partners, patients and clinicians, 
and positive, from scientific investigators and firms in-licensing the drug, due to the belief 
of the potential for patient benefit. Furthermore, the invasive nature of the drug is likely to 
have contributed towards the problematic perspectives felt by users. This evidence 
implies that membership into the set positive stakeholder perspectives is not conclusive, 
thereby justifying the QCA score of ‘0’. 
7.5.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 0) 
The license(s) for TransMID (CRM107) were transferred through a complex network of 
firms throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This is had detrimental impact on the 
development of the project (Vrazo, 2006).  
When TransMID was discovered NINDS investigators were working with scientists at 
Cetus Corporation, one of the first US biotechnology companies, who had licensed the 
Transferrin antibody technology from Ian Trowbridge (Johnson et al., 1996, interviewee 
D). However, when Cetus Corporation were acquired by Chiron Corporation in 1991 
(Fore et al., 2006), researchers needed another partner to produce the antibody under 
good manufacturing practices (interviewee D). Initially Nycomed, fulfilled this role, with 
Avicenna taking on manufacturing later.  
Firstly, the project passed to Nycomed through their acquisition of a division of Sterling 
Winthrop, a by-product of the Sanofi acquisition of Sterling Winthrop (The Globe and 
Mail, 1994). In this it was observed that Sanofi always had the intention of divesting part 
of the Sterling Winthrop business amounting to the activities ‘that it deemed as non-
strategic’ (ibid), indicating that TransMID was not strategic in Sterling Winthrop or Sanofi.  
Avicenna, a Canadian manufacturing start-up (1992), consulting for Nycomed 
(Medicenna Therapeutics INC., 2014), took on the manufacturing of TransMID, in 2000, 
as a result of Nycomed-Amersham deals (Medicenna Therapeutics INC., 2014, 
interviewee D). Prior to this, while the project was at Nycomed/Amersham 122  little 
progress was made to develop the project (interviewee E).  
                                                 
 
122  Nycomed and Amersham merged in 1997 but in 2000 Amersham decided to divest the 
Nycomed business. 
224 
 
Development of the drug and trials were undertaken at the NINDS (NIH) (Weaver and 
Laske, 2003, Bobo et al., 1994, interviewee D, Laske et al., 1997), with Nycomed having 
some involvement in trial design (interviewee D), however it wasn’t until the license with 
Avicenna was initiated that the investigators at the NIH had a high level of involvement 
and communication with their industrial partners (interviewee D). This was integral to the 
phase II trial undertaking, however, when Avicenna was acquired by KS Biomedix, this 
relationship did not continue (interviewee D).  
At the time of the KS Biomedix acquisition TransMID was Avicenna’s lead candidate 
(AFX.com, 2001a). This acquisition of Avicenna, by KS Biomedix, was strategic, 
motivated by the desire to build an oncology portfolio (interviewee E). Furthermore, it 
provided KS Biomedix with a presence in North America (London Stock Exchange 
Aggregated Regulatory News Service, 2001). Despite the acquisition the production of 
TransMID remained in the same location, whereby KS Biomedix retained the Canadian 
Avicenna site (Zehr, 2001).   
However, when the project passed to KS Biomedix, not only did responsibility for 
development pass to them, in the form of the need to initiated phase III trials with a lack 
of involvement from the NINDS team, but they also had to fund this R&D. In 1996, just 6 
years after the company was founded, KS Biomedix floated on the Alternative Investment 
Market of the London Stock Exchange (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 1995).  
When KS Biomedix took on TransMID they appreciated that it would be an expensive 
venture, and put together a strategy to raised sufficient fund for the phase III trial 
(interviewee E). This involved a stock-market financing round to raise the funds for the 
acquisition and trial (interviewee E). KS Biomedix demonstrated success in returning to 
the stock market to access additional funds. In just the previous year, managed to raise 
around £15m (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2000). In addition from 1996 to 2001 the firm 
raised £26m in 5 years (The Wall Street Transcript, 2001). In 2001, the intention was to 
raise in the region of £30m (interviewee E) however, due to market conditions, and the 
fluctuation of the stock markets, only £16m was eventually raised (KS Biomedix Holdings 
PLC, 2001d).  
This was a blow to the KS Biomedix strategy, particularly considering that during 
TransMID development the KS Biomedix pipeline included two lead inflammatory disease 
products in phase II trials, and TransMID entering phase III (AFX.com, 2001b). The 
advanced stages of these products meant that the company had a high burn rate (£4m, 
compared to £1.9m in the previous year) (ibid), amplifying the issues associated with 
disappointing stock-market placings, as discussed above. Furthermore, share prices fell 
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when one of the inflammatory disease products produced disappointing results in the 
phase II trial (Pharma Marketletter, 2001).  
This was partially addressed due to a series of licensing agreements for the 
commercialisation of TransMID in 2002 (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2002b, KS 
Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2002c). These licensing agreements allowed KS Biomedix to 
continue developing TransMID by beginning a phase II in paediatric brain cancer patients, 
receiving orphan drug status (in the USA and EU) and the potential for fast track approval 
from the FDA (KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2001c, KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2001a, 
KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2001b, KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2002e, KS Biomedix 
Holdings PLC, 2002d, KS Biomedix Holdings PLC, 2002a).  
In addition, the company spent time negotiating with the FDA on the phase III trial design. 
However, when Xenova acquired KS Biomedix it was stated that the approval for the 
phase III study design was taking ‘longer than originally envisaged’ due to the 
introduction of the Special Protocol Assessment Committee at the FDA (KS Biomedix 
Holdings PLC, 2003b).  
On the acquisition Xenova valued KS Biomedix at just £17m, including a consideration 
in relation to TransMID of £6.5m (Xenova Group plc, 2003c). TransMID was one of the 
main motivations for Xenova’s acquisition of KS Biomedix, where the product became 
Xenova’s lead compound, filling the pipeline gap arising from the disappointing 
Tariquidar results, a failed chemotherapy agent for non-small cell lung cancer (Xenova 
Group plc, 2003a). This indicates that Xenova did have cancer capabilities. The strategic 
value of TransMID to Xenova is demonstrated when it is described as their ’jewel in the 
crown’ (Investors Chronicle, 2003).  
Xenova went back to the FDA for approval of an amended phase III trial design involving 
two smaller sequential trials, as opposed to the previous larger one (Xenova Group plc, 
2004a). This change was motivated by the projected study costs whereby the KS 
Biomedix protocol was expected to cost around £18m which was halved in Xenova’s 
proposed trial (Investors Chronicle, 2003). 
Despite Xenova rapidly receiving approval for the phase III study design, like KS 
Biomedix, they struggled to raise sufficient funds for the trial. In September 2004, in an 
effort to reduce turnover costs of the firms, Xenova sold its manufacturing facility 
(previously KS Avicenna) to QSV Biologics (for £2.9m), who took on TransMID 
manufacturing (Xenova Group plc, 2004b).  
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Furthermore, Xenova extended KS Biomedix’s commercialisation licensing strategy, in 
April 2005 when PharmaEngine gained commercialisation rights for TransMID in China 
and South Korea (Xenova Group plc, 2005). However, these finance strategies were not 
sufficient, and the company was put up for sale and was acquired by Celtic Pharma in 
September 2005 (Celtic Pharmaceutical Holdings LP, 2005). Celtic’s support for 
TransMID was short lived, and despite continuing with the phase III trial, in February 
2007 it terminated development, for both technical and economic grounds:  
 ‘At the end of 2006, ahead of incurring significant planned expenditure in 2007, 
Celtic Pharma undertook a condition power analysis. The aim of this analysis was to 
evaluate, on the basis of the first one third of events, the probability of the TransMID 
treated patients achieving the study’s targeted increase in survival at study end, as 
defined in the protocol. The completed analysis showed that it was extremely unlikely 
that TransMID would meet the trial criteria for efficacy. Accordingly, Celtic Pharma 
has decided to terminate the trial and further clinical development of TransMID on 
commercial grounds. The trial Data Monitoring Committee has independently 
recommended to Celtic Pharma and the Trial Steering Committee the trial be 
stopped on medical grounds.’ (Celtic Pharmaceutical Holdings LP, 2007) 
Due to the lack of publications indicating these clinical trial results, it is difficult to 
contextualise Celtic’s claim, of discontinuing on medical grounds. However, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that in order to compete with competing brain cancer drugs, 
e.g. temozolomide, TransMID would have had to show improved efficacy, compared to 
standards treatment, which may not have been satisfied. 
From an economic perspective when Celtic Pharma acquired Xenova their strategy as a 
private equity fund was to acquire late stage products and develop them to approval, 
whereby Xenova would become their drug development arm in the UK (Market Wire, 
2005). This primary motivation of Celtic, of their investment strategy (Celtic 
Pharmaceutical Holdings LP, 2007), was central to their decision to discontinue 
TransMID development. This is in contrast to a bio-pharma firm, who may have been 
more concerned and committed to the scientific interest in the product. 
The organisation environments that surrounded the development of the TransMID project 
may have had detrimental consequences for the drug. Firstly, the number of companies 
through which the project passed slowed development down. In addition, the difficult 
funding environment facing small biotechnology firms, particularly in the UK was also key 
to this story, whereby firms demonstrably could not financially support the project. These 
factors justify the non-membership of this case into the set supportive organisational 
environment (QCA score ‘0’). 
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7.5.7 TransMID Conclusion 
The TransMID case history is complex and shrouded in organisational issues, mixed 
expectations and uncertainty over the novel therapeutic approach. These uncertainties 
that were seen in the initial phases of discovery and early development were overcome 
by problem solving and committed investigators in the uncertain technological area.  
The novelty of this approach contributed to high expectations surrounding the project, 
however there were also reported of negative perspectives of the project. One of the 
major issues in the development of TransMID appears to be the complex arrangement 
of organisations that took on its development. These companies were also faced with 
their own environmental constraints, mainly around funding.  
These issues contributed towards project drag, however, this was latent until the 
breakdown of the protected space upon the Celtic Pharma acquisition. This case 
presents the strongest evidence to show that the acquiring firm implemented a more 
objective evaluation procedure whereby issues were uncovered that previously were 
deemed conquerable. 
7.6 Prolarix – Delays and Difficulties 
Prolarix (NQ02, Caricotamide and tretazicar), in a pattern reminiscent of TransMID, 
underwent notable delays during development, stemming from difficulties in regulatory 
requirements for trials. This contributed towards cash difficulties for the small firms 
involved, due to longer periods of high burn rate.  
In the Prolarix these delays led to project drag and were central to motivating changes 
in the organisational environment surrounding the project, as the firms encountered 
funding difficulties had to be acquired. Furthermore, these organisational changes 
contributed towards knowledge transfer and accumulation issues, and in the absence of 
a key individual championing the project, these problems contributed to the termination 
of the project. In addition, the project suffered from the additional issues of small market 
potential and a lack of media/stakeholder coverage.  
7.6.1 Interview sources 
No interviews could be undertaken to inform this case history. 
7.6.2 Introduction 
Prolarix was primarily in development for the treatment of hepatocellular carcinoma 
(HCC) (liver cancer). The drug was made up of caricotamide (EP-0152R) and tretazicar 
(CB1954). The early stages of clinical development were undertaken at a small UK 
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biotechnology firm called Enact. When Enact was acquired by Protherics development 
of Prolarix continued. When BTG acquired Protherics it too continued development of 
Prolarix for a year, but then subsequently discontinued the project in 2009.  
1995 ENACT (ENZACTA) founded 
2002 Cancer Research UK sponsored Phase I trial for Prolarix agreed  
2003 ENACT acquired by Protherics 
2004 Prolarix enters Phase II 
2007 Liver cancer competitor (sorafenib) introduced 
2008 Prolarix Phase II initiated in liver cancer; Protherics acquired by BTG 
2009 Prolarix discontinued by BTG 
Table 29 Key events in development of Prolarix 
 
7.6.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 0) 
Prolarix is made up of caricotamide, a cosubstrate, and a prodrug tretazicar (CB1954). 
The mechanism of action of the drug uses the endogenous NQO2 enzyme, found to be 
latent in certain tumour cells but activated by caricotamide, which in turn converts 
tretazicar to a cytotoxin (Pharmaprojects(London Stock Exchange Aggregated 
Regulatory News Service, 2006b)). 
The scientific background of Prolarix dates back to the 1950s when CB1954 was 
identified from a large series of aziridines, synthesised and investigated for tumour 
growth inhibition (Knox et al., 1993). CB1954 was found to have a high therapeutic index 
when tested on the Walker 256 carcinoma tumour model in vivo (ibid). Despite extensive 
studies and a trial in 1970 showing responses in rat tumour models, no effect was present 
in human tumours (ibid). In 1986 CB1954 was described as ‘a drug in search of a human 
tumour to treat’ (Workman et al., 1986, Knox et al., 1993, Newell et al., 2003).  
The research pathway around CB1954 changed in 1993 when scientists began to 
understand the compound’s mechanism of action. Here CB1954 was found to be 
activated by the NQO2 enzyme in rat tumours, an enzyme that was found to be latent in 
human tumours (Knox et al., 1993, Knox et al., 2000). To activate the enzyme in human 
tumours three alternative strategies were suggested: 1) an analogue to CB1954 that 
could be reduced into a cytotoxic agent in tumour cells, 2) exploring pyridinium 
compounds that could enhance the CB1954 cytotoxicity, or 3) administering a CB1954 
activating enzyme that could target human tumours by conjugating to an antibody (known 
as the Antibody-directed enzyme prodrug therapy (ADEPT) approach) (Knox et al., 1993).  
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It was the second of these approaches that was explored in the production of Prolarix. 
In 2000 Knox, a researcher from the Institute of Cancer Research, and colleagues 
published a paper that explored a number of pyridinium compounds to activate the NQO2 
enzyme in tumour cells (Knox et al., 2000). This prodrug approach was less complex 
that the alternative ADEPT approach: ‘it might be possible to use CB1954 directly for 
prodrug therapy of human tumours without the complications associated with 
macromolecular targeting systems required for GDEPT [gene-directed enzyme prodrug 
therapy] and ADEPT’ (ibid). This prodrug system was a novel approach to the delivery 
of cancer therapeutics and was described as ‘the first example of a latent enzyme-
prodrug system switched on by synthetic co-substrate’ (ibid).  
Once a suitable co-substrate compound was identified (Knox et al., 2000) it was tested 
in preclinical animal models. Tretazicar and caricotamide (Prolarix as it was later known) 
was found to be particularly effective in liver samples, as well as colorectal and 
pancreatic tumour cells, due to the higher concentration of the activating enzyme NQO2 
in these cells (Pharmaprojects).  
In 2001 the compound was ready for trials (Enact Pharma, 2001), however due to a delay 
caused by changes to the regulatory environment, the project did not enter trials until 
2005 (Protherics, 2005a). These changes were introduced under an EU Directive on 
clinical trials which set out that all trials should be undertaken until Good Clinical Practice 
and products in trials should be made to Good Manufacturing Practice (Newell et al., 
2003). Furthermore, the previous exemption from obtaining a Clinical Trials Certificate 
for doctors and dentists conducting trials on their own patients, was also removed (ibid).  
Phase I trials results were not published until 2010 when investigators reported that 
testing of the drug showed that the NQO2 enzyme was selectively activated by 
caricotamide in a trial involving 32 patients (Middleton et al., 2010). In addition, NQO2 
activity was found to be higher in solid tumour cells than in normal cells, with the highest 
activity found in liver cancer tissue (ibid). Toxicity of patients in this study was low, with 
less than a quarter of patients showing grade 3 or 4 toxicity at the maximum tolerated 
dose (ibid). Therefore, this phase I trial provided ‘sufficient proof of mechanism to warrant 
advance of this prodrug system into phase II efficacy trials for HCC patients’ (ibid).  
This phase II trial programme was planned for 2008 in HCC (Protherics, 2008a). In 
addition, there are also plans to begin a phase II programme to combine sorafenib with 
Prolarix and compare with sorafenib alone (ibid). However, in 2008 Protherics was 
acquired by BTG. Prolarix was not mentioned until November 2009 when phase IIa were 
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discontinued to allow BTG to seek a specialist oncology partner (British Technology 
Group, 2009c).  
From the data available it is difficult to conclude the consistency of the Prolarix 
investigators, due to the lack of published material presenting trial results. In the article 
from 2010 there are researchers from BTG (ex-Enact employees), University of Oxford, 
Royal Marsden, UCL Cancer Institute, and CR-UK (Middleton et al., 2010). In addition, 
the 2000 discovery research publication lists authors from Enact, University of Bradford, 
ICR and Beckman Research Institute (California) (Knox et al., 2000). This implies that, 
despite the diversity of researchers investigating the drug, Enact employees had a high 
level of involvement in the process, collaborating with other researchers, with Knox 
appearing prominently in both articles (first author in one, second author in the other).  
However, Prolarix scores high when considering the knowledge accumulated in the 
primary indication disease area. Here 24,506123 articles were found mentioning HCC in 
all years preceding the initiation of trials124. However, no articles were found mentioning 
caricotamide AND (tretazicar OR CB1954)125 prior to the year Prolarix entered clinical 
trials, and only 31 were found mentioning NQO2126 during this period. 
From the evidence presented it is clear that despite the established and promising 
research pathway forming the basis for Prolarix, the phase I trials were limited, 
particularly in those that were published (with only one publication mentioning trials 
(Middleton et al., 2010)) and, despite conveying promising results, phase II results were 
never obtained to confirm these. These factors justify the QCA score of 0. 
7.6.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
From early development of Prolarix the drug was specifically aimed at liver cancer. This 
resulted from preclinical studies findings investigating Prolarix in human tumour 
xenografts showing increased activity of the NQO2 enzyme in liver samples In addition 
high activity was also found in colorectal and pancreatic tumours (Pharmaprojects). This 
                                                 
 
123 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Carcinoma, Renal 
Cell’ as a search term in PubMed. 
124 Up to and including 2004 
125Search term used: ((caricotamide AND (CB1954 OR tretazicar))) AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - 
Publication] : "2002/31/12"[Date - Publication]) 
126 Search term used: (NQo2) AND ("1900/01/01"[Date - Publication] : "2002/31/12"[Date - 
Publication]) 
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informed a phase I trial strategy which was to realise potential in liver, colorectal and 
pancreatic cancer patients (Enact Pharma, 2001).  
After a long delay caused by regulatory issues, in 2005 Protherics stated that the drug 
was in a phase I study in patients with solid tumours in general (Protherics, 2005a). 
However, in the following year the Protherics had plans to pursue development in HCC 
despite the phase I that was underway at the time (Protherics, 2006).  
In 2008 Protherics further highlights the wider market potential for Prolarix, including 
ovarian cancer and melanoma (Protherics, 2008a). These expectations indicate that 
despite the potential for the drug to be specified to liver cancer, and the immediate 
strategy to progress with this indication, there was also potential to widen the therapeutic 
applicability at a later date.  
In addition Protherics, on acquisition of Enact in 2003, quantify their expectations of 
market size when they claim that the worldwide market for an effective HCC treatment 
could reach an estimated £2.8bn per year, due to the area being one of high unmet 
clinical need (Protherics, 2003a). This implies that despite the relatively low numbers of 
people affected by the cancer, mortality figures were high, quoted to be 120,000 for liver, 
colorectal and pancreatic tumour patients per year in the USA and UK combined (Enact 
Pharma, 2001). This represents a high proportion, where a total of 563,700 cancer 
deaths were expected in the US in 2004 (Jemal et al., 2004). For the liver cancer 
indication solely the Protherics Chief Executive, in 2004, stated that Prolarix could 
achieve sales of $250m (Clay, 2006).  
HCC remains an area of unmet clinical need, particularly in the UK, despite the 
development and approval for the kinase inhibitor sorafenib which was approved in 2007 
for HCC, due to the lack of recommendation of the drug from NICE (National Cancer 
Institute, 2013, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), 2010). This 
decision by NICE may have impacted the development of Prolarix, providing a level of 
comparative efficacy, safety and cost-effectiveness, and thereby setting the bar higher 
for additional clinical candidates. 
Despite the long development times of Prolarix, due to delays in getting approval for trials 
(as will be discussed later in this discussion), the patents associated with the drug were 
not filed until 1998 (Burke and Knox, 2005) and 2002 (Burke and Knox, 2006), and 
therefore would not be expected to expire until 2022. This indicates that imminent patent 
expiry was not a factor in contributing towards the drugs termination, based on the 
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average phase II and III duration being 6.5 years (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004), with the 
Prolarix phase II being initiated in 2004.  
This section shows that despite Prolarix showing a range of potential indications, HCC, 
the primary cancer indication, had a competing product introduced in the late stages of 
Prolarix development (during phase II). Furthermore, due to the lack of orphan drug 
designation at the time of development the drug was not subject to the benefits of this or 
any other regulatory policy. These factors, taken on balance indicate that the drug cannot 
be classified as a member of the set high market demand, thereby the QCA score of 0 
has been allocated.  
7.6.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 0) 
Prolarix received little coverage in the national newspapers. There are two mentions of 
the drug in mainstream, i.e. non-specialist, newspapers that report Prolarix positively, for 
instance describing Protherics of having ‘high hopes’ for the project (Manchester Evening 
News, 2004) or stating that the project’s results ‘appear favourable’ (Freeman, 2005), 
however these are in local newspapers and therefore not as influential as comments 
made in national or international media. The high expectations of Prolarix as projected 
from Protherics are further highlighted in interim results in both 2005 (Protherics, 2005b) 
and 2007 (Protherics, 2007b).  
This lack of press coverage is perhaps surprising considering the support in trials and 
early stage discovery and development coming from CR-UK. CR-UK is mentioned in line 
with supporting and organising the trial however there is no specific coverage coming 
from the charity claiming support for the project. This may be an indication that Cancer 
Research UK may not have had particularly high interest in the development of Prolarix. 
This may stem from the overshadowing of Prolarix by the interest in a sister molecule 
that was developed (again by Enact and Protherics), also utilising the CB1954 but being 
applying using gene therapy in prostate cancer, which received a high level of interest in 
2001 from major newspapers (Charter, 2001, Connor, 2001, Hall, 2001). 
A lack of media coverage, which is particularly surprising due to the involvement of CR-
UK in the development of Prolarix, is the main justification for the QCA score of 0, non-
membership into the set positive stakeholder perspective.  
7.6.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 0) 
Most of the initial work on the CB1954 compound and the identification of a suitable co-
substrate for the prodrug application of the project was carried out by researchers at the 
ICR, led by Richard Knox (Knox et al., 1988a, Knox et al., 1993, Knox et al., 1988b, Knox 
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et al., 1991, Roberts et al., 1986). A collaboration that continued throughout the 
development of the project.  
Enact Pharma (previously called Enzacta) took on Prolarix development as they were 
founded on the basis of the ADEPT technology which formed an alternative possibility 
for the delivery of CB1954 to treat cancer patients. The ADEPT technology was proposed 
in 1987 (Bagshawe, 1987), investigated by a group of scientists who were later the 
Scientific Directors of Enact (Enzacta Group plc, 1999). In 1995 a company called 
AEPACT was established to develop the ADEPT technology (ibid). In 1998 AEPACT 
was acquired by Prodrug Pharma who subsequently changed their name to ENZACTA 
(ibid). This complex pathway to the foundation of Enact (Enzacta) was focused on the 
development of the ADEPT technology, therefore, establishing Prolarix as lower priority. 
However, funding from Cancer Research UK enabled the firm to progress the project. 
The commitment from CR-UK continued throughout preclinical development and into 
phase I, which was expected to be run by Professor David Kerr, clinical head of the CRC 
Institute for Cancer Studies, University of Birmingham (Enact Pharma, 2001). At this time 
in line with the aforementioned EU Directive on clinical trials, manufacturing regulations 
changed meaning that the materials used in early phase trials needed to comply with 
Good Manufacturing Practice regulations, therefore implying a major set-back for 
Prolarix development. This was due to the need for CR-UK to reformulate the drug and 
work with the formulation contractor to do so (Enact Pharma, 2002). Despite this 
regulation being introduced in 2001, the approval from the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency in the UK for the improved formulation was not received 
until 2006 (London Stock Exchange Aggregated Regulatory News Service, 2006b). 
By the time the trial had begun, in 2004/05, Enact had, in 2003, been acquired by 
Protherics (Protherics, 2003c). The motivation for the acquisition was primarily the Enact 
lead compound, Voraxaze, with secondary attention on the continued development of 
Prolarix (ibid). At this stage the motivation from the Enact perspective is said to be linked 
to a lack of funds: ‘without further funding in the short term, the Company [Enact] would 
need to reduce its operational activities significantly and would be unable to fund the 
development of its core drug development programmes’ (Protherics, 2003c:5). 
Once Protherics had acquired ENACT, coinciding with Prolarix’s entrance into phase I 
trials, they stated their intention to out-license the product to a marketing partner within 
two years (Protherics, 2003b). This strategy changes, however, as demonstrated in the 
2006 annual report which states “Protherics intends to fully develop and undertake the 
sales and marketing of Prolarix in the US and EU” (Protherics, 2006). Despite this, 
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Protherics make little progress in the development of Prolarix which remained in phase 
I with 23 patients treated in 2007 (Protherics, 2007a).  
In 2008, however, just after the announcement of the initiation of the phase II study for 
Prolarix (Protherics, 2008b) in HCC patients, BTG acquired Protherics (British 
Technology Group, 2008). BTG’s initial intention was to develop Prolarix through phase 
II trials and then out-license (British Technology Group, 2009b). However, in the 2009 
annual report BTG stopped the phase II study to ‘seek a specialist oncology partner’, 
which was unsuccessful (British Technology Group, 2009a). 
The firm dynamics, which surrounded the development of Prolarix throughout two 
acquisitions involving a shortfall of financing imply an unsupportive environment for drug 
development. These issues may have had a detrimental impact on the development of 
the project. In addition, the delays due to changes in manufacturing legislation for trials 
came at an integral time in the projects history. This is taken to contribute towards the 
non-membership of Prolarix into the set supportive organisational environment and 
justifies the score 0.  
7.6.7 Prolarix Conclusion 
Prolarix did have the potential to be applied to a range of indication types, however this, 
in addition to the extensive and supportive discovery-related science, were the only 
straightforward aspects of the drug’s development. The clinical trials, expectations 
surrounding the development of the drug and the complex organisational environment 
contributed to the decision to discontinue Prolarix development. These aspects are 
linked. Funding issues, and delays contributed towards a lack of clinical data, which did 
not support the justification for continuing development for the project by BTG. In addition, 
if the drug had been subjected to the media coverage that has been found to be 
associated with other charity-developed drug projects (see temozolomide) it may have 
been a more attractive licensing prospect for BTG and, later another industrial partner.  
7.7 CAT-3888 – Overshadowed by a Follow-on 
The development of CAT3888 (synonyms: BL-22, GCR-3888), a recombinant 
immunotoxin, suffered from 5 issues that contributed towards its eventual termination: 1) 
low market potential, 2) novel and uncertain market, 3) novel and uncertain knowledge 
base, and 4) differences in risk-associated thresholds between large and small firms 
upon portfolio evaluation. 
The novelty of the project contributed towards initial interest and excitement, and, as it 
was being developed, first by academic researchers and then by a small firm (CAT), the 
235 
 
desire for proof of concept may have overcome the issues associated with novelty and 
uncertainty, as was the case for gemtuzumab.  
Furthermore, with the project being led by a research team, and later by small firms, the 
low market potential would be more acceptable than in larger firms. However, taking the 
small market opportunity, in the context of an emerging follow-on product that was 
comparable but more efficacious in a broader range of indications, it is perhaps not 
surprising that CAT3888 was discontinued upon acquisition of CAT by AZ. Here we 
observe that rather than project drag accumulating around the project leading to a loss 
of momentum, it is the gaining of momentum by another similar project that is the key 
motivator. Furthermore, we observe that where evaluation criteria were suspended or 
had different thresholds while the project was at CAT, the action of the breakdown of the 
protected space when AZ acquired, contributed towards a re-evaluation and subsequent 
discontinuation of CAT3888, in favour of CAT8015.  
7.7.1 Interview sources 
An interview was carried out with one individual involved in the development of CAT3888, 
interviewee G.  
7.7.2 Introduction 
CAT-3888 is a recombinant immunotoxin, comprised of a disulfide linked Fv antibody 
fragment conjugated to Pseudomonas exotoxin PE38. The drug targets the CD22 
antigen on tumour cells, and so, despite being developed primarily for the treatment of 
hairy cell leukaemia (HCL), also showed some efficacy against other B-cell malignancies. 
Development of CAT-3888 was initiated at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) in the USA 
(part of the National Institute of Health), licensed to Genencor, and later in-licensed by 
the British biotechnology company, Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT).   
1989 First immunotoxin (anti-CD25 single chain Fv and Pseudomonas exotoxin) 
produced 
1999 CAT3888 Phase I trials begin 
2001 Results from Phase I presented 
2003 CAT3888 Phase II trial begins 
2004 NCI signs CRADA with Genencor 
2005 NCI CRADA passed to CAT with license 
2006 CAT acquired by AZ 
2007 AZ discontinues development of CAT3888 
Table 30 Key events in development of CAT3888 
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7.7.3 Knowledge base (QCA score = 1) 
The knowledge providing the basis for CAT3888 can be traced to work undertaken in Ira 
Pastan’s lab at the NCI in the 1970s and 1980s (Pastan, 2003). During the development 
of the drug, despite the disruptions caused by varying licensing agreements and 
acquisitions, the project did benefit from a relatively consistent research team throughout, 
facilitated by the cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA), signed 
initially between NCI and Genencor, and passing to CAT. 
Pastan’s NCI lab work on immunotoxins explored 4 generations of drug candidates prior 
to the development of CAT3888 (Pastan, 2003). Incremental advances during this 
process included developments to the linker attaching the antibody (anti-CD22) to the 
toxin (Pseudomonas exotoxin) and the utilisation of recombinant DNA techniques to 
improve production of the drug (Pastan, 2003, Kreitman and Pastan, 2011). Furthermore 
recombinant immunotoxins presented a second generation in the history of 
immunotoxins in general (Teicher and Chari, 2011). A major benefit of recombinant DNA 
techniques is the ability to produce a smaller antibody, leading to increased efficacy 
whilst lowered toxicity of the drug (National Cancer Institute, 2001, Teicher and Chari, 
2011).  
In addition to the novelty of the immunotoxin approach the knowledge surrounding the 
CAT3888 target, CD22, was also relatively uncertain. Despite being found in 1987 to be 
expressed in B-cells (Dorken et al., 1987, Pastan, 2003) in 1997, the action of CD22 and 
its role in disease was described as requiring further understanding (Tedder et al., 1997).  
In preclinical development CAT-3888 showed complete remissions in vivo, in mice 
models bearing lymphoma cell lines expressing CD22, with additional testing undertaken 
in monkey models and naked mice (Kreitman et al., 1999, Kreitman et al., 2000). Phase 
I trials began in 1999, where 16 patients with chemotherapy-resistant HCL were treated. 
The results showed 11 complete remissions, and two partial remissions (Kreitman et al., 
2001a). Three of 11 patients who did relapse after 18 months showed complete 
remissions following retreatment (ibid).  
This result demonstrated one of the main advantages of CAT-3888, over standard 
cytotoxins, where due to low levels of toxicities, CAT3888 can be administered in quick 
successions. Indeed, the toxicities in the CAT-3888 phase I HCL trial, the most severe 
of which was kidney failure from decreased platelet and red blood cell count, were 
resolved and all patients recovered showing complete remission (National Cancer 
Institute, 2001).  
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Additional phase I results also showed positive results (Kreitman et al., 2001b, Kreitman 
et al., 2004, Kreitman et al., 2005a, Kreitman et al., 2005b, Kreitman et al., 2008). In 
response to these results, and the high expectations surrounding the drug, a phase II 
trial in HCL patients began two years later (October 2003) (Cambridge Antibody 
Technology PLC, 2005a). This trial showed 16 complete responses, and eight partial 
responses, from a total of 35 chemotherapy-resistant HCL patients (Kreitman et al., 
2009).  
Whilst CAT3888 development continued, researchers at the NCI developed a second 
project, CAT8015, showing higher affinity to the CD22 antigen and therefore a broader 
range of applicability, than CAT3888, in B-cell malignancies (Kreitman and Pastan, 2011). 
CAT8015, was licensed along with CAT3888 from NCI, to Genencor and later to CAT, 
which was subsequently acquired by AZ. It was the development of CAT8015 that 
motivated the discontinuation of CAT3888, whereby its commercial viability was greater 
due to the larger market it would reach (Kreitman and Pastan, 2011, interviewee G).  
Despite the success of CAT3888 in trials, incremental changes led to the development 
of a family of drugs, including CAT8015, with a wider potential to treat haematological 
malignancies. This mean that CAT3888 acted as a proof of concept for the development 
of a follow-up compound.  
Despite the accumulated knowledge around CAT3888, there is little evidence of disease-
related knowledge during the development pathway of CAT3888. This is demonstrated 
whereby only 2,336127 articles were found to mention the primary indication (HCL) in the 
years leading up to trials128 of CAT3888. 
The therapeutic approach used in CAT3888 was novel. However, the consistency of the 
research group due to the majority of the work being carried out under the NCI CRADA, 
allowed the knowledge to accumulate throughout project development. Therefore, this 
should not be seen to be an inhibitory factor in the termination of the project. With this in 
mind and in order to maintain consistency throughout, CAT3888 is characterised as 
being a member of the set ‘extensive and accumulated knowledge base’.  
 
                                                 
 
127 This figure was obtained using the Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) term ‘Leukemia, Hairy 
Cell’ as a search term in PubMed. 
128 Up to and including 1999 
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7.7.4 Market demand (QCA score = 0) 
The applicability of CAT3888 in cancer indications was limited by the expression of CD22 
on tumour cells. By the time CAT3888 entered preclinical development it was already 
recognised that CD22 was only expressed B cells of human B-cell lymphomas and 
leukaemia (Vitetta et al., 1991, Clark, 1993, Kreitman et al., 1999). This discovery 
enabled the development for CAT3888 to be directed at models for B-cell malignancies 
found to be CD22+ (Kreitman et al., 1999, Kreitman et al., 2000). CD22 expression 
across all lymphomas and leukaemias stands at around 70%, and specifically at 70-85% 
of Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (NHL), 99% of B-cell CLL and more than 90% of paediatric 
ALL (Kreitman and Pastan, 2006).  
This indicates that a large proportion of leukaemias and lymphomas express the CD22 
antigen therefore providing broad applicability for CAT3888. However, the highest 
density of antigen sites is found in hairy cell leukaemia (10,000->100,000 per cell), where 
to other B-cell malignancies show 1,200 sites per cell in CLL, and 4,500 sites per cell in 
ALL (Kreitman and Pastan, 2011). CAT3888 demonstrated low binding affinity to CD22 
indicating that HCL was the most suitable indication for the drug (Kreitman et al., 2001a, 
Kreitman et al., 2001b, Kreitman et al., 2004, Kreitman et al., 2008, Kreitman et al., 2005a, 
Kreitman et al., 2009, Kreitman et al., 2005b, Pharma Marketletter, 2005a). This 
realisation implied a substantial decline in the potential market demand for the drug, 
where HCL appears in only 2% of all leukaemia patients, totalling around 6,000 new 
cases each year worldwide (Maevis et al., 2014).  
The small CAT3888 market potential is also echoed in press reports. In 2005, the market 
for the drug was quantified at between $200-300m (Pharma Marketletter, 2005b). This 
can be compared to an estimate of the market for acute and chronic leukaemias which 
was stated, by Genencor, to stand at around $400m in 2004, again representing a small 
opportunity in terms of returns for drug developers (Genencor International Inc., 2004b).  
In conclusion, CAT3888 did not hold significant market potential, when considering the 
number of indications it could be applied to which was limited by the target receptor 
specificity to subtypes of leukaemias. The small market potential for CAT3888, and the 
higher efficacy seen in the follow-on project CAT8015, were a key contributor in the 
termination of the project and so the score for the QCA analysis is 0.  
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7.7.5 Stakeholder Perspectives (QCA score = 1) 
CAT3888 was met with positive expectations from various stakeholders, in addition to 
those held by CAT, which invested in the project when they in-licensed due to the 
expectation that immunotoxins would be a promising area to enter into (interviewee G).  
Positive drug project expectations were also felt by the scientists involved: ‘the unusually 
high response rates led researchers to have high hopes for the use of this drug in HCL, 
and possibly in other patients’ (National Cancer Institute, 2001). In addition scientists at 
competing companies also demonstrate positive perspectives where CAT3888 
(previously BL22) is described as ‘one of the best documented and promising 
immunotoxins’ (Chowdhury and Wu, 2005).  
Furthermore, at this time mabs, including CAT3888 (an antibody-conjugate), received 
high expectations from industry stakeholders. This is demonstrated in the headline, in 
October 2006, that stated ‘Monoclonal Antibodies, Generating $7.3 Billion in Sales in 
2005, Have Been the Most Successful Class of Biological Anticancer Agents’ (Research 
and Markets, 2006).  
The investment bank, Lehman Brothers ‘hailed the deal as a positive development for 
CAT’, when the Genencor-CAT agreement was signed (Pharma Marketletter, 2005b). 
However, the same article estimates the potential revenues of the drug to be just $200-
300m (ibid). Furthermore, Reuters Health report the phase I findings as ‘exciting for two 
reasons’: ‘“first, it is the second example of a targeted toxin being delivered to a specific 
type of tumor cell.” Second… it provides further support for the use of antibodies in 
delivering treatments to a cancer cell’ (Brown, 2001).  
Patient perspectives are demonstrated, for instance, in a high profile patient story 
reported on CNN, presenting the project as a life-saver (Frazier, 2001). The story 
involved a stage four HCL patient, resistant to previously available drugs, who entered 
complete remission in response to CAT3888 treatment (ibid). In addition, treatment was 
described as ‘extremely effective’ and rapidly effective: ‘within two days patients have 
more than a 90% reduction of malignant cells in their blood’ (Frazier, 2001).  
In terms of the stakeholder perspectives of CAT3888 it is clear that many actors saw the 
drug as positive, both in terms of its promising expectations, its novel nature and in the 
demonstration of support through patient stories. This justifies membership into the set 
and the QCA score of 1.  
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7.7.6 Organisational environment (QCA score = 0) 
As mentioned initial development of CAT3888 was undertaken by a team at the NCI, 
including Pastan, Kreitman, FitzGerald and colleagues. In 2004 the NCI signed a CRADA 
with the US company, Genencor, for two related project candidates, BL22 (CAT3888) 
and HA22 (CAT8015) (Genencor International Inc., 2004a).  
Genencor were a diversified biotechnology company delivering products in ‘healthcare, 
agri-processing, industrial and consumer markets’ (ibid). Genencor describes the NCI 
agreement as one that ‘builds on our strengths in protein engineering, preclinical 
development, manufacturing and clinical development and on the NCI’s clinical 
development capabilities’. This demonstrates the strategic and capability fit of the 
projects (CAT3888 and CAT8015) at Genencor (Genencor International Inc., 2005).  
Despite this good synergy CAT3888 was only supported by Genencor for a year. In 2005 
Genencor was acquired for their capabilities in industrial enzymes, by Danisco, a Danish 
firm focused on producing food ingredients (Danisco A/S, 2005). Shortly afterwards CAT 
took over the CRADA with NCI by in-licensing CAT3888 and CAT8015 (Pharma 
Marketletter, 2005b, Cambridge Antibody Technology PLC, 2005b).  
In 2005 CAT described itself as: 
‘A biopharmaceutical company aiming to bring improvements to seriously ill patients’ 
lives and in this way create outstanding returns for shareholders. The company 
seeks to develop high value products in which it has a significant economics interest, 
both independently and in collaboration with partners, by using its capabilities and 
technologies in the discovery and development of antibody medicines in selecting 
therapeutic areas. CAT also licenses its technologies to enable others to develop 
drugs in which CAT has a financial interest’ (Pharma Marketletter, 2005a).  
Despite having extensive experience in antibodies, including early research leading to 
Humira, a blockbuster mab approved for rheumatoid arthritis, the CAT pipeline was 
limited to respiratory and inflammation projects, and CAT were lacking in cancer 
research experience (Pharma Marketletter, 2005a). CAT’s motivations for acquiring the 
projects were to expand activities into the USA, and into oncology and immunotoxins, 
both of which were perceived as areas of growth and potential (interviewee G).  
The primary motivation, to expand into the USA, was fulfilled wherein CAT hired 10 key 
staff from Genencor to continue to be responsible for CAT3888 and CAT8015 in the USA 
(Cambridge Antibody Technology PLC, 2005b). In addition oncology presented the 
‘greatest opportunities’ for firms due to: 1) medical need, 2) high numbers of relapsed or 
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refractory patients, 3) ‘achievability’ 4) multiple points for intervention (particularly in 
antibodies) and 5) market attractiveness (Cambridge Antibody Technology PLC, 2005a).  
In 2006 CAT’s commitment to oncology was further exemplified by their acquisition of an 
additional oncology project from Enzon (Cambridge Antibody Technology PLC, 2006). 
This project (CAT5001) was also an immunotoxin (using Pseudomonas exotoxin) that 
came from the lab of Ira Pastan (ibid). Therefore, CAT5001 benefitted from the 
capabilities accumulated during the development of CAT3888 and CAT8015. It was later 
announced, in 2006 that AZ was acquiring CAT (London Stock Exchange Aggregated 
Regulatory News Service, 2006a). The new parent company discontinued the project, 
as reported in their annual report in 2007 (AstraZeneca PLC, 2007). 
Despite this, development of the enhanced version of the project, CAT-8015, did 
continue at AZ. This supports the conclusion that the reason behind the CAT3888 
discontinuation was the higher potential of the follow-on, CAT8015. 
This section has demonstrated that the environment surrounding CAT3888 development 
was positive and consistent due to the role of staff at the NCI. The consistency of the 
location of development and those involved in the project, may have overcome the 
difficulties that can be associated with mergers and acquisitions. However, the 
acquisition by AZ ultimately coincided with the termination of the development of 
CAT3888. It is this reason that contributes towards the QCA score of 0. 
7.7.7 CAT3888 Conclusion 
This case history indicates that the development of CAT3888 was primarily test bed used 
to demonstrate proof of concept, for the subsequent development of CAT8015. This 
highlights a mechanism of project drag distinct from those previously discussed. Here 
we observe a loss of momentum due to the displacement of a project as a result of the 
gradual gaining of momentum of another. In other words, as one proves to be more 
successful, the other is perceived to be relatively less so.  
Project drag is compounded by the novelty of immunotoxins which was a new and 
uncertain approach to cancer treatment. Furthermore, while providing proof of concept, 
CAT3888 was aimed at a smaller patient population than its follow-on compound 
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(CAT8015129). The lower level of potential market demand for CAT3888 is assumed to 
be the main motivation for AZ discontinuing the project. 
We see these factors of project drag accumulating throughout the project, becoming 
salient upon acquisition by AZ, whereby the acquiring firm implement a re-evaluation of 
the project outside of the protected space previously shielding the project, leading to 
termination.  
7.8 Insights from Descriptive Analysis 
This Chapter, along with Chapter 6, has provided a lengthy discussion of the 11 drug 
project case histories that provide the empirical evidence for this thesis. Chapters 6 and 
7 have also provided evidence justifying the QCA score which will be analysed in Chapter 
8. This section builds on the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6 to formulate an overarching 
picture of the mechanisms contributing to success and failure of rare cancer drugs.  
In our descriptive analysis of these 11 cases we refer back to the framework constructed 
in Chapter 3, which was further developed in the discussions of Herceptin and Gleevec, 
presented in Chapter 5. A diagrammatic representation of the way the data can be 
represented as part of this framework is presented in Figure 11. This chart not only 
provides summary data for the scoring of conditions for each drug project but it allows 
us to draw out several key trends which will be discussed in this chapter. In line with the 
QCA to follow, which takes explanations of success and failure to be asymmetrical, we 
will discuss these patterns separately for the two outcomes.  
7.8.1 Explaining Successful Projects 
Firstly, as observed from Figure 11, successful cases all encounter at least three uppers, 
i.e. the mechanisms implemented to overcome issues during drug development: 
pazopanib encountered two downers/three uppers, nelarabine four downers/three 
uppers, temozolomide two downers/five uppers, Campath five downers/four uppers, and 
gemtuzumab five downers and three downers.  
From the observation of the balance of uppers and downers, the two baseline cases, 
pazopanib and temozolomide, show a small number of downers, demonstrating their 
relatively unproblematic development pathways. Therefore, we focus our investigation 
                                                 
 
129 CAT8015, now moxetumumab, remains in development stages at AZ, entering Phase II clinical 
trials in 2014, and is expected to be launched in 2018 (AstraZeneca PLC, 2015)  
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into the mechanisms at work in the cases of nelarabine, Campath and gemtuzumab, 
where more downers are encountered than uppers.  
One of the mechanisms used to overcome the downers in these cases is the action of 
key individuals. Key individuals were seen to be a substantial contributor towards the 
success seen in nelarabine, and Campath. In nelarabine, Trudy Elion promoted the 
project through mergers of the parent company and subsequent project evaluation. For 
Campath, Herman Waldmann and Geoff Hale helped to overcome organisational issues 
particularly in the wake of the Wellcome license discontinuation.  
The case histories have also shown particular characteristics of key individuals that are 
noteworthy in promoting projects and overcoming issues in development. The two main 
characteristics are: 1) a strong and wide ranging network (seen to be key in nelarabine, 
where Elion bought in expertise from Duke University and Kurtzberg, and Campath, 
where Waldmann used his contacts in LeukoSite to gain a new license partner when 
Wellcome discontinued their involvement), and 2) continued involvement throughout the 
project (this is seen in nelarabine and Campath and a lack of continued involvement from 
key individuals was problematic in the case of banoxantrone). 
Gemtuzumab also benefited from a similar mechanism of championing. In this case the 
organisational support was in the form of a productive and risk/benefit-sharing 
collaborative relationship and a good relationship between the collaborating firms’ CEOs. 
In addition, despite the large number of downers that may have contributed towards 
project drag and termination, gemtuzumab also benefited from being used as proof of 
concept for the technological approach. Although not explicitly stated, Campath may also 
have been subject to this type of positive force, whereby the approach was similarly novel. 
In addition, Campath and nelarabine were also aimed at areas of serious unmet medical 
need, whereby patient need and the lack of existing comparator for regulatory approval 
has a positive impact on the development of the project.  
7.8.2 Explaining Failed Projects  
Figure 11 shows that failed projects encounter many more downers than uppers in all 
cases. Perhaps the least problematic case was barasertib (three downers; two uppers). 
In this case additional issues also arose in the lack of understanding surrounding the 
drug’s mechanism of action, and the questions surrounding efficacy that arose gradually 
throughout development. Here we make two conclusions. Firstly, despite the efficacy 
being comparable to that found in other cases, it is perceived to be insufficient to warrant 
further investigation in such a small patient population. Secondly this represents 
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contributors to project drag, where issues accumulated causing a loss of momentum for 
the project.  
In plevitrexed, the other unsuccessful big pharma project, again relatively low efficacy, 
long development times and lack of strategic fit were found to contribute towards 
discontinuation. Here, we find that where issues associated with projects in large firms 
are not resolved they contribute towards project drag. With the exception of the negative 
external perception of plevitrexed due to the disappointment of the precursor molecule, 
issues surrounding pharma drug development tend to be inherent to the project as the 
firm is not vulnerable to external dynamics.  
In small firms, we see both the formation of protected spaces that formulate within the 
firms, around a project, through a process of shared positive expectations, and an 
undercurrent of project drag. This presents a more complex dynamic, as demonstrated 
in banoxantrone, TransMID, Prolarix and CAT3888.  
Here the protected space may mean that the downers that contribute towards project 
drag are not fully recognised by the developing firm due to the suspension of objective 
evaluation criteria and the perception that all problems are conquerable. However, 
factors contributing towards the loss of momentum for the project continue to accumulate, 
in addition to the added complication of lack of resources, and difficulties associated with 
a lack of experience.  
Where project drag is mainly observed to concern issues internal to the project, small 
firms are also vulnerable to external pressures, which may lead to M&A. Not only does 
M&A itself contribute towards the project drag through the disruption it causes, but it can 
also lead to the breakdown of the protected space and therefore the downers contributing 
towards project drag are uncovered.  
For instance, in the cases of banoxantrone and TransMID, we observe the changes to 
licensing agreements and M&A events causing delays and disruptions. In addition, in 
banoxantrone, the blue discolouration of patients’ skin also contributes to project drag. 
Not only would the project drag accumulate throughout development but due to the 
formation of protected spaces the individuals involved in development perceive these 
issues to be conquerable and the loss of momentum is not recognised until the protected 
spaces break down.  
In Prolarix, we observe project drag from the delays in development, due to the changes 
in GMP requirements for products used in clinical trials, and the removal of the doctors 
and dentists exemption. This contributed towards a high burn rate for the developing firm, 
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which in turn led to the eventual acquisition of Enact by Protherics, and Protherics by 
BTG. 
In CAT3888, which was displaced by CAT8015, as development progressed, the 
continued success of the follow-on contributed towards project drag. Here, uniquely, we 
find that a loss of momentum for one project is a result of the gaining of momentum in 
another project, providing an increasingly high benchmark comparable for the original 
drug.  
7.8.3 General Observations 
In addition to the above findings associated with successful and failed projects, which 
highlight a difference between the dynamics in large and small firms, we also observe 
some general findings. Firstly, we find no direct action of patient demand on firms as was 
the case with Herceptin and Gleevec. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.   
Another observation is the endogeneity between the issues of uncertain/novel 
approaches, which influence both knowledge and markets, and the enthusiasm 
associated with a new approach that acts to counteract the negative effects. This 
confirms the findings from the literature and the narratives presented in the Herceptin 
and Gleevec cases.  
The descriptive analysis has highlighted the diversity in the mechanisms at work 
contributing towards success and failure of drug projects for rare cancers. This implies a 
complexity that makes the identification of trends difficult due to the large number of case 
studies assessed, necessitating an alternative methodological approach. The QCA 
provides this due to the ability to simplify the findings, both in terms of the calibration 
(scoring of membership into sets) and the amalgamation of factors into four overarching 
conditions. This facilitates an interpretation of the data which complements and builds 
on the findings from this section.  
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8 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) – Crisp Set QCA 
As per the methodological approach set out in Chapter 4, a QCA was undertaken in 
addition to the descriptive analysis carried out in Chapters 6 and 7. While the descriptive 
analysis built up the similarities and differences between each case, the results from this 
QCA provide a comparative analysis of all of the projects seen together. The QCA 
findings are complementary to previous findings because the previous descriptive 
analysis provided a dynamic view of the case histories, while the QCA will take an overall 
picture of the project, rather than appreciate changes through time.  
The QCA findings echo those from the descriptive analysis: the main condition 
associated with success is a supportive organisational environment. Here, the QCA 
shows that this condition is necessary, but not sufficient, in isolation, for the success to 
occur. In addition, in conjunction with the presence of either, positive stakeholder 
perspectives, or an extensive and accumulated knowledge base, a supportive 
organisational environment is sufficient for success. Furthermore, interestingly a high 
market demand is not required to confer success (as seen in the cases of nelarabine 
and gemtuzumab). 
Due to the asymmetric nature of QCA, explaining the absence of the outcome (i.e. non-
technical 130 failure of a project) warrants separate analysis. Here, the QCA findings 
indicate that failure is associated with the absence of a high market demand (a necessary 
condition), in conjunction with either the absence of a supportive organisational 
environment, or the absence of an extensive and accumulated knowledge base and the 
absence of positive stakeholder perspectives131. 
Throughout this thesis, as mentioned in Chapter 4, an upper case letter is represents the 
presence of a condition, and a lower case letter the absence of a condition, as is common 
practice in the implementation of QCA methodology. 
                                                 
 
130 Recall here that the research design excluded cases terminated for technical reasons, i.e. 
those due to safety, or severe efficacy (i.e. the drug was found to show very little or no response 
in patients).  
131 The terminology in this thesis, is in-line with QCA good practice. Due to the nature of the 
calibration of the conditions, it is more suitable to discuss the presence/absence of a condition, 
as opposed to substituting in different descriptors (e.g. high/low, unaccumulated/accumulated, 
positive/negative, supportive/unsupportive). This was discussed in section 4.4.3. 
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8.1 Summary of Crisp Set QCA Scores 
QCA scores132 were assigned for each condition (extensive and accumulated knowledge 
base, high market demand, positive stakeholder perspectives and supportive 
organisational environments) in the case histories presented in Chapters 6 and 7 
(summary of data points and justification of QCA score in Table 31).  
Prior to undertaking the QCA we can make some initial observations from the different 
projects pathways, and how these differentiate successful (green) and unsuccessful (red) 
outcomes. These are presented in diagram (Figure 12) and table format (Table 32). 
Figure 12 supports the premise that organisational environment differentiates success 
from failure. When tabulated (Table 32), with darker shaded cells indicating where 
observed score is different to that expected (under the assumption that all four conditions 
are required for success), the deviant, and therefore interesting, cases are: nelarabine, 
barasertib, plevitrexed, gemtuzumab and CAT3888.  
 
Figure 12 Typology diagram representing the pathways represented in the 
empirical data 
 
                                                 
 
132 QCA scores are mentioned at the end of each section in Chapter 6 and 7. 
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Table 31 Summary of data used to justify QCA scores for case histories 
Drug Project 
Extensive and Accumulated Knowledge Base  High Market Demand Positive Stakeholder Perspectives Supportive Organisational Environment 
Y 
Targeted or 
Cytotoxic 
New/ Established 
Target 
Validated 
Consistent 
Research Team 
Disease 
Know-
ledge 
QCA 
 
Many Indication 
Media 
Report 
Competitor 
Orphan 
Drug 
status 
Patent 
Issues 
QCA 
Positive 
Media 
Reports 
Easy Administ-
ration 
Patient 
Stories 
QCA 
Interorg. 
Activity 
Productive 
Relationship 
Strategic 
Experienced 
Firm 
QCA 
Pazopanib Targeted  New  Yes Yes No 1 
 
Yes, common 
~$1bn per 
year 
Sunitinib (3 yrs 
prior) 
No No 1 Yes Yes No 1 
No (mergers 
early on) 
n/a Yes Yes 1 1 
Barasertib Targeted New No Yes Yes 0 
 
No n/a 
Gem-tuzumab 
(before) 
No No 0 
Not of 
project 
No No 0 
Yes (discovery 
phases) 
n/a Yes Yes 1 0 
Nelarabine Cytotoxic Established Yes Yes Yes 1 
 
No $1bn No Yes No 0 
Not of 
project 
No No 0 Yes 
Yes, also internal 
key individual 
No Yes 1 1 
Plevitrexed Cytotoxic Established Yes Yes Yes 1 
 
Yes, common 
$12m; 
$8m; 
$66m 
  Yes Yes 0 
Not of 
project 
No No 0 Yes Yes and no No Yes 0 0 
Temo- zolomide Cytotoxic Established Yes Yes Yes 1 
 
Yes, common n/a No Yes No 1 Yes Yes Yes 1 
Yes (commer-
cial) 
n/a Yes Yes 1 1 
Campath Targeted New No Yes Yes 1 
 
Yes, common n/a No Yes No 1 Yes No No 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes and no 1 1 
Gem- tuzumab Targeted New No Yes Yes 0 
 
No 
$300m; 
$250m; 
$150m 
No Yes   0 Yes No Yes 1 
Yes (discovery 
phases) 
Yes Yes Yes and no 1 1 
Banox- antrone Targeted New No No No 0 
 
Yes (not 
developed) 
$250m   No No 0 
Yes (but blue 
side effect) 
No No 0 Yes Yes and no No No 0 0 
TransMID Targeted New No Yes and no Yes 0 
 
No 
$600m; 
$210m 
Carmustine 
implant/ temo-
zolomide 
No Yes 0 Yes No No 0 Yes Yes and no Yes No 0 0 
Prolarix Targeted Established No No No 0 
 
No 
$2.8bn; 
$250m 
Sorafenib (not 
NICE approved) 
No No 0 
Yes (limited 
& local) 
No No 0 Yes   No No 0 0 
CAT3888 Targeted New No Yes No 1 
 
No 
$200-
300m 
No No No 0 Yes No Yes 1 Yes Yes No Yes 0 0 
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Case ID Knowledge Market Stakeholders Environment Outcome 
Pazopanib 1 1 1 1 1 
Nelarabine 1 0 0 1 1 
Barasertib 0 0 0 1 0 
Plevitrexed 1 0 0 0 0 
Temozolomide 1 1 1 1 1 
Campath 1 1 1 1 1 
Gemtuzumab 0 0 1 1 1 
Banoxantrone 0 0 0 0 0 
TransMID 0 0 0 0 0 
Prolarix 0 0 0 0 0 
CAT3888 1 0 1 0 0 
Table 32 Summary of csQCA scores for each drug project case study (green for 
successful pathways, red for unsuccessful pathways; darker colour for where 
presence/absence of condition does not correspond with presence/absence of 
outcome) 
 
8.2 Analysis 
The first stage of a QCA is to assess necessary conditions. This is followed by the 
construction of a truth table, and the generation of solutions presenting the configurations 
explaining the outcomes. Each of these analyses are undertaken separately for 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes, due to the asymmetrical nature of QCA. 
8.2.1 Necessity – Explaining Successful and Unsuccessful Cases 
A condition is found to be sufficient when there are cases showing presence of the 
condition and presence of the outcome, (cases in X133=1, Y=1), while no cases show 
presence of the condition and absence of the outcome (no cases in X=1, Y=0). Cases 
with X=0, Y=1, or X=0, Y=0 are irrelevant. This is because sufficiency is found when the 
condition (X) in question is a subset of the outcome (Y) (Figure 13). In other words, the 
presence of the condition would be sufficient for the outcome to occur, or ‘if X, then Y’.  
In contrast, for a condition to be necessary for the outcome to occur, there should be 
cases that show the presence of the condition and the outcome (cases in X=1, Y=1), and 
no cases where there is the absence of the condition and the presence of the outcome 
                                                 
 
133  X in general discussions of QCA methodology, represents the condition score, where Y 
represents the outcome.  
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(no cases in X=0, Y=1). This is because the outcome (Y) is a subset of the condition (X) 
(Figure 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section explores the necessity of each condition for successfully advancing a project 
to regulatory approval. This assessment is facilitated by the construction of matrices for 
each condition. Each condition is represented by a letter, knowledge base, ‘B’, market 
demand, ‘D’, stakeholder perspectives, ‘S’ and organisational environment, ‘E’134. 
These matrices (see Table 33, Table 34, Table 35, and Table 36) indicate that a 
supportive organisational environment is necessary for the outcome to occur. This is 
confirmed in when a test of necessity is computed (Table 37).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
134 These letters were chosen due to the obvious distinction between the upper and lower case 
letters.  
Figure 13 Venn diagram illustrating the relationship between subset/superset 
relationships and necessity and sufficiency 
X=0 
Y=1 
X=1 
Y=1 
X=1 
Y=0 
X=1 
Y=1 
 
X is a subset 
of Y (X is a 
sufficient 
condition for 
the outcome 
Y) 
Y is a subset of 
X (X is a 
necessary 
condition for 
the outcome 
Y) 
252 
 
Table 33 Matrix identifying necessity and sufficiency of extensive and 
accumulated knowledge base 
 
Table 34 Matrix identifying necessity and sufficiency of high market demand 
 
 
 S (positive stakeholder perspectives)  
0 1  
Y 
1 nelarabine 
pazopanib, 
temozolomide, 
Campath, 
gemtuzumab 
Positive stakeholder expectations is 
neither sufficient (due to the 
presence of TransMID and 
CAT3888) nor necessary (due to 
the presence of nelarabine) for the 
success to occur 0 
barasertib, 
plevitrexed, 
banoxantrone, 
TransMID, Prolarix 
CAT3888 
Table 35 Matrix identifying necessity and sufficiency of positive stakeholder 
perspectives  
 
 E (supportive organisational environment)  
0 1  
Y 
1  
pazopanib, 
nelarabine 
temozolomide, 
Campath, 
gemtuzumab 
A supportive organisational 
environment is necessary (due to 
the absence of cases in the 
Y=1;X=0 cell) but not sufficient for 
success to occur (due to the 
presence of barasertib) 0 
plevitrexed, 
banoxantrone, 
TransMID, Prolarix, 
CAT3888 
barasertib 
Table 36 Matrix identifying necessity and sufficiency of supportive organisational 
environment  
 B (extensive and accumulated knowledge base)  
0 1   
Y 
1 gemtuzumab 
pazopanib, 
nelarabine, 
temozolomide, 
Campath, 
gemtuzumab 
Extensive and accumulated 
knowledge base is neither 
necessary (due to the presence of 
gemtuzumab) nor sufficient (due to 
the presence of plevitrexed)  
0 
barasertib, 
banoxantrone, 
TranMID, Prolarix, 
Plevitrexed, 
CAT3888 
 D (high expected market demand)  
0 1   
Y 
1 
nelarabine, 
gemtuzumab 
pazopanib, 
temozolomide, 
Campath 
High expected market demand is 
sufficient (due to the absence of 
cases in X=1, Y=0), but not 
necessary due to the presence of 
cases in Y=1, X=0 0 
barasertib, 
plevitrexed, 
banoxantrone, 
TranMID, Prolarix, 
CAT3888 
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Condition Consistency Coverage 
B 0.8 0.67 
b 0.2 0.2 
D 0.6 1 
d 0.4 0.25 
S 0.8 0.8 
s 0.2 0.17 
E 1 0.83 
e 0 0 
Table 37 Consistency and coverage values for necessary conditions to explain 
successful cases 
 
The necessity of a supportive organisational environment for success, further 
demonstrating the key points identified from the descriptive analysis. In order for success 
to occur, a supportive organisational environment should be present. However, it is also 
possible for the presence of a supportive organisational environment to appear in failed 
projects (e.g. in the case of barasertib), because the condition is necessary but not 
sufficient for success. In addition, despite the matrix analysis apparently showing that a 
high market demand is sufficient for success, a truth table analysis is required to confirm 
this.  
Due to the asymmetrical nature135 of QCA an analysis of necessary conditions is also 
undertaken for the absence of the outcome (i.e. failure/unsuccessful projects). In this 
instance as there are no obvious (100%) necessary conditions, therefore it is helpful to 
compute calculations to ascertain necessary conditions for the absence of success 
(Table 38). In this, consistency is a measure of the extent to which the empirical data are 
represented by the measure of necessity, i.e. the degree to which the outcome can be 
considered as a subset of the condition (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:143). 
Coverage represents the relevance of the necessity of a condition. Therefore, in order 
for necessity to be concluded, both consistency and coverage scores should be high 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:147). 
 
 
                                                 
 
135 The asymmetric nature of QCA implies that the conditions associated with failure are not 
necessarily the counter scenario from those seen in successful cases 
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Condition Consistency Coverage 
B 0.33 0.33 
b 0.67 0.8 
D 0 0 
d 1 0.75 
S 0.17 0.2 
s 0.83 0.83 
E 0.17 0.17 
e 0.83 1 
Table 38 Consistency and coverage values for necessary conditions to explain 
unsuccessful cases 
 
Table 38 indicates that, although not perfect, the absence of a high expected market 
demand is found to be necessary for an unsuccessful outcome. This is concluded due 
to a consistency value of 1, representing a coverage of 75% of cases.  
8.2.2 Truth Table Analysis – Explaining Successful Cases 
A truth table (Table 39) is constructed where all possible combinations of conditions are 
accounted for, either where empirical cases exist, or a configuration is a logical 
remainder, where cases are not observed. The objective of a truth table is to define which 
configurations are relevant to include in the solution formulation, where the solution 
represents the pathway(s) leading to the outcome. We assign configurations to include 
as ‘1’, if evidence shows that this configuration leads to the presence of the outcome, ‘0’ 
to exclude, if evidence indicates this configuration leads to the absence of the outcome, 
and logical remainders as ‘-‘.  
In this section we will analyse successful cases, and therefore include configurations 
observed in the successful empirical cases. Initially, if the empirical case is not observed, 
the configuration is not included (Table 39).   
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B D S E Cases (outcome) Consistency Inclusion 
1 1 1 1 pazopanib (1), temozolomide (1),  Campath (1) 1 1 
1 1 1 0 -  - 
1 1 0 0 -  - 
0 1 0 0 -  - 
1 0 1 0 CAT3888 (0)  0 
0 0 1 1 gemtuzumab (1) 1 1 
1 1 0 1 -  - 
0 1 1 1 -  - 
0 1 1 0 -  - 
0 1 0 1 -  - 
1 0 1 1 -  - 
1 0 0 1 nelarabine (1) 1 1 
1 0 0 0 plevitrexed (0) 0 0 
0 0 1 0 -  - 
0 0 0 1 Barasertib (0) 0 0 
0 0 0 0 banoxantrone (0), Prolarix (0), TransMID (0), 0 0 
Table 39 Truth table explaining a successful outcome, with no assumptions made 
about counterfactuals 
 
In the absence of any approach to deal with logical remainders the solution, after logical 
minimisation, based solely on the empirical data is136: 
BdsE + bdSE+ BDSE  → Y  (solution 1a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
136 Note that with Boolean algebra ‘+’ represents ‘or’ 
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This can be presented as a Venn diagram (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 Venn diagram showing truth table analysis explaining success 
 
Solution 1a shows that success is associated with either i) a presence of extensive and 
accumulated knowledge base, absence of high expected market demand, absence of 
positive stakeholder expectations and presence of supportive organisational 
environments, or ii) the extensive and applicable knowledge base and absence of high 
expected market demand, and the presence of positive stakeholder expectations and 
the presence of supportive organisational environment, or iii) the presence of all four 
conditions, in conjunction.  
However, this solution is too complex to be informative. This complexity arises from 
limited diversity existing in social reality, meaning that only a limited number of possible 
combinations are empirically observed (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012:152-3). To 
combat this, in a QCA analysis, we can account for counterfactuals, by predicting the 
outcome that would occur in observed configurations. 
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 We observe BDSE (pazopanib, temozolomide, and Campath), bdSE (gemtuzumab) and 
dBsE (nelarabine) in the empirical data. Therefore, can also infer that BdSE, BDsE and 
bDSE, if observed, would also account for success, and so should be included into the 
truth table analysis. The configuration bDSE is also further supported by the case history 
of Herceptin. We can therefore re-run the truth table including these additional 
configurations (‘1’ in Table 40).  
 
 
The resulting solution, after logical minimisation is:  
BE + SE   →  Y  (solution 1b) 
When representing solution 1b as a Venn diagram it accounts for a logical portion of the 
space, including all the empirical instances where the outcome is observed (Figure 15). 
B D S E Cases (outcome) Consistency Inclusion 
1 1 1 1 pazopanib (1), temozolomide (1),  Campath (1) 1 1 
1 1 1 0 -   
1 1 0 0 -   
0 1 0 0 -   
1 0 1 0 CAT3888 (0) 0 0 
0 0 1 1 gemtuzumab (1) 1 1 
1 1 0 1 -  1 
0 1 1 1 -  1 
0 1 1 0 -   
0 1 0 1 -   
1 0 1 1 -  1 
1 0 0 1 nelarabine (1) 1 1 
1 0 0 0 plevitrexed (0) 0 0 
0 0 1 0 - 0 0 
0 0 0 1 Barasertib (0) 0 0 
0 0 0 0 banoxantrone (0), Prolarix (0),  TransMID (0) 0 0 
Table 40 Truth table explaining a successful outcome, with assumptions made about 
counterfactuals 
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Figure 15 Venn diagram showing truth table analysis explaining an unsuccessful 
outcome 
 
Interpreting solution 1b shows that in order for the outcome (success) to occur a project 
requires supportive organisational environment, in combination with either i) the 
presence of extensive and accumulated knowledge base, or ii) the presence of positive 
stakeholder expectations, irrespective of the presence or absence of extensive and 
accumulated knowledge base and high expected market demand.  
In other words, whenever a supportive organisational environment occurs, so will 
success, assuming the drug has the potential to work 137 . However, a supportive 
organisational environment can occur in the case of unsuccessful drugs (for instance, in 
the case of barasertib) because the condition (OE) needs to be combined with other 
conditions (in this case either an extensive and accumulated knowledge base, or positive 
stakeholder support.  
                                                 
 
137 This was fulfilled in the selection of the cases and the focus on projects that had failed for non-
technical reasons (i.e. safety and/or severe efficacy). Refer to Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.2.2. 
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Although not conclusive, due to the lack of cases observed showing the presence of a 
high market demand, it is intuitive, and not contradicted by the empirical data that a high 
market demand is sufficient, on its own, to lead to success. More data would be needed 
to prove this conclusively suggesting an avenue for future research whereby projects for 
larger population sizes may provide further insights. This was not addressed in this thesis 
due to an ambition to understand and compare cases aimed at small markets. This also 
facilitated a bounding of the research in line with feasibility, as the sample size would 
have grown substantially if all cancer indications were included.  
The solution explaining success is also interesting because stakeholder expectations, 
such as those associated with patient stories, contribute to the outcome in association 
with supportive organisational environments, despite the possible absence of extensive 
and accumulated knowledge base. Similarly, the presence of extensive and accumulated 
knowledge base, in the presence of supportive organisational environments can, on its 
own, contribute towards success despite the absence of positive expectations amongst 
wider stakeholders.  
8.2.3 Truth Table Analysis – Explaining Unsuccessful Cases 
Due to the asymmetrical nature of the results obtained from a QCA, we use a separate 
truth table analysis to explain the absence of the outcome, i.e. unsuccessful projects. 
This uses the same data as the previous analysis but includes, into the solution, the 
cases associated with the absence of the outcome. Here, the software is instructed to 
explain the negated outcome (y) with the resulting truth table representing the 
consistency scores for each configuration (related to the outcome scores for the cases 
included).  
Without accounting for logical remainders, this analysis show the resulting solution: 
bds + Bde   →   y  (solution 2a)  
As we did in the analysis of the successful outcome, we use logic to account for logical 
remainders, using simplifying assumptions. In this we can assume that as BdSe is 
associated with an unsuccessful project then it is likely that bdSe will also equate to the 
absence of the outcome (Table 41). Furthermore, as with the analysis of the successful 
outcome, here we also need to ensure that no configurations showing the absence of 
the necessary condition (the absence of high market demand) are not considered in 
counterfactuals contributing towards explaining the presence of the outcome we want to 
explain (in this case the absence of success) (‘0’ in Table 41). 
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The resulting solution is: 
de + bds   →    y  (solution 2b) 
This solution highlights that unsuccessful cases are associated with a lack of market 
demand and either 1) the absence of supportive organisational environments, or 2) the 
absence of extensive and applicable knowledge base and positive stakeholder 
perspectives. In other words, whenever a lack of market demand occurs a drug is 
unsuccessful. However, as seen in the cases of gemtuzumab and nelarabine, a lack of 
market demand can occur in association with success. This is because a lack of demand 
is necessary (i.e. the outcome is a subset of the condition) and needs to be combined 
with other conditions in order to account for all empirical cases.  
Despite solution 2b appearing to show contradictions from the complex solution 2a, that 
makes no conclusions about counterfactuals/logical remainders, in terms of the 
presence/absence of an extensive and accumulated knowledge base, it is intuitive that 
solution 2b be more akin to reality. Here we consider that, where solution 2a includes 
the presence of extensive and accumulated knowledge base (‘B’) in one of the pathways 
explaining an unsuccessful outcome (‘y’), it is more logical, with our knowledge of the 
process of drug discovery and development, that the absence of an extensive and 
B D S E Cases (outcome) Consistency Inclusion 
1 1 1 1 pazopanib (1), temozolomide (1), Campath (1) 0 0 
1 1 1 0 - - 0 
1 1 0 0 - - 0 
0 1 0 0 - - 0 
1 0 1 0 CAT3888 (0) 1 1 
0 0 1 1 gemtuzumab (1) 0 0 
1 1 0 1 - - 0 
0 1 1 1 - - 0 
0 1 1 0 - - 0 
0 1 0 1 - - 0 
1 0 1 1 - - - 
1 0 0 1 nelarabine (1) 0 0 
1 0 0 0 plevitrexed (0) 1 1 
0 0 1 0  - 1 
0 0 0 1 Barasertib (0) 1 1 
0 0 0 0 banoxantrone (0), Prolarix (0), TransMID (0) 1 1 
Table 41 Truth table explaining an unsuccessful outcome, with assumptions made 
about counterfactuals 
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accumulated knowledge base (‘b’) should be associated with an unsuccessful outcome 
(‘y’), as presented in solution 2b138.  
Furthermore, if we exclude the atypical case, CAT3888, which was discontinued due to 
its role as a tool for proof of concept, rather than a drug development endeavour in its 
own right, the resultant complex solution (i.e. with no simplifying assumptions accounting 
for logical remainders). This supports the role of absence of extensive and accumulated 
market demand in explaining failure.  
dse + bds   →    y  (solution 2c) 
8.3 Summary of QCA Findings 
The QCA analysis has shown that in successful projects, organisational environment 
plays a key role and is necessary for the outcome to occur. This corresponds to the 
explanation from the descriptive analysis section which highlights the importance of 
organisational relationships, and the action of key individuals to the promotion of the 
success of a project. The resulting solution (solution 1b) is taken to be explanatory for 
the outcome to occur. Here for ease of interpretation we can factor out the necessary 
role of a supportive organisational environment  
E(B + S)    → Y  (solution 1b) 
In the case of unsuccessful (or in the absence of success) projects a key role is played 
by market potential. In isolation, however, this is not sufficient for a project to be 
discontinued. When a lack of high market demand coexists with unsupportive 
organisational environments, or with limited knowledge and a lack of positive stakeholder 
perspectives, a project is unlikely to succeed. In solution 2b we can factor out the 
necessary role of an absence of market demand, for interpretations sake.  
d(e + bs)    →    y  (solution 2b) 
                                                 
 
138 Incidentally, it is common and, in fact, good practice to refer back to theoretical and empirical 
knowledge when assessing the suitability of different solution options.   
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8.4 QCA Discussion 
The QCA analysis echoed the findings from the descriptive analysis in the finding that a 
supportive organisational environment is often key to driving the success of a project. In 
explaining success, this factor is a necessary inclusion in the pathway to success. This 
finding is interesting because it highlights that a project may succeed regardless of the 
level of expected market demand. For instance, in gemtuzumab and nelarabine, other 
factors such as the role of key individuals, managerial support, fulfilling unmet medical 
need and productive collaborative relationships, overcame the role of market demand. 
This contrasts to the accepted perspective that markets are central issue in accounting 
for whether or not a project is continued.  
The solution outputs to a QCA should be interpreted in configurations, as well as the 
necessary role of single conditions. Here we explore each pathway contributing towards 
each outcome, i.e. BE and SE for success, and de and dbs for failure, and will focus on 
the deviant cases i.e. not BDSE for success (pazopanib, temozolomide, Campath) or 
dbse for failure (banoxantrone, Prolarix, TransMID). 
In success, supportive organisational environments appear to be sufficient when 
combined with other conditions. Firstly, when combined with positive stakeholder 
perspectives, supportive organisational environments account for gemtuzumab. Here 
the path to success involved the action of heavily publicised patient stories, a productive 
collaborative relationship between the organisations and Celltech’s lack of vulnerability 
to the funding environment.  
Alternatively, the conjunction of extensive and accumulated knowledge base with 
supportive organisational environments explains the pathway leading to success in 
nelarabine. Nelarabine was based on an established knowledge trajectory and a 
consistent research team, in addition to being supported by a key individual and aimed 
at an unmet need which helped to counteract proposals to terminate the drug’s 
development by BW, and later, GW. 
In explaining unsuccessful projects, the absence of a high market demand was found to 
be necessary for the outcome, and sufficient when in conjunction with either the absence 
of supportive organisational environments, or the absence of extensive and accumulated 
knowledge base and the absence of positive stakeholder perspectives. Here, although it 
was common to see successful projects developed regardless of market potential (e.g. 
in the cases of gemtuzumab and nelarabine), there are no instances in which an 
unsuccessful outcome shows a high market demand.  
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The path contributing towards an unsuccessful outcome accounts for plevitrexed and 
CAT3888 (de → y) and barasertib (bds → y). For plevitrexed the outcome was 
associated with a lack of potential/expected market demand, organisational 
communication difficulties and a lack of strategic cohesion between project and 
organisation (AZ). In barasertib, the outcome can be explained by insufficient market 
demand, false predictions/uncertainty surrounding the knowledge foundation and lack of 
media/stakeholder coverage.  
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9 Discussion and Conclusions 
9.1 Summary of Findings 
This thesis provides an extensive discussion of the conditions associated with success 
and failure of rare cancer drug development projects. This investigation was motivated 
by the health burden of cancer, and the need for new therapeutics to treat patients. The 
investigation into rare cancers is further justified by the shifts in the approaches to both 
drug discovery and development, particularly in oncology, and the associated changes 
to the strategies and structure of the industry. The drug development project itself is 
taken as the unit of analysis in order to enable a holistic narrative of the factors 
influencing the outcome, regardless of the changes and movement of the project from 
organisation to organisation and through its life cycle. 
The context Chapter (2) presented a review of the empirical history surrounding cancer 
research and the drug development process. The literature discussing the forces of 
biomedical innovation were also reviewed, highlighting the relevance of a multi-
dimensional approach and facilitating the construction of a framework, later used to aid 
data collection and analysis. This chapter also illustrated the significance of the present 
research justifying it in the context of an industry in flux, with the introduction of  
personalised medicine, particularly in the context of oncology therapeutics, and the 
increasing costs and need for efficiencies to be achieved. This changing system warrants 
the reassessment of business models, policies and strategies surrounding the 
development of drugs for the modern age, which in turn require an investigation into the 
key conditions affecting the successful and unsuccessful production of drugs. 
The literature review facilitated an exploration into the effect of conditions on innovation 
in different sized firms, and the associated resource constraints. In addition, the 
importance of the access and integration of knowledge, both within and between firms, 
and dynamics of inter-firm relationships was also emphasised. We discussed the 
importance of key individuals active in promoting projects, and thereby influencing 
innovation and the role of individuals in their surrounding networks. Finally, we 
highlighted the importance of expectations in the development of drugs. Here, it was 
emphasised that innovations are a function of individuals’ actions and the expectations 
they hold. In addition, protected spaces (discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.3), created 
by collective expectations shared by a group can influence the interpretation of results, 
thereby clouding judgement and, in some cases, contributing towards the suspension of 
evaluation criteria (Konrad, 2006).  
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A literature gap was identified, wherein there is a lack of studies of drug innovation 
focusing on the project as the unit of analysis. In addition, the literature tended to focus 
on one or two of the dimensions (individuals, organisations, networks) surrounding drug 
development. In order to fill these gaps this thesis had the objective of addressing the 
question: why do some drug projects succeed in development, while others fail? It was 
appreciated early on that this question was broad ranging and required some 
deconstruction. Therefore, the following questions were posed: what environmental 
(socio-economic) conditions, identified from the innovation literature, influence go/no-go 
decisions in drug development? This objective was fulfilled by the literature review and 
construction of the framework. Further, how do the environmental (socio-economic) 
conditions, identified from the framework, contribute towards the development of rare 
cancer drug projects? This question was answered in the analyses, the findings from 
which are described below. The final question: do these conditions show interactions 
and/or cumulative causality (project drag)? refers to the interactive dynamics of 
conditions influencing drug development. Here we are interested in whether particular 
conditions, or factors contribute terminally to an outcome, or whether they have the 
cumulative effect of causing the project to gradually lose momentum and fail. 
In order to answer these questions, it was realised early on, in line with much of the 
literature in this area, that it was necessary to undertake a case study approach. This 
thesis had the added aim of providing a degree of generalisation facilitated through the 
implementation of a multiple case study method was implemented. This involved 
undertaking a descriptive comparative analysis and a QCA, within the context of theory 
building. QCA has facilitated a systematic, and case-based view of the empirical 
evidence in this thesis appreciating the multiple configurations leading to success and 
failure.  
The selection and investigation of 11 drug project case histories enabled a detailed 
description of the systems surrounding drug development, the forces at work and the 
reasons behind termination or success. The case histories were contextualised in a pilot 
study of path breaking drugs which were well documented and used both to demonstrate 
examples of causal pathways as well as to test the utility of the framework.   
In line with the differences in drug development between large and small firms, identified 
from the literature review, the 11 case histories were grouped accordingly. This division 
highlighted one of the first findings of this thesis. We observe that in projects from big 
pharma, drugs tend to be subject to ‘project drag’. Here, we witness the accumulation of 
issues, observed through evaluation processes, such as market potential (barasertib), 
266 
 
sufficient efficacy (barasertib, plevitrexed), or lack of strategic research direction 
(plevitrexed). Furthermore, in large firms organisational environment is found to be 
relatively supportive, thereby proving an unproblematic condition, this can contrast 
sharply with circumstances in smaller firms139. This is unsurprising due to large firms’ 
broad-ranging capabilities, abundant resources, economies of scale and scope as well 
as experience in accessing and integrating internal and external knowledge, as was 
highlighted in the literature review. Here, we only see one case whereby the 
organisational environment is deemed to be insufficiently supportive in a large firm, 
where the strategic fit of the project, along with other issues, contributed to development 
termination. Contrastingly, small firms tend to be more vulnerable to external forces, 
limiting access to resources, and expertise. 
Drugs developed by small biotech firms were subject to more complex industrial 
dynamics due to their vulnerability to organisational issues, where firms underwent an 
unexpectedly large number of transactions, and the formation of protected spaces. 
However, issues contributing towards project drag, such as delays, efficacy issues, and 
M&A and license change disruptions were also apparent.  
The descriptive analysis allowed us to explore mechanisms implemented to overcome 
issues contributing towards project drag. Key individuals were found to have a role in 
mediating project development through promoting drug progress (Campath, nelarabine, 
and temozolomide). Unmet need (gemtuzumab, temozolomide and nelarabine), novel 
technological approaches (gemtuzumab and Campath) and public/charity support 
(temozolomide) were also found to play a role in motivating drug development within 
firms.  
The QCA sought to confirm and expand on the findings from the descriptive analysis.  
This highlighted that the role of a supportive organisational environment is necessary for 
success, implying that, whenever the outcome is present (success), supportive 
organisational environments are also present. However, this condition is not sufficient 
for success and relies on the presence of either an extensive and applicable knowledge 
base, or positive stakeholder perspectives to contribute towards the successful 
development of a project (solution 1b: E(B+S) → Y).  
                                                 
 
139 This is with the exception of plevitrexed where the cytotoxic action of the drug was not aligned 
with the organisation’s strategy (moving towards targeted therapeutics). 
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Due to the asymmetrical nature of a QCA a separate assessment of the role of the 
explanatory conditions on the absence of the outcome (failure) was undertaken. It was 
found that an absence of market demand was necessary for an unsuccessful outcome. 
However, in order to fully explain failure, pathways involving a conjunction of factors had 
to be explored. Failure is associated with an absence of market demand and either 1) 
the absence of a supportive organisational environment; or 2) the absence of an 
extensive and accumulated knowledge base and a lack of positive stakeholder 
perspectives (solution 2b from Chapter 8: d(e+bs) → y). 
It is most surprising that having an extensive and accumulated knowledge base did not 
independently play an important role explaining either success or failure. The deviant 
cases contradicting the action of this condition are plevitrexed and CAT3888, where a 
knowledge base is detected but this is not met with success, and gemtuzumab, where a 
well-developed knowledge base was absent but the project succeeded. The former 
cases can be explained through the consideration of their role within the portfolio of the 
host firm.  
Firstly, plevitrexed was a follow-on and part of a traditional approach to drug discovery 
and development (cytotoxins), and therefore subject to stringent evaluation due to the 
lack of strategic position in the firm’s pipeline. Secondly, CAT3888, did have an 
accumulated knowledge base but to a large extent the purpose of the project was to 
provide proof of concept, and an understanding of the drug target and interactions, for 
the follow-on. Gemtuzumab benefited from other motivations (e.g. desire for proof of 
concept) and therefore the stakeholders involved in developing the drug mobilised 
resources to overcome issues resulting from lack of knowledge in particular areas (for 
instance, in the development of the mab/toxin linker). 
9.2 Theoretical Contributions 
Primarily, this thesis’ contribution is in answering the empirical research questions. In 
particular, the first and second questions are addressed by the identification of the 
conditions influencing drug innovation for rare cancers. Four conditions (knowledge base, 
market demand, stakeholder perspectives and organisational environment) were 
identified through an in-depth review of the literature, all of which were found to play a 
role in the development of these drugs. We find that safe and effective drugs may not be 
developed despite potentially providing a benefit to patients, indicating that the market 
does not function adequately and that other factors also play a role.  
The third research question explored the utility and relevant of the term ‘project rag’ and 
concluded that drug projects do experience project drag, i.e. the accumulation of issues 
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contributing towards the loss of momentum for the drug. In small firms this interacts with 
the influence of protected spaces (section 3.2.3). Here termination appears to be a result 
of definitive decision making, usually resulting from the impact of external pressures, but 
also the accumulation of project drag that lies latent until the breakdown of collective 
expectations (protected spaces) leading to re-evaluation (for further discussion see 
section 9.2.2). 
9.2.1 Role of Supportive Organisational Environment 
The condition found most consistently to play a role in defining innovation outcomes is 
that of a supportive organisational environment, as evidenced from the descriptive 
analysis and QCA. The identification, from the QCA, of the necessity of the presence of 
this condition for success is important because necessary conditions lend themselves to 
policy interventions (Ragin, 2000). We therefore conclude that all instances of 
successfully developed projects will show the presence of a supportive organisational 
environment. However, we also note that in order to fully confer success, this condition 
needs to appear alongside other conditions (an extensive and accumulated knowledge 
base and/or a positive stakeholder perspective).  
The organisational environment also plays a role in the failure of drug projects. Here, a 
difficult organisational environment is a component of the pathway to failure, in 
combination with the perception of relatively low market potential. By looking at the 
pathways to failure (dbs + de → y), we observe that dbs140, i.e. the absence of: 1) market 
demand, 2) extensive and accumulated knowledge base and 3) positive stakeholder 
support, only uniquely accounts for one case, barasertib. All other failures resonate more 
with de, i.e. the absence of market demand and difficulties in organisational environment, 
as evidenced in the descriptive analysis. This justifies further discussion of these 
conditions. 
Organisational environment can be split into two components, when thinking about the 
mechanisms acting to contribute towards success or failure. Firstly, within small firms, 
issues tend to be associated with resource allocation, mainly in accessing finance for 
small firms (e.g. in TransMID), regulatory expertise (e.g. in Prolarix) or vulnerability to 
takeovers (e.g. in TransMID and banoxantrone). Secondly, interfirm issues can be further 
categorised between those associated with M&A, the revaluation of projects in light of 
                                                 
 
140 QCA expression from solution 2a and 2b (Chapter 8) 
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acquisitions, and the associated lack of objective evaluation in small firms pre-M&A, and 
in the post-M&A integration process in the enlarged firm.  
The small firm dilemma, of diminishing cash resources and difficult financial 
environments, is widely discussed and acknowledged (Martin et al., 2009, Hopkins et al., 
2013). As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, we observed this to be the case for firms since 
the 1990s when high profile failures occurred and VC and stock-market interest in the 
UK biotech sector waned (Hopkins et al., 2013). This has previously been found to effect 
the ability of firms to take projects through to later drug development (ibid). This thesis 
confirms this finding, drawing on evidence from a project level perspective. 
The organisational environment issues surrounding small firms are inherently linked to 
the frequency and impact of M&A. In the impact of M&A and licensing transactions, in 
contributing towards organisational difficulties for small firms, we increasingly witness 
funding as a key contributor (Hopkins et al., 2013). These events can lead to the definitive 
termination of a project supporting the literature observing M&A as a disruptive force for 
the firms involved (Hitt et al., 1991b, Hitt et al., 1991a, Ernst and Vitt, 2000, James, 2002). 
In addition, this stems from the difficulties in transferring knowledge, in particular from 
outside the firm.  
This thesis highlights that projects in small firms are adversely effected by funding issues 
contributing towards increasingly frequent M&A causing disruption and delays. This is a 
key finding for this thesis as it takes the project at the centre of the analysis and provides 
a novel insight into the multiplicity of organisations involved in the life-cycle of a drug. 
Alternatively, where supportive environments stemming from the action of key individuals 
(see section 9.2.3) or, for instance, supportive interfirm collaborative relationships, 
projects are positively impacted and development is facilitated.  
9.2.2 Project Drag and Protected Spaces 
As previously mentioned, by taking a project-level approach, this thesis facilitates a 
relatively unique insight into the dynamics surrounding the progression of drug 
development. The term ‘project drag’ has been introduced in this thesis to describe the 
loss of momentum in drug development, as a result of the accumulation of issues in drug 
development. In some cases, mechanisms are implemented to counteract this process, 
however, it can also lead to project termination. Project drag can accumulate in an 
observed, or latent manner, depending on the action of protected spaces. 
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As opposed to go/no-go decision-making, project drag relates to smaller issues that 
independently would not cause termination of development, but are amplified when 
found in the presence of other negative occurrences.  
We draw on the sociology of expectations literature to explain the role of protected 
spaces, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Protected spaces form when individual expectations 
are shared across groups. Here, collective expectations around a project are embedded, 
contributing towards the implementation of subjective criteria for, or the suspension of, 
evaluation processes (Konrad, 2006).   
Furthermore, protected spaces exist at varying levels within and between different teams 
involved in a drug project. In a larger company, where there are multiple teams working 
on one project, it may be harder to build up protected spaces between these teams. 
Furthermore, in a big pharma environment in which there tend to be less limitations in 
access to the resources, skills, and knowledge required to successfully bring a drug to 
market, dynamics internal to the project act on decision-making and evaluation 
processes. Here it was common to witness the accumulation of issues that negatively 
impact project survival. These include: inadequate level of efficacy, poor strategic fit, low 
market demand and short patent life. We term such accumulation ‘project drag’, where 
negative issues contribute towards a loss of momentum eventually leading to no-go 
decisions. The observation of this phenomenon implies that success in innovation arises 
from the alignment of components and how positive and negative effects interact to 
produce an outcome.   
In small firms protected spaces are more readily built up as teams work more closely 
together and witness the work of others in the process. In this thesis, in these types of 
organisations we also observe the action of project drag, including efficacy questions, 
delays, small markets and the relative success of a follow-on, that accumulate 
throughout project development. However, where project drag in larger firms 
accumulates freely we find that in smaller firms the project is shielded through the 
formation of a protected space.  
Protected spaces, in small firms, are also likely to result from small firms putting “all of 
their eggs in one basket”. Firms may create a protected space around the project due to 
the support previously committed to that project and a lack of alternative options, 
introducing a dependence on that drug. This finding is also linked to the literature relating 
to risk aversion (section 3.2), and the constraints of firm size, resources and capabilities. 
In this, small firms, constrained by limited resources and capabilities, were concluded to 
implement lower thresholds due to the lack of alternative options available to them. In 
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contrast, in larger firms, projects are predicted to be subject to higher thresholds due to 
the availability of a range of opportunities. 
When issues occur within a protected space in small firms, there is a perception that the 
problem can be addressed and overcome, perhaps causing delays but not termination 
(Konrad, 2006). This implies that where project drag occurs in drug development the loss 
of momentum lies latent, unrecognised by those in close proximity to the project. 
However, when the protected space breaks down, for instance, due to M&A, the 
dynamics of project evaluation changes leading to definitive decisions to terminate 
development.  
We find the breakdown of protected spaces leading to the termination of a project clearly 
in the cases of TransMID (upon acquisition by Celtic Pharma) and CAT3888 (upon 
acquisition by AZ). Here, project termination occurs soon after the M&A event where the 
acquiring firm evaluate the project more objectively, or undertake evaluation where it was 
previously suspended. At this time, the latent issues contributing towards loss of project 
momentum are uncovered and acted upon, leading to termination. We also observe the 
potential that the action of the breakdown of protected spaces may be occurring in the 
case in the BTG acquisition of Protherics, for Prolarix, and the merger between 
Transcept and Novacea in the case of banoxantrone.  
Alternatively, in large firms, where we find project drag to be occurring on a continual 
basis, protected spaces may formulate, however, due to the different organisational 
cultures, and lack of pioneering mentality, the issues associated with a drag are noted 
and accumulate throughout development. This is in contrast to small firms where 
problems are perceived as conquerable. 
The dynamics of project drag and protected spaces highlights that drugs tend not to be 
subject to definitive decisions and are more often terminated as a result of a loss of 
momentum. This is interesting because it highlights that reasons for project 
discontinuation are not always definitive, and more accurately a process of combination 
of issues. Furthermore, this counters the perception that some may have, of decision 
making process as clear-cut. In addition, this finding emphasises the importance of using 
a QCA which facilitates an appreciation of the multiplicity of different contributory factors 
leading to the same outcome (equifinality). 
We can further conclude that in the aforementioned context of an industry in a state of 
flux, with one project’s drug development increasingly reliant on a number of different 
organisations, the impact of the loss of momentum, on the transition of a project from 
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organisation to organisation, could become more pronounced at present and in the future. 
Furthermore, where costs are increasing, and efficiencies are necessary, there is a need 
to address the accumulation of perhaps unnecessary project drag caused by inter-
organisational movement of projects.  
9.2.3 Knowledge Dynamics 
One unexpected finding of this thesis is the role of the drug’s knowledge base. This is 
interesting in the context of the shifts described in Chapter 2, where an increasing role 
of drug-disease-target understanding was emphasised. However, we appreciate that 
firms are constrained in the accumulation of knowledge and how they use it. On the one 
hand, surrounding drug projects with an enthusiastic team helps compensate for a lack 
of knowledge, helping to mobilise the exploration of research streams to fill gaps 
(gemtuzumab, Campath). On the other hand, knowledge is shown to accumulate in the 
development of a pilot drug that can be applied to the development of a follow-on, in a 
lengthy and expensive process of exploring proof-of-concept (CAT3888).  
Furthermore, the difficulty in measuring early stage accumulation of knowledge around 
a project may also explain the insignificance this condition has in this thesis. Here, it may 
be the case that in all projects investigated, there is sufficient knowledge to take a project 
through to development and therefore the knowledge base does not play a role in 
differentiating success from failure at later stages. This needs to be taken into account 
when generalising from these findings, as investigating the conditions leading to success 
of projects in earlier phases may indicate the knowledge base to be important. 
The findings from this analysis showed that enthusiasm for novelty did help successful 
projects utilising new therapeutic approaches. However, this was not found to be a 
necessary or sufficient condition, as it was also witnessed in unsuccessful projects.  
Technologies, and, in this study, projects, can be supported through the excitement and 
desire for new scientific and technological knowledge, operational principles and proof 
of concept, through the action of project advocates, as explained above. This confirms 
the relevance and important of insights from the sociology of expectations literature and, 
in particular, studies exploring new technological approaches, where advocates mobilise 
the sharing of visions to form collective spaces between individuals.  
The consistency of the research group over time, the cultural practices within an 
organisation and the complexities in transactions involving the projects, were also found 
to play a role. This can again be related to the collective expectations surrounding 
projects and the associated facilitation of knowledge transfer mechanisms. In the former, 
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research groups working together would be more likely to share visions around a project 
that would become engrained in working environments and relationships. Furthermore, 
where individuals work together more readily, the transferral of tacit knowledge will be 
facilitated by the development of trust, social capital and the associated ease of 
communication and coordination. 
This formation of shared expectations is also clearly linked to the aforementioned 
concept of protected spaces which form around a drug project in the case where groups 
work closely together and collectively drive towards a successful outcome for the drug. 
As was the case for protected spaces, knowledge accumulation is more easily facilitated 
on a within-team, rather than between-team, basis and therefore, where teams are based 
on disciplinary silos, it is less likely that the knowledge accumulation and formation of 
protected spaces will continue through the drug’s life cycle and as it progresses from 
team to team and organisation to organisation.  
The accumulation of knowledge through mechanisms of cooperation, communication 
and coordination show further salience when we consider the multidisciplinary nature of 
the knowledge utilised in drug discovery and development processes. This 
multidisciplinary stems from the shift in approach from trial and error, towards one that 
uses more structure-, or target-based knowledge, as described in Chapter 2. In other 
words, the accumulation of knowledge surrounding a drug, its target, and disease 
pathway requires people with unique expertise to come together to transfer and 
exchange ideas. 
9.2.4 Project advocates 
Another key factor drawn out in the descriptive analysis was the role and characteristics 
of effective project advocates who provided the capabilities to overcome critically 
detrimental events, such as Elion in nelarabine and Waldmann in Campath.  
In Chapter 3 we conceptualised a ‘project advocate’ as a person who has the skills, 
expertise and characteristics sufficient to contribute towards differentiating success and 
failure. For instance, the ability to mobilise resources, both from within the organisation 
and from surrounding networks. Individuals are likely to become project advocates 
through a history of involvement and a vested interest in seeing the drug project from 
conception through to successful launch.  
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In this dynamic we witness certain types of project advocates to be noteworthy in their 
action and characteristics. Most commonly these people promote the innovation by 
utilising their wide-ranging networks and consistent enthusiasm for the project to 
overcome hurdles in development. Project advocates align resources and skills to 
counteract the loss of momentum associated with project drag, and issues that would 
otherwise lead to definitive failure, for instance, following license discontinuation in the 
case of Campath. In particular, where project drag is compounded by the movement of 
drugs between organisations, the presence of a project advocate who has the sufficient 
capabilities to overcome the detrimental impact of these changes, retaining momentum 
in the drug’s development, allows success to be achieved.  
Where markets are small, the action of key individuals, managerial support and 
cooperation act to provide an alternative avenue to motivate resource allocation. For 
instance, this occurs in the success of nelarabine and gemtuzumab, in the absence of a 
large expected market demand. In addition, where a project is used for proof of concept, 
as was seen in gemtuzumab and CAT3888, a smaller market may be accepted given 
the potential that future projects may have broader applicability. In CAT3888 the 
knowledge accumulated through the project enabled the development of a follow-on 
candidate which displaced the drug’s development upon AZ’s acquisition of CAT. 
The role and characteristics of the key individuals identified in this thesis can be related 
back to the literature explored in Chapter 3. Here Rothwell and colleagues (Rothwell et 
al., 1974, Rothwell, 1992) emphasise the power, age, seniority and experience of 
individuals in influencing the impact they have on innovation. In addition, under Tidd and 
Bessant’s (Tidd and Bessant, 2013) characterisation the key individuals in nelarabine 
and Campath fulfil two or more of the roles described: for instance, functioning as an 
inventor (with knowledge breadth, and the ability to provide inspiration, motivation and 
commitment), with proximity to the organisational sponsor (with power, influence and the 
ability to pull strings), and technological gatekeeper (who is responsible for collecting 
and distributing information). 
The contribution of key individuals is important because it highlights the interpersonal 
nature of drug development. Here, we perceive there to be integral role for individuals 
who can promote a drug and thereby facilitate the translation and transferral of 
knowledge from one firm to another, upon licensing agreements or M&A events. 
Individuals who have the capacity to use their networks, accessing resources and 
aligning expectations surrounding a project, are important to drug innovation. This 
mechanism is predicted to be important, particularly in a context in which the industry is 
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attempting to overcome productivity issues through consolidation and external access to 
knowledge and projects.  
9.3 Policy Recommendations 
The conclusions from this thesis lend themselves to recommendations that can be 
implemented to work towards resolution of the unnecessary discontinuation of projects 
with the potential to change patients’ lives.  
The key recommendations of this thesis are most relevant to managers of organisations 
and other industry stakeholders. The recommendations are based on the general 
assumption that, as the pharmaceutical and biotech industry continues to change and 
shifting dynamics continue to occur, the issues identified in this thesis, particularly around 
organisational environments, the breakdown of protected spaces and project drag, 
become more salient. We see an increase in the numbers of inter-organisational 
movements occurring during a project life-cycle, increasing costs and additional 
complexity stemming from the shift towards personalisation and the need for involvement 
from multiple disciplines, teams and organisations, around an individual project.  
This thesis has found that protected spaces are generated from the formation of 
collective expectations shared by those involved in drug development which lead to a 
shared goal. In some instances, this has been found to have the potential to overcome 
the accumulation of issues which could otherwise cause doubts over development and 
lead to termination of the project, so-called project drag. Where we observe that more 
disciplinary teams and organisations are involved in the development of a drug project, 
and M&A becomes a critical part of organisational strategy, there is an increasing need 
to acknowledge the potential for project drag to occur and to maintain protected spaces 
where the project is strategically important.   
Where protected spaces are broken in M&A and therefore do not pass to new 
organisations or teams, project drag becomes pronounced and can be problematic to 
the outcome of the drug. M&A, licensing and collaborative agreements should consider 
the importance of interaction between old and new teams to facilitate the transferral of 
tacit knowledge and shared expectations surrounding a project. Organisational 
negotiations around a drug project depend on the shared goals and therefore spending 
time sharing and setting these out is important. In these types of agreements, which are 
becoming an increasingly integral part of a project lifecycle, it is necessary for there to 
be extensive contact between teams, while also accounting for the multitude of teams 
involved, ranging from scientific to marketing and sales, regulatory and managerial.  
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The findings from this thesis also support the argument that development teams should, 
where possible, be retained post-M&A, in order to maintain momentum around projects. 
Furthermore, if the project is strategically important then the acquiring organisation 
should focus on understanding the project teams involved and maintaining the protected 
spaces around them and avoid introducing and imposing new ways of working 
unnecessarily.  
If a collaborative strategy involving partners is required, it should be considered that 
these multidisciplinary teams should be given the opportunity to develop a deep mutual 
understanding of the project, with a holistic and shared view of its development, in order 
to ensure their findings can be taken into and maintained within the protected space.  
Where small companies have strategic objectives that involve eventual M&A, this should 
be considered on the project level in order to account for project drag and the potential 
breakdown of protected spaces. These would involve accounting for expectations of 
acquiring companies where data should be recorded as well as efforts made to retain 
and transfer tacit knowledge. This may require early and prolonged interaction with the 
acquiring company, something that may be difficult, where small companies are often 
forced into M&A.  
Furthermore, where personalised medicine may require an increasing role for small firms 
in discovering new and innovative projects, it is necessary for these firms to have the 
support to remain independent and calls into question the ability and suitability of small 
firms to be involved in development stages of the lifecycle of a project.  
The findings of this thesis surrounding the role of the organisational environment feed 
into the discussion of whether small firms are capable of carrying out late stage 
development. This finding supports conclusions from previous studies which also 
highlighted issues for small firms in accessing sufficient funds for this expensive late 
stage of drug development (Hopkins et al., 2013). Here, the small firms that provide an 
important source of new projects for the industry, cannot satisfy their essential role 
unless they are sufficiently capitalised, in order to help provide a shield to industrial 
dynamics.  
 
Small firms need to access funds but also not raise capital at a valuation of detriment to 
their shareholders. One problem is the difficulty in valuing and promoting the worth of 
early stage products. This could be facilitated by the second policy recommendation of 
this thesis, namely in the alignment of the needs of patients with projects early in 
development.  
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The ability for firms (big and small) to formulate markets and package products to be 
attractive and accessible to potential patients and partners, facilitates the coordination 
and cooperation necessary for product development.  
One way of early acknowledgement of the potential market of a project highlights a role 
for patient groups. Patient groups, in rare disease communities, commonly bring together 
patients and drug development R&D. Despite being expected to appear in this thesis (in 
rare cancers) the involvement of patient groups was not found to be significant. This may 
be a function of the midline rarity of the ‘rare’ cancers, whereby the diseases may be 
more associated with cancer, which are commonly well-researched, than rare diseases. 
However, lessons can still be learned from rare cancers that might be applied on the 
advent of the molecularisation of oncology in therapeutics, and in personalised medicine.  
In rare diseases, patient groups play and important role by articulating their demand for 
treatment options (Boon et al., 2008, Moors et al., 2008, Boon et al., 2011). This 
connection, between users and producers, may also be beneficial for firms to gain 
access to, and support from, the patients who comprise the market they aim for. However, 
where patient groups often rely on the lumping of diseases together into categories, the 
molecular understanding of cancer and the increasing interest in personalised medicine 
may act in the opposite direction, splitting diseases and therefore making the sharing of 
visions and expectations harder. 
This thesis indicates that there should be an increase in communication between patients, 
and organisations involved in the drug innovation process should, however, also be 
considered in the context of the ‘patient revolt’ as described by Vasella and Slater in the 
narrative around Gleevec (imatinib) (Vasella and Slater, 2003). In this case the firm may 
be hesitant due to issues surrounding manufacturing scale up and the action of patients 
lobbying for the drug. Therefore, caution should be implemented in involving patients in 
the drug development process.  
Firms should be more involved in accessing and formulating their markets during early 
phases of drug development is contentious whereby population increases have been 
exploited through consumerism, promotion and ‘pharmaceuticalization’ 141  (Abraham, 
2010). However, here there is a positive perspective where we consider the potential 
that even in the context of low potential market demand, the ability to link drug 
                                                 
 
141  ‘Pharmaceuticalization is a term developed by Abraham and colleagues to describe the 
influence of the pharmaceutical industry on politics, markets and society, in general.  
278 
 
development with patients at earlier stages could be mutually beneficial to both firms and 
patients142. 
The existence of project drag and protected spaces implies a need for more 
understanding, cross organisationally, between small firms and large firms as to the way 
in which projects should/can be assessed and understood. We acknowledge that large 
firms tend to be the market for small firms, therefore projects initiated in biotech need to 
be more geared to the evaluation criteria imposed upon them by pharma. However, there 
is a danger of the occurrence of collective denial, wherein small firms would benefit from 
opening themselves and projects up for criticism to avoid group-think.  
In addition, big pharma could learn to be more sympathetic to the needs of patients and 
smaller firms, where projects suffer from project drag and vulnerabilities to industrial 
dynamics. Due to the different specialisations and expertise of big and small firms, it may 
be the case the projects from pharma may benefit from being licensed to smaller firms 
for development, as opposed to termination. This was demonstrated in the SUGEN-AZ 
agreement where the smaller company had the opportunity to take on development of 
the projects, should AZ terminate their development for economic reasons. This 
appreciation for the distinction in the thresholds imposed by different sized firms and the 
necessity for the processes to be aligned is important and could contribute towards the 
development of more drugs for patients.  
9.4 Methodological Contributions 
Another contribution of this thesis is methodological. This is in the framework and its 
operationalisation, and the combination of multiple case study research with a QCA, with 
a theory-building objective. Despite the existence of the four conditions in other studies, 
such as Moors and Faber (2007), the way in which these have been operationalised and 
data gathered, largely from publicly available sources for this thesis is unique. This is 
due to the in depth and systematic range of data the present case studies draw on. This 
allows for a level of cross-case comparison that would not be possible in a scenario 
where data are taken from personal accounts only.  
                                                 
 
142 Pricing is a complex and evolving issue, subject to a variety of dynamics applied to different 
contexts. There is not space to discuss these issues in this thesis, which, furthermore, rely on 
marketing and adoption strategies, going beyond the issues associated with development. In 
addition, as demonstrated in footnote 87, pricing is subject to high levels of uncertainty, and is 
unpredictable, even by the firms responsible for drug commercialisation.  
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In addition, the multi-dimensional approach undertaken, with the project at the centre of 
the analysis, has proved to be valuable in appreciating the extent to which projects can 
frequently move from organisation to organisation. This has allowed for an appreciation 
of standalone projects without limiting the analysis within the organisational boundary, 
thereby allowing a picture to be built up of the development of the drug from start to finish.  
The methodological approach employed here has also facilitated a well-rounded 
discussion of success and failure, whereas in prior research the focus has tended to be 
on one or the other. The QCA allowed us to analyse these scenarios separately and in 
comparison, facilitating a more realistic picture of an outcome, whereby the absence of 
an outcome is not necessarily conducive to the opposite causal pathway explaining the 
presence.  
9.5 Limitations 
Despite the interesting insights garnered from this thesis it is also important to consider 
these in the context of certain limitations. For instance, the conclusions presented here 
can be critiqued due to the potential for endogeneity between conditions. Here, in 
particular, there is a possibility of reverse causality between the outcome and supportive 
organisational environment, whereby the failure in the project may lead to the breakdown 
in the environment surrounding that environment, rather than the causal direction 
outlined previously. Here it is logical that the issues with the organisational environment 
observed in this thesis, e.g. funding, delays in development and M&A, may be seen to 
stem from the lack of potential of a project to succeed. However, this is interesting to 
consider as it is the perception of these factors that is ultimately at issue, bringing the 
discussion back to issues of evaluation criterion, expectations and protected spaces in 
firms and the role of individuals in contributing towards these. 
Another limitation stems from the amount of data that it has been possible to collect while 
compiling 11 cases. In order to establish a breadth of data for a range of cases, by 
necessity the depth of the case histories presented in this thesis has been reduced. This 
was in part overcome by the involvement of interviewees in previewing the case histories. 
Here, interviewees had the opportunity to read the case studies generated from publicly 
available data, prior to the interview. In addition, interviewees were sent the relevant 
case history when it had been completed, in order to verify the information presented. 
While only five interviewees replied giving approval, in general there was an agreement 
of the quality of the case studies whereby only small clarifications were volunteered in 
some instances. The main purpose of this was to ensure that the representation of the 
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case history was in line with their recollection. However, it is always possible, in any 
research, that there is important information that has not been considered.  
In addition, this thesis has not explored the dynamics of post-approval marketing and 
commercialisation efforts, and in most instances there has not been space to establish 
or comment on what happened to the projects in the adoption phases. For this reason, 
the definition of success is imperfect as commonly drugs cannot be observed as being 
successful until they have reached the patients’ bedsides. However, for the purposes of 
this thesis, where the aim was to understand more about the events leading up to 
approval, the definition of success used was sufficient.  
9.6 Further Research  
The final limitation of this thesis is its focus on rare cancers. This also provides an avenue 
for further research. Here we admit that the insights concluded from the case histories 
and analysis can only be applied more broadly with caution, both in rare diseases and 
drug development more generally. With consideration of this further research 
investigating the dynamics of other rare diseases would also be warranted. Furthermore, 
in time, when drugs developed for personalised medicine are more widespread it would 
be interesting to assess whether they suffer from the same issues, and development 
pathways to those that have been identified here.  
In addition, where new policies have been introduced to attempt to overcome the market 
failure in the area of neglected diseases, the application of the methodology and 
framework highlighted in this thesis may provide a productive avenue for investigating 
the dynamics in this area. The prediction would be that, due to the lack of interest in this 
area finding sufficiently comparable cases would be problematic, however, in time this 
might be overcome. There may be an impact, for instance, in the case of neglected 
diseases, on the dynamics of protected spaces and project drag. Here policies such as 
advanced market commitments, which have been suggested to motivate the 
development drugs with the incentive of a predetermined guaranteed market, may 
enhance the protected space surrounding the development of a drug through the sharing 
of a vision contributing towards the suspension of evaluation criteria.  
9.7 Summary and Key Conclusions 
In summary, this thesis has contributed empirically, methodologically and theoretically, 
as well as suggesting policy resolutions, and advancing our understanding of the drug 
development process. Empirically, we have mapped out the environment surrounding 
drug innovation in rare cancers highlighting the frequent movement of projects between 
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organisations and the multiplicity of the actors involved. This finding was facilitated by 
the implementation of a novel method that furthered the discussion of drug innovation, 
in providing a comparative analysis of a medium N set of case studies.  
Theoretically, this thesis has highlighted a causal complexity that exists in the 
development of drugs, whereby successful drugs are the product of a process involving 
the alignment of components that contribute in differing ways, dependent on context. We 
have found that it is difficult and expensive to produce drugs but that with perseverance 
and the right external and internal environmental selection pressures, projects can 
succeed despite project drag and adverse events. However, for projects originating in 
small firms, where there is a vulnerability in accessing resources, success is dependent 
on the sufficient survival of the organisation and the impact of the environment 
surrounding the firm.  
We recommend policies and considerations to address these issues. Firstly, in improving 
the environment for small firms to enable the support of projects, and the alignment 
between large firms and small firms, who are mutually dependent. We observe that there 
may be benefits to the action of market access and creation early on in drug development, 
both for patients who gain access to important therapeutics, and to the firms developing 
them. This is anticipated to be more challenging given the shift towards personalised 
medicine and the associated splitting of disease areas.  
It is anticipated that this thesis provides a starting point for the systematic, comparative 
and cumulative assessment of the successful development of drugs. Future work, 
involving investigations into alternative disease classes may emphasise different causal 
pathways, however, this thesis provides a foundation for these assessments. This 
addresses a dearth in the current literature whereby small N or single case study 
research is seen alongside large studies showing broad trends. By providing an avenue 
by which research can fulfil a middle ground, this thesis aims to provide a shift from 
anecdotal evidence to conclusions based on comparative analysis unpicking the internal 
structure of causality. 
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Appendix 1 
Interviewee A = John Tite   
Former Department Head, Therapeutics Section, Wellcome Foundation (1990-1995) 
 
Interviewee B = Doug Onsi  
 Former Chief Operating Officer, LeukoSite 
 
Interviewee C = Dr Chris Mirabelli  
 Former Chief Executive Officer, LeukoSite 
 
Interviewee D = Dr Richard Youle 
 Senior Investigator, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke 
 
Interviewee E = Anonymous 
 
Interviewee F = Professor Stephen Taylor  
 Formerly at Faculty of Life Science University of Manchester 
 
Interviewee G = Dr Patrick Round 
 Formerly Senior Vice President at Cambridge Antibody Technology 
 
Interviewee H = Professor Laurence Patterson  
 Formerly at De Montfort University and School of Pharmacy, London 
 
Interviewee I = Dr Geoff Yarranton  
 Formerly Director of Research, Celltech 
 
Interviewee J = Professor Ian Judson  
 The Institute of Cancer Research, Royal Marsden, Sutton 
 
Interviewee K = Anonymous 
 
Interviewee L = Udai Banerji 
 The Institute of Cancer Research, Royal Marsden, Sutton 
 
Interviewee M = Anonymous 
 
Email correspondence X = Dr Russell Hagan 
 Head of R&D at British Technology Group 
 
Email correspondence Y = Anonymous 
 
Email correspondence W = Dr Joanne Kurtzberg  
 Department of Pediatrics, Duke University 
 
Email correspondence V = Professor Malcolm Stevens 
 Formerly at Aston University  
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Appendix 2 
Interview Questions 
These questions were used by the interviewer but generally not presented to the 
interviewee unless requested. 
- What was your role at [firm name]? How did you first become involved in the 
project and what was your continued involvement in the project? 
- Can you say something about the initial scientific research that contributed 
towards the origins of the project? 
- Was it discovered in-house or licensed in? 
o Involvement of original investigators? 
- What was the target market for the drug project initially? Did it change, and if 
so, why? 
- What role did this demand play in discussions around the project? For instance 
was it always the intention to develop the project for multiple indications? Or 
was there a reliance on high prices or the incentives gained form orphan drug 
designation 
- Can you tell me a bit about the science behind the project?  
o e.g. novelty? Controversy? Still in development? 
- Did patient groups or charities play a role in the development of the project? 
o What role did this demand play in discussions around the project? For 
instance was it always the intention to develop the project for multiple 
indications? Or was there a reliance on high prices or the incentives 
gained form orphan drug designation 
- To what extent was the project part of a wider firm strategy?  
o – in rare diseases, - in cancer, - in personalised medicine? 
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Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Why do some drug projects succeed in development and others fail? A study to 
understand the conditions for which drugs for rare cancers are developed 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet provided for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, without my legal right being affected.  
3. I understand that the digital recording of the interview is voluntary and that I am 
free to decide whether to allow it.  
4. I understand that my response to the interview question will be used for 
research purposes and for this particular research project specifically.  
5. I understand that the association of my interview responses with the 
organisation I was working with at the time of interest is voluntary and that I am 
free to decide whether to allow for this association.  
6. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
……………………..……………..                           ………......……….                              ……………………………..……  
Name of participant   Date    Signature 
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Participant Information Sheet  
Why do some drug projects succeed in development and others fail? A study to 
understand the conditions for which drugs for rare cancers are developed 
I would like to invite you to take part in a doctoral research study. Before you decide whether to 
take part I would like to give you the opportunity to understand why the research is being done 
and what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully, 
with thanks in advance.  
This research project is part of my PhD research into drug innovation for rare cancers. The 
research project aims to inform both policy and industry by identifying the socio-technical 
conditions that lead to successful drug innovation, particularly in drugs for cancers that affect 
small populations (‘rare cancers’). If you are interested in receiving the results of this research 
please let me know and I can send you a copy.  
The research will be implemented by collecting data on case histories, where a case is defined 
as a drug project developed for a rare cancer (whether successfully approved and launched, or 
discontinued in development). Areas for data collection are 1) market demand, 2) knowledge base, 
3) stakeholder perception, and 4) firm synergies. A large majority of the relevant data has been 
gathered using desk-based research techniques, by accessing publicly available databases. The 
specific types of data already collected include: whether the drug had orphan status, which 
indications were being explored and how common those indications are, any mention of 
expectations of market potential in industry press releases/newspaper articles, publication 
analyses of the primary indication and target, the number of relevant patient groups (for the 
primary indication), the expectations of the drug as presented in newspaper articles, and the 
nature of the firm involved in development (e.g. size, previous experience and M&A activity). It is 
felt, however, that discussing the process of drug development with those involved will add an 
extra dimension to the research.  
The interviews that will be carried out involve contacting various stakeholders involved in the drug 
discovery and development process, to fill in the gaps in the story on an ad hoc basis and to add 
depth to the analysis. In addition, I am also interested in more general discussions surrounding 
the decision making processes and risk-management strategies within both public and private 
organisations.  
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Participation in the interview is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. I will 
ask you to sign a consent form to show you have agreed to take part.  
Interviews may be recorded using a digital voice recorder, however please let me know if you are 
not comfortable with this. For contextual reasons it may useful for me to be able to associate your 
answers with the organisation with which you were associated during the drug project discovery 
or development, however if it is your expressed wish for this not to be the case please let me 
know. Otherwise, all interviews will be anonymised.  
This research has been periodically reviewed by my doctoral supervisors (Michael Hopkins and 
Paul Nightingale), and the research committee of my academic department at the University of 
Sussex. Furthermore, the research has received approval from the University’s ethical review 
process.  
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